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This thesis  is  a commentary on  G.'  s  extant works  and  fragments 
which consists in three main parts:  an Introduction, the Greek text, 
and notes on the text and fragments.  a)  The Introduction offers an 
account of G. 's life which is  based on the infonnation provided by 
ancient authors, a discussion of the stylistic features of his prose -
along  with  a presentation of the  criticism of his  style by ancient 
authorities  - and  an  analysis  of  the  recurring  argumentative 
schemata that underlie  G.'s extant work.  b)  The Greek text,  as  it 
stands,  embodies the readings that I adopt.  c)  The commentary on 
the  extant  texts  and  fragments  is  nonnally  preceded  by  short 
Introductions,  which  are  pertinent  to  the  main  problems  of 
interpretation posed by the individual texts.  The notes  themselves 
nonnally include: i)  a presentation of the textual problems and the 
possible solutions which have been proposed by previous scholars, 
together with the arguments that support the readings adopted in the 
text,  ii)  explanation of the text and its  stylistic  characteristics, iii) 
discussion  of the  individual  arguments,  and  their  role  in  the 
reasoning as  a whole, and iv)  where appropriate an analysis of the 
philosophical issues raised by the texts themselves. 
2 PREFACE 
This is  the first commentary on Gorgias' work in English, and the 
first  detailed one in any language;  more importantly perhaps  this 
thesis  deals  independently with an author who  is  most frequently 
referred to  in footnotes. I think that I am justified in believing that 
this neglect does not accurately represent the gravity of G. 's work, 
and  the  scholarly work that has  been  done  in  the  last  few  years 
makes me feel less lonely. 
The emphasis in this thesis is mainly placed on the interpretation 
of  G.'  s own preserved speeches, and this explains the order in which 
I have presented the texts. It was for this reason also that I did not 
see fit to comment on the text of  Sextus' summary ofG.'s work On 
not Being; yet, it would have been impossible to avoid textual notes 
on  the  De Melissa  Xenophane  Gorgia,  because  the  readings  one 
adopts there affect one's own interpretation. Writing a commentary 
requires a certain economy of  expression; several points could have 
been discussed in more detail, but my aim has been to  present the 
whole of G.'s work. It was also for the sake of economy that I did 
not include the Testimonia (section A in Diels-Kranz);  1 it was upon 
those, however, that I based my Introduction. In complying with the 
instructions, the Bibliography includes only the titles of books and 
articles  that  I  refer  to  in  my  thesis,  and  consequently  I  only 
reluctantly  dropped  works  that  contributed  decisively  to  my 
understanding of  G. 
Commenting on G.  is  not the same as  commenting on a single 
work of an individual orator which purports to be cohesive in itself; 
like  the  Sophists'  intellectual  activity  in  general,  G.'s  individual 
works touch on a great range of themes. Numerous scholars make 
G.'s works appear coherent by systematising the available material 
and thus detecting in them theories or doctrines that recur in various 
forms.  I  frequently  challenge  this  view,  mainly  on  the  basis  of 
1 The numbering of  the Testimonia in my text follows Buchheim's edition. 
3 evidence provided by the texts themselves. I hope that my difficulty 
in  detecting  theories  in  G.'  s  work  will  not  be  construed  as  a 
difficulty  in  appreciating  his  pioneering  contribution  to  the 
development of  rhetoric and the examination of  logos, the two fields 
in which his influence was particularly felt. 
I am indebted to many people. The first to initiate me into G. was 
Mairi  Y  ossi;  it was  in her undergraduate seminar on "Prepaltonic 
and Platonic Poetics" that I first became acquainted with G. Mairi's 
logos  echoed  ever since  in my  ears,  and  when I  completed  the 
writing of my thesis she generously commented on my text in the 
penetrating way that she  always  does.  I  am very indebted to  my 
parents;  they have been encouraging for years  all my educational 
undertakings. I am grateful to Georgia Petridou for all her patience, 
and  for  lifting  my  spirits  when  I  reached  the  point  of posing 
metaphysical questions pertinent to the relation between classics and 
'real life'. She could not have been more caring. She was also kind 
enough to  read my work and discuss with me aspects of it which 
were closer to  her interests. lowe much to  Thomas McGrory; he 
read carefully my typescript and corrected my English. As if this 
were not enough, he was certainly the person who made me feel that 
Glasgow  was  my  second  home.  Special  thanks  lowe to  Prof. 
Garvie. In the first year of my studies in Glasgow he gave me the 
opportunity to  attend his postgraduate seminars on Greek tragedy; 
especially  his  teaching  of the  Persae  made  G.'  s  contention  €1T' 
d/../..OTpiwll  TE  1TpaYILaTWIl  Kat.  a-WILaTWIl  EV'TUXLaLS"  Kat.  OV(J"1Tpayc.aLS" 
tOLOll  n  1TCi8TfILa  OLd.  TWll  /"0YWll  bra8ev  '"  ljmxfJ  more tangible.  I 
also have to thank him for reading my essay on the relation between 
G.  and Euripides' Troades. Dr Costas Panayotakis has always been 
ready  to  offer  good  advice.  I  am  also  grateful  to  :Mr  Graham 
Whitaker,  the  classics librarian;  Glasgow University Library is  an 
ideal  place to  do  work in Classics.  Many thanks  to  :Mrs  Jennifer 
Murray;  she  is  a  genuinely  kind  person.  I  now  feel  the  need  to 
express my warmest thanks to my examiners, Dr S. Usher and Dr. 
D.  L.  Cairns:  they saved me  from  serious  mistakes  and in many 
4 cases they offered alternative interpretations which now seem to me 
more plausible than the ones that I had originally put forward. 
My  deepest  gratitude  lowe  to  my  supervisor,  Professor 
MacDowell. Without his support this thesis would have been a 'not-
being'. I may be the least appropriate person to praise his erudition 
and  his  expertise  in  the  fields  of Greek  oratory,  comedy,  and 
Athenian law. However, I feel confident in saying that his scholarly 
excellence is in harmony with a deeply 3~3ao"KaI\LKTJ nature. 
5 ABBREVIATIONS 
Ancient authors 
Aiskh.  = Aiskhylos 
Aiskhin: =  Aiskhines 
And.  = Andokides 
Arist.  = Aristotle 
Ar.  = Aristophanes 
Dem.  = Demosthenes 
Eur.  = Euripides 
Hdt.  = Herodotos 
Hom.  = Homer 
Is.  = Isaios 
Isok.  =  Isokrates 
Lys.  = Lysias 
PI.  =  Plato 
Plout.  = Ploutarkhos 
Soph.  = Sophokles 
Theophr. = Theophrastos 
Thuc.  = Thucydides 
Xen.  =  Xenophon 
Frequently abbreviated words and titles 
DK  =  H. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6
th edn., rev. 
and ed. W. Kranz, vols. 1-3, Berlin, 1951-2. 
fro  = G. 's Texts and Fragments (section BinD  K) 
G.  = Gorgias 
Hef.  = G.'s Encomium of  Helen 
Loeb  =  Loeb Classical Library 
LSJ  =  A Greek- English Lexicon, H. G. Liddell-R. Scott, 9
th ed. 
Rev. H. S. Jones, R. McKenzie, Oxford, 1940. 
MXG  =  [Aristotle] De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia. 
ON  B  =  G.'s On not Being (as represented either in the MXG  or 
in  Sextus) 
Pal.  = G.'s The Defence ofPalamedes 
6 Test.  =  Testimonia (section A in DK; in the present thesis I 
employ Buchheim's edition) 
Abbreviations of  the titles of  periodicals in the Bibliography are 
nonnally as per L ' Annee Philologique. 
7 INTRODUCTION 
8 I.  Gorgias'Life 
G.  was  the son of Charmantides of whom nothing is  known;  his 
brother was  the  physician Herodikos.
1  G.'  s  sister was  married to 
Deicrates,  and she gave birth to  a certain Hippokrates, whose son 
Eumolpos dedicated a statue of G.  at Olympia.
2 Ploutarkhos (iT.8a) 
says  that  when  G.  delivered  his  Olympic  Oration,  a  certain 
Melanthios complained that G. advised the Greeks to unite, when he 
was himself unable to secure unity in his own house, because he had 
fallen in love with his female servant and this caused the jealousy of 
his wife; but Isokrates belies this information (Test.I8), and there is 
every reason to  believe him, not the anecdotal testimony given by 
Ploutarkhos.  G.'s life lasted for more than 105  years,  and thus he 
had a personal experience of the fascinating events that took place 
during the fifth, and the beginning of the fourth centuries: though at 
a very young age, it is possible that he had firsthand knowledge of 
events that took place during the Persian wars,  and he was an old 
I For Herodikos see PI. Grg.  448b (=Test.2a); at 456bff. Plato puts in G.'s mouth 
a comparison of rhetoric with medicine,  which shows that the former is  by all 
means superior to the latter and to any other existing art (-rEXV77).  G. there says that 
the physician, ifhe is to be compared with a rhetor, "would be left at the post" (as 
Dodds  translates  otlOUf.Lou  av  c/>avfjvuL  -rov  lu-rpov,  p.2l1),  which is  certainly a 
reductive colloquialism. But there is  no way of confIrming that the historical G. 
considered  the  'art'  of his  brother inferior to  his  own one,  although  we  may 
speculate that this was so. Yet, it is certainly possible that Plato exploits and gives 
a new meaning to  the comparison of  rhetoric with medicine which was probably 
inaugurated by G. himself (see Hel.  14). From Aristotle (Rhet.1400b19) we learn 
that  Herodikos  attempted  a  word-play  with  the  names  of Thrasymakhos  and 
Palos.  We  should also say that Herodikos, G.'s brother, should be distinguished 
(see  Olympiodoros  on 448b)  from 'HpOO\'KOS  b  2:llAlJ\L~P\.uvos,  -ro  OE  apxa'iov 
Meyapeu, (PI. Prot.316el), of whom we learn from Suida s.  v:I'!M1"oKpa.TI]S  that he 
was, along with G., a teacher of  Hippokrates. 
2 We possess this information thanks to the fact that the base of the statue with the 
inscription (Test.8) was discovered in 1876, by German archaeologists very close 
to  the temple of Zeus at Olympia,  and it dates  from the  flrst  half of the fourth 
century. 
9 man at the outbreak of  the Peloponnesian War; he contributed to and 
witnessed the evolution of Greek science; he was still active in his 
eighties 
1  when Solcrates (399) defended himself, and he was in his 
early  sixties  when Plato,  the  person who  later  wrote  a  dialogue 
under  his  name,  was  born;  if we  accept  Athenaios'  otherwise 
anecdotal testimony (see Deipn. xi 505d-e=Test.15a) he also read it 
and refuted its accuracy, as far as his own theses were concerned. In 
the field in which his influence was particularly felt,  he had plenty 
of time  to  identify the features  of his  own prose in the  works  of 
Antiphon, Andokides, Isolcrates, and to read some of the narratives 
of Lysias,  for which the latter was so  much admired by critics  in 
antiquity. 
Although there is no reason to doubt that G.' s life spanned more 
than a century/ the exact dates of  his birth and his death cannot be 
specified  with  any  certainty.  The  main  infonnation  is  given  by 
pseudo-Ploutarkhos  (Test.6)  who  says  that  G.  was  older  than 
Antiphon, who was born around 480; Porphyrios now places G.'s 
acme  in the  80
th  Olympiad,  that  is  in the  years  460-457,  and 
according  to  Pausanias  (Test.7)  he  was  invited  to  Pherai  by its 
tyrant, lason, which provides us with a tenninus post quem, as lason 
became  tyrant  in  380.  On  the  basis  of  this  infonnation,  in 
combination with the fact that most of  the sources give him 107-109 
years of life one should consider the years around 485 as a possible 
date  for  his  birth  and  378  or  later  for  his  death.  But  these 
1 See PI. Ap.1ge (=Test.8a). 
2  The  most reliable  sources  do  not  specify  the  exact  number  of years;  these 
sources  are Isokrates Antid.155 (1T.1eiarov  xpovov  j3LOUS')  and Plato  (Phdr.261b) 
who  compares  G.  with Nestor, the proverbially old wise man of the  Iliad.  The 
scholiast writes:  d1TEI.KC£~EI.  IlE  roy  TOfYYLa.V  rqi  Nearopl..  E1TEI.Il-iJ  Ka.t.  a.i.llfJfLWV  Ka.t. 
1TO.1UEr7Js  EyevEro.  Other  sources  include:  Suidas  s.Y.  Topyia.S'  (=Test.  2), 
Apollodoros (=Test.lO), and Olympiodoros (Test.lO) 109;  Philostratos (=Test.l), 
Pliny  (=Test.l3),  Loucianos  (Test.l3),  and  Censorinus  (TEst.l3)  108;  Cicero 
(=Test.12)  107;  Pausanias  (=Test.7)  105.  Athenaios  (Test.ll)  80  is  certainly 
wrong; as  Skouteropoulos suggests  (p.155),  by  7T  Apoll. probably refers to  the 
years that G. was professionally active; Diels suggests pI.' . 
10 conclusions  are  merely based  on the  available  sources;  although 
there is no serious reason to object to the placing ofG.'s birth in the 
years before the birth of  Antiphon, common experience shows that it 
is hardly possible for a person who is 107 years of  age to travel from 
wherever he was situated in the Greek world to  Pherai, in order to 
exhibit  or  teach  his  art. 
1  At this  age  - normally  much  earlier -
human ambition expires. 
Nothing is known about G.' s life before his arrival in Athens in 
427;  some  sources  make  him  a  pupil  of Empedokles,2  but  this 
information should preferably be considered with caution, because 
as  a leading scholar in the field of the history of ancient philosophy 
has recently c1aime~ "retrospecively, such lines of  succession were 
also constructed for the Prep  1  atonic period, and these successions of 
Preplatonics  were  in  various  ways  linked  with  the  later 
philosophical schools".3 Apart from specific affinities of G.'s works 
with Empedokles' life (mainly his reputation as a magos; notice that 
Diogenes (Test.3), says that he found in Satyros the information that 
G.  witnessed  Empedokles'  practice  of magic)  and  premises  (for 
instance the theory of  a7roppoaL; see also notes on He!.  4), it was also 
Aristotle's otherwise opaque statement that Empedokles was the one 
who inaugurated rhetoric that probably served as the ground for the 
invention  of a  smooth  and  (even  geographically)4  'reasonable' 
succession. 
5 
The  first  (and  probably  the  only)  important  incident  that  we 
know with some certainty is that G. arrived in Athens in 427, as the 
I To this commonsensical observation, we may add Kerferd's remark (1981, p.44) 
that "the inference [sc. that 380 is a tenninus post quem] is quite unjustified since 
the story merely relates a comparison between G.'s brand of rhetoric with that of 
his pupil Polykrates". 
2 See mainly Diog. Laert. 3.58,9 (=Test.3); see also frs. Test.3, 10, 14. 
3 Mansfeld (1999), p.32  . 
.\  Dodds  (1959),  p.7,  contends  that  "late  writers  make  him  a  'pupil'  of 
Empedoc1es ...  perhaps merely because they were both Sicilians". 
5 For G. and Empedokles see Buchheim 1985,417-29. 
11 leader of  an embassy whose task was to seek Athenian assistance on 
behalf of the  city of Leontini against the threat of Syracuse.  This 
information is  safe, because it is provided by Plato (Hip.Maj.282b; 
it is surprising that Diels did not include this passage in his edition), 
and there are  at least two  more authors to  reiterate it (see TestA); 
but the chronology of the embassy we owe to  Thucydides (3.86.2), 
who does not mention G.'s name. Yet, that this was G.'s first visit to 
Athens, as most of the scholars suggest,  I  is in itself doubtful. None 
of the  above mentioned sources says that it was,  and it is  equally 
feasible to speculate that it was not: in 427, G. was already 60 years 
old, and it is possible that there may have been more opportunities 
for him to visit Athens before this date. 
The  duration of his  stay there  is  unknown,  and  we know 
nothing  of any  subsequent  visits  to  it,  but  according  to  Plato 
(Hip.Ma.282b4=TestA), G.  taught in Athens for money. Like most 
of the  sophists
2  he moved from the one city to  the other teaching 
people for fees.  Weare told that he was treated with animosity by 
the citizens of Argos and that a penalty was imposed on those who 
attended his teaching (Test.22a); he spent some time in Thessaly at 
the court of Aleuadae (as Plato and Isokrates confirm; see Test.1S, 
19); he travelled to  Elis, where he delivered his encomiastic speech 
for  the  city;  we also  know  (see  fr.S)  that he  taught Proxenos  of 
Boiotia, and it has been inferred that G.  went to  Boiotia as  well;3 
1  Untersteiner  (1954,  p.93)  writes  "he  then  traveled  from  city  to  city";  but 
probably  this  is  what he did before his  arrival  in Athens;  similarly,  Dodds,  in 
discussing the dramatic date of Grg.  is certain that 427 "is Gorgias' first (and only 
attested) visit to  Athens" (1959, p.17). But that it is  the  'only attested'  one does 
not mean that this was the only one as welL 
2 In PI. Ap.1ge Sokrates mentions G., Prodikos, and Hippias; in PI. Prot.  316c6 we 
learn that Protagoras did the same thing (earlier in this dialogue we are told that 
Protagoras was accompanied by some ofhis pupils 315b). 
3 See Untersteiner (1954), p.98 n.21. 
12 and he also  appeared before the audiences gathered in Delphi and 
Olympia.  I 
Several prominent figures  are mentioned by ancient authors  as 
being  G.' s  students,  but  their  common  practice  of  creating 
successions and contextualising individual intellectuals is once more 
discernible.  This is  obvious in Suidas (s.v.  fop'YLoS=Test.2)  where 
Alkidamas is presented as the leader who succeeded G. in his school 
(axOA7JV),  although we know that no  such school was established by 
G.  Others, like Agathon, were simply imitators of G.'s style, and in 
the absence of any further positive indications it would be wrong to 
assume  that  they  were  his  students  in  the  sense  that  they 
systematically attended his lectures. 
A  number  of G.'s  pupils  are  mentioned  by  several  authors; 
Menon  of  Thessalia  and  his  friend  Ari stipp os  (plMen.70a-
b=Test.19). Plato also presents Polus, one of the interlocutors in his 
dialogue Gorgias,  as  one of G.'s pupils.  Isokrates,  the rhetor who 
established a school in Athens,  is  also  listed by some authorities 
among G.' s pupils; but as  this is  information given by authors of 
late antiquity, mostly Roman times, we should not be too ready to 
accept it.
2  A  certain Philippos  appears  in all  the  instances  where 
1  Blass  (1887),  p.25  suggested that he  returned to  Leontini  in 424,  due  to  the 
political situation there; but no source COnImns such an hypothesis. That he went 
back to Athens "at the time of  his Funeral Oration" as Untersteiner claims (1954, 
p.94) is  speculation which in its  turn is based on the speculative view  that this 
speech was composed in 421. The Epitaphios is  void of references to particular 
historical events, and there is  no good reason to  suppose that G.  needed to be in 
Athens at the time of its composition. 
1 All the sources are cited by Too  1995, p.235, who  devotes an Appendix of her 
book to  this  subject; she rightly casts  doubt on the  sources  making  Isokrates  a 
pupil of G.  Her argumentation is  twofold:  a)  she  refutes  the  reliability of later 
biographers and writers, and b) she claims that all the direct references to  G.  are 
pejorative, and that in the cases where G.'s name is not mentioned we should not 
associate  Isokrates with him.  More particularly,  she  maintains  that in Antidosis 
155 f. (=Test.18) "Isokrates implicitly underscores a contrast with his predecessor" 
(p.238); but in  this  context Isokrates uses  G.'s case  as  an example, in order to 
show  that  the  Sophists  did not make  a  fortune  out  of their  profession,  and 
13 Aristophanes refers to G., and it has been suggested that he probably 
was one of his students (Test.Sa).!  Eumolpos, the grandson of his 
sister might  also  be included,  if the  phrase  1TULQE[US- KuL  qnAius-
EVEKU in the inscription on the base of  the statue that he dedicated in 
Olympia means:  'because of the education (that he  [sc.Eumolpos] 
has received). A certain Proxenos ofBoiotia is also presented by his 
friend Xenophon in the Anabasis (Test.S) as a pupil of  G.
2 
Pausanias (Test.7) saw at Delphi a golden statue of G.  which he 
dedicated himself, whereas Cicero  (Test. 7)  claims that the  golden 
statue  was  dedicated  by  the  Greeks  in  order  to  honour  him. 
Athenaios  (T est. IS a)  embellishes  this  dedication  by  saying  that 
when  G.  came  back to  Athens,  Plato  welcomed  him with these 
words: 'the elegant and golden G. has arrived'! Pliny, in referring to 
the same incident, gives a date which is  conspicuously wrong:  he 
writes  'LXX circiter  olympiade'  (Test.7),  which  means  that  the 
dedication took place between SOO  and 497. Diels
3  has maintained 
that Pliny misread 1>' in his Greek source, and took it to be an 0  " 
from which it should be deduced that G. dedicated the statue in 420-
417. This is a reasonable but not conclusive explanation. More can 
perhaps  be  said  about  G.'s  statue  in  Olympia;  this  statue  was 
dedicated by Eumolpos,  the  grandson of G.' s  sister,  and  it  dates 
from  the  first  half of the  fourth  century.4  It should be taken  for 
Skouteropoulos  (1991)  is  probably  right  in  saying  that  "a7'O  a.7ToO'1TaO'fLa 
otacpa£veTat ...  Eva  (Jepp.a  O'lJva£a87]p.a  yt'  aUTov"  (p.161).  She also  doubts  that 
when Isokrates says that "his work serves to correct the attempts of an unnamed 
author who composed a defence of Helen while intending to write an encomium 
of her" (p.138); Too has not probably read carefully enough G.'s He!.  to  see its 
intertextual affInities with Isokrates' own Helen. 
I  See Dunbar 1995, note on 1700-1. 
2 For more names see Untersteiner (1954), p.94 with notes. 
3  1876, p.SO. 
4 This can be inferred from the letters on the inscription; it is reasonable to assume 
that the statue was dedicated some time after G.'s death (which probably occurred 
some time after 380; I deduce that simply on the basis of  his long life, not on the 
information concerning Iason), and if  this is true the statue was dedicated there 
14 granted that this statue is later than the one in Delphi (see Test. 8), 
because the inscription clearly refers to the latter. It seems that the 
dedication  of a  golden  statue  had  caused  negative  comments, 
because Eumolpos thought it wise to mention that by the dedication 
he did not mean to show offwealth, but to pay tribute to G.
l 
A  good  deal  of the  sources  provide  us  mostly with  anecdotal 
material  about  G.  Ailianos  (Test.9)  tells  us  that he,  and Hippias, 
used  to  wear  purple  clothes,  "as  though  to  emphasise  their 
continuation  of the  functions  of poets  in  earlier  days,,;2  if this 
information is true, it may also be an indication of the emphasis that 
G. placed on the external appearance and the ritualistic gestures that 
perhaps accompanied his displays.3 
Athenaios  (Test.ll)  says  that  when  G.  was  asked  how  he 
achieved such a long life, he responded that he never did something 
for  his  own pleasure,  although he  says  that  Demetrios  records  a 
either at the end of the first or at the beginning of the second quarter of  the fourth 
century. 
I Both dedications have ingeniously been discussed by Morgan (1994, p.375-386), 
in relation to  Plato's Phaidros 235d6-236b4, where Phaidros promises Sokrates 
that he  will dedicate a golden statue of  him, if  the latter will manage to deliver a 
speech on the  subject of love  which will be better than Lysias'  one.  Morgan 
believes, and convincingly shows, that the reference is  to  the statues of G., and 
that it serves as  "an implicit critique of Gorgias'  dedicatory practice" which "is 
not merely a passing blow at the sophist, but is integrated with the major themes 
of the dialogue:  the quality of the virtuous life, the practice of writing, and the 
kind of immortality that one should aim for" (p.386). 
2 Kerferd (1981), p.29. 
3  It  is  well known that in his  Clouds Aristophanes caricatures  the  Sophists  for 
being particularly poor;  they  have an empty stomach,  they walk barefoot,  they 
have to  go  through numerous hardships etc.  In three cases they are presented as 
securing  their  clothing  by  smuggling  people's  clothes  (179,  497,  859).  It  is 
evident that Aristophanes does not have fifth-century Sophists in mind; notice that 
Plato (Hipp.mi. 368bff.) depicts Hippias - who is mentioned by Ailianos - skilful 
enough to  make  his  own rings, sandals, clothes and belts of the  'Persian' type, 
which  are  1TOAUTEAWV  (they  cost a  fortune).  Dover,  in his  edition  of the  play, 
p.xxxix-xl  suggests  that  Aristophanes  attributes  asceticism  to  the  Sophists 
probably by generalizing a typical characteristic of  the Pythagoreans. 
15 different  answer:  'r  did  nothing  for  someone  else',  which  may 
probably be related to the fact that G. was a bachelor; 
1 a very similar 
answer is  provided by Stobaios  (fr.ll).  Cicero  (Test.12)  gives  a 
different version:  G.  was  asked why he wanted to  be alive for so 
many years;  his  answer was, that he did not have any  complaints 
against being elderly.  When death was  about to  come he  said to 
someone who came to see him:  'Sleep is now about to hand me to 
his brother [namely Death],.2 
1 Buchheim  (1989), p.203 adopts a different view, but the dictum is so enigmatic 
that nothing can be said with certainty. 
2 Cp.Test.15. 
16 II. GORGIAS' STYLE 
i. Stylistic features 
a) epanalepsis 
1.  repetition of  units of  utterance 
No other known prose author makes such a great use of  repetition as 
G.
l  The effect of this  device  becomes  even more spectacular by 
virtue of the fact that the elements repeated are placed very close to 
each other. Sometimes no other units intervene between two similar 
words, and frequently there are just one or two.
2 
epanalepsis in G.  either coexists with other stylistic devices, or 
else it results directly from them. As will be shown later, repetition 
and balanced antithesis  are  interrelated,  but an equally important 
device  that produces repetition is  the polyptoton.  Some examples 
include:  Hel.  4  €V~  O€  (J'wf-Lan  7Toi\Aa  (J'wf-LaTa  O'Vv?jyay€v  dvopwv, 
Hel.  18  7ToAAa  O€  7ToAAoZs  7ToAAwv,  Pal.  8  €f-LoL  T€  7Tap' 
,  I 
EKELVOV 
€KEl.VqJ  TE  1Tap'  €f-Lov  (notice  the  chiasm  as  well).  Other  less 
complicated  epanalepses,  very  common  ill  Pal.,  involve 
anadiplosis,  as  in 36  EVEpYE:rTJv  rijs 'E>..Aaoos,  "E>..A.7JV€S "EAA7Jva  or 
"B.A7Jvas 'B.A?jvwv  in  37. The schema etymologicum also makes its 
presence,  as  in Pal.  l3, TOUS  f-LEYl.U'TOVS  KLvovvovs  KLVOVVEVELV.  To 
these features one should add the climax attempted in Pal.  23:  1TEpL 
OE  -rWV  YEVOf-L€VWV  ou  f-Lovov  OUK  dovvaTov,  di\Aa  KaL  pq.owv,  OUOE 
f-LOVOV  pq.owv,  di\Aa .... 
I  See Dover (1997), p. 136ff. 
z Dover (1997),  p.136-7  evinces  statistically  that  G.  "must have  sought  close 
recurrence deliberately" (see Table 7.2), but he also claims that "whatever praise 
or blame is deserved for the 'invention' of close recurrence should be attached not 
to  him but to  moralizing aphorisms", such as  the passage from Hesiod's Works 
and Days (352-5) that he cites. 
17 Anthypophora  and  questions  are  sometimes  followed  by 
recurrences; so  in Pal.  7,  the hero asks Tivl.  Tis  wV •••  'lTOTEpa  /LOVOS 
/LOVqJ;  Anthypophora (a string of  questions answered by the speaker) 
plays  an  important role  in the  section of Pal.  where  G.  seeks  to 
show that the act of  treason was impossible; so in 9, P. says that one 
may allege that he made a pledge with Priam by means of money, 
and  he  poses  the  question:  'lTOTEPOV  Ol)v  oALyol.s;  He immediately 
retorts, aM' OUK  ElKC)s  aVTL  /LEYcLAwv  tJ'lTOVPYTl/LcLTWV  oAiya  XPTJ/LaTa 
Aa/Lf36.vEI.V.  He then refutes the possibility that he got a large amount 
of  money by asking how was it possible to transfer the money, and 
he goes on: Tis  otYv  ~v T]  KO/LI.0TJ;  mlk 0' uv  <7}  Eis>  €.Ko/Ll.aEV  7} 
'lTOAAoi;  'lTOAAWV  yap  KO/LL~OVTWV  'lTOAAO~  UV  ~aav  /LcLproPES  rils 
€'1TI.{3ovMjs,  EVos  oE  KO/LL'oVTOS  OUK  UV  'lTOAU  TL  TO  cPEPO/LEVOV  ~v. As 
this  example  shows  it is  practically  impossible  to  track  down  a 
passage where stylistic devices will not include antithesis. 
There are some cases where the elements repeated are not very 
close to each other, as in Pal. 11  ('lTpcLTTEI.V) and 16, with the dazzling 
recurrence of TL/LTJ  and its products, but they are  admittedly very 
few. Parallelism, a very important feature in Go's prose unavoidably 
results  in repetitions  as  welL  So,  in Hel.  11  we find:  T]  oE  ooga 
'lTEpl.f3cLAAEL  TOUS  aury XPW/LEVOV<;  . 
Pleonasm, redundant repetition, stresses important points, as the 
one made  in Pal.  29  concerning his previous  life:  a'lT'  apxfjs  Els 
UlTius or in He!.  where G. becomes very analytical about the laws as 
they  are  dictated by nature:  'lTEcPVKE  yap  OU  TO  KpELaaov  tJ'lTO  TOU 
iJaaovos '"  KUi.  TO  /LEV  KpELaaov  T]y€LofJaL,  TO  OE  -ryaaov  E'lTEafJal.  (6). 
We may now discuss some of  the repetitions that G.  seems to be 
fond of. He shows a preference for  'lTaVT- derivatives, and this may 
belong to the style of the prose composed by the Sophists, because 
Plato pokes fun at it in his Menexenos (247e). So in Pal. 12 we find a 
striking polyptoton  with  'lTcLVT€S,  after a  lower-scale  repetition of 
18 a.7TaS"  (notice that the next paragraph starts with one more  7TClV7"-); 
later, in 19, we read 7TC1V7"Es"  7Ta.V7"a  7Tpa.7"7"OUaL  (the parechesis of /p/ 
in 7TaV7"- repetition is very common), and 7TiiaL  7TEPt.  7TaV7"oS"  Ean. In 
24 we find  KOLVOV  a.7TaaL  7TEPI.  7Ta.V7"WV.  Apart from that, there is  a 
specific kind of repetition which G. uses when he wants to produce 
strong  correspondences.  So,  when  in  He!.  G.  claims  that  Paris 
deserves  an  eye-for-an-eye and a tooth-for-a-tooth punishment, he 
writes:  a~wS" ovv 0 J.LEV  E7TLXELpfpaS"  {3a.p{3apoS"  {3a.p{3apov  E7TLXELp7JJ.La 
KaL  AOYlf!  Kat  VOJ.Llf!  Kat  epYlf!  AOYlf!  J.LEV  al7"iaS",  VOJ.Llf!  DE  anJ.LiaS", 
ePYlf!  DE  '7JJ.LLaS"  7"tJXE'iv  (8). A similar example, accentuated with a 
question,  can  be  tracked  down  in Pa!.22:  cPpa.aov  7"OU7"OLS"  <7"OV 
7"P07TOV>,  7"OV  7"07TOV,  7"OV  xpovov,  7T07"E,  7TOV,  7TWs- ElDES";.  Finally, 
one should mention the passage from active to passive voice (0  J.LEV 
ovv  7TELaaS"  Ws- dvaYKa.aaS"  dDLKE'i,  i]  DE  7TELa6ELaa  Ws- avaYKaa6E'iaa 
J.La.7"7Jv  aKouEL  KaKWs- 12, or E7"apa.x87J  KaL  ha.pagE  rTjv  tjroxilv  He!. 
16). 
To  these types  of repetition we should add the recurrences  of 
elements  (mainly in He!.)  which are  significantly  distanced from 
each other, or even repeated in different texts. In  He!. 6, G. gives the 
four possible reasons that made the heroine travel to Troy. The same 
words - along with the statement of  the author's reassurance that he 
has completed the task that he had programmatically stated in the 
prologue - are used in the epilogue of  this text in the reverse order. 
Another interesting example is the repetition of the derivatives of 
7TOPLJ.LOS"  in Pa!.,  which  is  undoubtedly  intended to  bring  out  the 
situation  Palamedes  is  in  (e.g.  DLDaaKa.Awv  E7TLKLVDUV07"EPWV  :r, 
7TOpLJ.LW7"EpWV  7"tJXE'iv  4),  as  opposed to  his proverbially resourceful 
personality  (see  30  7"iS"  yelp  UV  E7Toi7JaE  7"OV  avep0J.rTLVOV  {3Lov 
7TOpLJ.LOV  €~  d:1TOpOU ... ).  Some expressions can also be found in both 
Hel.  and  Pal.  The  Aa{30vaa  Kat.  OU  Aaeovaa  in Hel.  4,  becomes 
eAa{3ov,  eAaeov  Aa{3wv  (Pa!.ll).  Similarly,  the  description  of the 
function  of cjJa.pJ.LaKa  as  lethal  substances in He!.  14  (Kat.  7"<:1.  J.LEV 
19 voaov  rei  De  f3Lov  1TaV€~), is altered in PaL to define death and a bad 
reputation (ro  j-Lev  yeip  rov  f3LOV  reAoS",  i]  De  rep  f3£qJ  voaoS") 
2.  epanaleDsis in sound 
It  is  natural  that  the  repetItIons  of words  or  phrases  produce 
similarities in sound. But G.  does not confine himself to that, as his 
preserved texts are marked by a manifestly deliberate recurrence of 
similar sounds.  Traditionally, such devices  as  hornoeoteleuton  and 
paronornasia  are  not analysed  under the  heading  of epanalepsis. 
However, it is  primarily through repetition of phonemes that these 
devices are achieved, and this is why I discuss them in connection 
with epanalepsis. 
Critics imputed to  G.  redundant sound play;  independently 
of  how annoying or gracious the frequency of sound-plays may be, 
we should bear in mind that form is not simply the robe of content. 
Similarity in sound is in most of the cases inextricably interwoven 
with  meaning;  for  example,  when G.  says  ra7]  yeip  uj-Lupr£u  KUL 
clearly  intends  to  stress  the  opposition  between  €1TU~V€rcl.  and 
j-Lwj-L7J7"a.  In other words, the similarity in sound serves to transfer the 
meaning of the one element to  the meaning of the other, in a way 
which resembles very much the 'metaphor' of  meaning attempted in 
rhyming poetry.  The devices I  shall discuss  are the  following:  (i) 
isocolon, (ii)  homoeoteleuton,
l  (iii) parison, (iv) paronornasia, and 
(v) parechesis.
2 
All the first three devices are very frequently combined; so 
m  the  Epitaphios  we  read  L1~0S"  j-Lev  dyaAj-Luru,  euvrwv  oe 
dvu87jj-Luru.  Several striking combinations of them in He!.  are  also 
I  Sometimes G.  transposes the similarity of sound from the end to  the  beginning 
of sentences (see  Smith 1921, p.351, and Dover 1997, p.152); the technical term 
for this device is homoikatarkton. 
2  For reasons of a more economical presentation of examples under the heading 
parechesis I include invariably alliteration and assonance. 
20 worth  noticing.  In 2  we  read  EJ-€fUPeaeui  -re  -ra  E1TUt.ve-ra  KU~ 
E1Tut.ve'iv  -ra  ~wp:rrra,  and  later  ei.  oe  f3£q.  ilfnni.a87J  KU~  dvop.WS' 
Ef3t.6.a87J  KU~  dOI.KWS'  uf3pl.a87J.  A  perfectly  balanced  construction 
ending with homoeoteleuton  I  is  the one closing the examination of 
the  first  cause  in He!.:  ei  ovv  rij  Tux:rJ  KU~  -reP  eeeP  -rT]v  Ul-rLUV 
ci.vuee,EolI,  ~  -rT]1I  '£).ev7Jv  rijs  8uaKAeLuS"  d1ToAu-reoll.  Pal.offers 
several  examples  as  well;  P.  expresses  the  cornerstones  of his 
argumentation  as  follows:  ou-re  yap  f3ouA7J8eis  EOullap.7Jv  ou-re 
oUlla~evoS"  Ef3oUAf/J7JV  epyot.S"  E7nXEl.pe'Zv  -rOl.ou-rOl.S"  (5). Epitaphios is 
no less marked by such constructions, as 8epa1Tov-reS"  ~Ev -rWII  ci.8I.KWS' 
Homoeoenarcton, epanalepsis of initial syllables, is again a 
field in which G.  is at home. Some examples: 4£Up-rLU  KU~ duu8l.u, 
KU~ 
d1ToAoyrjaua8ut. ... d1ToAucmaeUt.,  (Hef.  1,  2,  4,  8);  f3l.oS"  OE  OU  f3t.WTOS" 
(which  is  also  an  oxymoron),  dva;wS"  dva;w,  rO"WS"  raOIl, 
dOl.KW ••• doLK7]8fjVUt.,  Ci8€OIl,  CiOt.KOV,  Civop.ov,  Ci;wv  d;uIJom  (Paf.21, 
22,  23.  33,  36, 37). In Epitaphios we find -ro  oeov  EV  -reP  oeovn, 
~a  "  ,rlJ  '  "  ,,~  U)-,pt.aTUt.  el.S"  -rOUS"  U)-'pt.aTUS" ... , epWTWV ... €PWOS-. 
Paronomasia  is  the  word-play  which  involves  sound 
assimilation between signifiers that are semantically related to  each 
other  in  various  ways.  In Pal.  for  example  G.  plays  with  the 
antonyms  KpanaToS"  and  KaKt.aTOS- twice:  in 2  (WO"1T€P  ot.'  EK€'iIlU 
KDanaTOC;  av  ~v dvfJp,  ou-rw  8Le!.  -ruihu  KaKl.aTOC;  av  er7J)  and in 14 
(ci.II-r~  TOU  KPU-rLaTOU  TO  KaKt.aTOv).  Another word-play G.  seems to 
enjoy  is  the  one  with  GUll-compound  verbs  denoting  knowledge, 
which are combined with similar compound verbs used of  existence. 
In Pal.  11, we find TWII  GU110 II-rWII ,  aVlI€l.~t.,  ~1I0t.0€ and later in  15 
aVlIEaTe  yap  ~OL,  81.0  aVllt.aT€  TaUTU.  But  playing  with  words 
denoting knowledge does not stop here. In 22, P.  will contend that 
'if you know (doWs-),  you do  lmow (oia8u) because you saw ([OeVlI), 
1  Dover's (1997),  p.1S3  comparison of the  frequency  of homoeoceleuton  in G. 
with other authors proves that "again. G. leads the field". 
21 or  because  ...  '.  The  unreliability  of Saga  is  later  expressed  as 
fo llows:  oofry  mcrrEvous  a.1TLa-ro-rciTqJ  -rrpciyfLan  (24)  1.  To  these 
examples  we may add the ironical use of KaLvos- in (26),  used of 
'\01'05',  probably  alluding  to  KEVOS-,  that  is  'empty',  'meaningless' 
(although these words were not homophones, as  they are in modem 
Greek) . 
We  may now pass to parechesis. G.'s play with sounds within 
phrases or sentences is extremely complicated, undoubtedly the fruit 
of meticulous  composition.  Apart from  the  repetition of a  single 
consonant known as  alliteration (see Hel. 4 1T'\eLcrras-... dvSpwv,  with 
the  insisting Is!), he very regularly pursues  assonance, that is  the 
repetition of combinations of vowels with consonants, arranged in 
various  manners  (i.e.  in some  cases  we find  the same  consonant 
followed or preceded by the same consonant, in some others it is the 
vowel that remains the same etc.). In Hel.  3 we read 1TEpL  i]s- DOE  0 
'\01'05',  OUK  c1S7J,\ov,  ouoe  d,\£yOts.  o7j'\OV  yap  cOs- fL7JTP05'  fLev  A-ryoa5', 
with the combinations de - del - ude - del - led. In Pal.  we find 
e'\a{3ov,  e'\a8ov  '\a{3wv  with  elab  - elath  - lab  (11)  and 
-rrapaocOOovow,  fLt.a8Ov  rijs- -rrpoooaLas- dvnot.SovTES- (21); a reversal of 
the order of the phonemes is traced in d1To{3a,\6vTa ... a.va,\ci{3ot.  TLS-
(21). Other examples from Hel. would include -rrpoY:JilLq.  /  -rrP08V(.LLq. 
8. Lastly, a remarkable sentence full of  assonance, is the one closing 
the Epitaphios. 
b. Symmetry 
1. antithesis 
Probably no other author in antiquity used symmetrical antithesis as 
much  as  G.  did;2  it  has  been  remarked  that  in  some  cases  G. 
I For more examples, see Schiappa 1999, p.90-I. 
1  Dover's calculations  (1997),  p.lS1  reassure me  in making  this  point (see  his 
Table 7.4). As he says "Gorgias' use of  symmetry is prodigious". 
22 conjoins antithetical words or notions even in places where they are 
useless  (e.g.  EKELVOS'  }Lev  OLOOUS,  EYW  oe  it.ap.{3a.vwv  Pal.  9).  This 
may well be true but the frequency of contrasted items in his prose 
is  not  simply  the  product  of his  general  tendency  for  polished 
symmetry. Closer reading of the techniques of reasoning employed 
by him clearly shows that G. bases a good deal of  his argumentation 
on polarities. One cannot be far from truth if  one concludes that the 
distinctly  antithetical  form  of his  prose  coincides  \Vith  rhetorical 
tactics that rely on antinomical syllogisms. 
The most recurrent type of  argument from antinomy is the one in 
which  G.  proposes  two  possible  options  which  contradict  each 
other, in which case he does very little to vary his diction. In HeL  6 
he repeats the antithetical pair KpEl.aaOV  /  ~aaov three times, he then 
picks up  KpELaaov  once more in comparing the gods to  men; another 
example is found in PaL2:  7TorEpa.  }LE  XPi?  OLKU£WS'  a.7To8uVELV  :r,  fl-Er' 
bVELawv  fl-EYLO'TWV  KUi.  rijs- uLax.f.aT7'JS'  ulrius  {3I.U£WS'  a.7To8uVELV  18 
(an instance where he varies his wording is PaL 18  where he uses 
(3it.a.11TELV and KUKWs  E7TOLouv;  but the second alternative comes a few 
lines later in the paragraph), so as the one member of the antithesis 
to  counterbalance  the  other both in fonn and content  {p.ep-</JEa8uL 
-rE ...  fLWfL7JTa.  1;  in Pal.,  OU-rE  yap  (30Vit.7Jf7EI.S .•. E{30Vit.fj1TJv  5,  a.X\d. 
xp-ryp-a-ru  fL€V ... K-rfia8al.  15).  The  symmetrical  construction  of the 
antitheses  is  even  more  emphasised  by the  coexistence  of other 
stylistic devices, such as the paromoiosis CilYELaeaL  /  aYEaeUL,  BEau 
yap  1Tpa8ufLLav .•. a.v8pW7TC.V7j  7TP0fl-7Jf7t.q.  HeL  6,  and  E7TUywyoL  / 
d1TUywyoL  10), complicated chiasms (-rov  -rorE ... a.pxiJv  -rou  p-eX\ov-roS" 
He!.  5), questions and hypophora (see Pal.  9, 10,), isoeolon, parison 
and  homoeoteleuton  (e.g.  -ra.U-ru  yap  7Tp0 vo-ryaaaL  fL€V  ovva-ra., 
fLE-ruva-ryaaaL  oE  a.vLu-ru PaL34)  and sound-plays which to  a certain 
degree  are  unavoidable due to  the abundance of repetitions of the 
same words. 
There are very few paragraphs in G.'  s texts in which antithesis is 
absent.  With  great  care  he  opposes  words  to  words,  phrases  to 
23 phrases,  clauses  to  clauses.  Some  examples:  ill  He!. 
'c'  ,  ,  "  '  eve" ~av  ... e7TLKTIJTOV  ovvap.l.v  4 
r  ,  ~  I  ,~  ~ 
,  0  J.L€V  ap-rraaus ..• eovarrrxrJa€v  (with 
the stressed antithesis between passive and active voice; cpo  7Tf:£cm<;  -
cl.VaYKa.aa<; /7TeLa8€Zaa  - dvaYKa.a8eZaa  12), and 0  J.L€V  Ecpaae  OeLVa, 
1]  O€  E7Ta8e 7, ovvao-r-rr;  J.L€.ya<; .•. aJ.LI.Kp07"a7"qJ aWf-I.an  8,  T€XV7J  ypacpelS, 
OUK  d).  ..  rf3er.~  I..exfje£<;  13,  I..v7Tel:v  /  7T08eZv  18.  In  Pal.  7]  aacp&; 
3,  yo.p 
e8vvaJ.L7Jv ...  e~ov/l..fJ87Jv 5,  "EM7JV  fJapfJapqJ  7,  7Tel.aa<;  7J  ~l.aaaJ.L€vo<; 
(although  for  G.  persuasion  is  violence)  14,  eL.  J.L€V  otiv  el.p.1. 
aocp(J<;. .• el.f-I.l.  26, ou8' trrro .•• a.PXova'l.V 32. It would be useless to bring 
in examples from the Epitaphios, because almost every single line 
of  this text includes an antithesis. 
It would be more interesting,  however,  to  cite  some recurrent 
antitheses. G.  opposes one to many three times (He!.  4,  13;  Pal.9), 
and the word fJapfJapo<;  to "E/VI.7JV  twice in Pal.  (7 and 14): in both 
cases the two words are juxtaposed. €1Tl.a-riJ.L7J and €i.oWs- are opposed 
to 86;a in Pal. 3,22,24. It is also remarkable how G. plays with the 
pronouns to  distinguish the situation Palamedes is  in from that of 
the prosecutor  (€yw /  vp.a<;,  ae  Y€ ..• €P.e). 
The most frequent conjunction in his antitheses is  the f-I.ev ... a€., 
but 7]  has a significant presence as well. A notable example of the 
f-I.€v ... 8€  conjunction is in He!.  3:  J.L7J7"Po<;  {J.€V  A7joa<;,  7TaTpo<;  O€  7"OU 
elval.  Eco;ev,  a O€  01.0.  7"0  cpavat.  -ryMrx.87J.  For  7]  in  antithetical 
constructions one may compare Pa1.l8:  cl.Mo.  0,."  4>[)  .. ovc;  wcpe/l..eZv  7] 
7Tol..ef-l.I.Ov<;  j3l..a7T7"eLv.  It should be pointed out that 7]  appears more 
frequently in Pa!., where disjunctive questions playa prevalent role 
in the reasoning. 
24 2. svmmetrv in construction 
Much attention has been paid to  the  absence  of variation in the 
diction  and to  the symmetry in sound;  yet,  an equally  important 
feature  of G.'  s  prose is  the  symmetry in  the  construction of his 
sentences. Words or phrases are very commonly arranged so  as  to 
match other units of utterance with the same syntactical  function, 
and  in  this  way  there  is  a  remarkable parallelism  in the  surface 
structure  of  his  sentences.  As  in  most  cases,  symmetry  in 
construction coexists with acoustic similarities. 
This phenomenon is so frequent that only some examples can be 
presented here; for a better depiction of  the phenomenon I intend to 
reproduce longer units of utterance,  such as  the first paragraph of 
He!.,  Pa!.30  (7TOPLP.OV  E~  G.7Topou ... 8La-rpLf3f]v)  and  Epitaphios 
(jJ.aprupLa  8€ ...  7Tic:rr€I.)  (Key:  A=  article  N=noun  or pronoun,  P-
participle, n= nominative, g=genitive etc;  p=particle, p*=the same 
particle  as  the  previous  one,  Adj.= Adjective,  Adv.=Adverb,  c= 
conjunction,  c*  as  p*,  Pr=preposition,  V=verb,  Inf=infinitive, 
Part.=participle; when a participle functions as  an Adjective I write 
Adj.) 
Helen 1: Nn Ndp Nn NdpNn Ndp*Nn Ndp* Nn Ndp*Nn 
An p* Adjn. Ng Nn 
Na pc Na c* Na c* Na c* Na c* Na 
V 
Aa p Adja. Ng Nd Inf  Ad p Adjd Na Inf. 
Adjn p Nn c Nn 
Inf  c Aa Adja c Inf  Aa Adja 
Palamedes 30:  Adja Pr Adjg 
c 
Adja pr* Adjg 
Na c Adja Part. Adja Pro Na 
Na c* Adja Na Ag Ng 
Nac* NgNa 
Na c Na Ng Adja Na 
25 Evitavhios: 
c) asyndeton 
NacNgNa 
Na c* Adja c Adja Na 
Na c Ng Adja Na 
NnpNgv AgNg 
NgpNnNgpNn 
cNa 
c AdjgNg 
c AdjgNg 
c AdjgNg 
c AdjgNg 
Adjn Pr Aa Na Ad Nd 
Adjn p Pr Aa Na Ad Nd 
Adjn p* Pr Aa Na Ad Nd 
Adjn p* Pr Aa Na Ad Nd 
There  is  a  remarkable  disparity  in the  distribution  of asyndeton 
between He!.  and Pal.; in the former, asyndeton is rare, whereas in 
the  latter one it is  more regular. In Hel.  there is just one example 
which is worth mentioning, located in the last paragraph: acp€l./..ov  T0 
\/  ~/  \  /  1  /  ~  /  1  /\oyep  OVGKI\€W,V  yvvaI.KO~, €v€f.1-El.va  Tep  vOfJ-lp ... 
In Pal.  there are numerous asyndeta with nouns,  adjectives and 
participles as in 3 1TaTp{.oa,  TOKea~  , •• ,  13  1TPOYovwv  ap€TUL,  XP7JfJ-a.TWV 
1TA718os  (notice  the sequence:  nN,  nN,  N,  Nn,  Nn,  where n=noun 
gen,  and  N=noun  nom.),  "EV..7Jv  f3apf3a.povs,  €is  WV  1TO/"/"OV~  14, 
80V/..€LUV  a.VT!.  f3aGI./"€Lu~,  aVTi.  TOU  KpaTr.aTOV  TO  Ka.KLaTOV  14, the 
remarkable  T0  vop.qJ,  rij  8LK7J".in  17,  EfJ-aVTov,  TOKEUS ... 19, 
1Tupup.€/...ryaUVTa •.. EaT€P7Jp.evov ... o  l.a.yovTa  ...  a1Topp£zj;avTa  20, 
1T€1TOI.7JKOn .. ,1TapaO€QWKOn  21,  the symmetrical  <;-av  TP01TOV>,  Tav 
I Schiappa (1999, p.89 n.S) observes that "the use of asyndeton at or near the end 
of a speech can be found also in Isaeus (6.62, 9.37), Aiskhines (1.196, 2.182), and 
Demosthenes (8.76, 21.226)", 
26 ro-rrov ...  -rrWs- eloes 22, douvaroLS.  alaxpoLs ... 25, a.8eov,  a.CILKOV ..•  36. 
There  are  fewer  asyndeta  with  verbs  as  ill  the  climax 
auvfJileop.ev .. , EKpUlpa  11, and in the intense challenging at 22 €ileErw. 
cpav-frrw.  p.ap-rvp7J0-a-rw ... ,  which is  the  second  strong asyndeton  m 
the same paragraph. 
In Epitaphios the asyndeton is employed in the accumulation of 
the virtues of the dead and by employing it G.  encourages  a faster 
reading of the text, which suggests that the  dead did not lack any 
possible praiseworthy virtue  and that these  virtues  are in fact  so 
many  that  it  is  tiring  even  to  enumerate  them.  This  is  further 
stressed by the  fact  that the phrasing  immediately preceding the 
asyndeton is marked by the abundance of particles: Kal.  MYEI.V  Kal. 
(TLyav  Kal.  -rrol.e'iv ... KaL.yvwp.7]V  <Kal.  pwp.7Jv> ,  TiJv  P.EV ...  TiJV 
(5  ' ••• p.€V ... oE ...  aVeaOEI.S  1TPas  TO  auP.CPEpOV,  evopyrrroL  1TpOS  TO 
,  ~  A..  ,  'R  "  "R  '  ~  "  ~  1Tpe1TOV,  rep  'f'pOVLP.ep ..•  Vf'Jpl.a-raL  el.S  rous  Vf'JPLa-ras ... oeLVOL  ev  TOLS 
d)  hyperbaton 
There is no significant difference in the frequency of  hyperbaton in 
Hel.  and Pal.  Apart from the separation of the article from a noun, 
an adjective or a participle, which are common hyperbata in Greek 
language (at any rate 'correct' word order exists only in the teaching 
of Greek composition), it is worth our attention that G.  often uses 
hyperbata  in order  to  bring  together two  similar  or  antinomical 
elements. So, in rov xpovov  OE  r0 .\oyep  rov  rOTe  vuv  u-rrepf3cis (Hel. 
5; is it a coincidence that lJ'1Tepf3as  appears here?) the hyperbaton has 
as  a result the  emphasis on the antithesis  betvveen  'time past' and 
'time  present'  and  a  chiasm  as  well  (see  also 
,  ~ 
a1TOK7e I. val.  yap 
p.e ...  paol.WS",  where  {3ovilop.evoL  and  ovv-ryoea8e  2;  the  words 
expressing  the  cornerstones  of his  argumentation  in this  text are 
brought  together.  Ws  dva~ws  dva~l.a  22,  OTav  o.vopes  o.vopa ... 34, 
rous  OE  1TptfrrovS  rwv  1TPW-rWV "EM.7Jvas 'EM.-ryvwv  37). An excellent 
hyperbaton  - to  the  extent  that  it  can  also  be  adduced  as  an 
27 argument  against  those  who  impute  to  G.  that  he  sacrifices  the 
content for the sake of the form - is  found in Hel.  15  au  XaJ\e'lTC.uS" 
8~arPeV~E70.~  rr,v  rijs  AeyO{kEv7]S  yeyovEVUI.  a.{kup-riaS"  al  r[uv. With 
this wording G.  can be assured that no  one takes the charges against 
Helen seriously. What I read as  an hyperbaton (see note ad lac.) can 
be found in the  last line of the preserved passage from Epitaphios, 
because I believe that the best possible reading of  the text emerges if 
we  take  0  -rr6eoS"  to  govern  au  ~wvrwv. The  fact  that  G.'s  other 
hyperbata are not as  long as  this  one  should not prevent us  from 
reading this sentence in the way I do  for two reasons: first, because 
in Hel.  16 the verb is distanced from orav that introduces the clause, 
secondly because G.'  s period normally consists in smaller clauses 
and phrases, and thirdly because conclusions based on statistics are 
not always  safe: if a stylistic device appears once,  it is  100% this 
device. 
e) hiatus 
There is  a great discrepancy in the distribution of hiatus between 
Hel.  and Pal.; according to my calculation there are 94(+3)1 in Hel., 
56 (+3) in Pal.  and 19 (+1) in Epitaphios.z This discrepancy, along 
with  other  stylistic  features,  has  been  used  by  Schmidt  as  an 
argumene for the later dating of Pal.  I believe though that such an 
argument is too shaky, and I would prefer to see in this discrepancy 
a  depiction of the different character of these  two  speeches. It is 
possible  that,  as  he  intended  his  Pal.  to  be  a  speech  for  oral 
presentation  before  an  imaginary  courtroom,  G.  took  care  to 
compose a smoother speech. It is  for the same reason that there is  a 
1  I exclude  from  my  calculation Hel.  12,  because  the  text  is  too  conupt;  (-+-3) 
me:ms that there are three hiatuses in places where the text is not well preserved. 
2 One should note that Pal.  is  a considerably longer text than Hei.,  and this points 
even more to Go's carelessness to avoid hiatus in the latter. No conclusions can be 
drawn from the Epitaphios, because in all likelihood it is fragmentarily preserved. 
3 Schmidt (1940 vol. iii), p.71. For a SlllIllIlaIY of  views see Orsini 1956, 82-83, 87 
n.l, and my discussion of  the relation between the Troades and G.'s Hel. below. 
28 significant  decrease in  'poetic'  diction  and  an  increase  in more 
dramatic expression (questions, apostrophes to  the litigant and the 
judges etc.) in this text. 
f) Transition 
Every reader of G.'s works will prima facie discern that the author 
takes  pains  to  signpost his  passing  from  the  one  section  of his 
speeches to  the other.l This process, evident in both He!.  and Pa!., 
attests  the  didactic  nature  of his  prose,  as  it  makes  possible  the 
memorisation  of how  a  speech  should  be  structured.  Instead  of 
learning general rules about the structure of a speech, G.'s students 
were provided with ready-made expressions of  general applicability. 
As may be expected this applicability is more overt in Pa!'  than in 
He!', because of the markedly forensic character of the former. It is 
to this text that we will tum our attention. 
(1),  H  /LEV  KaT7]YopLa  Kai.  -r,  d7ToiloyLa  Kai.  -r,  KPL(JL<;  ou  7Tepi.  Ba.va:Tou 
yLYVeTa.L. 
(4)  7Tepi.  TOUTWV  Mywv De  7To8ev  a.P~W/La.L 
(5)  DLa  DL(J(JWV  up.Zv  €7TLDel~W TP07TWV- OUTe  yap  f30UA.:ry8ei.<; ••• 
(6)  €7Ti.  TOUTOV  De  TOV  ilOyov  er/Ll.  7TpWTOV ..• 
(12)  7TCJ.VTW<;  a.pa.  Ka.i.  7TavT7]  7TaVTa  7TpaTT€LV  dSUVa.TOV  ~v /LOL. 
(13)  (JKet/;a.a8a.L  KOLVfj  Ka.1.  TODe. 
(21)  on  /LEV  ";"  v''''  OUV  OUT  av  <€DUva/L~v  f30UilO/LeVO<;  OUT'  aV 
ouva/L€Vo<; >  €f3ouil6/L~V  .•. DLa  TWV  7TPO€r.P~/L€vWV oeDeLKTa.L. 
(22)  f30VilO/La.L  De  /LETa  Ta.UTa  7TPO<;  TOV  Ka.rf]yOpOV  OLa.A€x8f]va.L. 
(27)  7TpO<;  /LEV  ouv  (],E  TaUTa.  (of general applicability as  a  transition is  the 
whole of  27) 
(28)  7TpO<;  0' v/La<;  cO  a.VOP€<;  KpLTa.i.  7T€pi.  ep.ou ... 
(32)  d)."\a  yap  OUK  E/LOV  €j.La.UTOV  E7Ta.LV€'iV- 6  oE  7Ta.pWV  Ka.LPO<; 
~vaYKa.(J€.  Kal.  Ta.UTa  KarrrrOpOVj.L€VOV,  7TavTW<;  d7TO/l.oyr](Jaa8a.L. 
I  See MacDowell (1982), pp.18-l9, who righdy observes that this fearure did not 
originate with G., as  "Herodotos too  sometimes announces  what he is  going to 
say, and later points out that he has said it". 
29 (33)  AOL.1TOV  S€  1T'EpL  ufJ-Wv  1T'pOS  up.Us  €(1"j£  pm.  AOI'OS, 
1T'au(]'op.al.  rijs ci.1T'oA.oyias. 
(37)  ELp7JTal.  Tet  1T'ap'  e[J-Ou  Kal.  1T'auop.al.  ...  €XEI.  AOyOV. 
g)  Diction 
1.  Dialect 
"  "  OV  EI.1T'WV 
G.  writes in Attic dialect, and his texts are among the oldest extant 
examples of  Attic prose.  I Before his time, prose was written in Ionic 
dialect, and Herodotos and the medical texts are the main exponents 
of this  prose.  The reason why  G.  chose Attic  for his  teaching of 
rhetoric and for the exhibition of  his potential in public speaking is 
eloquently explained by Dover:  "[Athens]  was the powerhouse of 
oratory,  the meeting place of philosophers,  and that is  why Zeno 
(from Elea) and G.  (an Ionic-speaker from Sicily) wrote in Attic,.2. 
Apart  from  this  obvious  reason,  G.,  as  a  vagabond professional 
teacher of  rhetoric must have had every reason to  express himself in 
the predominant dialect of the day,  and this was undoubtedly the 
Attic dialect. 
But if the  choice of Attic  dialect by G.  is relatively simple to 
explain,  the  concomitant  problems  arising  from  this  choice  are 
1  We  have no  knowledge about Attic prose before G.  (see Blass,  1887,  p.55). 
Finley (1939) has given strong arguments that favour the view that the style of the 
speakers  in  Thucydides  is  the  one  that  they  used,  and  that  he  remained 
independent of G.' s influence. In any case, almost nothing has survived from their 
speeches,  for  the  practice  of publishing  speeches  originates  with  Antiphon. 
Gagarin (1997, p.9) claims that Antiphon's Tetralogies are "perhaps the  earliest 
works of Attic prose", but I am vr::ry reluctant to  accept this both because we do 
not possess the whole of G.' s works and most importantly because the extant ones 
do  not  include  any  internal evidence (the  case of Aiskhylos'  Suppliants  should 
make  scholars  more  cautious,  when they  draw  conclusions  about dates  on  the 
basis  of stylistic analysis). The information that he came to  Athens  in 427 does 
not necessarily mean that nothing was written by him in Attic dialect before this 
date  (according  to  Gagarin  1997,  pA, Antiphon wrote his  fIrst  speech around 
430), because if  it is true that he amazed the assembly, we may infer that he was 
at least fluent enough to make himself understood. 
2 Dover (1997), p.85. 
30 rather intriguing. We may, however, start from  a less  complicated 
point  It is  well known that G.  came from  Sicily,  a  place where 
people did not speak the language spoken and written in Athens. 
Was it then possible for him to  produce such a polished prose? The 
answer to  this  question is  clearly yes.  One  should not confuse  a 
literary dialect with a local one; the Doric of Pindar is not the Doric 
spoken in Sparta or elsewhere.! 
We may now pass to the most puzzling problem concerning G.'  s 
decision to use the Attic dialect. We have already mentioned that the 
language of prose before our Sophist's time was the Ionic dialect, 
and  that  the  earliest  datable  speech  composed  in Attic  prose  is 
placed around 430. However, there is  little doubt that some Attic 
prose  was  in  use  as  well;  people  always  wrote  letters,  and  the 
administration of the city included the issuing of decrees and laws. 
But before the emergence of early rhetoric, the only literary genre 
composed in the dialect which later became the language of  science, 
history, philosophy, and oratory was tragedy.2 And it is perhaps to 
this incomparably appealing literary genre that one should primarily 
turn, if  one wishes to locate the linguistic paradigm of  G  .. 
From a morphologic point of view,  G.  employs, as most of his 
contemporaries do  (mainly Antiphon and Thucydides) Ionic types, 
such as -{JO'- (He!.:  KPEL.O'O'OV,  ~O'O'ov 4, 19,  8~aaaL 10; Pal.:  8~0'0'wv 2, 
5,  19,  1TEO'O'OVS"  30, raaO'OJ.LEvoV  32, Epitaphios  8~aO'a.), but like other 
current  authors  he  is  not  consistent  (Pa!.:  1Tpa.rrEI.V  6,  11,  13, 
1Tpa.rrwv 19, KpE£rrovaS"  12). He uses 8a.pO'oS"  (He!.  14; pO'  is the nonn 
in tragedy) and 1TUpaovS"  (Pa!.  30),  rTJ.L~Kpora.rCfJ  (He!.  8,  probably to 
intensify the parechesis of Is/), rEl.xEWV  (instead of  rEI.XWV,  Pa!'  12), 
and he  has  ~VO~8E instead of aVVO~8E in  Pa!'  11  (so  cornmon  in 
Thucydides), but he totally avoids EO'- instead of ELa-.  It is  not safe 
1 See Dover (1997), pp.83-4. 
1 Comedy as  well; but the language of this genre is  frequently colloquial and it 
may have been oflitde use as a paradigm. 
31 to say that all the above mentioned words are Ionic forms,l because 
as  inscriptions  show Attic  dialect  at  the  time of G.  indifferently 
includes both -(j(j- and --ri-. Furthermore,  it is  hardly possible to 
attribute the preference to  --cr(j- or - pa- to  echoes from poetry;2 G. 
taught rhetoric  in more places  than Athens,  and probably he had 
good reason to  avoid forms that would mark his texts with the local 
Attic idiom.
3 
2.  Poetic diction 
The choice of words by G.  contributes significantly to  the overall 
result  of his  poetic  style;  but it  should  be  made  clear  that  the 
investigation of  poetic words in G.  differs significantly from that in 
other prose authors, because there is nothing to be compared to the 
systematic embedding of  poetical techniques attempted in his prose. 
Where in other authors poetic vocabulary or other distinguishable 
deviations from the linguistic norm can be isolated., in G.  elements 
from poetry haunt the entirety of  his preserved texts. In other words, 
'poetic  language'  as  such ought to  be taken to  mean something 
different from poetic style, for the former is only one among other 
elements that contribute to the formation of  the latter. 
Such words as  JLwJLo~ (in Helen 1 we find JLwJLov  €7n8el.vul., where 
later  orators  would  have  probably  written  €7TI.'nJLav),  dAK~V, 
d7T€7TA7](je,  OL(j(j6~ 
4  (for which  see  my discussion  on the  dialect), 
and Pal., or Eu6pyrrro~ and €V07TAI.O~ in Epitaphios - to mention some 
examples  - are  not very  frequent  in prose.  But it  is  with  great 
1  Schiappa  (1999,  p.102  n.l7)  too  hastily  concludes  that  "his  Attic  was  not 
'pure"'; but is there such a thing as  'pure' Attic? 
2 Sometimes the presence of the one rather than the other alternative may be due 
to sound-plays; this is confIrmed by the use of  7Tpcfaaov-rrx  (instead of  7Tpar;-ov-rcx) 
in Pal.  27. However, this explanation should be resnicted only in cases where the 
context clearly shows that the writer attempts parechesis. 
3 See Dover (1997), p.83. 
~ See Diets 1884, p.367 n.2. 
32 reluctance that we quote these words, because defining an isolated 
word as poetic is in itself problematic. Poetic words become poetic 
in virtue of  the context they are in or as a result of  their combination 
with other words. Things become even worse if  we consider that our 
knowledge of the language used by speakers that preceded G.  does 
not amount to much. Aristotle, for instance, implies that, in general, 
early  prose  writers  adopted  a  poetic  style,  because  of  its 
acceptability,l  and brings in G.'s name as  an example. If the norm 
was  a style similar to  that of G.,  then what is  poetic for us  (or for 
ancient critics) was not poetic at all to the ear ofms audience. 
2 
3.  compound words 
G.  was  fond  of compound  words  and  Aristotle  gIves  us  two 
examples  (see  fr.lS):  7M"wxop.ovaoK6AuKU~,  €1TLOpKT]auvru<;  KUi. 
KurEvopKT]auvru<;; no such long compound word can be traced in the 
preserved  texts,  but numerous  less  ostentatious  examples  would 
confirm  Aristotle.  In Hel.  we  find  op.orpwvo<;  KUi.  op.6!f;vxo~  2, 
rpI.AOVLKOV-rpI.AOTtP.LU  4,  7TEpLrp0{30<;,  7TOAVOUKPV<;,  rpI.A07TEV8T]<;  9, 
7TUP0I.X0p.€VWV  11,  €geyoT]rEvauv  14;  in Pal.  compound words  are 
I  Schiappa maintains that, "Aristotle repeatedly calls Gorgias' prose excessively 
poetic".  But I  cannot  find  anything  disparaging  in  the  passages  he refers  to. 
Especially  in  Rher.1404a  24-27,  G.'s style  is  used as  an  example,  as  Aristotle 
takes care to make a clear distinction between what happened when G.  composed 
his prose, and the present situation (Ka.i.  VVy).  In addition..  the ,OLOUTOU,  suggests 
the imitators of G.'  s style, rather than the creators of it themselves (see Buchheim 
(1989), p.206 andSkouteropoulos (1991), p.17S) 
:  Perikles'  Epiraphios  in Thucydides does not differ very much in style  from a 
piece  of G.'s  prose,  and if Finley  (1939)  is  correct  in  maintaining  that  the 
historian remained uninfluenced by the manners of G.'s prose, the suggestion that 
G.'s prose  was  not construed  as  poetic  is  strengthened (see  also  MacDowell 
(1982), p.17 and Gagarin (1997), p.25). 
33 considerably fewer, and in any case they do not seem to be favoured 
at the expense of  simple words. 
1 
It comes as no surprise that compound words provide G. with the 
opportunity to  embellish his  speeches with more sound-plays. For 
one can regularly find in his texts a juxtaposition of two compound 
words with either the  first or the second element changed. In Hel. 
one can trace the following instances:  6p.6~wvo-;  Ka~ 6p.at/;uxo-; 2, U1T' 
iiplJffoc;  'IE  r/nAOVLKOU  r/nAoTLp.f.a-;  'IE  dVLK-r]-rOU  (notice that G.  avoids 
the 7E ..  KaL  conjunction to bring the  ~LAO- words together); in Pal.  <5 
De  1Tapaooowv  TLC; •.. k.yw  De  1Toiq.  ouvap.EI.  1Tapa.J\i]t/;op.al.  14, 
TaUTa  15.  In Epitaphios,  admittedly  not  marked  by  compound 
words,  we  find  €P.~VTOU vApEO-; ...  €V01TALOU  €PLOO-;,  d1T08avovTwv  <5 
1T080c;  ou  O1Jva1T€8avEv. 
It  is  also  interesting  to  mention  some  cases  where  G.  uses  the 
above-mentioned technique to express or emphasise antithesis. So in 
Hel.  8 one finds  KaL  AV1T7]V  dchEAELV  KaL  xapav  €VEpyaaaa6al., in 10 
€1Taywyoi.  ",Sovfj-;,  d1Taywyoi.  AV1T7JS  10;  in Pal.  34 1Tpovoi]aaaL  p.€v 
ouvaTa,  fLETa.Voi]aaaL  De  dviaTa. 
ii. The cn"tics of  Gorgtas ' prose 
a) Aristophanes. Plato and Xenophon 
Unfortunately, all the critics who have something to say about G.' s 
prose  belong  to  later generations,  and their criticisms  are  mostly 
short  comments  made  en  passant, either in  comparing  the  author 
they discuss with G. or using him as an example of  a certain stylistic 
fearure.  It is  also  more than clear that a significant portion of these 
1  This  probably  reflects  the  different  purpose  of G.' s  two  preserved speeches; 
Pal., as  a paradeigma of forensic argument, tends to be closer to  what would be 
expected to be herd in a real courtroom (see also below my discussion of  hiatus). 
34 criticisms  are  not  independent  assessments  put  forward  by 
individual authors: Aristotle's influence is overt .1 
The  earliest  author who  has  some  words  to  say  about  G.  is 
Aristophanes;  in both cases  G.' s name appears  along with that of 
Philippos,  presumably one of his  students.  In his  Birds  (1694ff= 
Test.Sa)  he  calls  orators  eOYy/\u.rrToyci.a-rOpES",  that  is  people  making 
their living from what they produce with their tongue (a metonymy 
for language), and in the Wasps  (420=Test.Sa) we are told that the 
judges destroyed G.' s pupil Philippos. Yet, there is a passage in the 
Frogs where it is possible that Aristophanes caricatures a feature of 
G.'s style that we have already discussed,  that is  the  formulas  of 
transition. In 907-908, Euripides says:  KU~ J.L7Jv  €J.LUV1"OV  J.L€V  "IE,  -ri]v 
JMygw .... It is perhaps safe to  assume that it is G.  that Aristophanes 
parodies  here,  and that  the  practice  of explaining  how  one  will 
proceed  to  structure  one's  speech must have been recognised  as 
typically  Gorgian.  For it cannot be a  coincidence that  Agathon's 
speech in Plato's Symposium, deliberately designed to resemble G.'s 
style (see below), starts with these words: eyw  De  f3ov/\OJ.LU~  1Tp&rOV 
coincidence  at all  that we later find  sentences  like those  in  196d 
e/\/\EL1TE~V; for a pedestrian mimesis see Isokrates 10.8  -ri]v  J.L€V 
dpxiJv  1"OU  /\oyov  1To~i]aOJ.Lu~ TI]v  dpxiJv  1"OU  y€vovS"  ul.h7]S"). 
.,. 
ovv 
We then have to  move to Plato and Xenophon, who  once more 
have not much to  tell us  about G.' s style. We have already pointed 
out that Agathon's speech should be construed as  a parody of G.'s 
style. This at least seems to  be Plato's explicit intention, voiced by 
Sokrates when Agathon completes his speech (Ka.t.  yap  J.LE  TOPYLOV 
I  Aristotle's views  on Sophistic rhetoric are  distorted even by  modem scholars; 
Gagarin (1994) has shown that Kennedy (a foremost authority on ancient oratory), 
by  quoting  Aristotle  in a  fragmentary  manner,  reaches  the  conclusion  that  the 
Sophists relied solely upon probabilities (eLK6ra),  and he thus makes the student 
of  Plato agree with his master's thesis, as it is expressed in Phaidros 267a. 
35 E7rE7rov87J .•• 198c).  Another  characteristic  noted  by  Plato  (Gorg. 
449b9ff. and Phdr. 267a-b) is that G.  (like Protagoras, see Pro  tag. 
334e,  335b) was able to  make a speech as  long or as  short as  he 
wanted to.  Dodds says that "Plato's language seems to  imply that 
the  avv-rop.£a  of Protagoras  and  G.  was  simply  a  laconic  style, 
'putting a thing in the fewest possible words",.1  Apart from these 
sporadic  remarks,  and  some more parodying of G.'s style  in the 
Apology and the lvfenexenos, Plato has nothing more specific to say. 
At  any  rate,  Plato  was  not  primarily concerned about how G.  or 
other orators spoke, but about the fact  that rhetoric departed from 
truth.  When he is  interested in making points  about  the  style of 
orators  he uses  his  excellent rhetorical  talent to  mimic  and thus 
parody them,
2 by using their own tools. 
Xenophon  does  not have much to  say;  he simply puts  in the 
mouth of  one of  the interlocutors in his Symposium a phrase (p.I.Kpa7s 
KVAl.ql.  P.I.KPa.  E7rI.if;€Kr5.~lJ.J(j1.  2,26),  which  is  rOpYI.E£OUI/.  pTjp.aal. 
expressed; this, we may infer, is probably because of  the compound 
verb  E7rLif;EKr5.~lJ.J(j1. and the repetition of  P.I.Kp-.  The only value of this 
short reference is probably that G.'s diction had become a synonym 
of' grandiloquent speaking'  . 
b)  Aristotle 
The first author who has more specific points to  make is  Aristotle, 
who is anyway the first to attempt a systematic approach to rhetoric; 
yet,  as  it  is  well  known,  Aristotle  is  not interested  in  individual 
orators, and for this reason we should bear in mind that most of the 
times  G.'s  writings  are  used  by Aristotle  as  examples.  We  have 
already said that it is in his Rhetoric that he contends that G.'s style 
is poetic (1404a24-27; see the discussion of  poetic diction and n.lO). 
I  Dodds (1959), p.195; in the same place in Phaidros Plato also says that through 
the power of speech, G.  along with Teisias, managed to  make unimportant things 
seem important, and also old issues seem new. 
2 See North 1991, pp. 201-219. 
36 He  elsewhere  quotes  G.  to  show  how  TO  ifroxpov  results  from 
compound words  and metaphors  (Rhet.  140Sb 38,  1418a34-6;  see 
notes  on  fr.15,  16),  and  that  G.  did  not  have  any  difficulty  in 
developing  epideictic  speeches,  as  he  included  a  good  deal  of 
material which was not directly related to  them (see fr.17).  He also 
says (Rhet.  1415b32-1416a3=fr.10) that the beginning of his praise 
of the  citizens  of Elis  is  too  abrupt, but again,  this  should not be 
taken  as  a  hostile  comment,  because  the  quotation  from  the 
beginning of  this speech (it is thanks to Aristotle that we possess the 
three  first  words  of  it)  is  used  to  show  that  Ta.  o€  TOU 
OTfP.TTYOP~KOU  .•• cPVUEI.  O€  7]KI.UT'U  EXEI.  [sc.  1TpOO[P.~uJ. However, none 
of these  quotations  comes from a preserved speech,  and it is  thus 
impossible to lmow in what context they were actually placed by G. 
But  even  the  examples  Aristotle  cites  do  not  always  find  their 
stylistic  parallels  in the  preserved texts.  There  is  not  an  equally 
clumsy metaphor, such as the one of fr.16,  or such a dull word, as 
7TTWX0P.OVUOKOliuKUS- (fr.15). 
c) Cicero 
Cicero pays much attention to the symmetrical construction of G.'s 
sentences;  in  the  Orator  38  (ut  crebro  conferantur  pugnantia 
comparenturque  contraria)  he remarks that some people maintain 
that symmetrical antithesis, along with parison and homoeoteleuton 
were firstly used by Tbrasymakhos and G. He later rightly suggests 
that  balanced  clauses  prompt  rhythm  (167),  but  he  seems 
inconsistent,  for  at  175  he  attributes  the  invention  of symmetry 
solely to G.!  Although he does not name G., it is clear that Cicero in 
Orator  84 has  him in mind when he maintains that the  author of 
'plain' style will avoid similar endings, symmetry etc. 
We may now pass to  the more general points that Cicero makes 
about  G.'s style;  in Orator 39, he refers to  Plato's Phaidros 266e, 
where  the  word  lioyooul.oclAOVS- is  used  to  stigmatise  G., 
1 See also Diodoros xn 53,2 (=TestA). 
37 Thrasymakhos  and  Theodoros.  His  exact  words,  by  which  he 
finishes  his  list of Aoyooa£OaAo,"  runs  as  follows:  Theodorum  inde 
Byzantium multosque alios quos AoyoOaL.oc:f,\ovs- appellat in Phaedro 
Socrates.  But if we tum to  Phaidros 266e4 we find out that Plato 
refers  to  rov  ye  {3eA-n(]'7"'OV  ,\oyooaLOa.1.0V  Bv~c£v-nov  rivopa,  and he 
has  not yet mentioned G  .. It seems thus that Cicero generalises, so 
as  to  prepare  the  transition to  a  comparison  of these  rhetoricians 
with the mirabiles  Herodotos and Thucydides. These orators, one of 
whom  is  G.  himself,  saris  arguta multa  sed ut modo primumque 
nascentia  minuta  et  versiculorum  similia  qaedam  nimiumque 
depicta  ('they show many clever phrases but these are  like a new 
and immature product, choppy, resembling verselets, and sometimes 
over-ornamented', Loeb translation). But not many critics, modem 
or ancient, would agree that Thucydides primarily,  and Herodotos 
probably, longissime tamen ipsi a talibus deliciis vel potius ineptiis 
afuerunt.  In  175-6,  Cicero  talks  solely  about  G.  and  he  there 
provides us  with a piece of information which we cannot con:finn: 
he says that G.  overuses metaphor and embroideries that make the 
speech more joyful (this  is what festivitatibus  must mean),  as  he 
himself [sc.  G.]  calls  them  (et  his festivitatibus  - sic  enim  ipse 
censet - insolentius abutitur).  Unfortunately,  Cicero  - if what he 
says is  accurate - tantalises us here, as  he does not give the Greek 
word for festivitatibus. We may speculate, and only speculate, that 
what he attributes to G. is perhaps associated with pleasure (rep¥JL.s-), 
which,  according to  our Sophist, has  a pivotal role  in persuasion 
(see Hel.  5, 13). 
d) Poetic style and Gonrias as the EVOErr7s- of  stylistic of  devices 
Most of the critics of  later antiquity who refer to  G.' s style seem 
to  focus  their  attention  on  the  poetical  features  and  the  use  of 
stylistic  devices  in his prose.  As  we  have  already  seen,  numerous 
critics  have  been particularly ready  to  adopt  Aristotle's  view that 
38 G. ' s prose is poetic. Y  e~ it is perhaps more interesting that each one 
of  them gives different reasons to explain why this is so. 
Philostratos  (who  came to  Rome when Septimus  Severus was 
emperor), has more to say in the Bf.ot..  IOcPurrwv,  at the beginning of 
which emphasis is given to the Sophists, and particularly to  G.  (see 
Test.  1); he first compares him to Aiskhylos, because each of them 
contributed significantly to his own individual art. After this general 
point, Philostratos passes to  more specific details;  he says  that G. 
was  the first  to  introduce unexpected expression  (7Tapa8o~oil.oy[a~), 
grandiloquence for important issues, d7Toa-rciaeL~ and 7Tpoa{3oil.ci~, that 
is  abrupt pauses  and passing to  different subjects,  and  finally  he 
comes  to  poetic words, which aim at ornamentation and grandeur. 
Among these attributes, only a few can be confirmed by the extant 
texts.  No  one would doubt that G.'s style is  pompous  and abrupt 
(ancient  critics  would  call  it  'austere'),  but  d7Toa-rciaeL~  and 
1Tpoa{3oil.aL  are certainly not the most typical features of  his style. His 
explanation of the function of poetic names  does  not present any 
originality to  be discussed (he merely says  that  they  function  as 
embroideries and they add to the seriousness of  the speech). Finally, 
Epistle  73,  probably by the same Philostratos,  addressed  to  Julia 
Domna,  does  not  add  much  (see  Test.35).  Philostratos  there 
reiterates  that  G.  employed  d7Toa-rciaeL~  and  7Tpoa{3oil.ci~,  which 
abound in Epic poetry. 
A nwnber of  critics have derogatory points to make about the use 
of stylistic  devices  in  G.;  the  great  critic  of the  Attic  orators, 
Dionysios  of  Halicarnassos,  frequently  mentions  G.  as  a 
representative of the pompous and grandiose style adopted by early 
rhetoricians. Syrianus records Dionysios' suggestion  (Test.29) that 
G.,  unlike  Lysias,  adopted the poetical style  (epp.TJveiav)  in prose, 
because  he  thought  that  orators  should  differentiate  their  speech 
from  that of the average citizen. But if one considers  the  fact  that 
Lysias wrote forensic speeches for a great range of people, whereas 
G.  composed  model-speeches  which  did  not  have  to  be  in 
39 correspondence with the personality of any historical person, one 
understands that Dionysios' explanation is not satisfactory. In other 
places Dionysios becomes more hostile;  in Isaias  19.2 (=Test.32), 
he contends that G.  was less competent in his use of poetical style 
and  grandiloquence  than  Isokrates,  because  he  lacked  the  self-
constraint  that  this  style  requires,  and  he  also  characterises  G.'  s 
expression as 'childish' (-rraLOapl.(;;)'T]). 
In  addition,  it  would  be  interesting  to  observe  that  in  Lys.3 
Dionysios  quotes  a  phrase that Sokrates  (PI.  Phdr.238d)  utters  to 
warn  Phaidros  that  the  rest  of his  speech  about  love  will  be 
expressed  ou  -rroppw  oLeUp~f3Wv  nvwv;  with  this  quotation, 
Dionysios becomes more specific: G.'s style is not only poetic, but 
it  also  adheres  to  a genre whose  style  is  manifestly  high-flown. 
Some  features  of  this  bombastic  style  are  brought  out  in 
Aristophanes' Birds 1372-1409: it was characterised by a fondness 
for rare, compound words which have a significant presence in G.'  s 
work (cp. Aristotle's criticisms ofG.'s style above). 
Dionysios, like many ancient critics, readily names such stylistic 
devices  as  parisosis,  antithesis,  paronomasia  etc  as  Topy£ELa 
('Gorgian'), a blanket-term which is  meant to  cover the combined 
use of these stylistic features; it was the excessive accumulation of 
these devices in his prose that made G.  appear as their EVPErfJ<;  (cp. 
for instance Dionysios Dem.2S.23). 
Hermogenes,  an author of the  imperial era,  claims that rhetors 
like G. were driven away (€:K'rpaXTJII.£~ouaL) by the tragedians, and by 
poets like Pindar, who  elaborate a T'paYLKov  style (meaning here a 
pompous, majestic style, fr.Sa). That he refers to  G.  is confirmed by 
the  fact  that  he  cites  as  an  example  of r/roxpov  style  the  phrase 
E/-LzPUXOU,  T'(lq;ou"  yV-rra,  from  the  Epitaphios.  His  language  is 
particularly  vitriolic,  for  he  describes  'sophists'  as  V-rrO,;vIl.OL<;, 
meaning  'faked', and he  goes  on  to  say that  it is  they whom we 
should truly call  Efl-z/iUXOU,  yV1Tas.  Hermogenes  also  comments on 
the disproportion of what G.  and his  students Meno and Polus say 
40 with  the  way  they  say it  (Test.29).  He  stigmatises  their use  of 
grandiloquent  style  for  unimportant,  common  ideas,  which  IS 
especially apparent when they employ devices, and all  or some of 
the things that are embroidered, exaggerated, and finally pompous. 
There is little doubt that Hermogenes is one among the most hostile 
critics of  G. 
Diodoros  of Sicily is  the  author who  informs  us  that that  G. 
arrived  in  Athens  in 427.  He  attributes  to  him the  invention  of 
rhetoric devices, and he claims that G.  amazed the Athenians, who 
were anyway taken in by nice words. He then specifies the stylistic 
devices  that  G.  was  the  first  to  use:  antithesis,  parisa, 
homoeoteleuton;  this  information is,  of course,  inaccurate because 
we  know that  these features  had a long history before 427,  since 
they were developed by the Presocratics and the poets. It is perhaps 
more interesting to  observe that Diodoros explains the plausibility 
of these devices  on the basis  of the difference in individual taste 
when G. used them from the taste of  his contemporaries. 
Athanasios  Alexandrinos,  in his Prolegomena on Hermogenes' 
IIep~ 'zTr1.aeWV  (see fr.5a) refers to Thrasymakhos' and G.'s students, 
who  used parison without any restraint,  but he also  says  that G. 
himself was  unwise  in  employing  it  (Kov~6Ta.TO~),  and  he  then 
ridicules him for using the well-known metaphor of yV7TGS as  'living 
tombs'.  It  is  the same metaphor that  irritated  the  author of  IIep~ 
"Y<pov~ as  well.  Yet,  no  matter how silly this  metaphor may have 
appeared to critics, it proved to be an influential one (see comments 
on Epitaphios). 
Another important critic of  antiquity is Demetrios (the date of  his 
work  is  unknown  to  us);  the  points  he  makes  about  G.  concern 
primarily the period of his  prose.  Demetrios (LI2) calls  G.' s,  like 
Isolaates'  and  Alkidamas'  epp.7]ve£a.  (his  word  for  'style') 
Ka.TEGTpa.P.P.€717],  with tightly connected shorter periods, to  which he 
opposes  epp.7JVe[a.  OI.7JP7]p.€717]  (that is  periods  loosely  connected to 
each other). He later contends (LIS) that a good speech should be a 
41 mixture of both these two styles,  because if it consists merely in 
dense  periods,  'the  audience  cannot  keep  their  heads  on  their 
shoulders,  as if  they are drunk,  and  they suffer from  headaches 
(vuv'w.lxn)  because  of the  oddity  of what  they  hear,  and  they 
sometimes  shout  the  end  of a  period  because  they  know  it  in 
advance', The last disclaimer must primarily concern symmetrical 
constructions, because, as we have already mentioned, G.  does very 
little  in  them  to  vary  his  diction.  There  is  one  more  word  that 
Demetrios  has  to  say about  G.,  and  this  is  that  his  (along  with 
Isokrates')  symmetrical  KlVf...U  expressing  antithesis  contribute  to 
'hi~bDess of  expression' (p.e/,aA.Wopf.q.). 
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MISSING 
IN 
ORIGINAL version of  the myth followed by G., I  Palamedes was falsely accused 
by Odysseus  that he betrayed Greece to  the Troj ans. In order to 
support this accusation, he forged a letter ostensibly sent by Priam 
to  Palamedes and placed it in the  tents of the latter along with a 
quantity of  gold. When Odysseus 'found' the gold and the letter, he 
accused Palamedes of treason, and after a trial heard by the Greek 
leaders  the  wise  hero  was  condemned  to  death.  G.  divides  his 
defence into two major parts: a) if  I had wanted to betray the Greeks 
to  the barbarians I would not have been able to  do so (6-12), and b) 
if  I had been able to do  it I would not have wanted to do it (13-21).
2 
The development of  the argumentation in both parts makes abundant 
use of probabilities: in the first part, Palamedes proves that all the 
necessary stages for the preparation of  the betrayal (communication 
with  Priam,  a  pledge,  the  transfer  of  money  etc.)  were  all 
impossible. His argumentation proceeds by conceding each step: in 
order to betray Greece I had to do A which was impossible; but even 
if A had been possible B would have been necessary;  but B  was 
impossible; even if  B had been possible, and so on.
3  This first part 
is,  basically, a presentation of probabilities which are proved to be 
invalid, due to practical reasons. In the second part, probabilities are 
employed in relation to  motives. It is an exhaustive examination of 
possible reasons for which one might have been tempted to commit 
the crime of treason (money, power, helping friends etc.); each one 
of  these  motives  is  dealt  with  separately  and  much  of  the 
persuasiveness lies both in the conformity of  the hero with generally 
accepted  moral  standards  and  in  the  detailed  discussion  of 
practically every possible motive. 
I For the myth ofPalamedes see Introduction. 
2  Note  that when probability arguments  are  employed,  hypothetical  clauses  are 
very likely to  appear; an ELKelS"  must have as  its starting point a hypothesis, which 
is  either confmned or rejected; in Pal., the two  hypotheses are rejected, whereas 
in He!.  the validity of the four hypothetical reasons for which Helen deserted her 
home is confmned (see also Anastassiou 1982, p.244). 
3 See below, 'the Russian doll' argumentation. 
45 The  Encomium  of Helen  is  not  marked  by  the  use  of 
probabilities; the mythological version adopted here is the Homeric 
one, according to which Helen did travel to  Troy with Paris (cp.  5 
ETTpaqEv  a.  ETTp~EV);  what  is  questioned  in  this  speech  is  the 
responsibility of  Helen. I The invention of  the reasons which made it 
possible for Helen to travel to Troy is the only trace of  probabilities 
in this speech (cp. 6 TCl,  alTiac;,  01.'  a.c;  ElKOC;  -ryv  YEveafJal.  TOV  rijS' 
'£).EV7!S'  Elc;  ""V  TpoLav  0'7"6"ov). These reasons are the following: a) 
the wish of the gods, b) natural violence, c)  speech-persuasion,. and 
d)  love. Each reason is  dealt with separately (as  are the motives in 
Pal.),2  and they are not mutually exclusive.  At any rate,  Helen is 
innocent; but her innocence, in this case, does not mean that she did 
not  desert  her husband,  or that  she  did  not travel  to  Troy  with 
another man: it means lack of  personal responsibility. 
The absence of  probability-arguments in Hel., and the ample use 
of them in Pal.  is  a first indication that G.  did not actually prefer 
probabilities to truth, and that the use of  this type of  argumentation 
is not a matter of choice, but a matter of necessity.3 In the case of 
1 Cole 1991, p.76 claims that Hel.  "is an illustration of  what later rhetoricians (for 
example,  Qu:int.  7.41)  would call the status qualitativus", whereas "Palamedes' 
defense ...  provides  a model for the status  coniecturalis - the  type of argument 
concerned with detennining what actually occurred (cf.  Cicero, De inv.  1.8.10)". 
Gagarin 1997, p.122 saw both in G.'s He!.  and Pal.  and in Antiphon's Tetralogies 
"a foreshadowing of stasis-theory in Aristotle (Rhet.  1.13.9-10, 1373b38-74a17), 
who distinguishes cases where the facts  are in dispute from those where the facts 
are admitted but the defendant denies there is a crime". At any rate, G. is aware of 
the fact that the two  cases differ to  this respect, and this awareness is  depicted in 
both texts: He!.  eyw  oe  ,BouAop.a.L •.• dp.a8[a, 2,  7Tp08-fpOfLUL  Td, a.i.Tia"  OL' a,  €i.KO, 
7}v  Y€Vea8aL  TOV  rii>'  £l..evTJ>  €i.,  Tpoiav  o-rOAOV  5,  and Pal.  ouoe  OLO'  iYrrw;;  av 
Eio€i7J  1'L,  OV  TO  j.L-lJ  Y€VOf.L€vov 5. 
~ See below, 'apagogic' argumentation. 
J  Gagarin 1994, p.54  rightly observes  that Helen's "case seems  well  suited for 
giving  probability  a  higher  value  than  truth,  since  many  different  versions  of 
Helen's actions  existed~  ..  in which she did not go to Troy", and concludes "G. has 
no  reason to  resort to probability arguments, since the basic facts are known and 
accepted",  though it is  not certain if  Euripides'  Helen  (included by  Gagarin in 
46 Pal.,  G.  undertakes  the defence of a man accused falsely.  At the 
very beginning of  the speech (4), he has Palamedes claim that he is 
in a situation of a:rrop[a.  (although he is  11'OPI-?LoS" par excellence 25, 
and indeed the hero who made human life 11'OPL?LOV  E:q  d11'opoU  30) 
due to  EK7rIl:TJ§r.s  created by groundless  accusation.  The only thing 
Palamedes  can  do  is  trust  'truth'  (dA.,p€£,a.),  and  'compulsion' 
(ciVa:YK7J),  which  (or  who)  are  dangerous  rather  than  resourceful 
teachers (a,aa.<TKciI\.wv  E:7rLKl.VaUlIO'iepWV  :r,  7r0pL?Lwrepwv). %y  is truth 
a dangerous teacher? Because in his case, the truth is that he has not 
committed the crime which he is  accused of - a disclaimer which 
admittedly  is  not  of much convincing  value  - especially  in  the 
absence  of witnesses.  G.  certainly  knows  that  judges  are  not 
persuaded by mere statements of innocence, which entails  that an 
approximation  of truth  through  arguments  should  be  employed 
instead. This is  exactly what probabilities serve for.  In the case of 
He!., the defence does not refute the facts; G., neglecting the moral 
of Stesichoros'  suffering,  seems  confident  enough  to  adopt  the 
Homeric version of  the myth: Helen did go to Troy. By doing so, he 
does not need probabilities. What is at stake in He!.  is the removal 
of her infamy on the grounds of reasonable excuses; the notorious 
trouble-maker has been the victim of  uncontrolled powers. 
It seems thus  that probabilities  appear when facts  are disputed 
and that they are more of a necessity than mere choice; but even in 
the  discussion  of  factual  reality,  G.  does  not  always  prefer 
probabilities. He must have realised that other means of persuasion 
are  sometimes  equally  effective  and  convenient.  In He!.  13,  he 
claims that a speech written with skill (reXVT/)  persuades an audience 
without necessarily telling the truth. The fonn of a speech is  there 
considered as a detenninant factor of  persuasiveness; if  the admirers 
of truth may now feel ready to  argue that this is  a further proof of 
these  versions)  existed  before  G.'s  He!.  The  dates  of both Pal.  and  He!.  are 
uncenain;  for  some  conjecrures  see  Orsini  1956,  p.82-88  with  summary,  and 
Introduction. 
47 the  (conscious)  sacrifice of real  facts  for  the  sake of persuasion. 
there  is  the  counter-argument  that  in  cases  like  the  one  of 
Palamedes, the truth is that he is an innocent person, who has the 
serious task of defending his  own honour and  life.  Who,  in other 
words,  would  today  accuse  an  advocate  defending  a  victim  of 
conspiracy on the  grounds of his  /  her eloquence,  especially in a 
case where the evidence is lacking? 
Another vehicle of  persuasion is, of course, direct evidence given 
by witnesses. In Pal.  22, the defendant holds that an  accusation is 
stronger  when  it  is  accompanied  by  witnesses  (-rncrro-repov  yap 
ou-rWS'  -ro  Ka.T"1n'OP7JJ1-U  J1-ufYT1JfYT'IJev).1  In the following paragraph (23) 
the hero addresses Odysseus with the following words: 
cL\i\a  ao~  P.€V  ,  "  .,./ 
OUK  TJV  OLOV  <-re>  p.ovov  p.a.prupuc;  cii\i\a 
1fevoop.a.prupuc;  evpe£.v,  €p.o~ o€  ovoe-repov  evpeLv  -rov-rwv  ouvu-rov. 
The point is  that Palamedes,  being  innocent,  could  not find  any 
witnesses  of  a  crime  which  has  never  been  committed;  but 
Odysseus, on the contrary, was able to  present both witnesses - in 
case Palamedes has committed the crime - and falsewitnesses
2 
- as, 
of course,  he  has  not  committed  the  crime.  The  reference  to 
witnesses, that is to say people with personal knowledge, shows that 
G.  was  aware  of and  able  to  use  means  which  nonnally  furnish 
direct  evidence.  This  point  becomes  more  interesting,  when  G. 
I The false  accusation of Odysseus is  implied in Pal.  7,  where the  defendant,  for 
the  argument's  sake,  concedes  the  possibility  of communication  with  Priam.. 
which entails that an interpreter should have been used. If this had occurred. the 
laner would have been a wimess of the transaction. The failure of the opponent to 
provide wimesses  or to  accept evidence by means  of f3d.aavOS"  (cp.  Pal.  11)  is  a 
topos; see .A.ntiphon 1.6.13,23 and 29-30. Most recendy Plant 1999, p.66-67, 71. 
Z For tfEUOO(.UIp-rupf.a see for example Antiphon 2.4.7, .A.ndokides 1.7, Lysias 19. ·t 
48 attempts to  transform Odysseus from an accuser into  a witness or 
even an accomplice (22): 
1TVeOP.EJlOS".  El  p.EJI  OUV  lawv,  ~p6..aov  TOUTOI.S"  <,071  ,P07TOV>  ,  ,071 
- ~  - ,/ 
'al.S"  aUTal.S"  0.1. Tl.al.S"  ••• 
To  sum up,  although probabilities  are  an  important vehicle of 
argumentation, G.  does  not value them  ahead of truth;  ElxOTa  are 
necessary in cases where real facts are disputed and where evidence 
is  lacking. 
1 Pleasure invoked in the audience by a skilled speech is 
also regarded by G.  as a factor which plays an important role in its 
persuasiveness, so that a good rhetor should take this parameter into 
account.  Lastly,  it  is  clear  that  direct  evidence  presented  by 
witnesses is known to G., and, what is more, he seems to  be aware 
of the  function  of this type of evidence,  so  that  he  can argue by 
using it. 
b)  Argument from antinomy 
This pattern of  argumentation (Aristotle describes it as ,07TOS"  EX  ,llW 
Evav,iwv) is founded on the location of antinomic or contradictory 
properties attributed to  one and the same entity.
2  It occurs both in 
On  not  Being  (ONB),  where  it  is  used  for  the  refutation  of 
philosophical arguments  and in Pal.,  where  it is  integrated in  the 
characterisation of  the opponent. 
In ONB G. puts forward three major theses: a) nothing is, b) if  it is 
it  is  unknowable,  and c)  if it  is  and  it  is  knowable  it  cannot be 
communicated to others. A problem which has tantalised scholars is 
what exactly this 'it' refers to. Some scholars have said that it is the 
phenomenal  world  in  general  and  some  others  that  it  is  the 
I  Cpo  Aris!.  Rher.  1376a17ff.:  TTLcrrwfl.a:ra  oe  7TepL  f.Ulp-roPLIJiV  p.a.p-ropa,  p.€v  !1-TJ 
exovn.  on  €K  nuv  eLKo-rwv  oei:  KpLveLv .•• KaL  on  OUK  ecrrLv  €qa7Tarr;aaL  -rei  eLKo-ra 
€7TL  a.pyvpLtJ,J,  KaL  on  oux  ciAE.aKe-ral.  -rei  eLKo-ra  .jJeu00iJ-UP-roPLWV. 
Z See Lloyd 1971, p.121 and Mansfeld 1990, p. 99-102 
49 fundamental entities of  the philosophers, abstract notions expressed 
by the term ovra. 
In the  second part  supporting  the  first  major thesis  (namely, 
'nothing  is'),  G.,  as  the  Anonymous  author  of  De  l\1elisso 
Xenophane  Gorgia  (MXG)  informs  us,· collected  contradictory 
properties  (-ravavria  979a15)  attributed  by philosophers  to  ovra; 
these  contradictory  properties,  according  to  Anonymous,  were 
discussed by G.  after the  'original prooe  (;.LeTa.  ri]v  r8wv  aVTou 
ci7TOO€L~!.V 979a24), in which he sought to show that 'it is not either 
for being or for not-being'. In the version given by the author of 
MXG these properties are discussed in 979b20-980a9, were we learn 
that 'if anything is'  (el  oe  EO'TLV),  it must be either generated or 
ungenerated, one or many, in motion or at rest.!  Each member of 
these  pairs  is  proved  impossible  (with  syllogisms  which  partly 
derive from axioms of  the philosophers themselves), and from that it 
is inferred that 'being is not' . 
In Pal.  25-26, the hero addresses the litigant; it is interesting that 
he  does  not  attack  Odysseus  on  the  grounds  of  personal 
characterisation (27, although numerous adjectives may have been 
used  against  Odysseus).2 The  characterisation of the  adversary is 
1 The list of properties attributed to  OJl"7"!1 by philosophers is fuller in MXG979b20-
980a9, for Sextus does not include the pair in motion / at rest. This pair is absent 
in  the  'doxographical'  summary  in  MXG979al4-18,  but  it  is  traced  m 
XenMem.1.1.l4.  (Mansfeld  1990,  246-247  investigates  the  historiography  of 
philosophy as a Sophistic activity and he shows how later doxographical accounts 
depend  on it.  G.'s  ONB  does  not merely intend to  record earlier ideas  out of 
historical  interest,  but it clearly seeks  to  refute  them on the  basis  of 'logical' 
antinomies. 
1 Cole 1991, p.73 classifies the lack of  ethos as one among other characteristics of 
late  fIfth-century  rhetoric:  "the absence of any attempt to give ethos  to  what is 
said by  making  it suggest the  character of the person or class of person who  is 
saying it...points to  the demands of the practice and demonstration text" (p.79). 
There  is  no  doubt,  I  tb:ink,  that  G.'s  Hel.  and  Pal.  are  intended  for  practical 
didactic purposes, and a need for general applicability is also discernible; but this 
is  rather  different  from  saying  that  ethos  is  totally  absent.  In  his  self-
50 built on two separate arguments: in the first one Palamedes explains 
. that  Odysseus  rests  his  accusation  upon  belief (S6gcr.),  which  is 
defined as an ci1TLO'Tarcr.Toll  1Tpcr.yP.cr.;  serious accusations, we are tol<L 
should  be  based  on  finn  knowledge.!  The  second  part  of the 
characterisation, Palamedes  lists  his  inventions,  which are presented as  a  great 
benefaction to  the Greeks  and humanity in general (30).  Tnese are very unique 
virtues peculiar to this specific hero, and it is  impossible to  think of any of G.'s 
students who might have been in a position to  claim that he was the inventor of 
letters. It is  now true, that much of the self-dIaracterisation of Palamedes makes 
use  of standard moral values  (29-32):  he has  never been accused of anything 
before (29; notice that AOLoopia, an inaccurate accusation, OUK  €XOVC7ClV  8\EJIXOV, is 
imputed to  the opponent); he  does  not cause pain to  the  elderly,  he helps the 
young,  he  does  not envy  prosperous  people,  he  sympathizes  with those  who 
suffer  ...  (32): in short, Palamedes is  in absolute conformity with moral standards 
and  G.  is  thus  teaching  prospective  rhetoricians  how  to  use  the  stock  of 
conventional morality. This does not, I am inclined to  believe, imply the absence 
of ethos; it implies a twofold function of the self-cbaracterisation: a) to present an 
impeccable Palamedes for the purposes of The  Defence of  Palamedes,  that is  a 
Palamedes whose profile does not deviate from the mythical account, and b) to 
offer a paradigm of general applicability. If  my reading is correct, then Cole's 
suggestion seems to be an unjustified generalisation (I acknowledge, of course, 
that Cole examines  a  greater range of texts;  my point is  simply that G.  is not 
among those who neglect ethos). 
1  G.'s  texts  have  regularly  been  interpreted  under  the  light  of a  distinction 
between 'knowledge' and 'belief; the most eloquent representative of this line of 
inquiry has been Kerferd 1981, pp.81-82, who claims that "it is possible to discern 
a common conceptual modeL. .on the one hand is the real world, labelled truth or 
that  which  is  true.  The  cognition  of this  real  world  is  knowledge.  But  the 
commonest cognitive state is  opinion, not knowledge, and logos ...  operates upon 
opinion".  Long  1982,  p.240,  has  rightly  explained  that  "this  is  an unjustified 
systematisation  of Gorgias'  principal  preserved  writings"  (see  also  Schiappa 
1999, pp.125-126). The artificiality of this  distinction cannot be shown here; it 
will suffice to say that it appears only  in Pal.  3 and 24,  in a context which does 
not allow for generalisations. Hel.  11  has also been taken to  depict the prevalence 
of knowledge, but knowledge is  not mentioned there at all.  It is  simply said that 
'belief (oo~a) is slippery (see MacDowell 1982, note ad loc.). I consider that this 
systematisation  is  partly  the  concomitant of considering  ONE  as  a  treatise  in 
which  G.'  s  own  theoretical  credo  is  embedded  and  explicitly  put  forward. 
However, this text is (and probably was intended to be) open to different readings; 
51 apostrophe  to  the  opponent  makes  use  of an  argument  from 
antinomy; what is at issue here is the unreliability of a litigant who 
in referring to  a person, attributes to  this very person contradictory 
properties. 
In this context, Palamedes refers to  the speech of accusation in 
which Odysseus  had allegedly claimed that  the  defendant is  both 
wise and mad; wise in respect to his resourcefulness, mad in respect 
to the fact that he betrayed the Greeks (25): 
,J../  \  ",.  'r"  \', v  e  v  crOyA  .. av  Kal..  jJ-av~av,  I.IX17TEp  aux  a  av  TE  TOV  aUTOV  av pW7TOV  EXE  I.. V. 
01TOU  jJ-EV  yap  jJ-E  </ri:p  Elval..  TEXV17EvTa  TE  KaL  OEL.VaV  KaL  1TOpL.jJ-OV, 
cro<jJLav  jJ-ou  KaT7JYopEl..s,  01TOU  OE  AeYEL.S  rk 7TpouoLoouv  T7Jv'EL\aoa, 
jJ-avLav ..• 
What we have here is a game of  chess played by a single player: G., 
in defending Palamedes, has the privilege of answering accusations 
made by himself, while it should be noticed that these accusations 
could reasonably have been put forward by one who  might have 
wished to  capitalise on the overwhelming potential of this hero; if 
Palamedes  is  so  resourceful,  then  he  has  probably  used  his 
resourcefulness  for  malicious  purposes.  The  argument  from 
antinomy,  though more  simple here  than in ONE,  is  obvious;  the 
'two  totally  contradictory  properties'  (OUO  Tel.  €vavTLun-a-ra.) 
ostensibly  ascribed  to  Palamedes  by  Odysseus  make  the  latter's 
accusation contradictory itself,  from  which it is  logically inferred 
far  from  putting  forward  new  theories,  it  questions  the  validity  of established 
ones.  If the  message  of ONB  is  that philosophical  systems  claiming  absolute 
approaches to  truth are refutable, as  I think it is,  then it may turn out to  be  the 
worst source of information for  G.' s own premises, if  they existed at  alL  In my 
view,  ONB  should  be  read  as  a  criticism  on  the  process  of philosophical 
reasoning, as  a scrutiny of philosophical discourse. The fragility  of philosophical 
reasoning recurs in He!.  13 as well. 
52 that his accusation is unreliable (lTWs- x.piJ  dvopl.  TOLOVTqJ  1Tt.O'7"eVeLV, 
OO'7"t.S  TOV  ClVTOV  AOYOV  AEywv  7Tpes- TOVS  ClVTOVS  dVOpClS  7Tepi.  TWV 
antithesis).  The  defendant  concludes  that  Odysseus  is  a  liar  (at.' 
dfJ-~OTepCl av  eL7JS  rpeUO-ryS  26), by using the same argument. He asks 
him if he deems wise men as  cppOVLfJ-Ot.  or dvo7JTot.;  if wise men are 
dvo7JT0I...  Odysseus' claim is a flagrantly untrue novelty. If  they are 
cppOVlfJ-(JI..  they  do  not  prefer  sufferings  to  goods  they  already 
possess. I  The conclusion is: eL  p.€v  ovv  eLfJ-1.  aocpos,  oux TJfJ-ClPTOV'  e:l 
a'  TJfJ-ClpTOV,  ou  aocpos  eLfJ-I.;  in either case Odysseus' accusations are 
proved to be false, the opponent is a liar. 
Logical argumentation is thus in G.'  s hands a means of  bringing 
out the ethos of the opponent; instead of a personal attack, we are 
provided with  an  analysis  of the  logical  contradictions  resulting 
from  the opponent's charges.  Two  points  should be made:  a)  the 
clarity with which this pattern of argumentation is presented serves 
as  an example of G.'s teaching practices and the need for general 
applicability; having this example in min~  students of rhetoric can 
easily argue from antinomy. b) the ethos of  the opponent (not that of 
the defendant) is not presented on the basis of  personal attack; if  one 
is  reluctantly tempted to  indulge in a discussion of the morality of 
Gorgian rhetoric by comparing the method of  attack employed by G. 
with  that  used  by  fourth-century  orators  (say  by  Aiskhines  in 
Against Timarkhos), where even false  evidence is  used against the 
personalities of the opponents
2
,  then we may conclude that G.  was 
almost naIve. 
c)  Theorisation and examples 
This pattern is related to  reasoning involving speculation, which is 
not directly relevant to  the theses  defended.  Criticism has  focused 
1 In the theory of  rhetoric this type of  argument is called dillema. 
2  On inaccurate personal attack. see Halliwell 1991, pp.292-294, Harding  1994, 
pp.196-22L 
53 mainly on the discussion of  AOyOS" by G. in Hel. 8-14; this part of  the 
speech includes  one of the  earlier approaches  to  the  function of 
speech and persuasion (1TeL8cfJ),  especially in connection to its impact 
on the human soul: poetry, incantations, the perception of  speech by 
audiences,  persuasive  speech  are  all  employed  to  exemplify  the 
omnipotence of  ,1.oyoS". However, it is critical to bear in mind that G. 
does  not  support  his  argumentation  by  the  means  of theoretical 
discourse solely in this part of  He!.  The final reaso~ namely love, is 
from the very beginning of  its analysis linked to oljJl.S"  ('vision'), and 
what follows is a theoretical evaluation of  the function of this sense 
in relation with the emotional world. 
The impact of ,1.0Y0S"  upon the the emotional world of men has 
been admirably examined by Segal;  1 what I intend to do is to show 
a)  the ways  in which the combination of theoretical generalisation 
with the  use of examples contributes to  the argumentation in He!. 
and b)  that  the  separate  arguments  included in the discussion of 
,1.oyoS" and love are underlined by a common pattern. of  analysis. 
In 8,  ,1.0Y0S" is defined as a great ruler with extreme powers (II.0Y0S" 
DVVcl.aT1}S"  p.t€yas  €G'Tl.v);  the  realm  of His  activity  is  chiefly  the 
emotional world of  men. In order to demonstrate the impact of  II.0Y0S" 
upon our emotions G. brings in two examples corresponding to two 
different kinds of  ,1.0YOL:  poetry, defined as lI.oyov  exovTa.  fJ-€TPOV  (9), 
and  incantations,  Ev8eOL  Dui  ,1.0Ywv  €1TCpaa.i  (10).  Poetry awakens 
within the souls of audiences emotions for the sufferings of others 
(that is, with the  'suspension of disbelief'  audiences partake in the 
reality of  the literary event), and incantations - by means of  magical 
charming (Y07J1"e£as  Kul  j.La.ye£a.s-)  - make the soul act independently 
I  Segal  1962,  p.99-155;  according  to  this  scholar  Hel.  appeals  more  to  the 
emotional aspect of persuasion., whereas Pal.  makes use of  logical reasoning. This 
distinction is somewhat elusive, because the rationaiistic approach to AOyOS'"  is one 
thing, and the impact of AOyOS- upon the emotional world itself quite another (see 
Anasrassiou 1982, pp.246-247). 
54 of its own will. In both examples, speech enters the soul physically, 
and the schema applied is common in both cases: 
poetry ~  soul ~  emotions 
incantations -+ soul -+ enchannnent 
Both poetical  and  verbal  incantations  (OLa.  AOYWV)  enter  the  soul 
(ELa7jA8E,  avYYI.YVOf-LEV7J) and they affect it.! 
The  same  pattern  recurs  in the  analysis  of love  (15-19);  the 
logical  discussion  of  a  notoriously  irrational  emotion2  IS 
foreshadowed from the very beginning: G.  links Jpws to  i5l/JL~ and he 
remarks that 'the objects of  our sight do not have the nature that we 
want  them  to  have,  but the  one they happen to  have'  (15).  The 
problem, now, seems to be that 'soul is moulded by vision'  (OLa.  O€ 
rij~  OrpEWS  iJ  rf;vx:iJ  Kav  -ro'i~  -rp01TOL~  'T'V1Tov-raL).  An example which 
supports this thesis is brought in:
3 when soldiers face the weapon of 
the  enemies,  their  soul  is  in  panic,  so  that  they  fly  without 
considering the detrimental consequences of their action (16).  The 
function of  OrpL~ is  based on the same pattern of analysis  already 
employed in the context of  Aoyo~-arguments: 
vision -+ soul-+ flight (1TOAEf-LLU  (]'wf-La-ra •.. -+  E-r6.pa~E -rryv  ifrox:frv-+ 
<PEVYOV(]'LV  EK1TAayEv-rE~). 
1 Mourelatos  1982, pp.229-230 righdy maintains that the discussion of logos  in 
He!.  is  basically behavioural, but he fails  to  observe that the same holds  for  the 
discussion of  vision as well. 
1  This  is  explicitly  acknowledged  by  G.  (d  a'  €OTi.v  av8punnvov  vOCJ77JUl.  KcU. 
.Jmxi7>  ayvo7JJ.U1.,  mix W,  ci.~prT]JUl.  jJoCP.r.rEOV  aM' w,  aruX7Jp.a  VOfUOTEOV  19); the 
superiority oflove because of its divine narure (0,  €i.  p.ev  Beo,  B€wv  BeLav  oUva.p.Lv 
<€xwv>19)  is  not the cornerstone of G.'s reasoning (it is  mentioned in passing), 
and  it  is  worth noticing that it is  rationalised in  the  way  that divine powers  are 
rationalized in 6. 
3  The  examples  adduced in  15-19  correspond to a distinction  between negative 
(16,  17,  mainly fear)  and positive (18,  mainly pleasure invoked by painting and 
sculprure) emotions. 
55 Vision is again presented as coming physically (ElteoiJaa  16) into 
the  soul,  which  is  'moulded'  (nnroiJral.  15;  notice  also  that  the 
images of  vision seen in the past are 'engraved', EV€:ypar/;ev  17). 
The  generalisation  about  the  function  of vision  is  completed 
with a reference to emotions aroused by fine arts (19). It is assumed 
that the function of  painting and sculpture is to  provide vision with 
pleasant images, and, what is  more, from the products of art 1TIJeO, 
and  EpWS- can be generated. If one can possibly fall  in love with a 
statue (the example of  Pygmalion is telling), then Helen's falling in 
love with statuesque Paris is perfectly comprehensible. 
It  has  been  made  clear,  I  hope,  that  the  reasoning  In  the 
discussion of both Itoyo,  and love  develops  with  a  good  deal  of 
theorisation, which in some respects  follows  a common pattern of 
analysis concerning the relation of the stimuli to  the emotions that 
they  invoke in the  souL  But what is  the  value of this  pattern in 
association with the development of the reasoning for the  case of 
Helen? 
The answer is partly given by the text itself:  at 12,  Helen 
1  is 
called a victim of  persuasion, and at 19 we are told that we should 
not consider Helen's falling in love with Paris  as  a strange thing, 
simply because her eye (sic) happened to see his body. G. then uses 
theorisation because he relies on analogies: if Itoyo,  is  omnipotent, 
as  it  is  shown that it is,  in what manner could Helen escape his 
power? If  objects of  vision contaminate our souls, as it is shown that 
they do,  how then could Helen's soul avoid contamination by the 
statuesque body of  Paris? In the theoretical pattern of reasoning, the 
person defended is just another example that COnDnnS the theory. In 
addition,  theorisation  has  the  virtue  of explaining,  giving  logical 
1  In spite of the  texrual  problems  the  meaning is  clear,  G.  is  clearly trying  to 
present Helen as  a victim of persuasion. That he intends us  to  consrrue Helen as 
another example corurrming the view that persuasion is  as  effective as  violence 
and necessity is brought out by the wording itself  (KcU.  rirv' £)"EV'TJI')' 
56 meamng  to  things  otherwise  self-evident.  Everyone  has  perhaps 
fallen in love; G. is there to show (in his own way) why and how this 
occurs. From an excuse love is elevated to a very important reason. 
In  conclusio~ the  discussion of ,16yoS"  in He!.  8-14,  however 
interesting  implications  for the history of criticism in antiquity  it 
may have, is intended as a separate argument of  equal significance; 
theorisation is  used both in the examination of logos and in that of 
love.;.visio~ where examples play an important role.  The value of 
this pattern lies in that., by generalising, it is analogously applicable 
to  individual cases (in this case, Helen). We also  have to  assume, 
that much of the persuasiveness of theorisation through examples 
may have been the product of  €K7TII.7Jg~S"  experienced by audiences 
(or readers)  resulting from  the impressive ability of the  rhetor to 
apply elaborate 'lmowledge' to demanding intellectual issues. There 
is  one  more question:  if ,16yoS"  is  able to  deceive,  why should we 
become  the  victims of the person who has just shown that  lI.oyos 
deceives?  This  is  a matter of a  second-order reading of He!.,  and 
should  be  left  open. 
1  Personal  answers  are,  of course,  always 
available. 
d) Apagogic and the 'Russian doll' argumentation 
I include these two types in my classification reluctantly,  for they 
concern  fonnal  schemata of reasoning.  However,  I  hope  that  the 
investigation of  their role in G.'  s reasoning will be compensating. 
Apagogic  reasoning  is  employed  both  in  He!.  and  in  the 
discussion of motives  in Pal.;  in the former,  each reason is  dealt 
with separately,  and none of them results  from  or presupposes the 
preceding one.
2 This is brought out from the text itself, because the 
I  For  the  role  of  ci:rrci:rry  in  G.,  see  Verdenius  1981,  pp.116-128;  although 
Verdenius' study is  learned and still up-to-date, in my view the phrase 'doctrine 
of deception' clearly overstates our evidence. 
l  However, Porter 1993, p.275, is certainly right in holding the view that "if  G.  is 
trying to  keep his aitiai  apart. he is trying no  less hard to  make that task next to 
impossible" . 
57 transition from each reason to the following one is clearly marked (7j 
,  6  '  ~'R'  7  ,~  ,  \'  •  ,  8'"  ,  ,  yap...  El.  OE  /"'Lq....  ,  El.  OE  I\OYOS- 0  -rrEL(]US...  Kal.  07"t.  fJ-El',  El. 
AOyCP •. . 15,  -rryv  OE  TEn1.prrJV  aLTiav  Tcii  TEn1.p-rcp  AOYCP  OL€~El.P.1.  15). 
G.  invents four reasons, each one of  which is  intended to show the 
same thing: Helen is  not responsible. The same process is traced in 
Pal.  13-21.  G.  distinguishes  between two  types  of motives  (19): 
people commit crimes either in pursuit of  a gain or in avoidance of  a 
loss  (7}  KEp80~  Tl.  f-LETl.OVTE~  7j  ~7Jp.£av  cf;EvyovTE~)  et tenium  non 
datur. All the motives presented fall within those two categories; the 
arguments put forward show that if  the defendant had committed the 
crime  of treason.,  he  would  have  had  the  opposite  results.  The 
apagogic reduction both in Hel.  and in Pal.  is  used because each 
independent argument is meant to be perceived as being as strong as 
the rest of  them. In other words, G.  is not compelled to present each 
step in any particular order, because in these cases his material does 
not impose upon him such a process. 
On the contrary, the first major division of  Pal.  (6-12) proceeds 
with the 'Russian doll' schema, which I take it to be an indication of 
G.' s  awareness  that  motives  and  actions  corroborate  the 
argumentation in a different manner.  As  each new smaller doll is 
brought out from a 'Russian doll', in the same manner each stage in 
the  discussion  of the  actions  preparing  an  alleged  betrayal  is 
presented as  logically following the preceding one
l
.  The more the 
arguments  represent  a  logical  string  of  acts,  the  more  the 
argumentation is benefited; this is why the first argument deals with 
what should have normally been the starting point ofa betrayal (6): 
I  In  Long's  words  (1982),  p.235  "the  sequence  of claims  is  assumed  to  be 
exhaustive,  leaving  the  opponent no  perch for  any  reply",  and further (237)  he 
points  out  that  the  elimination of the  defendant's  opportUnities  "amount to ...  a 
reconstruction of the alleged treachery from its beginning to its end". 
58 eO€L  yap  nva  1tpw-rOV  UpxT1v  y€veaeal.  rijs  1Tpooouias,  -r,  O€  ci.px-Tj 
AOYOS  all  €rTf  -rrpo  yap  'iWV  l-LeAAOV'iWV  epywv  dvayK7]  AOyOVS 
yf. yv€afJal.  -rrpO'i€POV ••• 
That each argument concedes the preceding one is  indicated by the 
introductory phrase of each new argument: dUd.  o7J  TOtiTO  n!J  AOyCp 
ovvaTOv  y€veafJal. ...  7,  dMd.  o7J  Ka~  TOUTO  y€veafJw,  Kai1T€p  ou 
Y€VOf.l.€vov ...  8,  c/rfJU€L  ns  ...  9,  Ka~  0-iJ 
, 
TOI.VVV  y€veafJw  Kal.  Td.  /-L7J 
y€vO/-L€va .•. 11  etc. It is also worth our attention that the second major 
division is actually introduced by conceding the first one: 'if  it were 
by  all  means  possible  (€l  l-L6J\I.G'Ta.  1TaV'iWV  €ovva/-L7]lI),  for  what 
reason would I have wished to  do  these things?' (6).  The value of 
this type of  argumentation lies in the fact that it presents a cohesive 
string  of arguments,  based  on  logical  assumptions.  It  can  be 
conceived as a representation of  the crime, in which the defendant is 
ab le  to  show that what is  presented by the  accuser  as  a  fact  is 
nothing but assumption. 
The same pattern is followed in the philosophically oriented On 
not Being; each one of  the three major theses concedes the previous 
one: nothing is (A), ifit is, it is not possible to have lmowledge of  it 
(B), ifit is and it is possible to have lazowledge o/it, it is impossible 
to communicate it to others (C). Although the schema is the same, it 
is  not used to  the same extent in the individual arguments of this 
texts, as it happens in Pal. 6-12. 
In short, G.  seems to  arrange his arguments in accordance with 
the nature of the case he defends; actions, normally developing in a 
linear,  consecutive order, suggest a similarly linear and  exhaustive 
representation,  which  demands  some  logical  participation  of the 
audience. In the case of self-contained arguments on the other hand 
the  argumentation  is  apagogic;  different  theses  are  supported  by 
independent arguments: in Hel.  each reason is argued separately, so 
that  the  refutation of her infamy is  based on  four  equally  strong 
reasons;  analogously,  in  Pal.  13-22  each  motive  is  dealt  with 
59 Separately as we1l, and it is shown that none of  them could have led 
the hero to perform the act that he is accused of. 
G. 's  argumentative  process  does  not  merely  consist  ill 
probabilities; Plato  in his  Phaidros (267a)  simply  singles  out the 
type of argument which makes G.  susceptible to  criticism, in view 
of  the fact that probabilities do not reproduce factual reality. A sober 
assessment  of the  argumentation  used  by  this  Sophist,  which  is 
based on a  close reading of his own  preserved  texts,  shows  that 
various  argumentative patterns  are  employed by G.  and that he  is 
wise enough not to  ignore factual reality.  G.'s reasoning is  not as 
simple as it is usually taken to be. 
60 TEXTS AND FRAGMENTS 
61 11 
ropyLov 
(1) Koaf-Lo~ 1TOII.EL  f-LEV  EvuvopLu,  aWf-Lun  OE  KaMo~, ifJuxfj  OE  a0cPLu, 
1TpaYf-LUn  OE  apET1"  lI.oYlP  OE  all.1,8ELa·  Ta.  OE  EVUVTLU  TOVTWV 
aKoaf-LLu.  avopu  OE  KuL  yuvaZKU  KuL  lI.oyov  KuL  epyov  KU~ 1TOII.Lv  KU~ 
1TpaYf-Lu  XPTJ  TO  f-LEV  a;LOV  E1TULvou  E1TULVlP  nf-Lav,  TqJ  OE  avu;LlP 
f-LWf-LOV  E1TLn8EVUI.·  raT}  yap  af-LUpTtU  KU~  af-Lu8Lu  f-LEf-LcPEaeuL  TE  Ta 
E1TUI.VETa  KuL  E1TUI.VELV  Ta  f-Lwf-L-rrra.  (2)  TOU  0' UVTOU  avopo~ M;ul. 
TE  TO  OEOV  op8w~  KU~  EII.Ey;UI.  TOV~  f-LEf-LcPOf-LEVou~tEAEV~V,  YUVULKU 
1TEpL  TJs  (,f-LOcPWVO~  KuL  (,f-LoifJuxo~  YEyOVEV  7j  TE  TWV  1TOI.7]TWV 
aKouaaVTWV  1T{aTl.~  7j  TE  TOU  OVOf-LUTO~  cP1,f-L7],  0  TWV  auf-LcP0PWV 
f-LV1,f-L7]  yEyOVEV.  EYW  OE  {3ovII.Of-LUI.  >..oYWf-LOv  nvu TqJ  >"0YlP  OOV~ rTJV 
f-L€V  KUKW~  aKovouauv  1TUUaUI.  rijs  UlTtU~,  TOV~  O€  f-LEf-LcPOf-LEVOU~ 
ifJEuOOf-LEVOU~  E1TLOEL;UI.  KUt.  OEL;UI.  Tall.7]8E~  <KuL>  1TUUaUI.  rij~ 
af-LU8Lu~. 
(3)  an f-L€V  oov  cPvaEI.  KUt.  "lEVEL  Ta.  1Tp6JTU  TWV  1TPWTWV  avopwv  KUt. 
YUVUI.KWV  -r,  yuvTJ  1TEPi.  ~~  aOE  (,  >"oyo~,  OVK  a07]lI.ov  ovoi::  OIl.Lyol.~. 
o7]lI.ov  ya.p  iUs  f-L-rrrpo~  f-LEV  A1,ou~,  1TUTpO~  DE  TOU  f-L€V  YEVOf-LEVOU 
8EOU,  TOU  DE  II.EY0f-LEVOU  8v-ryrou,  TuvDapEw  KUt.  L1LO~,  ilJv  0  f-LEV  Ol.a. 
TO  EIvul.  EDo;Ev,  0  OE  DLa.  TO  cPavul.  ijIl.Erx8~.  KUl.  ~v 0  f-LEV  avopwv 
KpanaTO~ (,  DE  1TavTwv  rVpuvvo~. (4)  EK  TOWVTWV  DE  YEVOf-LEV~ eOXE 
TO  Lao8Eov  Kall.lI.o~,  0  >..u{3ouau  KUi.  013  lI.u80uau  eOXE"  1TII.E£aTU~  OE 
1TII.E£aTOI.~  E1TL8uf-L£.u~  EPWTO~  EVEl.pyaauTo,  €vi.  DE  aWf-Lun  1TOMa. 
aWf-LUTU  auVT,yUYEV  avopwv  E1T/.  f-LEyaIl.OI.~  f-LEYU  cPPOVOVVTWV,  ilJv  oL 
f-LEV  1TII.OVTOU  f-LEYE87],  oL  OE  EVYEVE£U~  1TuII.Ul.a~  EVOO;£uv,  oL  O€ 
62 .!\  - ,~,  ,  c/  ,~,  -I.'  ,  ,  ~,  v  [J./\.KTJS  wt.US  eves t.UV,  ot.  oe  ao",t.US  e1TLK'T"7JTOV  OVVUP.LV  eaxov- KUI. 
oans  p.ev  ODV  KUI.  01.'  on  KUI.  O1TWS  G.1Te1TATJae  T<JV  epwru  rryv 
'BevTJv  Au{3wv,  ou  Aegw'  TO  yap  TOtS  ei06aLv  a  rauaL  A€yeLv  1TLanv 
p.ev  EXeL,  Tep!f;Lv  oe  ou  ~epeL. TOV  xpovov  oe  T<fJ  AOYCP  TOV  TOTe  VUV 
tJ1Tep{3as  €1Tl.  rryv  G.pxiJv  TOU  p.eMOVTOS  AOYOU  1Tpo{3fJaop.UL,  KUI. 
1TpOefJaop.UL  Tas  ulTLus,  Ot.'  as  eiKcJs  ~v yeveaeuL  TOV  rijs 'BevTf.> 
ei<;  ryv  TPOLUV  a-rOAov. 
(6)  7}  yap  TvXTf.>  {3ouAfJp.uat.  KUI.  eewv  {3ovAevp.uat.  KUC.  '  AVa.YKTf.> 
!f;TJ~Lap.uat.v  E1Tpugev  a  E1Tpa,gev,  7}  {3~q.  ap1Tuaee'iau,  7}  AOyot.s 
1Tet.aee'iau,  <7}  EpwrL  cL\ouau>.  el  p.ev  ODV  OLa  TO  1TpclrrOV,  agws 
ulnCiaeut.  (,  ulnwp.evos·  8eou  yap  1TpOeUP.LUV  G.V8pW1TLVT]  1Tpop.TJ8iq. 
,~,  \'  '-1.  '  "  - "-'- UOUVUTOV  KWI\VeLV.  1Te",UKe  yup  OU  TO  KpeLaaov  U1TO  TOU  TJaaovos 
G.AAa  TO  ~aaov  "  ~  U1TO  TOU  KpeLaaovos  apXeaeUL  KUI. 
ayeaeUL,  KUi.  TO  p.ev  Kpe'iaaov  ir;e'iaeUL,  TO  oe  ~aaov E1TeaeUL.  eeo<; 
o '  G.VepW770U  Kpe'iaaov  KUi.  {3[q.  KUI.  ao~[q. KUL  TO'iS  aAAOLS.  el  oJv rij 
Tvx:a  KUI.  T41  ee41  rryv 
ovaKAe[us  G.1TOAUT€OV. 
,  , 
ULTLUV 
MjAOV  on  (,  <p.ev>  ap1Ta.aus  Ws  u{3p[aus  -ryoLKTJaev,  i]  oe  ap1TUaeeZau 
Ws  v{3pLaee1au  €oua-nJXT]aev.  agws  ODV  (,  p.ev  €1TLxeLpfJaus  {3a.p{3upos 
{3a.p{3upov  €1TLXeLpTJp.u  KUL  AOYCP  KUi.  vop.cP  KUI.  epycp  AOYCP  P.EV 
ulTiu<;,  vop.cP  OE  G.np.£us,  EPYCP  OE  'TJP.LUS  TUXe'iv- TJ  oe  {3waee1au 
KUL  TfjS  1TUTpioo<;  a-rep7]8eZau  KUi.  TWV  ~£AWV Op~uvLaee'iau 1TW<;  OUK 
aV  eLKoTWS  €Ae7]8eiTJ  P.CiAAOV  7}  KUKoAoy7]8eLTJ;  (,  P.EV  yap  Eopuae 
oeLVa,  TJ  OE  E1Tu8e'  O[KUWV  ODV  rryv  P.EV  olKTLpeLV,  TOV  OE  p.urijauL. 
(8)  el  oe  AOYOS  (,  1Teiau<;  KUI.  rryv  1f;vxiJv  G.1Tu-rf]au<;,  ovoe  1TpOS  TOUTO 
XUAe1Tov  G.1ToAoyrJaUaeUL  KUi.  rryv  UlTLUV  G.1ToAvaUaeUL  woe.  AOyOS 
ouvua-rTJs  p.eyu<;  €a-rLV,  os  ap.LKponlTcp  awp.un  KUI.  G.~uvea-ra.Tcp 
e€LOTUTU  EPYu  G.1ToTeAe'i·  OVVUTUL  yap  KUI.  cf>o{3ov  1TuUaut.  KUI.  AV1TTJV 
G.~eAe'iv  KUI.  xupav  Evepya.aUaeUL  KUI.  EAeov  E1Tuugfjaut..  TUUTU  oe  Ws 
OVTWS  ExeL  oeigw'  (9)  oe'i  OE  KUI.  06g7]  oe'iguL  TO'i<;  aKovouaL'  rryv 
1TOL TJat.v  Q.1Tuauv  KUL  VOP.L'W  KUC.  ovop.a.,w  AOYOV  EXOVTU  p.eTpov·  ~<; 
TOU<;  G.KOVOVTUS  el~Aee KUC.  cf>P~KTJ  1Tepicf>o{3o<;  KUI.  EAeo<;  1TOAVOUKPU<; 
63 KUt.  7To8o~  <jJL)..07TEV8-!Js,  E7T'  dJV..OTpLWV  Te  7TpUYP.a.TWV  KUt.  <JWP.a.TWV 
eUT'VXLUL~ KUt.  OV(]'7"UX£UL~  tOLOV  Tt  7Ta.8TJp.u  OLa  TWV  AOYWV  E7Tu8ev  Tj 
ifrox!J·  <jJepE  07J  7TpO~ ruov a7T' clMOV  p.eTU<JTW  AOyOV.  (10)  uL  yap 
€V8eOL  OLa  )..oywv  E7T<pOUL  E7TUyWYOt.  Tjoovfj~,  a7Tuywyot.  AV~ 
yLVOVTUL·  <JVYYLyvop.evTJ  yap  rij  oofv  ~  ifrox:fjs  Tj  OVVUP.L~  Tfj~ 
E7T~Ofj~ E8e)..ge  KUt  E7TeL<JE  KUt.  p.ETea77J<Jev  uUr7Jv  y07JTei~.  y07JTeiu~ 
OE  KUt  p.uyeiu~ OL<J<JUt.  TexvuL  eVPTJvTuL,  uZ  el<JL  ifrox:fj~  ap.uprrjp.uTU 
KUt.  oo~ a7Turrjp.uTU.  (11)  O<JOL  OE  o<Jovs  7Tept.  O<JWV  KUt  E7TeL<JUV 
Kai.  7TEi8ov<JL  oe  tPEVOfj  AOYOV  7TAa.<JuvTes.  el  P.EV  yap  7Ta.vTes  7Tept. 
7TAei<JTwv  oL  7T)..EL<JTOL  r7Jv  oogav  <YVP.{30VAOV  rij tPvx:fJ  7TupexovTuL.  Tj 
OE  06gu  <J<jJu)..Epa  KUt.  a{3e{3uLOS  oV<Ju  <J<jJuAepuLs  KUt.  a{3e{3uLoLS 
I  ';"  " 
TL~  ovv  aLTLU 
€.KOU<JUV  W<J7TEP  el  {31.q.  TjP7Ta.<J8TJ;  tJ7TO  yap  TfjS  7TeL8ou~  EgTJAa.8TJ  TO 
VOTJP.U.  KULTOL  7TEL8w  ava.YK~ eloos  ExeL  P.EV  OU,  r7JV  OE  OVVUP.LV 
r7JV  aUr7Jv  EXeL.  AOyo~ yap  tPVx7JV  0  7TEL<JUS,  17V  E7TeL<Jev,  Tjva.YKa<JE 
KUt.  7TL8e<J8uL  TOL~  AEyop.eVOL~  KUt.  (JUVULve<JUL  TOLS  7ToLOvp.eVOLS.  0 
P.EV  OVV  7TeL<JU~  W~  aVUYKa.<JUS  aOLKeL,  Tj  OE  7TeL<J8eL<JU  W~ 
avaYKu<J8eL<JU  Tep  AOYtp  P.a.TTJV  aKOVEL  KaKWs.  (13)  OTt  0'  Tj  7TeL8w 
7TP0<JLOU<JU  Tep  AOy~ KUt  r7Jv  tPvx7Jv  ET'V7T(iJ<JUTO  07T~ E{3ovAeTo,  XP7J 
p.u8eLv  7TPWTOV  p.ev  TOUS  TWV  p.eTewpoAoyWV  AOYOVS,  oZTtves  ooguv 
aVTt.  oo~ r7Jv  p.ev  a<jJeAop.evoL  r7Jv  0' Evepyu<Ja.f.LevOL  Ta  cl7TL<JTU 
Kat.  c'i0TJ)..U  <jJULVE<J8UL  TOLS  ~  OO~  OP.f.La<JLV  E7TOLTJ<JUV·  oeVTepov  oe 
TOVS  aVUYKULOV~ OLa  AOYWV  dywvus,  EV  oIs  Eis  AOYOS  7TOAVV  0XAOV 
ETeptPE  Kat.  E7TeL<JE  TeXVTJ  ypu<jJeLS,  OUK  dA7J8eL~  Aexeeis·  TPLTOV 
<oe>  <jJLAO<JO<jJWV  AOYWV  ap.£,A)..as,  EV  ais  OeLKVVTaL  Kai.  yvWf.L~ 
nixos  W~ eup.eTa.{3o)..oV  7TOLOUV  r7Jv  Tfjs  06gTJs  7TL<JTf.V.  (14)  TOV  UUTOV 
OE  AOYOV  €xeL  ~ Te  TOU  AOYOV  ovvaf.LLs  7TpOS  rryv  Tfjs  ifJvx:fjs  TUgLV  ~ 
TE  TWV  <jJUPP.a.KWV  TUgLS  7TpOS  r7Jv  TWV  <Jwf.LUTWV  <jJV<JLV.  w<J7Tep  yap 
TWV  <jJuPf.LUKWV  clMOVS  clMU  XVp.ovs  EK  TOU  <Jwf.LUTOS  EguyeL,  KUt.  Ta 
64 {-LEV  vOO"ov  Ta.  OE  {31.0V  1TuveL,  OVTW  KUI.  TWV  AOYWV  ot.  {-LEV  €AV7TTjO"UV, 
Ot.  OE  erepljIuv,  ot.  oe  €<po{3TJO"uv,  ot.  oe  els  8apO"os  KU-rEO"T7]O"UV  TOUS 
aKouovTUS,  01.  oe  1TeL801.  nVL  KUKij  rryv  ifIuriv  €<pup{-LaKevO"uv  KUI. 
'C  / 
ES EY0-rrrEVO"uv. 
(15)  KUI.  on  {-LEV,  El  AOYqJ  €1Tef.aBTJ,  OUK  TJoLKTJO"ev  aM' frn5xrJO"EV, 
ELP-rrrUL'  rryv  oe  TETapTTJv  ulTf.uv  TqJ  TETapTqJ  AOYqJ  oLE~eL{-LL.  El  ydp 
EPWS  ~v 0  Tui)ru  m:1.VTU  1Tpa~us,  ou  XUAe1Tws  oLu<pev~eTUL  ri]v  rijs 
AeyO{-LEv7JS  yeyovEvuL  a{-Lup-ri.us  ulTi.uv.  a ya.p  opwf.Lev,  EXeL  <pUO"LV 
OUX  fJv  TJf.Lel.s  8EA0f.Lev,  aM' fJv  EKUO"TOV  ETVXe'  OLd  oe  rijs oljIews  TJ 
IjIvri  Kav  TOI.S  TP01TOLS  TV1TofJruL.  (16)  UUTf.KU  ydp  OTUV  1TOAEf.LLU 
aLO-rypov,  TOU  f.Lev  aAe~pLOv  TOU  oe  1Tpo{3A-ryf.LUTU,  eel]  8eaC17]TuL  TJ 
OIjILS,  ETapG.xfJ7J  KUI.  ETG.pu~e  rryv  rjJvxfJv,  Ware  1ToAAG.KLS  KLVOVVOV 
TOU  f.LEAAOVTOS  <Ws>  aVTos  <pevyovaLv  EK1TAuyEv-res.  laxvpd  f.Lev  TJ 
uf.LEAeW  TOU  VOf.LOV  OLd  TaV  <po{3ov  elaqJKf.aBTJ  TaV  a1To  rijs  oljIews, 
1jns  EA80uau  E1Tof.TJaev  uf.LeMjauL  KUI.  TOU  KUAOU  TOU  aLa.  TOV  VOf.LOv 
KPLVOf.LEVOV  KUL  TOU  ayu80u  TOU  OUt  rryv  Vl.K7JV  YLVOf.LEVOV.  (17)  ijoTJ 
8€  nves  lMvTes  <po{3epd  KUI.  TOU  1TUPOVTOS  ev  TqJ  1Tupovn  xpovqJ 
<pPOV-ryf.LUTOS  e~EO"T7]O"uv'  OVTWS  a1TEa{3eae  KUI.  e~-ryAuaev a <po{3os  TO 
VOTJf.LU.  1ToMot.  oe  f.LUTUf.OLS  1TOVOLS  KUt.  OeLVal.S  VOO"OLS  KUt.  ovaLaTOLS 
aWf.LG.TWV  €V  awf.Lu  KUL  axfjf.LU  TeAef.ws  a1Tepyaawv-rUL,  T€P1TOVO"L  T-ryV 
OIjILV'  TJ  OE  TWV  avopLaVTWV  1Tof.TJaLS  KUL  TJ  TWV  ayuAf.LaTWV  epyuaf.u 
8EUV  TJOEI.UV  1TUPEO")(ETO  TOI.S  0f.L{-LUaLV.  OVTW  Ta.  f.Lev  AV1TEI.V  TO.  oe 
1T08El.v  1T€<PVKE  ri]v  OIjILV.  1TOAAd  oe  1TOMOI.S  1TOAAWV  epw-ru  KUI. 
1T'o80v  EvepyG.~ETaL  1TpUYf.LaTWV  KUI.  aWf.LG.Twv.  (19)  El  oDv  TqJ  TOU 
'AAe~G.vopov  aWf.Lun  Ta  rijs'  EMv7JS  Of.Lf.LU  iJaBev  1Tpo8vf.LLUV  KUI. 
Q.f.LLAAUV  EPw-rOS  riJ  IjIvx7J  1TupEowKe  Tf.  8uvf.LuO"TOV;  os  el  f.LEV  8eos 
8EWV  8Ef.UV  OVVU{-LLV  <exwv>, 1TWS  av  0 1jaO"wv  eL7J  TOUTOV  a1TwO"uaBuL 
KUI.  U{-LVvUaBUL  OVVUTOS;  El  a'  EO"TI.V  uv8pw1TLVOV  vOO"1Jf.LU  KUI.  rjJvx.fJs 
ayvo7Jf.Lu,  oux  ws  af.LapTTJf.Lu  f.LEf.L1TTEOV,  aM' Ws  u-rUxrJf.LU  VOf.LLO"TEOV· 
65 ~)..eE  yap,  clx;  ~)..eE,  ljroris  aYPEVJ.LaCnv,  OU  yvWJ.L7JS  {3ovAEVJ.LaatV,  KaL 
€Pf.J.YIOS  avaYKaLS,  OU  T€XV7JS  7TapaaKEvaLs. 
(20)  7TWs  ovv  XP7J  o£KaLOv  maaaf)aL  TOV  rijs 'EA.€v7JS  J.LwJ.Lov,  -ij-ns 
ErT' Epaaf)ELaa  ELTE  AOYCP  7TEtaf)ELaa  ErTE  {3Lq.  a.p7Taaf)ELaa  ErTE  V7TO 
eELas  avaYK7JS  avaYKaaf)ELaa  €7TpaqEv  a €7TpaqE,  7TavTWS"  OWcPEVYEt 
rryv  alTLav; 
(21)  acPELAov  TqJ  AOYCP  ovaKAELav  yvvaLKcJs-,  EV€J.LEI.Va  TqJ  vOJ.LCP  ov 
Ee€J.L7JV  EV  apxfJ  TOV  AOyOV·  E7TEl.pae7JV  KaTaAvaaL  J.LwJ.Lov  aOLKLav  Kat. 
8oq7Js  aJ.Lae£av·  E{30VAfJ87JV  ypatjJaL  TOV  AOYOV' EA.€V7JS  J.LEV  EYKWJ.LLOV, 
EJ.LOV  OE  7Ta[yvLOV. 
66 lla 
~  ,  ~ 
TOV  aVTOV 
•  17TEP  IIaAa.p.Tj3ovs 'A1ToAoyLa 
(1)  TJ  f.LEV  KUT7]YOp£U  KUL  1]  d7TO~oyiu  <KUL  1]>  KpiaL,  ou  7TEPL 
eUvaTOU  yiYVEml.·  eaVUTOV  f.LEV  yap  1]  rpvaL,  rpUVEPfj.  riJ  rjJTJrpqJ 
7TaVTWV  KUTErjJTJrpiauTo  TWV  eVTJTWV,  {prEP  1]f.LEpU  EYEVETO'  7TEpL  OE 
rij, dTLf.Liu,  KUL  rij>  TLf.Lfjs  0 Kivouvos  EaTL,  7TOTEpa  f.LE  XPTJ  OI.KU£WS 
,  , 
ULTLUS 
{3Luiws  d7TOeUVEiv.  (2)  oLaawv  OE  TOVTWV  OVTWV  TOU  f.LEV  o~OU uf.LEis 
KPUTEiTE,  TOV  0'  EYW,  rijs  f.LEV  O£KTJS  EYW,  rijs  OE  {3ius  uf.LEis. 
d7TOKTEivul.  f.LEV  yo.p  f.LE  OUV7pEa8E  {30U~Of.LEVOL Pq.o[ws·  KpUTEiTE  yap 
,  /  't'  ,~ ,  "  ,  ,....  (3)  ,  ,  -;- ~  KUL  TOUTWV,  wv  OuaEV  EyW  TUYXUVW  KpUTWV.  EL  f.LEV  OUV  0 
KU-r-ryyOpos  'OouaaEvs  7]  aurpWs  €7TLaTo.f.LEVOS  7TPOOLOOVTU  f.LE  rryv 
'EA~o.ou  Tois  {3Up{3o.pOLS  7]  oogo.{wv  y'  df.Lfj  OVTW  mUTU  €XELV 
E7TOLEiTO  rryv  KUTTJYOP£UV  OL'  EVVOLa.V  rijs 'EA)'o.oos,  apLaTOS  av  ~V 0 
'EA~o.ou,  ETL  OE  7TpOS  TOVTOLS  TOV  dOLKOVVTU  TLf.LWpOVf.LEVOS;  el  OE 
rpeOVqJ  7]  KUKOTEXV[q.  7]  7Tuvovpyiq.  avVEeTJKE  mVTTJv  TTJV  UlT{UV, 
av  ELTJ. 
(4)  7TEpL  TOVTWV  ~EYWV OE  7TOeEV  apgwf.La.L;  Ti  OE  7TPWTOV  d7TW;  7Toi 
OE  rijs  d7TO~oyius  Tpo.7TWf.LUL;  UlT£U  yap  dVE7TioELKTO,  €K7T~TJgLV 
Ef.LrpUVfj  Ef.L7TOLEi,  oLa  OE  rryv  EK7T~TJgLV d7TOpEiv  dVo.YKTJ  TqJ  ~oyqJ,  av 
f.L7J  TL  7TUP'  uurij,  rijs  d~7]8Eiu,  Ka.L  rijs  7TUpOVCJ'7]S  dVo.YKTfS  f.Lo.ew, 
oLouaKo.~wv E7TLKLVOUVOTEPWV  7]  7TOPLf.LWTEpWV  TUXWV.  (5)  OTL  f.LEV  ovv 
au  aurpWs  <Elow,>  0  KU-rTJy0PO,  KUTTJYOpEi  f.L0U,  aurpw,  oLou' 
aVVOLOU  yap  Ef.LUVTqJ  aurpWs  OUOEV  TOWVTOV  7TE7TOLTJKW"  OUO'  EOLX 
07TWS  Civ  EloEiTJ  TL,  OV  TO  f.LTJ  YEVOf.LEVOV.  El  O€  OlOf.LEVO'  OVTW  mVTU 
67 J1TLOELgW  Tp01TWV·  OUTE  yap  {30V;":ry8E1S  Jovva[1:T]v  av  OUTE  Ovva[1-EVO~ 
J{3ov;":rj87]V  €pyOL~ J1TLXELpELV  TOLOVTOL~. 
(6)  J1T1.  TOUTOV  oe  TOV  AOYOV  EI[1-L  1TPW'rOV,  wS  aovvuT6~ El[1-L  TOUTO 
1TpaTTELv.  EOEL  yap  nvu  1TpW'rOV  apriv  YEvea8uL  rij~  1TPOOOO"LUS,  -r, 
oe  apx:T!  AOYOS  av  Er7]·  1TpO  yap  TWV  [1-EM.OVTWV  EPYwv  avaYK7] 
iloyov~ YLvEa8UL  1TpOTEpOV.  AOYOL  oe  1T~ av  yevo(.vTo  [1-TJ  o"vVOVo"LU~ 
nvoS'"  YEVO[1-€V~; O"VVOVO"LU  oe  TLVU  TP01TOV  yevoLT' av  [1-7rr'  JKELVOV 
,  ~ 
EKELVOV  JAeOVTOS'";  ouoe 
1TUPUYYEALU  oLa  ypU[1-[1-aTWv  d4JiKTaL  aVEv  TOU  rPePOVTOS'".  (7)  aAAa. 
07]  TOUTO  nfl  iloycp  OVVUTOV  YEvea8u(..  KUt.  07]  TOLVVV  aVVEL[1-L  KUt. 
I  ,  ....  ,,"',  I  I  I  I  v 
O"VVEO"TL  KUKELVOS  E[1-0L  KUKELVCP  EyW  - nvu  TP01TOV;  T('VL  nS'"  Wv; 
"EAA7]V  {3up{3apcp.  1T~ aKOVWV  KUI.  Aeywv;  1TOTEPU  [1-0VOS  [1-ovcp;  a.U' 
"  "" "  , '  '"  '  e"  ,  ,  "  ayv07]O"O[1-EV  TOVS'"  UIV\7]I\WV  l\oyOVS'".  UI\I\U  [1-E  EP[1-7]VEWS'";  TPLTOS'"  upu 
[1-apTVS'"  YLVETUL  TWV  KPV1TTE0"8UL  OEO[1-EVWV.  (8)  aAAa.  07]  KUt.  TOUTO 
YEvea8w,  Kui1TEP  ou  YEVO[1-EVOV.  eOEL  oe  [1-ETa.  TOVTOVS'"  1TLO"TLV  OOUVUL 
1Tpo06T7J  1TLO"TEVELV  €[1-EM.EV;  aM.'  O[1-7]pOL;  TivES'";  oZov  Jyw  TOV 
dOEArPOV  gOWK'  av  (ou  yap  E1xov  aAAov),  6  oe  {3ap{3upoS'"  TWV  UL€WV 
I  I  ,~,  1"  '/  "  "  I  'I  nvu·  1TLO"TOTUTU  yup  UV  7]V  OVTWS  E[1-0L  TE  1TUP  EKELVOU  EKELVCP  TE 
1TUp'  €[1-ou.  TUUTU  oe  YLYVO[1-EVU  1Ta.O"LV  U[1-LV  av  ~v  rPuvEpa.  (9) 
4n7O"EL  nS'"  Ws  XPT][1-UO"L  -r7Jv  1TLO"TLV  J1ToLOV[1-EeU,  JK€LVOS'"  [1-ev  OLOOVS'", 
Jyw  oe  AU[1-{3avwv.  1TOTEPOV  OVv  OALYOLS'";  aAA'  OUK  "  ,  \  ELKOS'"  UVTL 
'dS'"  ovv  ~v -r,  KO[1-LOT];  1T~ 0' av  <fJ ciS'">  JKO[1-LO"€V  fJ  1TOAAoi;  1TOAAWV 
yap  KO[1-L~6vTWV  1TOAAOI.  av  ~O"uv  [1-apTVpES'"  rijs  €1TL{3ovMjS'",  EVOS'"  oe 
'r  '  KO[1-L",OVTOS  OUK  "  , '  ,)..'  '\'  UV  1TOI\V  n  TO  'f'EpO[1-EVOV  7]V.  (10)  1TOTEPU  0' 
rPepwv  elafjAeEV; a[1-rPoTEpU  ya.p  a1Topu.  Au{3wV  oe  07]  1T~ av  EKPUtf;U 
, 
n  aV 
WrPEAOV[1-7]V  d1T'  UUTWV; 
68 (11)  KUt..  yeveaew  KUt.  Ta.  /L-TJ  yeVO/Levu.  avvf/;;.eo/LeV. 
eL1TO/LeV,  TJKOVaU/LeV,  XPTJ/LUTU  1TUP  UUTWV  €AU{30V,  EAueov  AU{3WV, 
EKpvifJa.  EOeC,  ofrrrov  1Tpa'T'TeC,V  WV  €VeKU  TUUTU  EyeVeTO.  TOUTO 
TOl.VVV  en  TWV  elp7J/L€VWV  o.1TopWTepOv.  1Tpa'T'TWV  /LEV  ya.p  UUTOS" 
v  ~  e  ~  ~,  !'\ '\'  ,  ~,  ~  ..... c  ..! '\ '\  ,  e'"  e1TpUTTOV  7J  /Le  eTePWV;  CL/V\  OVX  EVOS"  7J  1TpU", c,S".  (l/\/\U  /Le  ETepWV; 
Tivwv;  07]AOVO'Tt  TWV  auVOVTWV.  7TOTEPOV  €AEV8epWlI  7]  OOVAWV,· 
EAeveepf.q. 
, 
TOVTWV.  <OLa.> 
Te£xOVS";  a1TUaLV  apu  cPUVepa.  yevoLTo  av.  tJ1Tuf.epLOS"  yap  0  {3i.oS" 
(aTpUT01TeOOV  ya.p)  EaT'  EV  01TAOC,S".  EV  orS"  <1TaVTeS">  1TaVTU  OPWat 
KUt  1TaVTeS"  V1TO  1TaVTWV  0pWVTUL.  1TaVTWS"  apu  KUt  1TaVT7J  1TaVTU 
1TpaTTeC,V  o.OVVUTOV  7]V  /LOL. 
(13)  aK€!f;Uaee  KOLVij  KUL  To;k  T£VOS"  EVeKU  1TpOa7]Ke  {3ovA7]8fjvUt. 
€1TaV€l./LL.)  1TOTePOV  <TOU>  rupuVVE'iv;  V/Lwv  7}  TWV  {3up{3apwv;  o.AA' 
V/LWV;  o.AA'  o.ovVUTOV  ToaOVTWV  KUL  TOWVTWV,  orS"  V1TapXeL  a1TUVTU 
cPpOV7J/LaTWV,  {3uaLAe£U  1TOAeWV.  (14)  o.AAa.  TWV  <{3up{3apwv>; a OE 
1TUPUOWo-WV  OE 
{3up{3apovS",  Eis- WV  1TOAAOVS-;  1TdauS"  7}  {3t.aaa/LevoS";  OtJTe  yap  EKe'iVOI. 
1TEC,aefjVUI.  {3oVAOI.VT'  av,  OUT'  EYW  {3l.aauaeul.  OVVU£/L7JV.  a.AA'  LaWS" 
EKOVTES"  EKovn  1TupuowaovaLv,  /LLaeOV  TfjS"  1Tpoooa£uS"  o.vnol.oovTES"; 
o.AAa  yE  mihu 1TOMfjS"  /LwpiaS"  Kat..  1TLaTEUaaL  Kat..  oegaaeul.·  TiS"  ya.p 
av  EAOI.TO  oovAE£av  o.VTt..  {3aaLAEiaS",  o.VTt..  TOU  KPUTiaTOV  TO 
69 E1TEXELfY/7aa  TOVTOLS.  aX\.a  )(!YTJp.aTa  p.E:V  p.€TpLa  K€KTTfp.aL,  1TOX\.WV  OE: 
ou8E:v  O€op.aL·  1TOX\.WV  yap  O€OVTaL  XPTfp.aTWV  01.  1ToX\.a  oa1TaVWVTES, 
aAA'  OUX 
, 
OL  KPEL7"7"OVES  TWV  rijs  TjOOVWV,  aAA'  , 
OL 
OOVAEVOVTES  TUlS  Tjoovu7.s  KUL. 
,  , 
a1TO  1TAOVTOV 
TOLOVTOLS  epyoLS  av-ryp  EmXELp-ryaELE  KaL.  p.€aws  ~POVLP.OS.  a1T' apErijs 
yap  aAA'  OUK  a1TO  KuK671JTOS  ui.  np.ai·  1TPOOOry  OE:  TfjS 'E\Aaoos 
EVOE-ryS  wv- ,  , 
E1TL 
,  , 
V1TO  TWV 
Evnp.OTaTWV,  u~'  UP.Wv  E1TL.  ao~Lq..  (17)  KUL  p.-ryv  ouo'  aa~aAE[as 
[Jiv]  OVVEKa  ns  av  TaUTU  1TpaguL.  1TaaL  yap  (5  yE  1TPOOOTTfS 
1ToMp.LOs,  T0  vop.lfJ,  rij OLKT]'  T07.S  8E07.S,  T0  1TA-ry8EL  TWV  av8pcfmwv· 
TOV  P.€V  yE  vop.ov  1Tapaj3aivEL,  -r-ryv  OE:  OLKTfV  KaTaAVEL,  TO  OE:  8E7.0V 
anp.a{EL,  TO  OE:  1TAfj80s  oLa~8E£pEL.  T0  OE:  TOLOVTlfJ  <0>  j3LOS  1TEPi. 
KLVOVVWV  TWV  P.EyLaTWV  OUK  €XEL  aa~aAELav.  (18)  aAAa  o-ry  ~r.AOVS 
ns  av  aOLK-ryaELEv.  EP.Oi.  OE:  1Tav  TouvavTLov  EY£VETO·  TOUS  p.E:V 
~r.AOVS  KUKWS  E1TOLOVV,  TOUS  OE:  ExepOUS  W~€AOVV.  aya8wv  p.E:V  oiJv 
eYKTTfaLv  ouoEp.Lav  ElxEv  Tj  1TpagLs·  KUKWs  OE:  1Ta8ELv  OUOE:  Eis 
I 
n  P.OL 
, 
EaTLV,  Er  nva  ~oj3ov  7] 
I  1TaVTU 
~  ~  /,/.,  / \  '  (;1  I  ~,  -.  ',./...  EP.UVTOV,  TOKEUS,  'f'LI\OVS,  u",Lwp.a  1TPOYOVWV,  I..Epa  1TUTPlfJa,  TU'f'0VS, 
1TaTpl.Oa  -r-ryv  P.Eyl.aTTJV  TfjS' E\Aaoos.  a OE:  1TaaL  1TEPl.  1TUVTOS  EaTL, 
TaUTa  av  TOL,  aOLK-ryauaLv  EVEXEl.pLaa.  (20)  aK€~ua8E  OE:  KUl.  TOOE. 
70 [-L€VE~V  EV  TOls  f3Upf3a.pOL~;  'TTUpU[-LEATJerUVTU  '1TC:LVTWV  TWV  [-LEY[crTWV, 
EcrTEfY17[-L€VOV  rij~  KaAALO'1"7]S  n[-L7]s-,  EV  u1ax.[aT7J  OVerKAELq.  oLC1YOVTa, 
,  , 
'TTOVOV~  E'TT 
{3~WTOS  'TTLcrTE~  EcrTEp7][-L€VqJ.  XPTJ[-LUTa  [-LEV  yap  a.'TTo{3uAOVTa  <7}  > 
ropUVVLOO~  EK'TTEerOVTU  7}  rTJv  'TTUTp£OU  </;VYOVTU  a.vuAa{3oL  n~ av·  0 
~,~  '{3\\  ,  '11  V  , 
DE  'TTLcrTLV  U'TTO  UI\WV  OVK  UV  ETL  K7i]erULTO.  on  [-LEV  OOv  OUT'  Q.v 
<EOVVa[-L7]v  {30VAa[-LEVO~  OUT'  Q.v  ovva[-LEVO~  >  E{30VAO[-L7]V  1TPOOOUVUL 
rTJV  '.EV..aou,  OLa  TWV  'TTPOELp7][-L€VWV  O€OEI.KTaL. 
(22)  {3ovAO[-LUI.  OE  [-LETa  TUUTa  'TTpO~ TOV  KUTTJYOPOV  OLUAEx8fjvUL.  TLVL 
"  WV 
, 
TO~OVTOV  yap 
,  , 
UKoveru~,  ,  , 
EcrTLV,  ,  , 
UVTO~  </;UVTJ-rW, 
[-LUpro p7]era TW.  "  EcrTUI. 
[-LUprop7]8€V.  E'TT€~  VUV  )IE  OUO€TEPO~ T7f1-WV  'TTUP€XETU~  [-Lapropu.  (23) 
</;TJerEL~  rer~  rerov  Elvu~  TO  er€  yE  TWV  YEVO[-L€VWV,  W~  crV  </;TJ~,  [-L7J 
'TTUP€XW8UL  [-L6.pTVPU~,  TWV  OE  [-L7J  Y€VO[-L€VWV  E[-L€.  TO  OE  OUK  rerov 
EcrTL·  Ta  [-LEV  yap a.y€v7]Ta  'TT~ a.OVVUTa  [-Luprop7]8fjVUL,  'TT€pt.  OE  TWV 
Y€VO[-L€VWV  ou  [-Lovov  OUK  a.OVVUTOV,  a.Ma  KU~  pq.owv,  OUOE  [-Lavov 
MowV,  a.AAa  erol.  [-LEV  OUK  ~v oLov  <TE>  [-Lavov  [-Lapropu~  a.Ma  KUt. 
if;EVoO[-Lapropu~  EVPEl.V,  E[-LOt.  OE  OUO€T€POV  dPEl.V  TOVTWV  OVVUTOV. 
(24)  on  [-LEV  oov  OUK  oIa8u  a.  KU7IJYOPEl.~,  </;UV€POv·  TO  07J  AOL'TTOV 
<OUK>  €lOOTU  erE  OO~6.~€LV.  Ehu,  rZ  'TTaVTWV  a.vepw-rrwv  TOA[-L7]POTaT€, 
86flJ  mcrTeveru~,  a.mcrToTaTqJ  'TTpaY[-Lun,  T7JV  a.AfJeELUV  OUK  e1.8Ws-, 
av8pu  'TTEP~ 
, 
T~  TOWUTOV  epyov 
71 'TOIS  oogci~OVO"L OEL  7nO"'TEVELV  dX\.a  'TOIS  EiooO"LV,  OU'TE  rryv  oogav  Tfjs 
d):TJeE£a~  7nO"'TOTEpaV  VOfJ-£~ELV,  dX\.a  'TdVUVT£U  rryv  dA#JELaV  rij~ 
06frp. 
(25)  Ka7IfYop-ryO"a~  OE  fJ-OV  oLa  'TWV  ElfYTlfJ-EVWV  AOYWV  ovo  'Ta. 
Wc-rrEP  OUX  OrO V  'TE  'TOV  au'TOV 
o.v8pumov  EXELV.  07TOV  fJ-€V  ycip  fJ-E  </riJs  ElvuL  'TEXV-ryEV'Tci  'TE  Kat. 
OELIIOII  Kat.  7TOpl..fJ-OII,  O"ocpLav  fJ-OV  KU7IfYOpEL~,  07TOV  O€  AEYEL~  Ws 
7TpOVO[OOVII  ri]v'  EMcioa,  fJ-av£av·  fJ-aVLa  ycip  EO"'TLV  EpyOI..~  E7nXELPEI.II 
'TOV~  0'  Ex8pov~  WCPEA-ryO"EL,  'TOV  O€  av'TOU  f3LOV  E7TOVE£OI..O"'TOV  Kat. 
acpaAEpov  Ka'TaO"'Tf]O"EL.  Ka£'TOI..  7T~ xp7J. dvopt.  'TOLOVnp  7nO"'TEVELV, 
OO"'TL~  'TOV  au'TOV  AOYOV  AEYWV  7TpO~  'Totk  UU'TOV~  a.vopa~  7TEPt.  nov 
av'TWV  'Ta.  EVaV'TLun-a'TU  AEYEL;  (26)  f3ovAOLJ1:T]V  0'  av  7Tapa  aou 
7TV8EooaL,  7TO'TEPOV  'TOV~  aocpov~  a.vopa~  VOfJ-L~EL~  dvo-ry'Tov~  1} 
'TOV~  yE  cppollouv'Ta~ 
I  '8- ,  \  .,.,  ,/..f  ,  "  7TapOII'TWV  aya wv.  EL  fJ-EV  OVV  ELfJ-L  0"0'jJ0~,  OVX  7Jf.LUp'TOV·  Ei  0' 
ilEa  7TpciaO"oll'TO~  OVVcifJ-EVO~  ou  f3ovA0fJ-UL·  <f3oVAOfJ-UL>  yap  ou  'T01.~ 
aol.~  KaKOI.~ dAAa  'TOIS  Ef.LOI.~  dya80L~ d7TOCPEVYELV  rryv  alT£av  'Tav'T7]v. 
7TpO~ f.L€V  0011  a€  'TaU'Ta. 
,  - €L7TELII 
E7TLcp80vov  f.L€V  dA7J8€~  OE,  <f.L7J  >  Ka7IfYop7Jf.LEVU)  f.L€V  OUK  dVEK'Tci, 
Ka'T~OpoVf.LEVU) O€  7TP0u7]KOV'Ta.  vuv  yap  EV  Vf.LI.V  €UeVVU~ Kat.  AOYOV 
tJ7TEXW  'TOU  7TapOLX0f.LEVOV  f3£OV.  OEOfJ-aL  OOV  VfJ-WV,  av  Vf.LC'i~  U7TOf.LII-ryO"W 
'TWV  'TL  Ef.LOt.  7TE7TpaYf.LEvwv  KaAWV,  f.L7JOEVU  cjJ8ovfjO"aL  'TOIS  AEyOfJ-EVOI..~, 
aAA'  avaYKaLOV  ~O"aooaL Ka7IfYOp7Jf.LEVOV  OELva  Kat.  ~EVOfj  Ka£  'TL 
'TWII  aA7J8wv  ayaewv  El7TEI.V  EV  €iOOO"LV  Uf.LLV·  07TEP  7jOLO"'TOV  f.L0L.  (29) 
7TpciJ'TOII  f.LEV  OOV  Kat.  OeV'TEPOV  Kat.  f.LEYLO"'TOV,  OLa  7Tall'TO~  a7T'  apxfJ~ 
€l~  TE§AO~  allaf.Lcip'T7J'To~  a  7TapOLXOfJ-EVO~  f3LO~  EO"'T£  f.LOL,  Ka8apo~ 
7TciO"7]S  al'T£a~·  OUOEt.~ yap  av  oUOEf.LLav  al'T£av  KaKo'T7J'To~ aA7J8fj  7TpO~ 
72 ?  WV  Oth-ws  , 
OVK 
q;-ryau<;  OUK  av  tjJEVaUL/-LTJV  OUO'  av  €"AEJ'XftELTJV,  ou  /-LOVOV  dvu/-LapT7JT0<; 
d"A"Aa  KUL  /-L€YU<;  EUEPY€TTJ<;  V/-LWV  KUL  'TWV' E"A"A-ryvwv  KUL  'TWV  a:7TaV'TWV 
dv8panrwv,  ou  /-Lovov  'TWV  VVV  OV'TWV  d"A"Aa  <KUL>  'TWV  /-LE"A"AOV'TWV, 
Elvu~.  'TL<;  yap  av  €'TTOLTJaE  'TOV  dv8panTLvov  {JLOV  'TTOP~JLOV  €g  d'TT0poV 
KUt.  ,  E't"  KEKoaJLTJJLEVOV  s  UKoaJLOV, 
JL€YW'TOV  El<;  'TT"AEOVEK'T-ryJLU'TU,  VO/-LOV<;  'TE  YPU'TT'TOV<;  q;VAUKU<;  ['TE]  'TOV 
O~KULOV,  ypaJLJLU'Ta  'TE  JLv-ryJLTJ<;  opyUVOV,  JLE'TpU  'TE  KUL  aru8JLcl, 
avvu"A"Auywv  EU'TT0POV<;  ow"A"Auya<;,  dp~8JLov  'TE  XPTJJLa'TWV  q;v"AUKU, 
7TVpaov<;  'TE  KpU'TLarov<;  KUt.  'TUXLarov<;  dYYEAOV<;,  'TT€aaov<;  'TE  OXOA~<; 
(£AV'TTOV  OW'Tp~{J-ryv;  'TLVO<;  OVV  EVEKU  rav8'  VJLOS  V'TTEJLvTJau;  (31) 
oTJ"Awv  <JL€v>  on  'T07s  'TOWV'TO~<;  'TOV  VOVV  'TTpoa€xw,  CTTJJLE~OV  O€ 
'TTOWVJLEVO<;  on  'TWV  ulO)(jJwv  KUt.  'TWV  KUKWV  epywv  d'TTEXOJLU~·  'TOV 
yap  €KELVO~<;  'TO V  VOVV  'TTpOaEXOV'TU  'TO~<;  'TOWV'TO~<;  'TTpOa€XE~V 
dOVvu'TOV.  dg~w  O€,  El  JLTJO€V  UU'To<;  vJLOS  dO~KW,  JLTJO€  UU'To<;  vq;' 
VJLwv  dO~KTJ8~va~.  (32)  KUt.  yap  OUO€  'TWV  (£"AAWV  €'7TL'TTJoEvJLa'TWV 
rf  "t  ~  ,  OVVEKU  Us ~o<;  E~JLL  KUKW:;  'TTaOXELV,  ov8'  V'TTO  VEW'TEPWV  ov8'  V'TTO 
'TWV 
ovarvxoVV'TWV  OlK'TLpJLWV·  OV'TE  'TTEVLU<;  V'TTEpOpWV,  OUO€  'TTAOV'TOV 
OV'TE  €V  JLaxuL<;  dpyo<;,  'TTOLWV  'TO  'TUaaOJLEvov,  'TTEL8oJLEVO<;  'TO~<; 
(£PxovaLV.  d"A"Aa  yap  OUK  €JLOV  €JLUV'TOV  €'TTULVE~V·  0  O€  'TTUPWV  KULP0<; 
-ryvaYKuaE,  KUt.  'TUV'TU  KU'T7]YOPOVJLEVOV,  'TTav'Tw<;  d'TTo"Aoy-ryaua8uL. 
(33)  AOL'TTOV  O€  'TTEPt.  V/-Lwv  'TTpo<;  vJLii<;  €arL  JLOL  AOYo<;,  OV  El'TTWV 
, 
KUL 
'TTUpUL'TTJaL<;  €V  OXAcp  /-L€V  oVCTTJ<;  'T~<;  KpLaEWS  xp-ryaLJLu·  'TTUpa  0' VJL~v 
'TO~<;  'TTPW'TOL<;  ovaL  'TWV' EAA-ryVWV  KUL  OOKovaLV,  OU  q;L"AWV  {J07]8ELUL<; 
OUO€  "AL'TU~<;  OUO€  OLK'TOL<;  OEt:  'TTd8ELV  vJLii<;,  d"A"Acl  'TqJ  auq;Eara'Tcp 
OLKULCP,  oLoaguV'Tu  'Td"A7]8€<;,  OUK  d'TTu'T-ryauv'Ta  JLE  OE~  OWq;VYE~V 'T7]v 
ul'Tiuv  rav'TTJv.  (34)  vJLii<;  O€  Xp7]  JL7]  'T01.<;  "AOYOL<;  JLii"A"Aov  ij  'TO~<; 
epyoL<;  'TTpOaEXELv  'TO V  vovv,  /-LTJO€  'Ta<;  ul'Tiu<;  'TWV  €A€yxwv 
'TTpOKPLVELV,  /-LTJO€  'TOV  OALYOV  xpovov  'TOV  'TTOA"Aov  aoq;WrEpov  ~YE~a8E 
73 KP~TT]V, JL7JoE  T-ryV  OW{30A-ryV  Tfjs  7T€£pa~ 7TLaTOT€paV  VOJL£~€~V.  a7TaVTa 
yap  T07s  ayaeoZ~  avopaa~  JL€yaA~  €UAa{3€£a~  Q.JLapTaV€~V,  Ta  oE 
aVT]K€aTa  TWV  aK€aTWV  ETL  JLCiAAOV- TaUTa  yap  7TpOVOT]aaa~  JLEV 
ouvaTa,  JL€TaVOT]aaa~  OE  av£aTa.  TWV  oE  TOWVTWV  EaT[V,  "  OTav 
aVOp€S"  avopa  7T€pl.  8avaTou  Kp[VwaLV'  07T€P  EaTl.  VUV  7Tap'  vpiv. 
(35)  €l  JLEv  ODV  ¥  o~a TWV  AOYWV  T-ryV  aAT]e€WV  TWV  EPYWV  Kaeapav 
T€  y€v€a8a~ TOZ~ aKovoua~ <Kat.>  cpav€pav,  €V7TOPO~ av  €l.7J  TJ  Kp[a~~ 
7j07J  d7TO  TWV  €lp7JJL€VWV- E7T€~O-ry  OE  OUX  OVTWS"  EX€~'  TO  JLEV  aWJLa 
TOUJLOV  cpUAa~aT€,  TOV  OE  7TA€[W  xpOVOV  E7TLJL€[vaT€,  JL€Ta  OE  Tfj~ 
dA7JfJ€£a~  T-ryV  Kp£a~v  7To~T]aaT€.  VJLZv  JLEV  yap  JL€ya~  0  K£VOUVO~, 
aO[KO~~  cpav€Za~  8O~av T-ryV  JLEV  KaTa{3aA€ZV,  T-ryV  OE  KTT]aaa8a~.  TOZ~ 
OE  dyaeoZ~  dvopaa~v  a~p€TWr€PO~  eavaTO~  OO~~  alaxPCi~'  TO  JLEV 
yap  TOU  {3Lou  T€AO~,  TJ  OE  Tcf;  {3Lcp  voao~.  (36)  Eav  OE  dO£KWS" 
a7TOKT€£V7]T€  JL€,  7TOAAOZ~  y€vT]a€Ta~  cpav€pov'  EYW  T€  yap  <OUK> 
dyvw~, vJLwv  T€  7TCia~v"EAA7Ja~  yvwP~JLO~ TJ  KaKOT7J~ Kat.  cpav€pa.  Kat. 
T-ryV  alr£av  cpaV€pav  a7Taaav  VJL€Z~  €~€T€  Tfj~  dO~K[a~,  OUX  0 
/  'r  I  ", ",  ,  I  \', 
y€VO~TO JL€~~WV  TaUT7J~.  OU  yap  JLOVOV  €~~ €JL€  Ka~ TOK€a~ TOU~ €JLOU~ 
Q.JLapTT]a€a8€  O~KaaaVT€~  do [KWS",  dAA'  vJLZv  aUToZ~  O€LVOV  ae€OV 
,  , 
a7T€KTOVOT€~ 
cpav€pav  OUOE 
,  , 
a~T~av 
(37)  €l.p7]Ta~  Ta  7Tap'  EJLOU,  Kat.  7TaVOJLa~.  TO  yap  V7T0f-Lvfjaa~  Ta  od 
f-LaKpWv  €lp7Jf-L€va  avVTOf-LWS"  7TpO~ JLEv  cpavAou~  O~KaaTa~ €X€~ AOYOV' 
TOUS"  oE  7TPWTOU~  TWV  7TpWrwv  "EAA7Jva~ 'EAAT]VWV  OUK  a~LOv  ouo' 
d~~waa~ f-LTJr€  7TpOa€x€~v TOV  VOUV  f-LT]T€  f-L€JLvfja8a~ Ta  A€x8€vra. 
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Maximus  Planudes,  Commentary  on  Hermogenes'  Id.  (voI.v, 
pp.548,8-551,1, ed. Waltz) 
L1wvvawS'  0  7TpEa{3(rrEp0S'  ev  r4J  oEvrepqJ  lIEpt.  xapaKr-rypwv  7TEPt. 
TOPYLOV  Mywv  raOE  qXTjaLV'  «OLKavLKOtS  (-LEV  ovv  ou  7TEpLeTVXov 
aurou  AOYOLS',  07](-L7JYOPLKotS  oE  oAiYOLS'  KaL  naL Kat.  rexvaLS',  rots OE 
7TAELoaw  e7TLOELKnKOLS'.  r~ oE  loeaS'  aurou  rwv  AOYWV  rowuroS'  0 
'/'  'Y  ~,  "  \  ,  ,  ,  xapaKr7]p  t EyKW(-LLa':,EL  OE  rovS'  EV  7TOI\E(-LOLS'  apLarEvaavraS' 
uri  yd.p  U7TfjV  rotS  uvopaaL  rovrOLS'  JJV  OE~  uvopam 
7TpoaE~vaL; r{  oE  KaL  7TpOafjV  Jw  OU  OE~  7TpoaE~vaL; €l7T€~V  OvvaL(-L7]v 
'"  '  ~,  ,  'e'  "'e'  '?'  '"  "e  '  'f'VYWV  OE  rov  av  PW7TLVOV  'f'  ovov.  ovrOL  yap  €K€Kr7]vro  EV  EOV  (-L€V 
r",v  upEr-ryv,  UVepW-rrLVOV  oE  ro  eV7]Tov,  7ToAAd.  (-LEV  0",  ro  7Tapov 
e7TLELKES'  rou  aueaoovS'  oLKaLov  7TPOKpLVOVr€S',  7ToAAd.  OE 
uKpL{3€LaS'  AOYWV  opeor7]Ta,  rourov  VO(-LL'OVr€S'  e€LOrarOv 
, 
KaL 
7TOLE~V,  Kat.  owad.  uaK-ryaavrES'  (-LaALara  ~V  O€L,  YVW(-L7]V  <Kat. 
PW(-L7]V>,  r",v  (-LEV  {3oVA€VOVr€S'  r",v  0' U7TOr€AOUvrES',  e€pa7TOVr€S'  (-LEV 
rwv  UOLKWS'  ovaTVxovvrwv,  KOAaaraL  oE  rwv  UO{KWS'  €UTVXOVVrwv, 
aUeaO€LS'  7TpOS'  ro  av(-L<pepov,  €UOpY7]TOL  7TpOS'  ro 7Tpe7Tov,  r41  <ppOVL(-LqJ 
rfjS'  YVW(-L7]S'  7TaVOVr€S'  ro  a<ppov  <rfjS'  rOA(-L7]S' >  ,  u{3pwrat.  €lS'  rouS' 
u{3pwraS',  Koa(-LwL  ElS'  rous- Koa(-L{ovS',  a<po{3oL  €lS'  rouS'  u<po{3ovS', 
oELvoL  ev  ro~S'  O€LVOLS'.  (-LaprupLa  oE  rovrwv  rp07TaLa  ear-ryaavro  rwv 
7TOAE(-L{WV,  L1LOS'  (-LEV  uyaA(-Lara,  €avrwv  oE  uvae-ry(-Lara,  OUK  a7TELpoL 
ovrE  E(-L<pvrov  "Ap€oS'  ovr€  VO(-LL(-LWV  epWrwv  ovr€  evo7TA{ov  €PLOOS' 
ovrE  <pLAoKaAov  Elp-ryv7]S',  aE(-Lvot.  (-LEV  7TpOS'  rouS'  8EOUS'  r41  oLKaLqJ, 
DawL  OE  7TpOS'  rouS'  rOKEas- rfj  e€pa7T€Lq.,  oLKawL  OE  npos- rouS' 
uarouS'  r41  raqJ,  €ua€{3eLS- OE  7TpOS'  rouS'  <piAovs- rfj 7Tiar€L.  rOLyapouv 
75 ath·wv  a1Toeav6v7"wv  0  1T6eo~  ou  avva1TEeaVeV  aAA' aeaVa7"O~  OUK  €V 
1 
Isokrates, 10.3 (ed. Mathieu-Bremond) 
'\:"  ,  'A..  '  aouva7"a  1Te~pWFJ-evov  a1T0't'a~ve~v; 
Isokrates, 15. 268 (ed. Mathieu-Bremond) 
avFJ-f3ouAeVaa~FJ-' av  7"o'i~  VeW7"EpOL~,  FJ-7]  FJ-EV7"OL  1Tepuoe'iv  7"7]v  rpvaLv 
7"7]v  aU7"wv ...  €~OKe[Aaaav  el~  7"olk  A6you~  7"OV~  7"WV  1TaAaLwv 
aorpw7"wv,  <iJv  0  FJ-EV  a1TeLpov  7"0  1TMjeo~  Erp7]aev  elvaL  7"WV  QV7"WV, 
'EFJ-1TeooKMj~ OE  7"E7"7"Upa  Kat  ve'iKo~ Kat  rpLA£av  €V  aU7"o'i~, "Jwv  0' ou 
1TAe[w  7"PLWV,  'AAKFJ-EWV  OE  OVO  FJ-6va,  IIapFJ-ev[o7]~  OE  Kat  MEA~aao~ 
EV,  ropy[a~ OE  1TaV7"eAW~ OUOEV. 
2 
Olympiodoros, in  Grg.  Proem.9 
dFJ-EA€~  Kat  yparpeL  0  ropy[a~  Dept.  <Puaews  aVyypaFJ-FJ-a 
aK0FJ-tP0v  7"fj  1TO'  OAUFJ-1T~ao~. 
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lIEpl  TOU  ~~ DVTOS 
[Aristotle], De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia 979a12-980b21. 
979a12  aUK  eLva£  C?7]aLl!  OUO€V'  el 0' EaTLV,  ayvW<rTOv  elvaL' 
KaL  on / fLEV  OUK  ean,  atJveeLs  Ta  €r€POLS  elp7]fL€va, 
oaOL  7TepL  TWV  /OVTWV  '\€YOVTES  TavavT£a,  WS  OOKOUaLl!, 
,  .J...  /  ~  .....  /  t  ,  rI  r/  \'  \ \'  t  ~E'  a7T0'f'aLvovTaL  aUToLS,  OL  fLEV  OTL  EV  KaL  ou  7TOl\l\a,  OL  0 
aD  on  7To'\'\a  KaL  OUX '/ €V,  KaL  oL  fLEV  on  ay€v7JTa,  oL  0' WS 
";'  /,  , /  '  /  ,~\  ~\  "  ,  ELl!aL,  fL7JTE  ayE  V7]Ta  fL7]TE  YEvofLEva'  ouoev av EL7]'  eL 
OVTe  €V,  OVTE  7To'\'\a,  OVTe  /  ay€v7JTa  OVTE  YEVOfLEva,  Ta  fLEV 
OVTE  elvaL,  OVTE  fLT]  ElvaL. 
~TTav /  TO  fLT]  ov  TOU  OVTOS  EL7].  TO  TE  yap  fLT]  ov  ean  fLT] 
OV,  KaL  /  TO  OV  OV,  [WaTE  OUOEV  fLii'\'\ov  elvaL  TJ  OUK 
ElvaL  Ta  7Tpay  /  fLaTa]. 
WaTe  OUK  av  OVTWS,  OUOEV  av  er7]  el fLT]  / 
raUTOv  Eanv  elva£  n  KaL  fLT]  elvaL.  el  OE  TauTo, 
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30 Chapter 6 
, <'  '8  <'  '  f3'  'c  '!'  v  ouoaf-Lo  EVOE  OVf-L  a~V€L ES  wv  E~P7JKEV, 
35 
cLU' wa7TEpEL  OUOLV  aVTow,  TOU  f-LEV  /  aVToS', 
~  ""  'v  "V  ,  ""  ,  '\.....Jl'  TOU  u  OUK  OVTOS',  TO  f-LEV  EaT~, TO  0  OUK  al\'lvES', 
979b 1 TO  f-LEV  f-L7]  av. 
TO  OE  af-Lcpw  7]  TO  ETEPOV  OUK  Eanv; OUOEV  yap  <frrTOV>, 
5 
TO  OE  KaL  Ean  v  En. 
y' UV  EL7]  "TO  f-L7]  OV  EaT~V  ", aAA' / El  07]  OVTW),  7TOTEPOV  <au> 
aUTO  yap  OVTW  yE  TouvaVT[OV  €O~KEV y[yvEa8a~. 
el  yap  /  TO  TE  f-L7]  OV  av  Ean KaL  TO  OV  av  EaTW,  10 
15 
78 on  €l  /  'Tat.lTov  'TO  JLTJ  oV  KaL  'TO  OV,  'TO  'T€  OV  OUK  €(T'T~ 
rt  I  "  WO"T€  1TaV'Ta  €(T'T~V. 
JL€'TCJ.  o€  'TOU'TOV  'TOV  AOYOV  cfrrJO'£V·  €i  o€  €(T'T~V,  7j'TO~  20 
dyev7]  /  'TOV  :ry  Y€VOJL€VOV  €lva~.  KaL  €i  JL€V  dyev7]7ov, 
'TO  0'  (l1T€~POV OUK  /  av Elva!.  1TOU.  OU'T€  yap  EV  aV'TqJ  OU'T' av 
EV  (lAAlp  €lva~· /  OVO  yap  av  OV'TWS"  :ry  1TA€!'W  €lva~, 
'TO  'T€  EVOV  KaL  'TO  EV  0.  JL7]oaJLou  /  oe  ov  OUO€V  €lva~ Ka'Ta  'TOV  25 
'TOU  zr]vwvo~ AOYOV  1T€PL  'Tfj~ / xwpa~. 
oDoe  /  Y€VOJLEVOV.  y€vea8a~ youv  ODO€V  av  OU'T'  E~ OV'TO~ 
OUT' EK  J.L7J  /  OV'Tos.  el  yap  TO  OV  }.LETa7TEO'OL,  aUK  av  €T' 
€lva~ 'TO  OV,  / WO'1T€P  y'  €i  KaL  'TO  JLTJ  OV  YEVO~'TO, 
ODO€  JLTJv  0130' EK  <p..TJ>  OV'TO~ av  y€VEa8a~·  30 
ei  0' EO'n  (aD)  'TO  /  JLTJ  OV,  Ot.'  a.1Tep  OUo' EK  'TOU  OV'TO~, 
o~a 'Tau'T' av  OUo' EK  'TOU  JLTJ  /  OV'TO~ YEvEa8a~. 
:ry  YEVOfL€VOV  €lva~, 'TaU'Ta  oe  <dovv'Ta>, dovva'Tov  n  Kat.  elva~. / 
"  'V  "  n"  \'  "./....  I  ,  I  €n  E~1TEP  €(T'T~,  EV  7]  1TI\E~W,  'r7]O'~V,  E(T'T~V· 
el  oe  fLTp-€  EV  JL~'TE /  1TO,{AC£,  OUO€V  av  Er7].  Kat.  EV  JL€V ......  . 
Kat.  on  dawJLa'Tov  av  Er7]  /  'To ........•  EV  K  ••..• E €xOV 
/  ~  ~ Z/  \ /  "~'  v  /'~'  fL€V  y€ ......  'Tlp  'TOU  7]VWVO~ I\OYlp.  EVO~ oE  OV'TO~  ouo 
."  ';'  '~"  I  \  \  \  ,~\  av ......  €~va~ ouaE  JL7] ........  JL7]7E  1TOl\l\a ....  E~  aE 
/  /  /  \  \  /  ,  ,~/,  fL7]7€  ·······fL7]'TE  1TOl\l\a  e(T'T~V,  ouaEV  E(T'TLV. 
980aloDo 'av Kwryefjva£  1>7]O'~v  oDoEv.  Ei  yap  K~V7]8E£7], / 
OV  eL7],  /  'TO  0' oDK  OV  yEYOVO~ Er7]. 
En  O€  €l  K~V€~'Ta~ Kat.  €v  /  <Ov>  JLE'Ta1>EpE'Ta~,  aD  O'VVEX€~ 
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5 cprp£v,  ~ (w6p7]Ta~, rou  Qvros,  j  dvrt.  rou  KEVOU  ro  o~7JpfJa8a~ 
A.€ywv,  Kae6:TTEp  EV  rotS  AEVK£1T  j  1TOV  KaAovp.EvO~S AOyo~S yEypa1Tra~. 
Elva~ OVV  OVOEV,  ros j  d1TOOE£~E~S A.€YE~ <rauras> ... 
a1Tavra  OELV  yap  ra cppOvoup.Eva  Elva~, j  Kat. 
ro  p.iJ  QV,  Er1TEp  p.iJ  Ea-n,  P.7JOE  CppovELa8a~. 
,  ~'"  j'  ~ ,  "  "  ,I,  ~~  ,~, 
E~  0  ovrws,  OvaEV  av  E~1TO~ 't'EVOOS  ovaE~S, 
dAA' WO'1TEP  OVOEV  j  p.aAAov a  OPWP.EV  ea-nv,  ovrw <OVOEV> 
Kat.  EvraUea  j  1TOAAOt.  av ravra OWV07JeELEV.  t  r<a>  OVV  p.aAAov 
<ro~6.>o '  7]  <r>a  ro~6.o' j  Ear£  t, 1TOLa  OE  rdA7]8fJ,  a07JAov.  warE 
"\ \  "  \  ";'~  ~"  -I.'  ~  "  j  \ '  "  al\/Hp; 0  yap  EWE,  1TWS  av  -ns,  't'7Ja~,  rovro  E~1TO~  I\oycp;  7J 
mvs  av  EKELVO  OfJAOV  dKouaav-n  y£yvo~ro, p.iJ  i06vr~; j 
,~\  j"  \  "  '"  \ \  \  -I.e'  \  ovaE  7J  aK07J  ra xpwp.ara  aKovE~, al\l\a  't'  oyyovS'  Ka~ 
A.€YE~ 0 j  A.€ywv,  dAA'  015  xpwp.a  OVOE  1Tpayp.a. 
"  "  ~  ,~,  '\  ~'<,/,'  -I.  ">  j  7J  Eav  xpwp.a,  WWV,  Eav  aE  't'0't'0V  aKa v  aas; 
dpxT/V  yap  015  <if;ocpov>  A.€YE~  <0  A.€>ywv OVOE  xpwp.a, 
dAAa  AOYOV'  War' j  OVOE  owvoELa8a~ xpwp.a  ea-nv, 
dAA'  opav,  OVOE  if;ocpov,  dAA 'j  dKOUE~V. 
Ei  OE  Kat.  EVOEXEra~ y~YVWaKE~V rE  Kat.  a  av 
y~YVWaK7J j  A.€YE~V, dAAa  1TWS  0 dKOUWV  ro  avro  Evvo-ryaEL; 
015  yap  olov  j  rE  ravro ap.a  EV  1TAE£oa~ Kat.  Xwpt.s  ova~v 
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10 ElvaLo  OVa  yap I  UV  Er7]  TO  €VO 
,~,  ,,,  ,/....  ~  ,  \'  \',  I  ,~, 
EL  OE  KaL  EL7],  'f'7]rTLV,  EV  1T/\ELOrTL  KaL  TaVTOV,  OvoEV 
"  .,.  "  .....  ,.- ,  ,  ,  .- ,.....  1"  '1\ 
EKELVOL~ OVaL  KaL  EV  TlP  aVTlPo  EL  yap  EV  TlP  aVTlP,  EL~ av 
aAA'1 au  OVa  EIEVo 
,/..  I  ~"~"  , 
'f'aLVETaL  oE  Ova  aVTO~ aV'Tq3  0f-L0La  ala8avof.L€  /  vOS" 
15 
20 
81 Sextus Empiriclls, Adv. Math. 7. 65-87 
(65)  ropyia~ oE  0  AEOV'TLVO~  EK  'TOU  UU'TOU  fLEV  'TaYfLu'To~  trrrfjpXE 
'TOZ~  dV7JP7]KOa~  'T21  KP~'T77PWV,  ou  KUnt  'TTJv  ofLoiav  DE  E7TLf3oATJV  'TOZ~ 
7TEP~  'T21V  IJpurrayopav.  EV  yap  'T4'  E7TLypuc/>ofLevqJ  rrEp~ TOU  f.LT]  QVTOS 
Ka~  . 7TpCYrOV  "  O'T~  OUDEV  Eanv,  DEVTEPOV  "  O'T~ 
, 
E~  Ka~  Eanv, 
dKUTaA7]7T'TOV  dvepcfnrqJ,  'Tpi'TOV  on  El  KUt.  Ka'TUA7]7T'TOV,  dAAa  ToL  yE 
dvego~aTov Kat.  dVEPfL7JVEV'TOV  1"4'  7TeAa~. 
(66)  on  fLEV  OVv  OUOEV  Eanv,  €7TLAoY£'ETa~  'T21V  'Tp07TOV  TOU'TOV'  El 
yap  Ean <n>,  7jr0~  'T21  OV  Eanv  Tj  1"21  fLTJ  ov,  Tj  KaL  1"21  OV  Ean  KUL 
TE  afLa  Kat.  OUK  EaTa~'  ~ fLEV  yap  OUK  OV  vOEZTa~,  OUK  Ea'Ta~,  ~ DE 
Ean  fLTJ  ov,  7TaAw  EaTa~.  7TaV'TEAW~ DE  a'T07TOV  1"21  ELva£  n  afLa  Kat. 
"  \  OV.  Ka~ 
OV  OUK  Eara~'  EVaV'T£a  yap  EaT~ Taura  dAA7JAO~~,  KUL  El  1"4'  fLTJ  ovn 
aufLf3ef37]KE  'T21  Elva~,  'T4'  ovn  aufLf37JaEra~  1"21  fLTJ  Elva~.  OUXt.  O€  yE 
(68)  KU~  fLTJv  OUDE  TO  OV  Eanv.  El  yap  1"21  OV  EaT~V,  7j'T0~  d£o~ov 
dpX7Jv. 
(69)  1"21  yap  y~vOfLEvOV 7Tav  EXE~ nv' dpxfJv,  TO  DE  dLDwv  dyev7]Tov 
KaeEaTW~ OUK  ElxEv  dpxfJv.  fLTJ  EXOV  DE  dpx-?Jv  a7TE~pov  EaT~V.  Ei  DE 
, 
EaT~V, 
, 
EaT~ 
,  ~ 
UV'TOV 
1"21 
,,I  ~,  ,,I  ,~",  ""y  r/  'v 
EfL7TEP~EXOV,  'TOU  OE  a7TE~pov ovoEV  Ean  fLE~."OV,  werTE  OVK  EaT~  7TOV 
82 ,  , 
EaTLV,  oe  yE 
aT07TOV.  TO[VVV  ouoe  EV  aun;:;  EaTL  TO  av.  Wcrr'  Ei  d[OLOV  EaTL  TO  av, 
a7TELpov  EaTLV,  Ei  oe  a7TELpOV  EaTLV,  OUOafJ-Ov  EaTLV,  Ei  oe  fJ-7JoafJ-Ov 
EanV,  OUK  EaTLV.  Toivuv  El.  dioLOV  EaTL  TO  QV,  ouoe  T7JV  dpxiJv  av 
, 
EaTLV. 
(71)  Ka~  fJ-7Jv  ouoe  YEV7JTOV  ElvaL  OVVaTaL  TO  av.  el.  yap  yeYOVEV, 
yeyov€v"  el  yap  OV  EO'TLV,  OU  yeyovev  aAA'  EaTLV  7]07f  OUTE  EK  TOU 
'"  '"J..  /\  (', C  "\  ,  ,  v  avaywfJS  O'f'ELI\ELV  U7Tap<:,E{J)5;  fJ-ETEXELV  TO  YEVV7JTLKOV  nvos.  OUK  apa 
(72)  ''''''  "'"  ""'''  OuaE  TO  avvafJ-'f'OTEpOV,  awwv  afJ-a 
TO  DV,  OU  yeYOVEV,  Ka~ Et.  yeYOVEV,  OUK  EaTLV  diowv.  Toivuv  Ei  fJ-frrE 
(73)  Ka~ aAAws,  Ei  EaTLV,  7jTOL  ev  EaTLV  7]  7ToAAa'  oi5TE  oe  ev  Eanv 
"  \  \  -'  ('  e  '  ,,,,,  \"  ,  \  ff  OUTE  7TOl\l\a,  ws  7TapaaTa  7JaETaL'  OUK  apa  EaTL  TO  OV,  EL  yap  EV 
Eanv,  7]TOL  7Toaov  EaTLV  7]  avvExes  EaTLV  7]  fJ-eYEeOS  Eanv  7]  aWfJ-a 
Eanv.  0  n  oe  CLV  ~  TOVTWV,  OUX  ev  EaTLV,  dAAa  7Toaov  fJ-ev 
,  v 
OUK  EaTaL  dOWLpETOV. 
TPL7TAOVV  EaTaL'  Ka~ yap  fJ-TJKOS  Ka~ 7TAaTOS  Ka~ j3aeos  egEL,  aT07TOV 
oe  yE  TO  fJ-7Joev  TOVTWV  ElvaL  A€YELV  TO  QV'  OUK  apa  EaT~V EV  TO  av. 
dvatpOUJ.LEVOV  avvavatpeLTUL  Kat  ra  1ToAAa ..  aAAd.  yap  OTt  J.LEV  OUTE 
"  v  ov  EaTL  TO  OV  Ean, 
,  , 
TaUTOV 
83 (76)  ou  p.7]v  aM' Er'lTEp  TavTov  €G"TL  T0  p.7]  DV'TL  TO  DV,  OU  ovvaTaL 
.,  A..  /  '¥'  "'".../..  /  ""  "  ',I  ,  ap.'f'OTEpa  ELVaL.·  EL.  yap  at-"'f'oTEpa,  ou  TaUTOV,  KaL.  EL  TaUTOV,  OUK 
ap.cPoTEpa.  oiS"  E'lTETaL.  TO  p.7]O€v  ElvaL.  EL  yap  P.frrE  TO  OV  €G"TL  P.frrE 
TO  p.7]  OV  P.frrE  ap.cPOTEpa,  'lTapa  O€  Taiha  OuO€V  vOE'i:TaL.,  ovoev 
(77)o'TL  O€  Kav  ~ 'TL,  Toiho  ayvWO'"7"OV  TE  Ka~  aVE'lTLV07]1"OV  EG"TLV 
aVepW'lTqJ,  'lTapaKELp.evWS"  tJ'lTOOELKTeov.  El  yap  Ta  cPPOvovp.Eva,  1rrJat.v 
o TopYLaS",  OUK  EG"TLV  DVTa,  TO  OV  OU  cPPovE'i:TaL.  Kat.  KaTa  A6yov· 
Wa-rrEP  yap  eL  TOtS  cPpovoup.eVOLS"  uvp.{3e{37]KEV  ElvaL  AEUKOZS",  KaV 
UVP.{3E{3fJKEL  TOZS"  AEUKOZS"  cPPOvE'i:aeaL,  OVTWS"  Ei  TOZS"  cPpovoup.evoLS" 
uvp.{3e{37]KEv  p.7]  ElvaL  oVaL,  KaT'  avaYK7]V  uvp.{3fJaETaL.  TOZS"  oVal.  p.7J 
cPpOVEZaeaL.. 
(7S) 
it,  , 
El.  Ta 
,  "  OUK  EG"TLV  TO  OV  OU  cPPOVE'i: TaL.".  Ta  oe  yE 
cPPOvovp.Eva  ('lTpOA7]'lTTeOV  yap)  OUK  €G"TLV  DVTa,  OJS"  'lTapaa-rfJaop.EV· 
OUK  apa  TO  OV  cPPovE'i:Tal..  Kat.  <p.7Jv>  O'TL  Ta  cPPOvovp.Eva  OUK  EG"TI.V 
oe  EG"TL,  cPaVAov.]  OUO€  yap  CLV  cPPOvfj  'TLS"  aVepW'lTOV  L7TTap.EVOV  7] 
app.aTa  EV  'lTEAaYEL  TpeXOVTa,  EUeeWS"  o.vepW'lTOS"  Z'lTTaTaL.  7]  app.aTa 
EV  'lTEAaYEL  TpeXEL.  Wa-rE  OU  Ta  cPPOvovp.Eva  EG"TLV  DVTa. 
(SO)  'lTPOS"  TOVTOIS  el  Ta  cPPOvovp.Eva  EG"TLV  DVTa,  Ta  p.7]  DVTa  OU 
cPPov7]8fJaETaL.  TO'i:S"  yap  EvaVTLOLS"  Ta  EVaV'TLa  uvp.{3e{37]KEV,  EvaVTLOV 
oe  EG"TL  TcIJ  av'TL  TO  p.7]  av.  Kal.  OLa  TOVTO  'lTaVTWS",  Ei  T0  DV'TL 
uvp.{3e{37]KE  TO  cPPOVE'i:aeaL.,  TcIJ  p.7J  DV'TL  uvp.{3fJaETaL  TO  p.7] 
cPPOVE'i:aeaL.  Q.TO'lTOV  0' EG"Ti.  TOVTO·  Ka~ yap l'KvMa  Kat.  X£p.aL.pa  Kal. 
'lTOAAa  TWV  p.7]  DVTWV  cPpoVEI.TaL..  OUK  apa  TO  QV  cPP 0 vE'i:Ta I.. 
(Sl)  Wa'lTEP  TE  Ta  opwp.Eva  15t.a  TOVTO  opaTa  AeYETaL.  O'TL  apaTaL, 
apaTa  EK{3aMop.Ev  O'TL  OUK  aKovETaL,  Ta  O€  aKOUG"Ta  'lTapa'lTep.'lTop.Ev 
O'TL  oUX  OpaTaL  (EKaG"TOV  yap  U'lTO  rijS"  lOLaS"  alaefJaEWS"  aM' oUX  U7T' 
84 rJ)..J\7JS  OcPECAEL  KpLvEa8aL),  ovrw  KaL  ra  cPPOVOVJLEva  KaL  El  JL-TJ 
{3AE7ToLro  rij  OIj;EL  JLTfoe  aKOVOLro  rij  aKoij  EO"IaL,  on  7TpOC;  roil 
OlKE£OU  AaJL{3aVEraL  KPL77JpLOU. 
(82)  El  oJv  cPPOVEL  nc;  €V  7TEAaYEL  apJLara  rpEXELv,  KaL  El  JL-TJ 
{3AE7TEL  railra,  OcPELAEL  7TLO"IEVELV  on  apJLara  EO"ILV  €V  7TEAaYEL 
rpExovra.  ar07TOV  oe  roilro·  OUK  apa  1'0  OV  cPPOV€LraL  KaL 
KaraAaJL{3aV€raL. 
(83) 
<::'  '  ,  ,  (;  OE,  aVEs OLO"IOV  yap  ra ovra 
)/  (\  ~  /,  ....  ~  I  8'  't,  t  ,  ,  I\oyov,  OC;  ErEpoc;  EO"IL  rwv  U7TOK€LJLEVWV.  Ka  a7T€p  OUV  1'0  oparov  OUK 
cPTfaf.v,  a7TO  rwv  E;w8EV  7TpOa7TL7TrOvrwv  Tjp.7.v  7TpaYJLarwv  auvf.O"IaraL, 
rOUrEO"IL  rwv  ala87J7wv.  €K  yap  rijc;  roil  XUAoG  €YKup-r]a€w<; 
€yyf.V€7aL  TjJLLV  0  Kara  ravr7]S  rfjc;  7TOLOrrrrOC;  €KcPEpOJL€VOC;  AOY0C;, 
KaL  €K  rfjc;  roG  xpwJLarOC;  IJ7T07TrwaEW<;  0 Kara  roG  xpWJLaroc;.  El  oe 
roilro,  oux  0  AOYOC;  roG  €KrOC;  7TapaO"larLKOC;  €O"ILV,  aAAa  1'0  €KrOC; 
roil  AOYOU  JLTfvunKOV  yf.vEraL. 
(86)  KaL  JL-TJv  ouoe  €V€O"IL  AEYELV,  on  OV  rpo7Tov  ra  opara  Kai.  .  o  AOY°C;,  "  WO"IE  ovvaa8aL 
El  yap  Kai.  tJ7TOKELraL,  4>TJaf.v,  0  AOY0C;,  aAAa  OLacPep€L  rwv  AOL7TWV 
LJ7TOKELJLEVWV,  KaL  7TA€{O"IqJ  OLEV-r]VOX€  ra  opara  aWJLara  rwv  '\oywv· 
01.'  erepou  yap  opyavou  A7J7TrOV  EO"IL  1'0  oparov  KaL  OL'  aAAOU  a 
'\oyoc;.  OUK  apa  EVOELKVU7aL  ra  7TOMa  rwv  IJ7ToKELJLevwv  a '\oyoc;, 
W<:rrr€P  ouoe  EK€LVa  r7Jv  aM-r]Awv  oLaoTf'\oL  cpvaLv. 
(87)  rOLOvrwv  oJv  7Tapa  r4J  Topyf.q.  ipropTfJLevwv  OLX€7aL  oaov  E7T 
auroLC;  1'0  rfjc;  aA7j8€{ac;  KPLr-rJpLOV·  roil  yap  JL-r]rE  ovroc;  JL-r]r€ 
yvwp{~€a8aL  oUvaJLEvOu  JL-r]r€  aAAqJ  7TapaO"la8fjvaL  7T€cPuKoroc;  ouoev 
CLV  ELTf  KPLr-rJpLOV. 
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Plato, Men. 76a8-e4 [Meno-Sokrates]. 
uvopi.  1TpEaf3vlIJ  1TpaYJLaTa  1TpOO'Ta'TTE~~  d1TOKp£VEaea~,  aUTo~ OE  OUK 
€e€AE~<;:  uvaJLV7'JO'eEi.~  EL1TELV,  0  n  1TOTE  AEYE~  TopyLa~ dPErTJV  Elva~. 
"  on 
01TEP  1Towva~v  Ot  TpUcp(jjVTE~,  "  aTE 
f30VAE~  '"  ouv  KaTe!.  Topyf.av 
au;  - OUKOUV  AEYETE  d7Toppoas  Tl.,Vas  TWV  OVTWV  Ka-ra 'EJ.L7TEOOKA€a;  -
acp60pa  YE.  Kat. 
, 
E~~  OU~ 
, 
Ka~ 
, 
aL.  U1ToppoaL 
,  "  ....."  ,~, !,.1  "  'r  "t  v  ....  EVWIS  TWV  1TOpWV,  TaS'  oE  CAa'TTOUS'  7J  JLE~."OUS'  E~va~; - EO'T~  TaUTa.  -
OUKOVV  KaL  oifJL.V  KaA€LS'  n; - €ywy€.  - €K  TOVTWV  oTJ  "at5V€S'  0  TOL. 
at5JLJLETpO~  Kat.  alae7JT6~.  - apL.O'Ta  JLOL.  OOKEL~,  iJJ  .LWKpaTE~,  TavT7Jv 
TTJV  d1T6Kp~a~v  €LP7JKEVaL..  - raWS'  yap  aoL.  KaTe!.  O'UVTj8ELaV  ELp7]TaL.· 
KaL  aJLa  olJLa~  €VVO€'iS'  on  €X0L.S'  av  Jg  aurijS'  EL1T€LV  KaL  cpwvTJv  0 
€O'T~,  KaL  oaJLTJv  KaL  aMa  1ToAAa  TWV  TOWVTWV.  - 1Tavu  JLEV  oDv.  -
TpaY~KTJ yap  EO'T~V,  Jj  MEVWV,  TJ  d1T6Kp~a~~ WaTE  dpEaKE~ ao~ JLiiAAOV 
5 
Theophrastus, Ign. 73 (p.47, ed. Coutant) 
86 Y£VETaL  J-LaJ.J..OV  dVaKAWJ-LEVOV,  TO  8E  dOUVaTEL  8Ld.  -n,V  dV0J-L0LOT7JTa. 
WarE  TO  J-LEV  T4i  depoLaJ-L4j  Kat.  rij  AeTrTOT7JTL  8La8uoJ-LEvov  €is  TO 
EKKa.VJ-La  8vvaTaL  Ka.£ELV,  TO  8'  ov8'  eTEpov  EXOV  ou  8vvaTaL. 
Ega1TTETaL  DE  d1TO  TE  rijs  VEAOu  Kat.  d1TD  TOU  XM.KOU  Ka.t.  TOU 
apyt5pov  TP01TOV  TLva  epyaa8evTwv,  OUX,  W<nrEP  Topy£a.e;  </rryat.  Ka.t. 
aAAoL  DE  TLVES  OrOvTaL,  8Ld.  TO  d1TLEvaL  TO  wp 8Ld.  TWV  1TOpWV. 
Sa 
Athanasius Alexandrinus, Prolegomena on Hermogenes' Stat. 
(Rh.Gr., vo1.14, p.180,9ff., ed. Rabe) 
rTJv  De  TPLT7JV  ;nrrOpLK7]v  1TEPt.  YEAoLw87]  TLvd.  TWV  J-LELpaKiwv  TOV 
KpOTOV  aVEYE[povaav  Ka.t.  KOAaKE[av  trm:ipxouaav  dvaL07j,  7Jv  Ka.l. 
J-LETEXELp£aavTo  EV  J-LEv  xapaKrijpL  Kat.  EVeUJ-L-r7J-LaaLV  1JJ-LapryJ-LEVOLS  O[ 
1TEPt.  19paaVJ-Laxov  Kat.  TopYLav,  1ToMqJ  J-LEV  T4i  1TapLaqJ  xp7]aaJ-LEVOL 
Kat.  rr,v  EVKa.LP£a.V  WV07]KOTEe;  TOVTOU  TOU  axr7J-LaTos,  EV  8E  8La.vo£q. 
Kat.  Tp01T1.p  AegEWS  aAAOL  TE  1TOMOI.  KaL  8iJ  Kat.  TopYLae;  aUToe; 
KOVCPOTa.TOS  wV,  as- Kal.  riJv  d1TaYYEALav  TaVT7]V  EV  TqJ  'E1TLTa.CPLqJ 
a.VTOU  OUK  loxVwv  yV1Tae;  El1TELV  ~WVTae;  Erp7]KE  Tacpoue;·  8LavoLq.  8e 
U1TEK1TL1TTEL  TOU  8eovToe;  Ws  Kal.' IaoKparys  J-LapTVpEL  OUTWS  cpaaKWV-
'·de;  yd.p  a.v  KTA. '[fr.1] 
[Longinus], De Sub/.3. 2 (ed. Russell). 
Ta.UT1)  Kat.  Td.  TOU  AEOVTLvov  TOPYLOV  yeAaTaL  ypacpovToe;,  SepfrJs a 
TWV  JIEpawv  ZEve;  Ka.l.  yV7TES  EJ-Lif;uXOI.  TacP0L. 
Hermogenes,Id. I (p.248,26-249,7, ed. Rabe) 
1Tapa.  oe  TOLe;  u1TOgUAOI.S  TOUTOl.al.  a01Jl.CJ'TaLe;  1TaJ-L1TOAAa  EupoLe;  aVO 
Tacpove;  TE  yd.p  €J-Lt/Juxovs  Tove;  yV7Tae;  AeyovaLv,  WV7TEP  E  Lat.  J-LaALCJ'Ta. 
agwL,  KaL  aAAa  TOLa.UTa  tjJuxpEUOVTaL  7TaJ-L7TOAAa.  €KTpaX7JM~ouaL 8' 
a.vTove;  a.Z  TE  TpayqJ8£al.  1ToMd.  EXOUaal.  TOUTOV  1Tapa.OEiYJ-LaTa,  Kat. 
DaOL  TWV  1TOL7]TWV  TpaYLKW-rEpOV  7TWS  1TpoaLpOUVTaL,  WCJ'1TEP 
JIivoa.pos-. 
87 Sb 
Philostratos, VS I. 9, 5. (p.209, 12f., ed. Kayser); cf. Test.1a. 
'Tel  J.LEV  KU'Tel  'TWV  {3up{3apwv  'Tp07TmU  vJ.Lvove;  d1TUL'TEl:,  'Tel  oE  KU'Tel 
'TWV  t EM-ryvwv  8p-ryvove;. 
Isokrates, 4. 158 (ed. Mathieu-Bremond) 
EVpOL  0'  av  ne;  EK  J.LEV  'TOV  1TOAEJ.LOV  'TOV  1Tpoe;  'Tove;  {3up{3apove; 
uJ.Lvove;  1TE7TOL7JJ.L€VOVe;,  EK  oE  'TOV  1Tpoe;  'Toue;  "E\.II.7Jvue;  8p-ryvove;  TJJ.L'iv 
yeYEv7JJ.L€VOve; . 
7 
Aristotle, Rhet. 3. 14, 1414b29 (ed. Kassel) 
II.€YE'TUL  OE  'Ta  'TWV  E1TLoELKnKwv  1TpooiJ.LLa  kg  E7TU£VOV  7]  if;oyov'  oLov 
Topy£ue;  J.LEV  EV  'Tefl' OIl.VJ.L'lTLKefl  1I.0Y£!l  V1TO  1TOlI.lI.wv  agwL  8uvJ.La'EaBuL, 
cJ  (ivopEe;"EII.II.1]VEe;.  E1TULVEl:  yap 'Toue;  'Tae;  1TuvwVPELe;  avvayov'Tue;. 
8 
Clemens AIexandrinus, Stro. 151 (II, p.33,18-22, ed. Stahlin) 
"KU~  'TO  dyWVLOp.U  7]J.Lwv  KU'Ta  'TOV  AEOV'T'ivov  Topyiuv  OL'T'TWV  roe] 
dPE'TWV  OEl:'TUL,  'T01I.J.L7Je;  KU~  (J'0cpLue;'"  'T01I.J.L7Je;  J.LEV  'TOV  KLVOVVOV 
V1TOJ.LE'ivuL,  (J'ocpiue;  OE  'TO  UrVLYJ.LU  yvWVUL.  a yap  'TOL  1I.0yoe;  KUea1TEp 
'TO  K-rypvyJ.LU  'TO  'OIl.VJ.L1T£U(J'L  KUII.El:  J.LEV  'TOV  {3ovIl.OJ.LEVOV,  (J"TECPUVO'i  oE 
'TOV  OVvaJ.LEvov. 
Sa 
Ploutarkhos, Coniuga/ia praecepta 43, Moralia 144 be 
Topy£ov  'TOU  pfrropoe;  dvuyvov'Toe;  EV'  OIl.VJ.L1T£q.  AOYOV  7TEP~  OJ.L0vo£ue; 
'Tol:e;  ·'E\.II.7J(J'LV °  MEl\av8we;  "ou'Toe;  TJJ.L'iv"  ecp7J  "avJ.L{3ovII.EuEL  1TEP~ 
oJ.LovoLue;  oe;  UU'TOV  KUt.  rTJv  YVVU'iKU  KUt.  rTJv  BEpa1TuLvuv  loiq.  'TpEl:e; 
QV'Tue;  0J.L0voe'iv  ou  7T€1TELKEV ".  ~v  yelp  ~  eOLKE  ne;  epwc;  'TOV 
Topyiov  KUt.  '7JII.O'TV1TLU  rf!s"  yvvuLKoe;  1Tpoe;  'TO  eEpU1TULV£OWV. 
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Philostratos, VS 19,4 (p. 209,3f., ed. Kayser); cf. Test.l 
10 
Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.14, 1415b32-1416a3 (ed. Kassel) 
DE  77KwTa  EX€L  [1TpOOL/kLa J  ...  7"OWV7"OV  yap  7"0  Topy£ov  EYKW/kLOV  Els-
'ffiEiovs-·  OUOEV  yap  1TpO€~aYKwv£aas- OUDE  1TpoavaKLv-ryaas- Eu8vs-
apXE7"aL "1" ffiLS- m)ALS- €VOaL/kwv". 
(11, 11a=tEMv7]s-'EYKwJ.Lwv  and tY1TEp  IIaAaJ.L-ryDovs- 'A1ToAoy£a) 
12 
Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.18, 1419b3-5 (ed. Kassel) 
O€LV  €</rrJ  Topyias- rTJv  J.LEV  a1Tovo7]V  oLacP8€[P€LV  7"WV 
yeAw'n,  7"OV  OE  yeAWTa  a1Tov07J,  op8Ws- Mywv. 
Plato, Grg.  473e 
,  , 
EVaV7"LWV 
7"£  7"OU7"O,  (J  nWA€;  YcAus-;  aAAO  aD  7"OU7"O  Eloos- EA€yxov 
E1T€LOdv  7"[s- n  Er1T7],  Ka7"ay€AUV,  EA€YX€LV  OE  /k-ry; 
,  , 
€aTLV, 
Schol. on Plato, Grg. 473e 
7"OU7"O  1TapaYY€A/ka  Topyiov,  7"0  7"as- a1Tovoas- 7"WV  avnD[KWV  Y€!.WTL 
EKAVELV,  7"a  OE  YEAoLa  7"aLS- a1TOVOaLS- EKKpOVELV. 
Olympiodoros, in  Grg.  20,5 (p.1l3, 24-27, ed. Westerink) 
laTeov  yap  on  Topyiov  EaT!.  1TapaYYEA/ka  on  "El  /kEV  /:;  EvavTios-
a1TOVOaLa  AeYEL,  yeAa,  Kal.  EKKPOV€LS- aUTov·  El  DE  EKELVOS- YEA~ aov 
a1TOVOaLa 
\  /  I  I  rl  I\€YOV7"OS-,  avV7"ELVOV  aaV7"OV,  l.va 
yeAWS' ". 
89 13 
Dionysios of Halikarnassos, Compo  12,5. 
KaLpov  OE  OU'T€  /rfrrwp  ouo€ls  OU'T€  qJLt...oaocpoe;  €ie;  'TOO€  xpovou 
'TEXV7]V  WpLa€V,  Ouo' 5a7T€p  'TTpclrrOe;  €'TT€xdP7]a€  'TT€pt.  av'TOV  ypacp€LV 
ropyiae;  0  A€OV'TLVOe;  ouoev  5  n  t...oyou  agwv  eypm/;€v·  ovo' eXH 
cpvaLv  'TO  'TTpaYJ-Lu  €le;  KUeOt...LK7JV  Kat.  ev'T€XVOV  nva  'TT€p£t...7]tjnv 
'TT€a€LV,  Ouo'  5t...w<;  €7TLarT]J-L7J  e7]pU'TOe;  €anv 0 KULpoe;  at...t...a  OO~. 
14 
Aristotle, SE 33, 183b36-184a8 
Kat.  yap  'TWV  'TT€pt.  'Tove;  €PLaTLKOVe;  t...oyoue;  J-LLaeUpVOVV'TWV  oJ-LO£u  'TLe; 
~v  iJ  'TTU£O€UaLe;  rij  Topy£ou  'TTpuYJ-LU'T€£q.·  t...oyoue;  yap  Ot  J-LEV 
, 
OL  €o[ooauv  oik 
,\  '  ,,I  ".'~  'TT1\€LaTUKLe;  €J-L'TTL'TT'T€LV  o..p'fV7]auv 
'TTap'  au'Twv- ou  yap  'TEXV7]V  at...t...a  'Ta  a'TTo  rije;  'T€XV7]e;  OLOOV'T€e; 
'TTaLO€U€LV  tJ7T€t...aJ-L{3uvov,  dXrrr€p  av  €r  ne;  €'TTLarf]J-L7]V  cpaaKwv 
'TTapaoWa€LV  €'TTt.  'TO  J-L7]oev  'TTOV€LV  'Tove;  'TTO 0  ue;,  €hu  aKU'TO'TOJ-LLK7JV 
J-LEV  J-L7J  oL06.aKoL  J-L7]o'  5e€v  ouv7Ja€TUL  'TTOp£~€aeaL  'Ta  'TO LaV'Ta,  00£7] 
OE  'TTot...t...a  YEV7]  'TTUV'TOOU'TTWV  tJ7TOo7]J-LaTwv.  oV'Toe;  yap  {3€{307}87]K€  J-LEV 
Plato, Phdr. 261 b-c 
at...t...a  J-Lat...LaTU  J-LEV  'TTW<;  'TT€pi.  'Tae;  oLKue;  /...EY€TaL  'T€  Kat.  ypacp€'TaL 
TEXV7J,  t...EY€TaL  OE  KUt.  'TT€pl.  o7]J-L7JYopLue;·  €'TTI.  'TT/...EOV  OE  OUK  aK7JKou. 
dXr]Koae;,  as  EV  'J).£qJ  oxot...a~OVT€e;  auv€yputf;a'T7]v,  TWV  OE 
ITat...aJ-L7JOoue;  aV7JKooe;  yEyovue;;  - Kal.  val.  J-La  ,1L'  eywy€  nov 
:\T'  "  r  '  lI.T'  ,  H€aTOpOe;,  €L  J-L7]  1  OpyLUV  1Y€aTOpU  nvu 
Cl  "  ,  C\'~  'O~  ,  opaauJ-Laxov  T€  KUL  o€OOWPOV  ouaa€u. 
90 15 
Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.3, 140Sb34-1406al (ed. Kassel) 
~  \  - "  ,  ,  r  '  "r  '\ 
OL'1TIlO~S- oV0f.Laa~v  ... Kal.  WS'  1  opy~as- WVOf.La",EV  7rrWX0f.LouaoKOllaKas-
16 
Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.3, 1406b4-11 (ed. Kassel) 
Topy{as- XAWpa  KaL  aval.f.La  TO.  7TpaYf.Lam·  aU  O€  mVTa  alaxP6k f.L€v 
eG'7TELpa5",  KaKW5"  O€  €eep~aa5"'  7TOI.TJTI.KWs- yap  ayav. 
17 
Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.17, 1418a32-37 (ed. Kassel) 
€V  O€  TOL5"  €mOEI.KnKOl,5"  OEl,  TOV  AOYOV  €7TELaOOWVV  €7Ta£VOI.5",  olov 
'IaoKpaT7J5"  7TOI.EL·  dEL  yap  nva  ElaaYEL.  Kat.  0  eAEYEV  Topy£a5"  on 
oUX  U7TOAE{7TEL  aUTov  <5  AOY05",  TaUTO  EG'TLV'  El  yap'  AXLAAea  Aeywv 
n  \ "  - -,.  A'  I  -L  'e  I  ,  I  ~,  ,'~  I  7]IlEa  E7TaI.VEL,  ELTa  l.aKOV,  E Ta  TOV  EO V,  0f.L0I.WS'  aE  Kal.  avopLav, 
18 
Aristotle, Pol. 1. 13, 1260a21-28; cf. Fr. 19. 
Kat.  OUX  fJ  aUTiJ  yuval.K05"  Kat.  dvopos-,  ouo'  dvopLa  KaL  oLKawaVv7], 
Ka8a7TEp  0ETO  };wKpaT7]5" ...  Ka80Aou  yap  oE  A€YOVTE5"  Ega7TaT<lXnV 
eaUTOl.Js-,  on TO  EV  eXELV  TTJV  ljroxiJv  dPEITJ,  ~ TO  op807TpaYELV,  7j  n 
TWV  TOWUTWV- 7TOA-V  yap  Uf.LELVOV  A€youaLv  oE  €gap~ef.LOVVTE5"  Ta5" 
apETCls,  Wo-rrEP  TopyLa5",  TWV  OVTWS'  opl.~op..evwv. 
19 
Plato, Men. 71e-72a; cf. Fr. 18. 
7TPWTOV  f.L€V,  El  f30VAEL  avopo5"  dPEITJV,  pq.owv,  on  aV1"77  €G'Tt.v 
avopo5"  dPE1"7],  LKavov  elval.  TO.  rij5"  7TOA€WS'  7TpaTTEI.V  Kat.  7TpaTTOVTa 
91 Ka.1.  ,  , 
a.V1"OV 
eUA.a.(3eLa8a.l.  f.L7JO€V  1"OI.OU1"OV  1Ta.ee'i:V.  eZ  O€  {3oUA.el.  YVVa.l.KOS  dperr,v, 
ou  xa.A.e1T()v  i3l.eA.eeLv,  on oeL  a.trr7]v  rTJV  OlKLa.v  eu  oZKeLV,  uqj,ovua.v 
re rei  EVOOV  Ka.L  Ka.rr,KOOV  ovua.v  rou dvopos.  Ka.L  ru7J €<TT"l.V  1Ta.l.OOS 
dper-ry,  Ka.L  e7JA.eLa.s  Ka.1.  appevos,  Ka.1.  1Tpeu{3vrepov  dvopos,  eZ  f.L€V 
{3ouA.el.,  €A.eVeepov,  ei  O€  {3ouA.el.  OOUA.ov.  72a Ka.1.  aMa.l.  mlf.L1ToMa.l. 
EKaaT7JV  yeip  rwv  1Tpa.~ewv  Ka.1.  rwv  T]A.I.KI.WV  1TpOS  EKa.<TT"OV  epyov 
EKa<TT"qJ  T]f.LWv  T]  dperr,  €<TT"I.V,  Waa.urws  i3€  olf.La.I.,  JJ  LWKpa.res,  Ka.1.  T] 
I  Ka.KI.a.. 
20 
Ploutarkhos, Cim.  10,5. 
Topyia.s  f.L€V  0 Aeovrivos  <jJ7JUl.  rov KLf.Lwva.  rei  xpTJf.La.ra.  K1"Cia8a.l.  f.L€V 
Ws  XPqJ1"O,  xpf]a8a.l.  O€  Ws  nf.LqJ-ro. 
21 
Ploutarkhos, De adulatore et amico 23, MoraIia 64C. 
o  f.L€V  yeip  <jJLA.oS  OUX  Wa7rep  d1Te<jJa.Lvero  TOPyLa.S,  a.V1"qJ  f.L€V  d~l.{!xrel. 
rei  'OLKa.l.a.  rov  <jJLA.oV  iJ1TovpyEiv,  €Ke£vqJ  0' a.uros  v1T7Jperr,uel.  1ToMei 
KUL  rwv  f.L7J  oI.Ka.Lwv. 
22 
Ploutarkhos, De mulierum virtutibus, prooem., MoraIia 242ef. 
T]p.l.V  O€  KOf.LifJorepos  f.L€V  0 TopyLa.s  <jJa.Lvera.l.,  KeA.eVWV  f.L7]  '1"0  el'Oos 
ciA.A.ei  rTJv  ooguv  elva.l.  1T0A.A.0(;S- YVWPI.f.Lov  rijs- YVVa.l.KOS-. 
23 
Ploutarkhos, De gloria Atheniensium 5, Moralia 348C. 
~ve7Jue 0' T]  rpa.yqJoLa.  Ka.t.  o  I.. e{3o fl37J,  Buvf.LuaTOV  eiKpOa.f.La.  KUt.  8ea.f.La. 
rwv  '1"0'1'"  dVepW7rWV  yevof.Lev7J  KuL  1Ta.pa.axouua.  ro(;s- f.Lu801.s  Ka.t.  1"o(;s 
1Ta8eul.v  d1Ta1"7]v,  ws  Topy£us  </J7Juiv,  7]v  0  '1'"  d1Ta.-rfJUa.S  C)l.KUl.Orepos 
rou  f.L7J  d1Ta.rr,Ua.V1"OS,  Ka.t.  0  d1Ta.-r-ry8eLs- uo<jJw,.epos  rou  f.L7] 
92 ,  --.A'  a7Ta.  'fVeVTO~.  <5  f.LEV  yap  d7Tarr]aa~  Dt.KaI.6TepO~, 
24 
Ploutarkhos, Quaestiones convivales VII 10,2, Moralia 715e 
<'  "E' ,  ,  ~f3  ELVal.,  TOV~  -rr-ra  E7T1.  .:;, '/  a~. 
Aristophanes, Ran. 1021. 
TOUe' 
Philo  demus, Herculan.  Volum.  CoiL  Altera (1873) T. VIII, p. 15 
(not included in any other edition of G.'s work) 
TOU  AlaxVAOV  D  [ ...  ] "Apews- EAeye. 
25 
Proklos,  Chr.,  in  Vitae  Homeri  et Hesiodi,  p.  26,  14-20  ed. 
Wilamowitz (cf. FGrHist 4 F 5b) 
dvayoval.v  aUTou  ['  0fLTJPOV] ...  ropy[a~ DE  0  A.EOVTI:VO~  el~ Movaal:ov 
aUTov  .\Eye  I.. 
26 
Proklos, Hes. Op., 760ff. (p.232,12-14, ed.Pertusi) 
ou  yap  a.7TAuk  dA-ry8ES  (3  EAeye  ropy[a~'  EAeye  DE  "'TO  fLEV  elvat. 
dcPavE'>  fL7]  'TVXOV  'TOU  DOKELV,  'TO  DE  DOKELV  daeevE~ fL7]  'TVXOV  'TOU 
elval. ". 
27 
Schol. T on Homer, IL 4. 450a 
93 28 
Anonymous, 'A7T'mp8eyp.a-ra.  ~tJ..oao4x»v,  No  34,  Syrian  Ms.  of 
Sinai  Abbey  fol.148a  (Studia  Sinaitica)  1  (1894),  p.35).  For  a 
translation and notes see Buchheim 1989 and notes ad loc. 
29 
Gnomologicum Vaticanum, 743, No. 166. (p.68, ed. Sternbach) 
Topy[ae;  0  pTp-wp  EAEYE  Tove;  ~~Ao(Jo~[ae;  j1-EV  c1.j1-aAovvTae;,  ITEpL  DE 
Ta  €yKvKA~a  j1-aef]j1-aTa  y~voj1-€vove;  oj1-oLove;  Eiva~  TOI.e;  j1-v7J(JTfjp(J~v, 
01.  ll7JVEA07T7JV  eEAOvTEe;  -ral.e;  eEpa7T'aLva~e; avTfje;  €j1-£YVVVTO. 
30 
Gnomologicum Vaticanum, 743, n.167 (p.69, ed. Sternbach) 
Topy{ae;  Tove;  pTp-opae;  €~  Oj1-0Love;  Eiva~  TOI.e;  f3aTpd.xo~e;·  Toue;  j1-EV 
yap  €V  {Joan  KEAaOEI.V,  Tove;  oe  ITpoe;  KAetfnJopav. 
31 
Sopatros,  Ll~aLpE(J~S  ~'1J7"71p.&.T{J)V  (Rh. Gr.  Vol.  8,  23,21-23,  ed. 
Walz) . 
Topy[ae;  j1-VOPOV  Eivm  A€YWV  TOV  7]ALOV. 
ADDENDUM 
Pollux, IX.1 (p. 148, ed. Bethe) 
'OvOj1-a(JT~KOV  [n]  [f3~f3A[OV]  ITEITO£  7JTa~  Topy[q.  T41  (JocP~aTfj,  oVTwuL 
j1-EV  c1.Kov(Ja~  ITa~OEVnKov, ELe;  DE  ITEl.paV  €AeEI.V  OA£YOV  AOYOV ...  Tcl  TE 
yap  aAAa  ';'v xpELav  aVTwv  c1.IToo€xoj1-a~,  KaL  on  TOV  TWV  OVOj1-clTWV 
KaTclAOYOV,  EXOVTcl  n  rij  1>V(JE~  ITpo(JKOp€e;,  T41  Tp07TCJ,J  Tfje;  OLa8€(JEW<; 
(JE(Jo1>~(JTa~  ITpOS  TO  aAVITOV  €V  T41  Tfjs  UVVTcl~EW<;  ax!Jj1-an,  ~ 
94 f.L7Joevu  eCirrov  'T(lJ  yvwa8evn  7TPOKUf.LEZV, 
7TOeEZV. 
,  ~ 
UKOVaUl. 
The following fragments are cited in section C in DK (MLf.LTJaEL~) 
1 
Plato, Symposion 198c. 
KuL  yap  f.LE  Topy£ov  0  AOyo~  ['  Ayaewvo~]  dVEf.L£f.Lv7JaKEv,  Wa-rE 
dTEXVW~ TO  TOU' Of.LTJpOV  E7TE7TOVe7J·  ECP0f30Vf.L7JV,  f.LTJ  f.LOL  TEAEVTWV  0 
'Ayaewv Topy£ov  KEcpuAiJv  OELVOU  AeYELV  EV  TqJ  Aoycp  E7TL  Ef.LOV  Aoyov 
7Tef.Lljiu~  UVTOV  f.LE  A£eov  rij dCPWVLq.  7TOLTJaELEV. 
Plato, Symposion 185c 
IIuvauv£ov  O€  7Tuvauf.LEvov  - oLouaKovaL  yap  f.LE  ['  A7TOMOOWpOV]  Lau 
\/  ~  \  ~  ,J..  /  I\EyELV  OVTWCTL  OL  C10,/,OL. 
Xenophon, Symposion II 26. 
2 
av  O€  TJf.LZV  ot.  7TUZSE~ f.LLKpUlS  dAL~L f.LLKpa  E7TLljiEKa'WCTLv,  Zvu  KuL 
EYW  EV  TOPYLELOLC1L  p-ryf.LUC1LV  EL7TW ... 
95 COMMENTARY 
96 11.  The Encomium of Helen 
1. The Argumentation 
G., following his poetic predecessors, introduces his praise of  HeI. 
with a Priamel, which according to  B'~<I.ildy (1962, p.5) "is a focusing 
or selective device in which one or more terms serve as foil for the 
point  of particular  interest".  The  topic-word  in  this  Priamel  IS 
KOO'P.OS"; 1  G.  proceeds  by determining  what  is  KOO'P.OS"  for  several 
elements  (lTOA€L:€VUvopLu,  O'wp.un:Ka.AAoS",  ifruxfJ:ao<jJLu, 
1Tpa.yp.un:dp€nj), and he places the focal element last:  KOO'P.OS"  for a 
speech is  truth.  G.'  s task then is  to  tell the truth about Helen, the 
notorious trouble-maker. 
In a programmatic paragraph G.  explicitly puts forward the very 
object of his  speech; "to say rightly what ought to  be said and to 
refute the critics of Helen".  Who  are the critics of Helen? Those 
who have listened to the poets and her nomen/omen. It is clear that 
for the purposes of his own argumentation, G.  presents Helen as  a 
woman unanimously criticised by the poets, though we know that 
the  poetical  tradition  is  divided.  And  her  nomen/omen  - a 
reminiscence of the archaic conception that the name brings out the 
nature of  the subject it describes - is a further reference to the poets. 
The ignorance created by the poetical tradition must be replaced by 
the  argumentation of the rhetor.  AOYLO'P.OS"  is  his  own method:  the 
rationalistic examination and the use  of arguments  are  opposed to 
the account of  the poets, whose words are the result of  inspiration. 
G.  then  gives  an  account  of Helen's  birth,  he  praises  her 
incomparable beauty and composes a brief encomium of  her suitors, 
1 For this word see note ad loco 
97 which  works  as  an  implicit  encomium  of herself;  for  having 
attracted so  many and so  important men suggests that she herself 
must have been an important woman as well. 
With  a  rhetorical  paraleipsis  (praeteritio)  he  bypasses  her 
marriage with Menelaos, because as he says "to tell those who know 
what they know carries conviction but does not give pleasure." This 
disclaimer is  to  some extent misleading. Although, G.  claims that 
the presentation of information already known does add credibility 
to  one's speech, he does not claim that sacrificing the informativity 
of a  speech  detracts  from  its  credibility.  This  is  explained if we 
compare it with G.'s statement later, in ch.13, that a speech written 
with skill and not spoken with truth can please and persuade a large 
crowd. Evidently, in this case a reference to Helen's marriage would 
not be very pleasant and it would hardly fit in G.'s argumentation, 
whereas the presentation of  her noble birth and of  her noble suitors, 
create an encomiastic image of Helen. This is  a good example of 
what  the  early  theorists  of rhetoric  meant  by  the  term  kairos 
(cp.fr.13): presenting the right arguments in the right time and in the 
right occasion. 
The presentation of the possible  reasons  that  forced  Helen to 
elope  with Paris  has  now been prepared:  divine  power,  violence, 
speech,  love.  It is  evident that Helen, put under the pressure of so 
strong  powers  had no  other choice;  as  de  Romilly  remarks,  this 
principle is "repeatedly applied by the orators ofThucydides" and it 
is "in constant use in the arguments of tragedy and later also in the 
speeches of  the orators". The main aspects of  this "principle" are the 
following: 
1.  The  invention  of possible  reasons  (or  excuses)  is  based  on 
probabilities;  G.  says  that  these  are  the  causes  "which  made  it 
reasonable  (ElKD~ ~v) for Helen's departure to Troy to  occur". These 
probabilities  are  not  mutually  exclusive;  each  one  is  equally 
possible, though a combination of  them is not to be rejected. 
2.  Their common denominator is that all of them possess a divine 
power  or  the  possibility  to  work  their  will  on  their  victims  by 
98 compUlsion:  gods  are  invincible by their nature,  violence,  though 
not personified in the Encomium,  is  presented by Hesiod (Theog. 
383-385) as the daughter of Styx and Pallas and the sister of  Kratos 
and  Nike;  speech  is  defined  by  G.  as  "a powerful  ruler,  whose 
achievements  are  supehuman  (eELoraTa)"  and  love  (€P~  is 
described as a god with a god's power. 
3.  The discussion of divine power,  AOYOS- and love involves a good 
deal  of  theoretical  argumentation,  whereas  the  discussion  of 
physical violence is straightforward. 
Divine power is not dealt with exhaustively; defending Helen as a 
victim of  divine power is as old as the fliad; what is surprising is the 
presentation of the decisions of the gods in civic terms (if;7]cpLup.auL, 
(3ovAEvp.auL  6) which belong to the proceedings of an Assembly. G. 
does not simply state that divine power is by its nature invincible; 
this political terminology prepares the rationalistic approach to  the 
power of  the stronger. With an axiomatic phrase, he states that" it is 
not natural for the stronger to be hindered by the weaker, but for the 
weaker  to  be  governed  and  guided  by the  stronger,  and  for  the 
stronger to  lead and the weaker to  follow." This typically Gorgian 
antithetical structure  expresses  a predominant theme of the  moral 
and psychological problematic of  the sophistic movement, that is the 
nomos / physis opposition and its implications concerning the right 
of  the might. 
Violence is  discussed briefly; if Helen was forced to  desert her 
husband it is not right to put the blame on her, who was the victim, 
but him, who as a barbarian committed barbarous crimes. 
What  follows  is  the  discussion  of  '\oyos-.  This  part  of  the 
Encomium is of  high importance since it provides one 0 f the earliest 
theoretical  approaches  to  the  functions  of human  speech  and  its 
psychological  implications.  Poetry,  magical  spells,  the 
psychotherapeutic  value  of  speech,  the  pragmatics  of  human 
communication  and  its  context,  the  philosophical  discourse,  the 
rhetorical persuasiveness will serve as examples. 
99 "Speech  (.:\oyos)  is  a  powerful  ruler.  Its  substance  (O'clJf.Lu)  is 
minute  and  invisible,  but  its  achievements  are  superhuman 
(e€LO-rU-rU)";  with  this  striking  personification  G.  begins  the 
discussion of speech. The .:\oyos to which divine power is attributed 
here is not any particular kind of  speech, but speech as a whole. The 
divine nature of .:\oyos is not at this stage presented as  the result of 
human craftsmanship. The human factor is deliberately kept back. In 
the present context, .:\oyos is an autonomous being with superhuman 
powers. 
Two kinds of speech are adduced as  examples of the power of 
.:\oyos:  poetry and incantations. Poetry is  defined as  "a speech with 
metre".  This  definition  is  interesting  because  of the  shocking 
assumption that the specific  distinction between poetry  and  other 
kinds of speech is metre. By saying so, G.  underrates poetry in the 
respect that it is implied that all the parameters of  poetical language, 
except metre, are common with all the other kinds of speech. And 
G. 's poetical style is a clear manifestation that what is said here is in 
absolute accordance with his practices. Aristotle claims that "as the 
poets,  although their utterances were devoid of sense,  appeared to 
have gained their reputation through their style,  it was  a poetical 
style that first came into being, as that of G." (Test. 29). I consider 
that G.'s poetical style, with the abundant use of ornamentation, is 
not merely a capriciousness. He seems to have awareness of  the fact 
that  he  is  creating  a  new  literary  genre  which  will  answer  the 
demands  of  an  increasing  need  for  persuasive  speech.  As 
Untersteiner put it,  G.'s emphatic definition of poetry seems to  be 
"peculiar  to  a  man  who  knows  that  he  has  created  the  modem 
sophisticated prose" (1961, p.99). The ability of  poetry to mould the 
souls of  the listeners (the r/roxuyor;£u of  Plato) and its channing form 
are the foundation stones of  the new rhetorical prose. 
The  discussion  of the  emotions  caused  by  poetry  follows  a 
pattern  regularly  used  in  the  Encomium:  poetical  speech  (the 
stimulus) comes into the soul of the listeners and it arouses fright, 
100 pity and longing.  The physiological signs  or better the symptoms 
with which the  soul  expresses  the  affection  are  the  tears  and  the 
shuddering  (cpPLKTJ)  of the audience. In addition,  G.'s remarks  that 
poetical speech makes the soul experience a suffering of its own at 
the sufferings of  others. The passage, with the combination of  cpof3o~ 
and  €J1.EO~,  reminds  us  of the  definition  of tragedy  in  Aristotle's 
Poetics,  but  this  verbal  similarity is  not a finn ground to  say,  as 
many  scholars  did  (see  comment ad loc.),  that  G.  anticipates  the 
'Kci8apa,~-theory' of  Aristotle. 
The second example of the power of logos comes from the realm 
of  magic. Incantations are the spells that in the popular view can force 
someone to  act in a way that does not correspond to hislher intentions 
and we have evidence that they were used for therapeutic reasons as 
well. Their power was derived from the gods. According to G., when 
the  power  of the  incantation  reaches  the  opinion  of the  soul  it 
enchants it and the soul persuaded is now forced to  change opinions, 
that is  it adopts  different views from those that it originally had.  In 
other words the person is alienated from itself and its actions are in 
accordance with the commands of the  incantation.  This  is  because 
"sorcery  and  enchantment  can  mislead  the  soul  and  deceive  the 
judgment". 
After the presentation of  the examples of  poetry and incantations, 
the  emphasis  is  placed  on  the  recipients  of logos.  Most  people 
persuade by creating a false speech.  I  But false speeches would not 
have been equally persuasive if  men "possessed memory of  the past, 
understanding of the present and foreknowledge of the future". But 
since it is not so "most men make belief  the adviser of  their soul". 
This  passage  gave  rise  to  several  interpretations  and  it  has 
regularly  been  used  as  a  manifestation  of G.'s  epistemological 
distinction between knowledge and opinion. Scholars who take this 
I In his short introduction, G. claims that unlike the poets he intends to tell the 
truth; similar declarations of  intention are frequent in Pindar as well; cpo  O.  1. 
46ff., N. 7. 20-4. 
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access to knowledge and as a matter of fact they are condemned to 
trust opinion, defined here as  slippery and unreliable. In my view, 
G.'s  texts  do  not  call  for  interpretations  coloured  by  sustained 
epistemological, metaphysical or even ontological theories. What is 
said here is  a  clear argument:  most,  not all  men,  rely on belief, 
because it is not easy, not because it is impossible, to have access to 
knowledge.  So  if Helen was  deceived, it is  because she did what 
most men do. 
If  Helen was persuaded by words we should not put the blame on 
her,  but on  the  man who  persuaded her,  because as  we are  told 
"persuasion, though not having an  appearance of compulsion, has 
the  same power". llELeW  and alla:YK7]  are two basic Greek notions. 
Herodotos  (VIll.ll1.2)  says  that  when  the  Andrians  refused  to 
contribute  money  to  the  Greek  side  during  the  Persian  Wars, 
Themistokles  told them that  the Athenians  are  coming with two 
great  gods:  Persuasion  and  Compulsion.  Aristotle  (EE  1224a39) 
clearly  distinguishes  them  as  well.  G.  seems  to  underrate  this 
established distinction for the purposes of  his argumentation. 
The power of persuasion is  demonstrated with three  examples, 
taken from  three different contexts of human communication:  the 
accounts of the natural philosophers, the speeches delivered in the 
courtrooms, the discussions of the philosophers. From this point G. 
is not concerned with the extra-human power of logos, but with the 
persuasion as  a result of human abilities, in other words we are in 
the realm of  rhetoric in the widest possible meaning of  the word. Let 
us  throw  some  more  light  on  the  examples:  the  first  example  is 
taken  from  the  theories  of  the  'natural  philosophers',  the 
'cosmologists';  G.  claims  that  these  men  make  things  otherwise 
invisible to the natural eye visible to the eye of  the mind. 
1. The argument seems persuasive: Anaxagoras 59A72 for example 
thought that the  sun is  a flaming  stone.  People,  not being able to 
refute this theory on the basis of their natural senses, are persuaded 
by words.  And this  was  probably what  G.  meant by the  phrase: 
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is unreliable if  it does not involve existence" (cp. fr.26). 
2. The second example is pertinent to the speeches delivered in the 
courtrooms; "a single speech  pleases and persuades a large crowd, 
because  it  is  written  with  skill,  not  spoken  with  truth".  The 
opposition of the  one  speech  to  the  mob  (oXAor;)  alludes  to  mass 
psychology~ The self-consciousness of the speaker reappears; being 
persuasive means pleasing the audience. 
3.  The third example derives from the "conflicts of philosophical 
speeches"; in these debates an opinion is  valid until substituted by 
another,  imposed by the development of the argumentation of the 
opponent. The interlocutors of these debates are differentiated from 
the 'cosmologists' and the 'advocates' because they do  not proceed 
with a speech composed in advance; their success depends on their 
alertness and the adjustability of  their argumentation. 
G.  then,  moves  on  to  the  demonstration  of the  power  of 
persuasive  speech  and  its  impact  on the  human  soul;  by using  a 
mathematical relation, he maintains that, "the power of  speech bears 
the  same relation to  the  ordering of the  mind  as  the  ordering  of 
drugs bears to  the  constitution of bodies"; as  there are drugs  with 
therapeutic value and others which are lethal, in the same way there 
are speeches that evoke positive and speeches that evoke negative 
emotions.  And  there  are  other  speeches  which,  by  means  of 
malicious persuasion (7T€~eo7.  KUK7j),  harm the soul. 
The  fourth  reason  is  love;  but paradoxically  the  word  love  is 
from  the  very  beginning  of the  argumentation  substituted  by the 
word oif;~r; ('vision'); the argument is built upon the idea that we are 
not responsible for the appearance of an object. The argumentation 
involves once more the examination of  the psychological parameters 
of the function of  vision and its impact upon the soul. The emotions 
103 caused by sight are divided into two categories: the negative and the 
positive. G. begins with the negative ones: 
1.  When soldiers face the offensive and defensive weapons of the 
enemy they flee because these very weapons  foreshadow frightful 
events. So their fear makes them disregard the benefits of a victory. 
Frightful sights cause psychological disorders. 
2.  Things  that people have seen in the  past are  engraved  in  their 
memory,  and  because  of them,  people  still  experience  terrifying 
emotions in the present. 
Several traits of "behaviourism" can be traced here:  a stimulus 
produces through  EKTrIl:llg~s (panic)  emotions  of fear.  The external 
display of these emotions can take various forms  (e.g. the flight of 
the  army).  This  inclusive  typology  of emotions  allows  G.  omit 
further  examples of frightful  sights, because,  as  he  says,  they are 
'similar to those mentioned" 
The positive emotions are shown by the effects of  the products of 
the  fine  arts  on the soul.  Two kinds of artistic  activity are  used: 
painting and sculpture. 
With a clause of striking density G.  describes both the process of 
creation  and the effects of a painting: "when painters complete out 
of many colours and objects a single object and form,  they please 
the sight". 
Saying  that  the  products  of the  fine  arts  can  evoke  the  same 
emotions as speech, that is pleasure (r€.p~ts), is obviously an echo of 
the  conception  that  both  art  and  literature  are  mimetic;  the 
difference between them, according to  G.,  is  that words please the 
soul, whereas fine arts please the sight. 
But pleasure is not the only result of art; from the passive state of 
pleasure, the soul is now passing to the active action of love. This is 
the  ro~ov 1Tci87]p.u  which is invoked by poetry in the human soul (9): 
falling  in  love with soulless objects is  the highest achievement of 
the mimetic process (a1T€PyuC1ius). 
104 "So if  Helen's eye, pleased by Alexander's body, transmitted an 
eagerness and striving of love to her mind, what is surprising?" The 
practical use of  the theorisation concerning the sight is now obvious: 
It was not Helen who fell in love with Paris, but her eye, which was 
pleased by his 'statuesque' body. 
With a repetition of the causes that made Helen follow Paris, G. 
reaches  the  end of his  speech.  In  all  of the  cases  Helen  is  not 
responsible for what has happened; she was the victim. But it seems 
that G.  saw fit to  tantalise scholars at the very end of  Hel., because 
after his statement that he has kept to the purpose which he set at the 
beginning of his speech, that is to  remove infamy from Helen, he 
goes on to voice his personal intentions in composing this speech: it 
was meant to be an encomium for her, and a 1Ta£yv~ov for himself! 
II. 
I 
1Tal. YVI.OV 
Authors do  not always utter their intentions in their own texts;  in 
deciding how one should interpret a text whose author prescribes in 
it how he means us to  perceive it, there are, I believe, two routes: 
one  either ignores the  author's statement or one decides  to  bring 
one's interpretation into harmony with the author's stated intention. 
But  all  this  depends  on  the  meaning  one  gives  to  the  word 
'intention'. I readily exclude the following meaning: 'G. wrote Hel. 
to  amuse  himself', because it  cannot be confirmed or rejected on 
any firm  ground, and chiefly because it does not contribute to  our 
understanding of his writing. On the contrary, I am ready to accept 
an  investigation  of the  function  of his  statement  that  Hel.  is  a 
1Ta£yvLOv  in the general context of  this speech. 
What is a 1Taf.yvLOv? Isokrates, in his own Hel., imputes to  some 
'sophists' that they deal with unimportant subjects, on the basis that 
these subjects are not demanding enough. In explaining his view, he 
maintains  that  serious  subjects  1"Oo-OU1"4J  XaAe1TW'TEpaV  €XOVo-l.  rr,v 
1"OU  1Ta[~eI.V  E1TI.1Tovw-repov  Eo-1"(.V,  and he then goes on to explain that 
105 for this very reason no one has any difficulty in 'praising' salt, or 
{30J.L{3V>"LOV~  (a kind of insect). Having said that,  he praises Kat.  TOV 
ypatj;aVTa  7rEPL  rij~'  EM:v7]S  (who  else but G.?)  for undertaking the 
task  of  composing  a  speech  for  Helen.  Interestingly  enough, 
Isokrates  locates  an  element  in  G.'s  He!.  which  makes  his 
achievement open to  criticism: 'Although he claims [sc. G.] that he 
has written an encomion about her, in fact what he says happens to 
be  a  defence of her'. Isokrates has  the  last words of G.'s He!.  in 
mind  (or  even  before  him),  and  his  words  acquire  interesting 
implications if we take into  account the fact that in this section of 
his He!.  he makes a distinction between O'7TOVOa~E~v and 7ra£{E~v, as 
two  distinct  intellectual  activities.  In  other  words,  why  does 
Isokrates present himself as ignorant of  G.'s own statement that He!. 
is a 7ra£yvLOv? 
There are the following possibilities: a) he did not have G.'  s text 
before him, or, in the version that he had before him that last word 
of  the text was missing, b) he preferred to refer solely to the part of 
G.'s self-referential statement which would give him a more suitable 
raison  d'etre  for  his  own  encomion,  c)  he  did  not  take  G.'s 
statement as an honest confession, d) a 7raLYvLOv  mayor may not be 
serious.  (a)  should  be  excluded;  even  if Isokrates  did  not  have 
before him G.'s actual words, the antithetical, polished form of the 
sentence makes  it  extremely  easy  to  memorise  it;  what  is  more, 
Isokrates'  own words pick up  G.'s ones  (cP7](IL  J.LEV  yap  €YKWf.LLOV 
YEypacP€l/a~  7rEPI..  aV'T7]S  = E{3ov>..fJ87]1/  ypatj;a~  TOV  >..6"101/'  .£>..€I/7]S ..• ; 
note  that in the preceding paragraphs  Isokrates  uses  €7ra~l/o~  and 
e7ra~I/EZI/ , not  ErKWJ.L~OI/). (b) is  harder to  refute; it could have been 
the case that Isokrates deliberately turned a blind eye to  the word 
7raLYvLOv,  because he wanted to  stress  that  his  Helen  exemplified 
what real eYKWJ.Lt..a  should look like; yet, it is hard to  explain why he 
fails to capitalise on G.' s own self-characterisation, when he has just 
mentioned  that  some  people  prefer  the  royal  road  to  the  stony 
serious  subjects.  (c)  Whether  G.' s  statement  were  or  were  not 
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Isokrates would not have been intimidated by G.'s dishonesty, as the 
wording in his massive criticism in  10.3  evinces.  (d)  seems to  me 
the only possible explanation; Isokrates was certainly aware that G. 
thought his own work to be a 1Tuiyvwv, but he did not see fit to  use 
this  self-reference in his  criticism.  G.'s He!.,  and the  encomia  of 
others that Isokrates has in mind differ significantly. 
The analysis so far shows that Isokrates at least did not find any 
absence  of seriousness  in  He!.  That  he  adduces  G.'s  example  to 
show what real E1TULVOL  should deal with points in this direction, as 
it does that he builds his own speech on the basis of  what he deems 
as  a  minor misfire  of G.'  s  speech.  In  this  light,  it  appears  that 
despite the word 1TULYVWV  G.  intends us to construe his speech as  a 
senous pIece. 
We may now turn  to  modern  views; 
1  modern scholarship  has 
more or less used the word 1TULYVWV  as  a catalyst, which has  the 
potential to  overturn the whole meaning of  He!.  Accordingly, it has 
been suggested that if the word implies a humorous tone, then He!. 
is a humorous piece, or at any rate that with this word G. underrates 
his  own work  (see Kennedy  1991,  p.288);  similarly,  it has  been 
thought that "he may have been equally aware of the usefulness of 
parody and pastiche as a means for focusing students' attention and 
making their memories more retentive" (Cole  1991, p.78).  On the 
contrary,  Poulakos  explains  that  no  teacher  of rhetoric  would 
conclude with an expression saying "you've been had" (1983, p.3). 
An interesting view has been forward by Verdenius (1981, p.12S), 
who  maintains  that "this kind  of 'Verfremdung'  seems  to  be the 
main  reason  why he  called  the  speech  'a diversion  of myself". 
Bertold Brecht's Verfremdung,  Verdenius explains, means that "the 
audience  should  be  stimulated  by  the  author  to  keep  a  critical 
distance  from  the  deceptive  fictions  and  not  to  take  images  for 
I  For further  literature and summaries,  see Untersteiner  1954,  p.I31  and n.106, 
Bona 1974, p.33, Caffaro 1995, p.73, Schiappa 1999, p.I30-1. 
107 reality".  G.,  throughout the discussion of the third reason  (8-14), 
keeps  reminding  us  that  persuasion  is  violent,  that  it  can  be 
malicious,  and that  it certainly  affects  our soul.  So  one may  ask 
oneself: if G.  shows how and why persuasive speech victimises its 
auditors, why should I become the victim of  his own speech? This is 
potentially valid  criticism;  but there are  some points  to  be made. 
There  is  no  reason  to  suggest  that  1Ta.£yv~OV  refers  solely  to  the 
discussion of speech in 8-14,  and in any case, had G.  intended to 
produce the effects of 'Verfremdung' by saying that his work is  a 
1Ta.iyvLOv, he would not have waited until the very end of  his speech. 
His audience should have been warned earlier. 
Schiappa  (1999,  p.130-1)  has  recently  claimed  that  "there  is 
plenty  of  textual  material  with  which  to  work  without 
overemphasizing the significance of the  last word.  After all,  one 
might speculate that G.'s choice ofpaignion was merely a matter of 
acoustical preference, since paignion is  a useful word to  complete 
the  melodious  phrase  men  enkOmion  emon  de  paignion". 
Agnosticism  in  literary  interpretation  is  perfectly justifiable  and 
sometimes  preferable;  but  it  should  not  take  refuge  in  formal 
embroidery.  If this method is  to  be employed, then probably one 
may claim that eYKwJL~oV is an equally ''useful word to complete the 
melodious phrase" JLev  eYKwJLLOV  eJLov  Qe  1Ta.i yVLOV. 
As  far  as  I  known,  no  one  has  paid  enough  attention  to  the 
iconoclastic reconciliation attempted in He!.  of  what normally is (or 
was  thought to  be) distinct;  some obvious  examples:  a dualism is 
discernible  in the  examination of ;tayoS"  which  serves  both  as  an 
argument  for  Helen's  case,  but  which  also  is  a  theoretical 
generalisation  about it.  Persuasion made Helen its  passive object, 
but we know that G. employs persuasion to persuade us too. What is 
said in this speech serves this speech's aims, but the generalisation 
involved  in  it  makes  its  contents  applicable  to  any possible  case 
where persuasion is involved. Helen is a mythical person, but every 
effort is made by G. to present her case as a real one; traditional and 
108 modem are reconciled in an almost postmodernist pastiche. In the 
same  connection,  1T€LeW,  which  is  frequently  depicted  on  vases 
alongside Helen and Aphrodite, is  in this speech rationalised to the 
extreme with purely secular and somewhat trivial examples (cp.13). 
Aoywp.os- is added to a traditional and mythological narrative, which, 
in fact, is never narrated, on the basis that Aoyos-,  or the kind of  Aoyos-
uttered  in  this  text,  can  overcome  linear  accounts.  Love,  a 
notoriously irrational power, is rationalised as well; its divine nature 
is  referred to  en  passant, and  even  there it  is  no  less  rationalised 
(19),  in  a  way which  clearly  echoes  the  rationalisation of divine 
power at 6. The genre to which G.  aspires his work to belong was at 
his period monopolized by the poets, and it is  thus  a thrust at the 
normative horizon of expectations.!  The highly poetical style used 
by G.  is  in  constant  opposition  to  the  rationalisation he attempts 
(although  one may here  object  that  Empedokles  and Parmenides 
expressed their philosophical credos in verse; but strictly speaking 
G. 's composition is not a poem). 
Specific and general, divine and secular, rational and irrational, 
practical and theoretical all coexist in a text the character of  which is 
undoubtedly unparalleled in what we possess from this period; Hel. 
is unbound by the restrictions of reality and real facts,  even by the 
representation  of factual  reality  which  prevails  in Pal.  The word 
1Ta£yvLOv  indicates,  I  think,  G.'s  awareness  that  he  is  creating  a 
speech for speech's sake. Helen's case was in G.'s hands a toy, and 
a toy always gives you the possibility to play with it in the way you 
want.
2 That he expresses this awareness may be seen as a somewhat 
boastful  declaration of the  limitless  power of A6yos-,  to  which  he 
overtly commits himself. 
I  Dover (1968, p.237) suggests that "k.YKWf./-LOV  and  €YKWf./-Lcf.~€LV  are freely used in 
the fourth  century of fonnal praise in prose or verse, but in fifth-century usage 
€YKWf./-LOV  is especially a poem celebrating someone's victory" 
2  G.  repeatedly in  the speech betrays his  easiness  in dealing with Helen's case: 
SijAOV  on...  7,  OliSe  1TOOC;  TOUTO  YaA€1TOV  cl1ToA0J'77cra.08aL ... 8,  au  YaA€1TWc; 
SLa<p€V§ETaL ••• 15. 
109 III.  Gorgias' Encomium of Helen and Euripides' 
Troades 
a)  Some introductory remarks 
The  VIew  that  there  is  some  relation  between  G.'s  Hel.  and 
Euripides' Troades originated in the 19
th  century, but as happens so 
often, there is still a good deal of  controversy as far as the extent and 
the quality of this relation are concerned. Some scholars, especially 
those who  trace a hidden or an overt 'influence' when similarities 
between  two  works  occur,  have been  ready  enough  to  date  G.' s 
work on the basis of its  affinities with Euripides'  Troades.  Some 
others find in Euripides' Troades only what they would describe by 
the tenus 'Sophistic' features or features of the 'sophistic rhetoric', 
which are in themselves problematic, if one bears in mind that not 
much of the work of the Sophists exists,
l  or that in any case, what 
exists is not always enough to  serve as  the basis for comparisons. I 
will not be concerned with the date ofG.'s He!.; the absence of any 
external evidence makes such an attempt shaky, and it seems to me 
that the arguments that have been put fonvard so  far prove nothing 
but the fragility of  the conclusions they are meant to support. 
2 
I  take  as  a starting point a disclaimer made by Croally:3  "The 
question  is  not of priority, or even influence, but of similarity". I 
thus  propose  to  commence  my  discussion  by pointing  out  some 
similarities  or dissimilarities between Helen's speech in the  agon 
and G.'s Hel.;  in this connection, I shall briefly discuss the possible 
affinities of Helen's speech with The Defence of  Palamedes. I then 
propose to  investigate the ever elusive issue of the presence in  the 
I For 'sophistic rhetoric' see most recently  Schiappa 1999, p.48ff. 
1 For a summary of views see Orsini 1956, p. 82-3, 87 n.l; for more recent views 
see Mazzara, 1999, 142-180; Croally 1994, p.155. 
3 See Croally 1994, p.155. 
110 Troades  of the  individual  arguments  employed.  by  G.  A  short 
postscript is  devoted to  one of the most obvious  features  of G.'s 
style which is discernible in Helen's speech in the agon. At any rate, 
the comparison will not be one between the Troades and 'Sophistic 
rhetoric'; on the contrary, I will confine myself to what seems to me 
a  more  moderate,  but  more  feasible  metho~  which  is  the 
comparison of some of the rhetorical aspects of this play with G.'s 
own rhetoric. 
b)  Gorgias' Helen and Helen's defence in the agon 
The first obvious similarity between Euripides' speech in the agon 
of the Troades and G.'  s Encomium is that they are both imaginary 
defences of a mythical person; the first  obvious  difference is  that 
Helen's arguments in the Encomium are not answered, whereas in 
the Troades Hekabe's speech is designed to overturn the arguments 
put forward by the defendant, who,  in an unusual reversal  of the 
normal  forensic 
1  order  delivers  her  speech  first.
2  These  basic 
remarks  are  not  without  importance,  first  because  it  should  be 
remembered that G.'  s speech is an Enkomion to  Helen, and hence 
the person praised is not a defendant in a forensic sense. 
3 
1 To avoid any misunderstandings, I wish to stress that I am well aware of the fact 
that the Troades is  a tragedy, and that consequently I do  not expect it to comply 
with the rules of forensic rhetoric. I even more fully appreciate that, even though 
every  reader  is  perfectly  justified  in  admiring  the  'Sophistic'  or  rhetoric 
intellectualism  of Euripides,  whatever  this  might be,  Euripides  was  probably 
primarily  concerned  with  producing  a  good  drama,  and  consequently  the 
rhetorical elements that I discuss here contribute in the one way or the other to his 
dramatic purposes. These purposes have been and are still vigorously examined 
by  others.  My  concern  is  with  an  as  accurate  as  possible  description  of the 
rhetorical aspects of  the Troades, as these are exemplified in the work of G. 
2 See Lloyd 1992, p.l0l. 
3 In this respect, the only other preserved speech by G., The Defence of  Palamedes 
probably offers a more fruitful ground for an approach to the rhetorical formalities 
adopted by Euripides, for the hero in that speech defends his own life before an 
111 If  now one wishes to locate the most important feature that 
G.'s Hel.  and Helen's speech in the Troades have in common, one 
should tum to  their intention. Neither of them attempts to  refute a 
fact;  on the  contrary,  in both of them the demonstrandum,  as  it 
were,  is  the  refutation  of personal  responsibility  for  an  act  the 
commission of which is  never questioned. 
1  G.  clearly accepts that 
Helen 'did what she did' (6), and he points out that his programme 
is  to  show the  possible reasons which prompted the elopement of 
Helen (KaL  1Tpo8-r,(J'op.aL  'TaoS"  al'T£a~ OL'  Cis  dKOS- ~v yeveaBaL  'TOV  rijs-
'EII.€vifS"  els- rTJv  Tpo[av  a-ro;\ov 5). Similarly, Helen, situated for ten 
years in the sacked cit'j of  Troy, is not in· a position to maintain that 
she did not desert her husband or that she did not travel to  Troy. 
Like  G.'s  He!.,  the  Helen  of  the  Troades  seeks  to  disclaim 
responsibility . 
But if there  are similarities, there are dissimilarities as  welL  In 
the  Troades, Helen has the advantage of addressing her prosecutor 
and  her judge directly  and thus  of shuffling responsibility  on to 
persons  who  are present.  She blames  Hekabe for giving birth to 
imaginary law-court whose members we are invited to believe are the leaders of 
the Greeks in the Trojan war. The speakers in both Pal.  and Euripides'  Troades 
need to persuade at least two audiences: the mythical judges and G. 's students (in 
the broader sense) in the former, Menelaos and the audience (in the broader sense) 
in the  latter.  This  entails  that  formal  constituent elements  of forensic  oratory 
which are undoubtedly present in the speeches of the agon can better be compared 
to  PaL  than to  HeL  It would suffice to  mention some of the characteristics that 
these speeches have in common: in both the Troades and Pal.  we frod a proemion 
where the defendant seeks to define hisfher position towards hislher judges (P.2, 
Tro.914-8);  in both of them the issue of o.VTLKa.rrr;opia.  is  raised (P.27,  Tro.917); 
in both of them facrual reality and possible motives are discussed (,reality': Pal. 
6-12  Tro.938-H, 951-958; motives P.13-21,  Tro.946f.).  And., of course,  in both 
the  register  is  formal.  with  frequent  indications  on the  part of the  speaker  of 
his/her self-awareness of the structure ofhisiher speech (see Postscript). 
1 For later theoretical discussions of  the distinction between refutation of facts and 
refutation of responsibility see Gagarin 1997, p.122; Cole 1991, p. 78. For matters 
of responsibility elsewhere in the  Troades and other Euripidean plays see Lloyd 
1992, p.l  02. 
112 Paris,  and she blames Menelaos  for  going  away and leaving her 
alone with his guest. No  doubt, she blames Aphrodite as well, but 
since divine responsibility is an argument also employed by G., we 
should better discuss  it when we  address  the possible similarities 
between the individual arguments used by G.  and Euripides. At the 
moment, it would be enough to  observe that responsibility is never 
attributed to  a person in G.'s Hel.  And it is  equally true that in this 
speech G. never (unlike the Hel en 0 f the T  roades) resorts to facts, as 
he amply does  in his  Pal.  He is  confident enough to  deny Helen's 
responsibility  on the  ground  of a  general  and  to  a  great  extent 
'theoretical'  discussion  of the  four  causes  (perhaps  with  the 
exception of the second one, that is  'violence'). In fact, the way he 
builds  up  his  individual  arguments  is  so  disconnected  from  the 
specific case he defends that his reasoning, or parts of  it could easily 
be applied to numerous other cases. The Helen of  the Troades on the 
other hand tests  the argument that she should have escaped from 
Paris' place after his death by reasoning in a manner that resembles 
cases where factual reality is  involved.  She says that she tried to 
escape, but the watches always stopped her on the walls, and she 
goes on to consolidate her argument by challenging her audience to 
check the reliability of  her statement by questioning the guards. This 
type of argument,  one of Aristotle's aTEXV0L.  7T£a-rEL.S,  is  as  may be 
expected  frequently  employed in Pal.  (e.g.  7,  22-23),  for  in this 
speech what is  at stake is not the responsibility of the hero, but the 
commission  of the  crime  itself.  But  again,  Palamedes  does  not 
simply  narrate  facts;  he  argues  his  case  by  proving  that  each 
necessary stage for  the  preparation and the commission of treason 
was in his case impossible, so that his discussion of 'factual' reality 
is  largely  based on argument from  probability  (ElKOS),  an element 
that Helen's speech totally lacks.
l 
1  Argument  from  probability  is  used  only  by  Hekabe  at  976-982;  she,  like 
Palamedes, denies to  refer to  'facts'; she rather reaches a reductio ad absurdum 
by showmg that the goddesses had no reason to be involved in the Judgment. 
113 It has perhaps been made clear that the defence of Helen in the 
Troades displays more significant generic similarities with G.' s Pal. 
than with his Hel., and that the main feature that both these speeches 
by or on Helen share is  that they both seek to  free  her from  the 
responsibility of  her actions. However, the means by which this aim 
is  accomplished  are  considerably  different;  to  this  respect  Pal. 
probably  offers  a  better  example  of the  kind  of rhetoric  that 
Euripides adopts, due to its forensic, if imaginary, character. 
c)  Gorgias' a.Lria.1. in the Troades? 
As  is well known,  G.  disclaims Helen's responsibility for her acts 
on  the  basis  of four  causes  (a.Lr[a.r.):  a)  divine  wish,  b)  natural 
violence, c) persuasion, and d) love. These reasons are not mutually 
exclusive, but even if  it were only for one of  them that Helen eloped 
to  Troy,  she  is  still  clear  of guilt.  Scholars,  now,  who  seek  to 
establish a  relation,  chronological or other,  between the  Troades 
and G.'s Hel.  tend to  locate  some or all  of these reasons  in the 
fanner work, 
1 whereas those who  deny such a relation argue that 
Euripides'  play  exhibits  none  or  just  a  few  and  at  any  rate 
insufficient similarities with G.' s Hel. 
2 In what follows I propose to 
show that no  such direct relation can be established, or at least it 
cannot be established on the mere basis of tracing the four causes of 
1 Croally 1994, p.155 is  the most obvious example; Goldhill, 1986, p.237 claims 
that "Helen is given several of Gorgias' arguments to  exculpate herself'; see also 
Conacher 1998, p.53. Wardy 1996, p. 165 n.46 solves the problem with great ease 
by  referring  to  Barlow  1986,  pp.207  -8,  who  says:  "by showing that persuasive 
words can persuade, but fail  to  lead to  consistent action,  Euripides may have in 
mind Gorgias'  gross  overestimation of them  in  his  Encomium  (10-14)  and be 
demonstrating  a different view"; Wardy clearly lacks  Barlow's caution,  for  the 
latter  elsewhere  concludes  that  the  Encomium  of Helen  is  "a  work  which 
Euripides was probably familiar with,  although the precise dating of it  has  not 
been established", 206. 
2 See Lloyd 1992, p. 100, and MacDowell 1982, p.12. 
114 G.  in the play by Euripides. If  Euripides responded to G., or to the 
effects  of his  rhetoric,  as  some  scholars  believe, 
1  he would have 
something more to say about logos  and peitho. But as we shall see, 
the  allusions  to  logos  in the  Troades  do  not  appear to  have any 
significant relevance to  G.'s discussion of it in his Hel.  Moreover, 
the mere location of  some or all of  the four causes in Euripides' play 
is not a convincing argument for its relation to  G.'s Hef.;  again, if 
Euripides  had wished his  play or parts  of it to  be construed as  a 
criticism of G.  he would not have restricted himself to  a  neutral 
reiteration of  them. G.'  s untraditional approach to the exculpation of 
Helen does not lie in the novelty of  the causes he proposes, because 
some of  them at least (certainly 'violence' and 'divine wish,)2 were 
already  available in the mythical tradition.  On the  contrary,  G.'s 
radicalism,  as  it were,  is  chiefly  thanks  to  the  way in  which he 
modifies  the  traditional  raw  material  for  the  purposes  of his 
argumentation. 'This disclaimer ultimately suggests that if one is  to 
accept any relation between the two  works,  one should draw this 
conclusion by also considering to  a certain degree how the Sophist 
reasons  for his  four reasons.  For the  sake of clarity I  propose to 
discuss  each  reason  separately,  although  it  is  true  that  the 
argumentative schemata that G.  employs to support the feasibility of 
his four causes frequentlyoverlap.3 
i. Cause 1: 'Divine wish' 
The first of the  causes seems to  be the  strongest argument in the 
hands of those who support the view of a Gorgian presence in the 
I See Scodel1980, p.99. 
2  I would add persuasion on the basis of evidence deriving from vase·paintings; 
see Ghali-Kahil1955, pp. 59-60, 225-230 and Noel 1989, p.140ff. 
3  I have suggested elsewhere (see Introduction) that the discussions of logos (8-
14) and love (15-19) are marked by a very similar 'theorisation', and that for this 
reason the section about speech and persuasion is not more important than the rest 
of the reasons proposed by G.  It is  perhaps more pertinent to  our interest in the 
pre-Platonic development ofliterary, rhetorical and linguistic theory. 
115 Troades.  G.  argues  that if it  were  Tvx:r?S  {3ovll.:r]p-aar..  KaL  eewv 
/3ovll.evp.aul.  KaL 'Avc1.yK7]S  rfrrlcjJtap.aal.v  that Helen did what she did, 
she is not responsible for her acts. It should be remembered, first of 
all, that G.  does not here or elsewhere mention Aphrodite. In fact, 
the discussion of love, the fourth cause, proceeds in a rationalistic 
manner to  an extent that only a passing reference to  love (epws)  is 
needed  (19).  In both these cases  G.  argues by making use of the 
common view that god is superior to man, yet when it comes to love 
itself at  19  he brings in the pathology of epws,  which we learn is  a 
human vOG7Jp.a and an dYV07Jp-a, an ignorance of  the soul. 
It should  be  established  then  that  when  G.  brings  m  divine 
responsibility,  his  approach  is  rationalistic.  For as  he says,  it is 
nature that dictates that the weaker submits to the stronger, which in 
this case is  divine power (rqJ  eeqJ  KaL  rij rUxrJ).  G.'s argument here 
clearly echoes one of  the most intense polarities of  the philosophical 
investigation of his  times,  that is  the relation between vop.os  and 
cpvav;. This is not the place to discuss this polarity, but as far as this 
particular argument is  concerned G.  seems to  adhere to  a  sort of 
pragmatism which in this case has insignificant implications for the 
morality of  his rhetoric, because no one would disagree that the god 
is  superior to  men.  But who  are  the gods  G.  calls  upon  for  the 
exculpation of  Helen? As we have seen Aphrodite and the rest of  the 
goddesses of the Judgment are clearly left out. Instead of them, G. 
refers to personified abstract notions: TvX'! and 'Avc1.YK7],  along with 
the  general  8ewv,1  which are  now combined with technical  terms 
from  the  field  of  the  administration  of  the  city  (f3ovll.evp.auL, 
t/;7]cpiup.aul.).  It seems that G.  intended to  distance himself from the 
mythical tradition, and this instance is a good example of  how myth 
is rehabilitated in fifth-century rationalism. 
If  now one  turns to  Euripides,  one finds  out that when Helen 
refers to  divine responsibility the only immortal she puts the blame 
1 Cpo  Empedokles DK 31  B 115,1  ECTrLV' AvciyK'l7S  XJYi7j.UJ..  eEWV  ifni,p~ap.a.  1TaAa.~6v, 
whom G. may have in mind here. 
116 on is  Aphrodite.  Conacher,  now,  claims  that "If we look at  the 
Euripidean Helen's defence  (at  Tro.914:ff.),  we will find  that the 
power of Aphrodite  is  the  only  one  which  also  appears  in G.'s 
Encomium", 
1  and  Croally,  who  finds  more similarities  maintains 
that  "it was  Aphrodite  who  offered  her  to  Paris  (929-31),  thus 
making  her  abduction  a  decision  of the  gods  (Gorg.  He!.  6)".2 
Unfortunately, the "power of  Aphrodite" does not appear in G. Hel. 
As I have shown G. makes every effort to  distance himself from the 
details of the standard account of the mythical tradition; it is a part 
of his  logical reasoning to  argue by generalising,  and by offering 
general schemata (in this case 'divine power is  superior to  human 
alertness') with a universal applicability. In Euripides on the other 
hand it is Aphrodite herself that Helen puts the blame on. She says: 
-ri]V  eeov  K6AU~E KuL  LiLoS"  Kpe£O'O'wv  yevov, 
AS"  -rWV  jJ-f:V  aMWV  OULp..OVWV  EXeL  Kpa-roS". 
(947-50) 
The argument here is a fortiori: 'if  Aphrodite is superior (Kpe£O'O'wv) 
to all-mighty Zeus, how could I resist her power?'. Helen's allusion 
here is clearly to the power of love which is inflicted by Aphrodite 
herself 
3  The  KpeLO'O'wv  of G.  is  different  from  the  one  to  which 
Euripidean Helen resorts. It is a KpeLO'O'wv  general enough to include 
all the possible aspects of  the compared elements: god (not goddess) 
is superior to  man as  far as  'violence (/3£q.)  and wisdom (O'o</;£q.)  and 
the  rest  of the  things  are  concerned'.  The  god  himself that  G. 
compares to  human beings remains unspecified, 
4  or it is as  general 
as  Tux:ry or 'AvaYK7J. 
I Conacher 1998, p.53. 
z Croally 1994, p.155. 
3 Cpo also Eur. Hipp. 1-6, and 443ff. 
4 All the occurrences of the word eeds- in HeL  6 denote the divine factor in general: 
eeou  1Tp08upiq.  rill8po'rrrou  1TP0f1-7J8£q.;  eeOc;  0' rillBpo'rrrou  KpeiCTO'WII;  lOt  OVII  rij  ruxr.J 
Kat.  1"4i  ee4i  ...r,v  aiTiall  rillaBeTEolI .•.  Helen in the Troades also closes her speech 
117 When G.  later (19) refers to  €Pus himself, the argument will 
still be based on the relation of the superior to  the inferior. At that 
point the argument is a hypothetical and disjunctive one: if  €Pus is a 
god (G.  does not even take that for granted), as  a god he is superior 
to  mortals;  if love  is  a morbid  state of the  human being  and  an 
ignorance of the human soul, then the blame should not be put on 
the person who suffers from it. In either case Helen is innocent. This 
argument comes  at  the  end of the discussion of the  fourth  cause, 
namely love, which, it should be remembered, has up  to  this point 
been considered mainly with a rational examination of examples of 
the impact of  vision upon the human soul, and it is thus meant to be 
a  specification  of what happened  in the  case  of Helen.  Had  G. 
wished to bring in Aphrodite in the one way or the other this would 
have certainly been the most appropriate part of  his speech to  do so. 
But he does not. His discussion of love is  clearly dissociated from 
Helen, and the responsibilities of  Helen's action are thus not shifted 
on to any particular god. G. could not be less personal.
l 
It has then become clear, I hope, that scholars who  are able to 
locate  in G.  the  Aphrodite  (or indeed the  rest of the  goddesses 
involved  in  the  Judgment)  simply  do  not  realise  that  divine 
responsibility is  presented in a very different fashion in this work 
than it is in Euripides' Troades.  In this play, divine intervention in 
Helen's affairs has  always  a name,  or at  least this  is  certainly the 
case in both Helen's defence and Hekabe's refutation of it.  In the 
Troades  love  inflicted  by  god  remains  an  excuse,  because  the 
rationalisation attempted by G.  in the Encomium is there absent. On 
the  contrary,  calling  upon  Aphrodite's  power  as  a  means  of 
exculpation occurs elsewhere in tragedy, and certainly in other plays 
by  Euripides,  e.g.  in  his  Hippolytos,  which  was  written  thirteen 
with the words EL  be  .-Wv  eEWV  KPUTELV / f3ou;\'IJ,  .-6  XJY7l~ELV  ci.iJ-Ol1eS'  ea-rr.  aov  TelaE, 
but who else can she have in mind but Aphrodite? 
1 See de Rornilly 1976, p. 309-321, who claims that  G.'s Encomium "la reference 
au  mythe  est soigneusement ecartee ... La.  la souverainete  de  l'amour reste  une 
excuse decisive, mais sans avoir besoin de se fonder sur des legendes", 319. 
118 years before the Troades.
1 The fact that in the Troades it is Helen 
who  employs  it  is  certainly  not  in  itself a  sufficient  reason  to 
conclude that Euripides answers G  .. 
ii. Causes II and 1]1:  'Physical violence' and 'Speech' 
Since there is  very little in Euripides to  suggest any affinities with 
G.'s  third  and  four  causes  I  discuss  them  together.  The 
argumentation for the possibility that Helen was violently abducted 
is more straightforward than the discussion of any of the other four 
causes in the Encomium; G.  very briefly suggests that if Helen was 
abducted by force it is not she that we should blame, but the violator 
who  committed an unjust act. It seems now that the Helen of the 
Troades never claims that she was dragged away by force, because 
most  editors  and  commentators  bracket  959-60,  a  reading  that 
makes the subject of  0 /k€V  j3£q.  ya/kt{i  Deiphobus; but the point she 
makes is that she married Paris by Aphrodite's force.
2  This being 
the case, the only two other references to Helen's forcible abduction 
are the one in Hekabe's speech (998-1001), and one less frequently 
mentioned,  if ever,  in  Cassandra's  speech,  where  the  prophetess 
maintains KaL  raiJe'  €KOVa7JS  KOU  j3£q.  /..€/..7JU/k€v7]S  (373). That Helen 
lFor more instances of the use of love as  an excuse in tragedy see de Romilly 
1976, p.17. 
2 Barlow 1986, pp. 211-12, who adopts Wilamowitz's reading, maintains "Helen 
is making the point that Aphrodite is the only bia and she sums this up at 964-5", 
212. Similariy, Lloyd 1992, claims that "Nor does Euripides' Helen argue that she 
was forcibly abducted, and Hecuba's attribution of this  argument to  her is  thus a 
mistake"  (p.101). Croally 1994, p.lSS, accepts that Helen says that "Paris married 
her by force", as he, of course, argues for the relation of G.  to  Euripides. It is not 
clear to me if  Meridor 2000, p. 20, thinks that Helen argues that she was abducted 
by force  when in commenting on Hekabe's speech she says  that "Hecuba now 
questions her opponent and asks which Spartan heard her cry for help when,  as 
she claims, Paris abducted her by force". 
119 does not use violence as an argument to improve her position, and 
thus  avoid  the  punishment  that  Menelaos  has  decided  for  her 
manifestly weakens the possibility that Euripides draws upon G.'s 
Encomion. 
The  section  about  AOYOS',  which  according  to  some  scholars 
constitutes the pivotal argument of G.'s argumentation, is not used 
by Helen at  all.  There are however some allusions  in the play to 
speech and persuasion, which are not sufficient to  establish a direct 
relation  between  the  two  works.
l  At  909,  Hekabe  in  a  self-
referential  statement claims  that her AOyOS'  will be enough to  kill 
Helen, which reminds us  the limitless powers that G.  attributes to 
AOyOS'  in saying that AOy0S'  ovvaa-r7JS  p..eyas  ecrriv,  (35"  O}LI.Kpo-r&rqJ 
awp..an  Kat.  dcPavecrraTqJ  eel.O-raTa  epya d1ToTeAeL  (8).  And at 966-8, 
where  the  chorus  urges  Hekabe  to  defend  her children  and  her 
homeland effectively against Helen's persuasion, for she is a sinister 
person who  speaks well. Again, one may observe the existence of 
the  recurrent polarity between deeds  and words,  which,  as  I  am 
inclined to  believe, G.  largely neutralises in his work;  in Pal.  for 
instance  the  hero  asks  his judges  p..iJ  TdiS'  '\oyOls  p..a.;u.ov  77  TOLS' 
epyoLS'  1TpOaexel.v  TOV  VOUV  (34),  for  el  p..€JI  Ol.a.  TWV  AOYWV  -r7Jv 
dA7}8el.av  -rwv  epywv  Ka8apav  Te  yeJlea8al.  TOLS'  dKOVOV(J'l.  <Kat.  > 
cPavepa.v,  eihropoS'  (LV  eL7]  1]  KpiU'I.S' ... (35).  Similarly,  in  He!.  (13) 
where G.  tries to  show the effects of persuasion through examples 
from different kinds of  AOy0l., he claims that one speech written with 
skill pleases  and persuades a great mob,  even if it is  false  (TEXVTJ 
ypacPelS,  OUK  dA7]8e£q.  AexfteLS'). Nevertheless, none of  these instances 
proves  that  Troades  draws  upon  G.' s  He!.  All  they  show  is  an 
awareness  of the power of AOYOS',  and its potential to  misrepresent 
factual reality by clever interpretations of  it. 
1 Mazzara's  points  (1999,  p.169ff)  on  ~€Va.7Tci.TTJS" at  Tro.864-6  seem to  me too 
pressed. 
120 iii. Cause IV:  'Love invoked by vision' 
When  G.  starts  his  examination of Love  as  a  possible  aLrl.a  for 
Helen's elopement to Troy, he says: El  ya.p  ep~ ¥  <5  -rClU-rCl  7rcT.v-rCl 
7rpcT.~as,  ou  Xa.AE7rWs- 8LClcPEV~E'ra.1.  -rT]v  rijs  /..€yoP.e1l7JS  yeyovevClI. 
ap.Clp-riClS  ClL-riClV  (15). But he then immediately goes on to  maintain 
in  an  axiomatic manner that 'objects of our vision do  not have the 
nature that we want them to have, by the one that each one of  them 
happens  to  have', which is  different from  what we expect him to 
say, as this sentence introduces an apparently different topic, that is 
the relation between objects of the external world to  human visual 
perception. In fact, the whole of the discussion of  love as a possible 
cause proceeds by a rationalistic approach to  human vision, and its 
impacts  on  the  psychological  realm.  This  discussion,  whose 
underlying argumentative schemata are very similar to those used in 
the  discussion  of logos  in  8-14,  is  meant  to  create  analogies  to 
Helen's  particular  case;  in  other  words,  G.  attempts  an 
argumentation where a score of  irrelevant material about the impact 
of vision on human soul are  employed so  that his  heroine's case 
may be presented  as  another  example  that  confirms  his  general 
observations. 
It is  interesting  now  to  pay  some  attention  to  the  manner in 
which G. passes from the general discussion of  vision to the specific 
case he argues for;  at 19, he asks: El  p.ev  -rep  -rou'  A/"E~civopou CTwp.Cln 
-ro  rijs'  Ell.ev7JS'  OP.P.Cl  -r,cr8ev  7rpOeUP.£.ClV  KClt  a.P.LMClV  epCJ.Yros  rij ifroxij 
7rClpeOWK€  -rl.  eClUP.Clcr-rOV,  which  means  that  since  we  accept  that 
objects of the world have the appearance that they happen to  have, 
and  since they can affect  our emotional world through our visual 
perception of them,  as  the examples adduced prove, we should not 
then be surprised if  Helen fell in love with Paris: her eye (not Helen) 
was pleased by his body (not Alexandros), and she thus gave in. The 
impersonal tone attempted here is striking; human beings like Helen 
are presented with no personal will, and all responsibility is passed 
over in the name of  psychological observations. This is undoubtedly 
121 a radical rehabilitation of the traditional view that love starts from 
the eyes; what G.  adds to  it is  a sophisticated explanation of how 
and why such a thing occurs. 
This being the case in the Encomium, we may now turn to  the 
Troades;  Helen  in her speech  is  never audacious  enough  to  use 
Paris'  beauty  as  an  argument.  She  merely  says  that  Kypris  was 
amazed (€K-rra:yl\.oUfl-EV7J  929) by Helen's beauty, and thus decided to 
offer her to  Paris,  if she were to  win the  contest.  More  relevant 
remarks about the interrelation of vision and love are actually made 
by  her  opponent.  Hekabe.  In  the  lines  that  precede  Helen's 
appearance  on  stage,  Hekabe pleads with Menelaos  to  avoid  eye 
contact with his wife, because she may invoke desire in him fl-TJ  (j' 
EI\.7J  -rro8w.  I  uLoe!:  yao  cLVSOWV  DlLUeaT "  €guLpe!.  -rrol\.eLS' ... (891-2). In 
fact, Hekabe is afraid that Helen's punishment will never take place 
if Menelaos sees Helen. As Scodel eloquently put it "there is  a sort 
of circular irony here:  the  real  defence of Helen lies  in the  very 
reason that her presumed guilt is not punished".  1 
There  is  another place,  in Hekabe's  speech  this  time,  where 
seeing is related to love; in answering Helen's claims about the role 
of  the goddesses she rather straightforwardly retorts that the Spartan 
woman was simply dazzled by Paris' beauty, and her mind was thus 
transfonned into  Aphrodite (987-8).
2  And a  few  lines  later (991-
996) she has more to  say about her son's appearance, this time the 
emphasis being placed on his sparkling, oriental clothes. Helen, she 
maintains, was just lured by his glowing appearance,  and she was 
thus tempted to  secure a more luxurious life than the one she was 
offered by her Spartan husband.
3 In fact,  Hekabe will at the end of 
1 Scodel 1980. p.99. 
: For a most recent discussion of  0 aoS"  S' lSwv  lILV  vouS"  E-;rodIJn  Ku'TTp~S" (98S) see 
Yferidor 2000, p.IS. 
3  I do  not understand :\-feridor's point (2000,  p.27-8) that "it is  hardly irrelevant 
that Gorgias' lis! of likely causes for Helen's elopement  ...  includes no passion for 
riches  and luxury.  Hecuba's  speech may  have  been composed  with  Gorgias' 
Encomium  of Helen  in mind".  If she  means  that  G.'s  speech  is  earlier  than 
122 her speech rebuke Helen for being insolent  enough to  appear in 
smart dresses (1022ff.), instead. of rags, and with her hair shaved.. 
Apart from betraying her shamelessness, as Hekabe wishes to show, 
Helen's immaculate appearance could be read as a metaphor for her 
immaculate and sophisticated speech. 
As was the case with the other three causes, the fourth  one 
does  not seem to  have any presence in the  Troades;  Conacher,  in 
discussing  line  988,  claims  that  "it  is  tempting  to  think  that 
Euripides  is  picking up  this  Gorgian argument and mischievously 
using  it  against Helen instead. of for her". I  But apart  from  being 
tempting, the view that there is no evidence to support that Hekabe's 
point presumes G.'  s observations about the impact of seeing on the 
souL For Hekabe's argument is far less subtle and less sophisticated 
than G.'  s  one.  And at any rate,  love was  interrelated with vision 
long before Euripides wrote the Troades.  In this  context it would 
suffice  to  mention  two  examples:  the  first  is  from  a  play  by 
Euripides himself; in Hippolytos 525, the chorus says'"Epws"Epws,  oS" 
KaT'  01L1La.TWV  /  a-ra.,ELS"  1ro8ov.  The second one is  derived from  a 
very different field, but it is probably not irrelevant in the present 
context; because ifwe turn to Empedoldes' fragments 86, 87, 95, we 
soon  find  out  that  the  creator  of the  eyes  is  no  one  else  but 
Aphrodite.
2 
Postscript 
One of the most obvious characteristics of the agon  of the  Trojan 
Women  is  the  self-referentiality  of  Helen's  speech,  which 
Euripides'  Troades,  because G.  has  nothing to  say about luxuries, then Meridor 
simply presses an unimportant point too much. And at any rate, as  we have seen.. 
G.  argues in such a general manner that any specific mention of Helen's luxuries 
would be surprising. Meridor probably fails to understands the extent to which the 
Sophist theorizes in his speech. 
I Conacher 1998, p.57. 
2 Cpo also Ibycus 287 PMG. 
123 undoubtedly makes  it sound like  a  formal.  immaculate  pIece  of 
rhetoric.  I  Helen does not proceed by simply arguing for her case;2 
she goes beyond that by relentlessly alluding to the manner in which 
her speech is  organised. This sort of  mannerism happens to be one 
of  the most characteristic features of G.'  s style,
3 whose fondness for 
marking the transition from the one part of  his speech to the other is 
omnipresent; in both of  his preserved speeches he programmatically 
announces  his  aim  at  the  beginning  and  he  then  unfailingly 
signposts  the passage from the one to  the other subdivision of his 
argumentation, by referring either to  the substance of what follows 
or to the manner in which he attempts to proceed.
4 
In the proemion of  her speech. Helen claims that she will attempt 
with her speech to  answer the charges that she anticipates will be 
brought against her, and this is expressed in a most Gorgian manner, 
with remarkable antitheses.
5 She then goes on to  blame Hekabe for 
I  See  Lloyd  1992,  pp.  5  and  101;  as  this  scholar shows,  this  expressed self-
awareness on behalf of  the speaker is not peculiar to this agon, and it may well be 
true that to a certain extent the same practice is employed by Hekabe as well. As 
Lloyd (1992)  maintains  "'The  second half of Hecuba's unusually  long speech 
shows far fewer signs of the philosophical and rhetorical influences that were so 
striking in the fITst half', p. 109. But Helen's speech serves better the purposes of 
this thesis. 
2 This rhetorical practice is discernible in Agathon's speech (cp. PI. Symp.196d), 
and it is parodied in Aristophanes' Frogs 906-7; Isokrates picks it up in 10.8 (rirv 
)Lev  ovv  cipxiJv  'TOU  >'6yov  1TOLTpOp.G.1.  rirv  cipxiJv  'TOU  yevov5"  aririjS" [sc. of  Helen]). 
3 See MacDowell 1982, p.18-19. 
4  Some examples: in Pal.  5 the hero outlines the two main arguments against the 
charge of treason:  'Even if  I had wished to  betray the  Greeks to  the Trojans I 
would not have been able to do so, but even if  I had been able to do so I would not 
have  wanted  it';  sometimes  the  demonstration  of the  arguments  is  smoothly 
completed by a reiteration of  what has just been proved (cp. Pal.  12,21, and Hel. 
20, where the four causes are repeated in the reverse order). 
5 Line 918  (-:-01:5"  (]"oi:aL  -:-ciJ.Ld.  Kat.  n1  (]".  al. -ncip.a.ra) has been though to be spurious 
(e.g.  by Diggle), because "it misleadingly implies  that Helen addresses Hecuba 
directly at some point whereas she never does"  Barlow  1986, p.210;  Conacher 
1998, p.56 quotes and translates it. With or without keeping the line the style of 
the opening of  Helen's speech is anyway antithetical, but it is worthwhile noticing 
124 giving birth to Paris, and the old man (-rrp€a~us 921).1  It is clear that 
Helen  presents  first  what  would  come  first  in  a  logical 
representation of 'factual' reality, and this is  amply brought out by 
the  wording  (-rrpiifrov  j.LEV  dpXds ... oevTepov).  The same process  is 
discernible  in  the  section  of Pal.  where  the  hero  refutes  the 
possibility of  committing the crime of  treason by demonstrating that 
each  necessary  stage  for  the  preparation  of such  a  crime  was 
impossible; there as  here it is  emphasised that the starting point of 
the  argumentation should coincide with what should come first  in 
the  only  possible  logical  sequence  of events  (err!.  OE  Tovoe  TOV 
Aoyov  elj.L1.  rrpiifrov ...  €OeL  yap  nva  rrpWTov  dpxT7v  yeveat1al.  rijs 
rrpoooaias,  f]  DE  dpxT7 ... 6;  rrp&rov  j.LEV  ouv  KaL  DevTepov  Kal. 
j.L€yurrov,  , 
o 
rrap0l.x0j.Levos  ~£os  ... ).  G.'s  Hel.  provides  us  with  no  fewer 
examples  of this  technique,  but due  to  the  nature  of this  speech 
which  is  meant  to  be  an  eYKWj.LI.OV,  it  is  not  the  defendant  who 
explains  how  she  will  proceed,  but  the  rhetor  himself.  In this 
context, it would suffice to bring in an example from the part of  the 
speech where G. is about to present the four causes (5): 
that antitheses or other devices expressed with pronouns are very regular and very 
distinct in Pal.,  especially when, as  Helen does  here and as  she will do  later at 
945,  he  addresses  someone:  in  23  he  addresses  Odysseus  (TO  erE  ye  nuv 
yevo/kEvwv,  w;  aU  </nj> ... TWV  OE  /kT,  yevo~vwv  €~), and later  at  28  and 33  he 
addresses the judges (-rrpo,  0' upii,  ... -rrepi.  €f.Wu  ,\o~  -rrOV  OE  -rrepi.  up.Wv  -rrpo,  upii, 
eern  f.W~  '\6yos-).  These occurrences also  serve as  examples  of G.'s marking the 
passage from the one section of his speech to  the other,  and the  same holds  for 
Troades 945. 
I  Some scholars identify !rim with Priam (e.g. Barlow 1986, note ad loc.), others 
with the old shepherd (e.g. Lloyd 1992, p.  102 and note 29). 
125 With  a praeteritio G.  makes  the statement that his  speech is  not 
meant to  deal  with factual  reality,  because what really matters  is 
whether Helen was responsible for her elopement, not the fact that 
she eloped.. No doubt, this is manifestly accepted by him. 
The same sort of formal  (and  rather formulaic)  indications  of 
transition  appears  also  in  the  main  body  of Helen's  speech;  the 
marked passage to  the second  argument  (that  is  the  Judgment of 
Paris) with the J.v8ellOe  Ta::ri),ol.  7T' at 923  is  clearly an invitation to 
understand it as a logical inference from what has already been said, 
and  it is  thus  employed by Euripides  with the intent both to  add 
cohesion  to  the  speech  and  to  ensure  that  this  cohesion  will  be 
evident to  the audience, should this be Menelaos and Hekabe or the 
spectators. It is with exactly the same words that Helen will pass to 
the  third  argument  (that  is  the  benefits  that  the  outcome  of the 
Judgment secured for the Greeks).  She says  TOil  Elleell  0'  W~ €xer. 
CTKeljIar.  ),0YOII  (931). 
These formulas  of transition are  repeatedly used by G.  in  his 
Pal.;  at  24 the  hero  has  just shown  that  Odysseus  accused  him 
without having any knowledge of  the facts, and he then assumes that 
the only remaining possibility is that Odysseus relied merely upon 
his  opinion  oo~a; the  words  he  uses  are  TO  01]  ),Ol.7TOII .•.  At  13, 
Palamedes invites his judges to  CTKeljIaa8al.  KOl.llfj  Ka~ Tooe,  that is to 
recollect that no possible motives would have been fulfilled by the 
commitment of  treason. Before Helen passes to the discussion of  her 
possible  motives  at  945,  she  utters  an  ErEll,  which  is  a  way  of 
passing  to  the  following  argument  by  partly  and  tentatively 
conceding that even if what has  been said up  to  this  point  is  not 
accepted,  what  follows  excludes  any  possibility  that  she  could 
reasonably be held responsible for her acts. The very same word is 
used by Palamedes in the section of  his speech where he shows that 
all  the necessary stages  for  the preparation of treason  were  in his 
case impossible (Pal.  10).  To  this  instance one could add various 
more formulas that serve the same purpose (aMa.  0-;'  TOVTO  TqJ  A6yCfJ 
126 QVVUTOV  YElI€a8W  7,  #!UEI..  Tl..S  9,  )Cal.  07]  TO£lIVV  YElI€a8W  KuI  Tel.  p.7] 
YElIOP.EVU 11). 
127 NOTES 
1 
KO<7lLO~  •••  a.A~eELa.:  G.  begins  his  prose-encomium  by employing  a 
literary  device  which is  amply used in poetry,  namely  a Priamel; 
although it seems that G.  does  not attempt to  create a climax, the 
elements that he selects as foil for the notion that he wishes to  focus 
on (AOylp  be  d)..ry8€La)  are not arranged haphazardly. The first  one, 
7TOALS",  is  an  inclusive  entity,  and  the  following  four  form  two 
antithetical pairs: the first of them (O"w!i-anNvxfI)  comprises the two 
constituent  parts  of human  existence  (G.  seems  to  accept  the 
independence of those two elements), and the second the common 
rhetorical distinction between works and words. It is  clear that G. 
lays the emphasis on the very last element, namely true speech. As 
the  programmatic  statements  that  follow  amply  bring  out,  G.'s 
intention  is  to  restore  Helen's  reputation  by  offering  a  rational 
examination of  her case. G., by expressing his commitment to truth, 
implies  that  his  speech possesses  KOO"!i-OS".  This  quality,  which  is 
forms  the  topic  word  of  the  Priamel,  persistently  resists 
interpretation. The main meanings of the word are a)  ornament, and 
b) order. In this context, G.  uses  KOO"!i-OS"  as  a signifier with multiple 
signifieds,  all  of which  depend  upon  and are  determined by  the 
element defined. For a city KOO"[.LOS"  is  the robustness of its men, for 
body it  is  beauty .... As  MacDowell puts  it  KOO"[.LOS"  is  "the proper 
condition in virtue of which a city is  a good city,  a body is  a good 
body etc." (1982, p.33). Although it is  clear what KOO"[.LOS"  is  for  the 
particular elements, the  meaning of KOO"[.LOC;  itself remains  obscure. 
Untersteiner renders  it with the  word  'harmony'  (1961,  p.8S),  G; 
Bona (1974, Sff.) translates 'perfection' and observes that it cannot 
be  taken  to  mean  ornament,  for  "neither  the  absence  nor  the 
presence of an ornament  ... would make an object be worth blaming 
128 or praising in its  own right"  (pp.5-6).  More recently  Wardy has 
argued that "this unqualified exclusion of 'ornament' is thoroughly 
misguided" and concludes that "the last thing readers should do  in 
reacting to  par.  1 is  to  suppress their initial responses  to  all the 
connotations of kosmos" (1996, p.156 n.8). I find Wardy's reading 
attractive  and  consequently  I  consider  that  KDap.oS"  should  be 
construed as  flexibly  as  possible.  Sykutris'  general description of 
G.'  s style fits  perfectly these  lines:  "~KE~VO  -rrOD  Xa.pClK1"1']pL.~El..  TOV 
q,pacrn.KOV  TPO-rrOV  TOU  r  oP'YL.OU  ELval..  Eva  uq,o~  Ka-r'  EmKpa.1"1']01. v 
o  v 0  p. a a T l. K 0 v,  0X'- P1lp.anKov  .•.  P.€  -r-f]v  AO'YI.K~V  au~v dOpLa-rLaV 
~Vl.axuETal.. -it  p.oU01.K61"1']~  KUt.  -it  auvul..ae"'1I.LanK6'T1l~  TOU  OAOU,  KuL  a 
AOYOS  p.era{3dJV..e-ral.  els  7Ta.peAaaI.V  7Tapa.a-ro.aewv  KaL  elKOVWV 
7TOAvxpWp.wv"  (the  emphasis  is  mine;  Sykutris  1934,  p.137).  To 
these  remarks  we  should  add  that  the  construction  is  strikingly 
symmetrical:  the  cola  following  the  topic-word  Koap.os  are 
constructed in exactly the same manner, (a) Noun (dat.) (b) Particle 
(c)  Noun  (nom.),  and  unlike  the  poetical  Priamels  there  is  no 
increase in the length of the individual elements (cp.  Race 1990, 
p.10). The interchange in the quanity of  syllables is as follows: (a)2-
(c)3, (a)3-(c)2, (a)2-(c)2, (a)3-(c)2, (a)2-(c)3. 
e:uavopL.a:  the  quality  of men  is  stressed  here,  as  MacDowell 
observes  (1982,  p.33;  cpo  Xen.  Mem.3.3.12-3:  ovoe  evavop£a  EV 
aM.7]  7TOAel.  op.o£a  rij  Ev8o.oe  avvo.yeral.;  AI. Nub.297-8:  7TapeeVOI. 
op.{3po<j>opOI.,  / eA8wp.ev  AI.7Tapa.v  x80va IIwQ.oos, evavapov  yav  ..• ). 
oWp.a-rr..:  'body' in a physical sense; it is significant that it precedes 
'soul' and that it is  distinguished from  it,  as  the next pair  AOYOS  / 
7Tpayp.a  presents two  notions typically opposed to  each other. Each 
one of  them seems to acquire independence, as it is attested from 14. 
Musti (1993, p.864) contends that "il significato fisico  del  termine 
[sc.  body J sia ben  rappresentato  nella letterarura  greca  arcaica  e 
classica" and he also  remarks that its  usage in G.  is  "realistico,  e 
perfino crudo". awp.a  admittedly plays an important role in He!.:  it 
was the 'body' of  Helen that attracted the bodies of  her noble suitors 
129 (4), it was the body of  Paris that attracted. Helen's eye (19). Helen's 
beauty attracted the bodies of  noble suitors, and this attractiveness is 
used in the  (only)  ptrrely  encomiastic  part of The  Encomium  of 
Helen;  Paris' beauty attracted Helen,. and this seduction is used for 
her defence. In his relativistic definition of 'body', G.  attributes to it 
a property (KaMOS), which will be proved to be double-edged, as  far 
as the persons who possess it are concerned.  ~  OE  <7o<j>(a.:  it is 
difficult to  understand what G.  had exactly in mind when he joined 
'wisdom'  with  'soul'. Wisdom  belongs  to  the  same lexical  field 
with sophist,  and it has  a great range of meanings (see  Gladigow 
1965).  Kerferd  holds  that  "According  to  the  received 
account. ..  these terms ('wise' and 'wisdom') went through a kind of 
evolution  in their meanings,  from  (1)  skill  in a  particular craft, 
especially handicraft,  through (2)  prudence or wisdom in general 
matters,  especially practical and political wisdom, to  (3)  scientific, 
theoretic,  or  philosophic  wisdom  ... this  sequence  is  artificial  and 
unhistorical, being essentially based on Aristotle" (1981, p.24). In 
He!.  <7o<jJLa  recurs in 4, listed among other virtues of  Helen's suitors 
and it is presented as something acquired by men through learning, 
it is an €1TLKrrrrOV  skilL What G. has in mind specifically as 'wisdom 
in the soul' may emerge - though not conclusively - from Helen 11: 
most people are deceived because, due to absence of  memory of  the 
past, of  judgment for the present and of foresight of the future they 
employ  opinion  (oo~a) as  counsellor of their soul.  We may infer 
from  this  passage that probably the presence of these qualities  is 
what makes the human soul wise.  -rrpa:YIl-a.-n.  OE  a.PE-n1=  "one might 
have supposed that dpe-rTJ  just meant 'merit', vinually equivalent to 
KOOp,OS.  But it  is  in accordance with the archaic use of the word to 
regard it  as  applicable primarily to  action" (MacDowell 1982, p.33; 
cf. Mst. EN 1098a 7-12, where dpe-rTJ  is presented as the perfection 
of  epyov: el.  o-r,  €a-rLv  epyov  dv8punrou  t/rox!Js  Evepyel..a.  Ka-ni  J\Oyov  7} 
p.-r,  aVEU  J\oyou,  TO  0'  aUTO  <jJap.€v  epyov  eLval.  Tqi  yevel..  Toi.Joe  Ka/. 
TOi.JO€  O"1TVoaiou .•• 1Tpoa-r1..8ep.ev7]S"  rijs'  KaT'  dperT]v  tJ7Tepoxfjs  1TpOS  70 
130 €pyOV). Wardy (1996, p. 156) criticises this reading on the basis that, 
"although it  is  true that pragma  could mean  'action', there  is  no 
evidence  for  a  limitation  of generalized  'arete'  to  action...  My 
alternative  reading  takes  pragma  as  equivalent  to  'thing'  in  the 
widest possible sense". But Wardy does not do  justice to  the text; 
action is traditionally opposed to  J\oyoS"  and it is not accidental that 
they are juxtaposed here. Tney form  an antithetical pair, picked up 
in the  following  sentence  .  AO")'<tl  OE  cL\~eE1.a.:  it  is  generally  and 
commonly assumed that G., as a pure rhetorician, was not interested 
in truth;  Dodds  (1959,  p.8)  contends  that  his  works  "make  the 
impression of a  dazzling  insincerity,  an insincerity  so  innocently 
open as  to  be  ...  entirely void of offence".  Many  scholars  tend  to 
assume  that  G.  was  uninterested  in  truth,  so  that  his  practices 
amount to  nothing but mere deception.  This criticism is  as  old as 
Plato; in Phaidros 267a, we read:  T€LaLa.v  Q€  lopyLa.v  T€  €d.aofJ-€v 
"<;'  "  ,  _  .!\,...q_  ,  "  1'<;"  '.\  ' 
€VO€LV,  01.  1TpO  'T'WV  CI.I\'/VWV  Ta.  €LKO'T'a.  €LUOV  WS"  TLfJ-7JT€U  1T1\€OV. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  G.  sometimes  uses  probabilities  in  his 
speeches, especially in Pal., but there is no evidence suggesting that 
he deliberately ignores truth. On the contrary, it would be extremely 
foolish  for  a rhetor to  ignore  truth,  that is  factual  reality,  since it 
undoubtedly provides him with unshakable  evidence (see  Gagarin 
1994, p.46-57).  Similarly, Kerferd's view that "G. is introducing a 
radical  gulf between  logos  and  the  things  it  refers  to"  and  that 
because of this  gulf "we can understand quite  easily the  sense  in 
which  every  logos  involves  a  falsification"  (1981,  p.81)  is 
unattractive, for it relies much upon the ontological autonomy given 
to  logos in ONE, without considering that it is very unlikely that G. 
put in  that text any  systematised theory  to  which he  was  himself 
committed.  As  Schiappa  (1999,  p.125)  has  recently  put  it, 
"propositions  of the  form  'G.  had  a  theory  of X'  are  potentially 
misleading", because "they overestimate the maturity of a theory's 
development by implying more  coherence  and completeness  than 
can be demonstrated with the available evidence" and also because 
"the attribution of a number of theories  to  ancient writers  on the 
131 basis of isolated or few fragments mischaracterises the process of 
intellectual investigation in ancient Greece during the sixth and fifth 
centuries". Consequently, there is no reason to suspect that when G. 
says  that  'truth'  is  KOcrp.OS- for  Jl.oyos- he  is  dishonest.  In  2,  he 
programmatically announces that he intends to  show the  tru~ and 
we may thus assume that he considers (and that he would wish us to 
believe) that his Jl.oyos- is not a Jl.oyos- of  dKOcrp.£a..  It is  a Jl.oyos- which 
proceeds  with  Jl.OYLG'P.OS-,  that  is  with  logical  argumentation  2,  a 
speech which is opposed to the speech of  the poets. 
<1vopa.  OE .•.  E.m.eE1.'VW.:  all these elements can be the objects of praise 
or blame according to  their qualities.  "Some of the nouns  are the 
same  as  in the previous sentence,  others not" (MacDowell  1982, 
p.33).  The  same  scholar suggests  that there  is  not  a  "significant 
distinction between EPYOV  and 1tpU{'P.a.", since G. intends to "achieve 
an even number of items in his  list". This view is  correct,  and it 
gains  even more ground by the fact that G.  attempts symmetrical 
sounds  (10  - gon  /  er - gon,  and p  - olin  /  p  -ragma)  within 
antithetical  pairs  (with  the  exemption  of  city  /  action).  The 
antithetical character of the introductory sentences is also  brought 
out  by  the  statement  "praiseworthy  things  should  be  praised", 
whereas what is not praiseworthy (not what is blameworthy) should 
be blamed. This deontological statement is tricky; is G.  saying that 
what is  not praiseworthy is always blameworthy? An easy answer 
would be that the question is too subtle to have any significance for 
the interpretation of  the passage, especially when nothing guarantees 
that G.  wished anything more than a polished formality (notice the 
alliteration  of /p/,  the  antithesis  5.gwv  /  dlla.~[qJ  the  polyptoton  -
combined with a repetition - and finally the isocolon all  of which 
coexist after the impersonal, and deontic xp-r,).  A more satisfactory 
answer  is  perhaps  that G.  needs  a  polarisation,  in  the  form  of a 
tertium non datur, functionally supported by the form. It is true that 
when a person, thing or situation is not praiseworthy, this  does not 
necessarily entail that it is blameworthy. Nevertheless, G.' s speech 
132 cunningly  polarises  these  qualities:  Helen  must  either  be 
praiseworthy  or blameworthy.  The tone from  the very beginning 
establishes  that  what  is  at  stake  here  is  serious. If  Helen  is  not 
elevated to  the heights of  praise, she will necessarily tumble all the 
way down to blame, where she has already been placed by the poets 
(G.  does  not  of course  bother to  take  into  account  Stesikhoros' 
Palinode).  An implied blackmail,  yet an  attractive  one,  since  it 
gives  G~' s speech its raison d' etre. 
cLtLa.et.a.:  the same noun is used in the characterisation of the state of 
mind established by the poets (2, and in 21 it appears combined with 
Saga.).  In fact,  the  phrase  ra7J  rap  ap.afYiia  KaL  dp.ae£a  forms  a 
hysteron proteron, for ap.ap-rLa  is brought about by ap.a.e[a. We may 
be reminded at this point that Sokrates  postulated that no  one  is 
willingly  bad,  which  means  that  human  morality  is  primarily  a 
matter of lmowledge (see Calogero  1976, p.408-421; for its use in 
Plato cpo PI. Gorg.477b7, and Dodds 1959 ad loc.). 
tLEp,q,ea8a(  -re ••• tLwtL"l1-m: with this axiomatic statement G. implies his 
obligation to  praise Helen (for the common epinician xpEoS"-motif 
cpo Pi. O. 8.72-75, and especially N.  8.38-9: erw .3'  dG'TOLS"  aowY  KaL 
.A'  ~  \  '.1.  '/  "  "  J..  '  ~ "  I  xvOVL  YULa.  Ka.I\V't'aLp.,  a.Lvew  aLVTfTa.  fLop.'f'av  0  eTTurrreLpWY 
dJ\LTPOLS,  which is  stylystically close to  G.'s expression.  See also 
Schadewaldt 1928, 277, Carey 1981, p.28, and Gerber 1982, p.  153, 
with  further  literature).  The  construction  is  stylistically  striking; 
notice the chiasm with one infinitive and its  cognate noun in the 
centre of the construction and its opposite in sense, with its cognate 
noun. At the beginning and at the end of  it (p.€p.tPeaBaL  - E7TaLveTG.  -
E7TaLveLV  - J-Lwp.7JTa), combined with isocolon and homeoteleuton. 
tLwtL0v: "generally poetic; the usual word for 'blame' in later prose is 
QVELQOS"  (MacDowell  1982,  p.33);  it  is  picked  up  in  20  and  21 
(p.WJ-Lov  dOLxiav;  it appears personified in PI.  Rep"+87a6:  OvO  av  6 
.MwJ-Loc;,  E</n7,  TO  re  TOLOVTOV  J-LEp.lj;aI.TO). 
133 2 
TaU  S'  a.UTaU  civOpOS  •••  EA€''Y~cu.:  A  lacuna has  been suggested by 
Dobree after EAey~a.L; Diels completed ad sententiam: TO  A€YOfL€VOV 
OUK  opeWs·  -rrPOa-rJKfiH.  TO£VlJV  EAey~a.L.  This  is  not  accepted  by 
Untersteiner,  Buchheim,  and MacDowell, who  rightly claims  that 
"no supplement is  really necessary; the sense and construction are 
satisfactory without it,  and it is not for us  to  foist  on Gorgias  yet 
another  redundant  antithesis"  (1982,  p.33).  G.  throughout  this 
paragraph  programmatically  announces  his  task.  His  statement 
refers to  both the content and the method of his speech. He has to 
say  rightly,  that  is  by  using  the  appropriate  language,  what is 
appropriate to be said about Helen, and to refute her critics. Deov  has 
been related to  the notion of  Ka.LPOS  (cp.  fro  13  with notes; see also 
Frankel  1975,  pp.447-8  and  n.14),  a  possibility  which  is 
strengthened  in  the  light  of  Epitaphios:  TOVTOV  vOP.£~OVT€S" 
,  'e  I  I  ,~.f',- ~I  ,  \/ 
KOLVOTUTOV  KUL  €LOTUTOV  VOfkOV,  TO  O€OV  €V  TqJ  o€OVTL  KUL  /\€Y€LV 
KUL  cJ'tYUV  KUI.  -rrOL€Lv ••• saying TO  Deov,  the appropriate thing at the 
appropriate time, along with the accuracy in diction are properties of 
those  praised  through  the  speech,  and  it  is  in  virtue  of these 
properties  that  they  are  (not  were,  because  they  are  mortal 
immortals) praiseworthy. G.  surely hopes that Helen will also, at the 
end of  the speech, be considered a praiseworthy woman (for TO  Deov 
see Macleod  1983,  p.  52  and n.4).  Moreover,  the  combination of 
Aega.L  with ope6is is reminiscent (though it cannot be proved that it is 
dependent upon)  OpeOE-rT€La.,  a term that can be rendered as  'correct 
diction'  (Guthrie  1971,  p.205,  Kerferd  1981,  p.68).  Linguistic 
investigation  was  undoubtedly  one  of  the  most  significant 
contributions of the Sophistic intellectual activity;  Prodicus is  said 
to  have  placed  his  interest  in  synonymy,  Protagoras  focused  on 
grammatical  categories.  There  can  be  little  doubt  that  their 
discussion of language was  chiefly prescriptive,  as  it is  shown in 
Aristophanes' Clouds, where Protagoras is satirised for his efforts to 
reconcile the grammatical with the natural gender. 
134 OtJ.ot¥uxo~:  although the word is  not traced elsewhere in classical 
Greek  (its  cognate  op.oifroXia.  is  common in modem Greek),  no 
emendation is required. G. encapsulates in a single word the impact 
of AOYOC;  on the soul of the audience. In 13  we learn that one single 
logos  can  persuade  a  mob  (O'xAas-),  so  that  op.6ifroxo,  explicitly 
indicated  the  unifying  function  of speech,  its  power  to  create  a 
consent. 
il  'ie  nUv  1TOI.''11-rWv ••• m.cm.s:  Tne  emendations  proposed  are  not 
necessary (see Dies 1913 p.193-4). The Mss reading is  satisfactory, 
though it has been taken either to mean a)  'the opinion of  those who 
have heard the poets', or b) 'the opinion of  those that the poets have 
heard'. The first meaning is strongly supported by numerous texts 
where Helen is criticised on the basis of her morality.  Stesikhoros 
was forced to write his Palinodia, because he had slandered Helen, 
and  it  is  interesting  that  later  biographers  attribute  Homer's 
blindness to his criticism of  Helen. Alcaeus B 1  OL.  - P contrasts the 
immorality of  Helen with the excellence of  Thetis, and he closes his 
poem with the following words:  oi.  8' d1TWAOVT'  dP4"  E  [M.vq.  /  KaL 
-rrOA€~C;  (cp.  Aiskh.  Ag.  681ff.).  In  Euripides'  Troades  (892-3) 
Hekabe praises Menelaos' decision to kill Helen, because she  aLp€~ 
yap  dVQPwv  OP.P.a.T',  €~aLp€~ 1TOA€LS',  /-rr£p.-rrP7JO'LV  OrKOVC;  ...  Dies on 
the  other hand,  has  proposed that "dKovaa.vTwv  -rrLans  equivaut  a 
fides ex auditu", and that "sous 1'dKovaa.vTwv  de Gorgias," may be 
found  "Ie  souvenir de  quelque  legende  de  cette  sorte  ou soit  l' 
instigation  a  ecrire,  soit  meme  la  revelation  de  verites  jusque-Ia 
ignorees  ou travesties  seraient venues  au  poete ...  d'  un  oracle  ou 
d'une apparition d' Helene" (Dies  1913,  195).  Segal  (1962,  p.145 
n.63) following Norden, and Untersteiner (1961, p.90) holds that G. 
means the inspiration that poets accept from the Muses; Bona (1974, 
p.  30  n.1)  also  accepts  (b),  and more  particularly what the  poets 
have  heard  is  the  oral  tradition  they  have  inherited  from  oral 
135 tradition.  It  is  interesting  now  that  Segal  (1962)  disagrees  that 
1T'OI.7JTWv  is "genitive of source" depending on a.KOUOOv-rWV,  whereas 
MacDowell (1982. p.34) takes the opposite view on the basis that 
there  is  no  genitive  "to  denote  the  source  of what  is  heard". 
However, it is hard to take sides. (a) is certainly plain: it refers to the 
recipients of (some of)  the poets' account.  (b)  would be attractive 
under  the  light  of the  method  proposed  by  G  ..  Where  he  self-
consciously (fiouIlOP.o.l.)  proposes a IlO)nap.oS"  as  his own method, the 
poets, being manipulated by the Muses, merely reproduce what they 
are  dictated  by  them.  Probably  G. 's  wording  is  deliberately 
ambiguous. 
QV0ll-o.'T'OS"  <!n1\.l-'T\---YE.yovev:  "Gorgias  produces  a  parr  of parallel 
phrases  by  adding  a  genitive  to  each,  but  the  parallelism  of 
construction  is  artificial,  because  -rOU  QvoP.o.-roS"  is  a  subjective 
genitive ...  but -rwv  au!-upopwv  is  an objective genitive" (MacDowell 
1982,  p.34;  he  compares  10  rfroxPiS"  a.p.o.p-n7p.o.-ro.  Ka.I.  8ofrJs-
a.1T'o.rr]p.o.-ro.,  19  tfsuxlls  a.yp€up.o.al.v ..• ,  and  3  a  P.Ev  a.vcpwv 
KpaTl.CJ"TOS ... ).  <ln1\.l-'T\:  'significant sound'  (MacDowell  1982, p.34); 
Helen's  name  brings  out the reality of the  subject it names  (cp. 
Aiskh. Ag.  681ff.: -riS"  1T'OT' wvop.o.{€V  ~'  /  ES  -ro  1T'o.v  E!7]Tt.!/LWS",  / p.7J 
Tl.S"  OVTl.V'  OUX'  oPWP.€V  1T'POVO£- /  0.1.0'1.  -rOU  1T'€1T'PWP.EVOU  / yllWauo.v  EV 
nlxq.  VEP,WV,  /  -ra.v  8op£yo.p.f3pov  a.P.cPI.V€L- /  KTJ  e'  'EAEVo.V;  E1T'€~ 
1T'P€1T'ov-rWS"  /  EAEVo.S"  €A.o.vop0S"  EA.E- /  1TTOIlI.S"  EK  -rWV  a.f3po-r[p.wv ••• ). 
The  archaic  idea that the  name reveals  the  truth of the  object  it 
denotes  (cp.  Heraclitus  48DK)  which seems  to  be  found  here  is 
refuted by G.  himself in ONE.  In that text it is  clearly stated that 
AOyOS"  is different from the objects it denotes, in other words a name 
is arbitrarily related to the object it refers to. This disclaimer further 
shows  (as  is  held throughout  this  thesis)  that  the  comparison  of 
passages  so  as  to  support theories  allegedly put forward  by  G.  is 
methodologically inappropriate. In this context G. intends to  oppose 
the  irrational  and  uncritical  account  of the  poets  to  his  logical 
argumentation.  We may  then assume  that probably her name  is 
136 reminiscent  of calamities  because  of its  poetical  usage,  as  it  is 
shown  by  the  Aeschylean  passage  quoted  above.  Il-vTtll-1l: 
combined with  1n7JJ-7J  also  in Lysias  2.3  p.vTjJJ-7JV  1TUpa.  rijs  1n7JJ-7]S 
il.u{3wv.  G.  clearly aspires  to  create a speech unbound by temporal 
limits.  il.O'}'Lap.Os  unchains  him  from  the  linearity  of  poetical 
narration;  it is  worth noting that in 5 we are told that through his 
present il.0Y0S'  (-rqi  il.OyCfl)  he can bypass the events of the past (-rav 
/  ,  /)  xpovov  70V  -rO-rE  • 
€)'W  O€  ~OUAoP.UI.  ••• Souc;;  the emphatic statement of his own method 
(introduced  with  the  eyw  oE  which  expresses  G.' s  intention  to 
distance  himself  from  his  predecessors)  has  undeservedly  been 
overlooked  by  scholars  (it  is  worth  mentioning  that  the  same 
boastful expression is uttered by Agathon in his 'Gorgian' speech in 
Pl.Symp.194e4:  eyw  oE  {3ovAO{J-UI.  1TpCrrov  p.ev  EL1TE'iv  Ws- XP-TJ  {J-€ 
El1TE'iV .•• ).  The  self-reference  denotes  personal  and  free  will  on 
behalf of the rhetor (. His speech is not fact-bound; the method that 
he  will  follow  is  a  matter  of personal  selection.  Linguistically 
speaking, after the theme, that is  something already known (in this 
case  the  poets'  account)  comes  the  rheme,  that  is  the  new 
information which is undoubtedly in a relation of contradistinction 
with what has already been said. This phrase serves thus both as  an 
announcement of the method that will be followed by G.  and as  a 
comment  on  the  practices  which have  already  been followed  by 
those  who  have  previously  dealt  with the  same  subject  (cp.  21 
ef30v Af]87Jv ).  AO)'I.at-LOV  'Tt. vu: Verdenius (1981, p.ll  7) claims that G. 
"declares that he will use a special kind of argument, ... but this  is 
not specified". Nevertheless, the emphasis here is  not on a special 
kind  of argument,  but  on  the  argumentative  speech  itself  (see 
MacDoweil  1982,  p.34).  AOYLGJ.LOs  indicates  G. 's  own  method, 
which is  going  to  be  logical  argumentation (that the word mems 
'reasoning',  'logical argumentation'  is  confirmed by  the  contexts 
cited by  Schiappa  1999,  pp.122-123).  Segal  (1962,  p.1l9)  saw  a 
"rationalistic  approach  to  persuasion  in  Palamedes"  and  an 
137 "emotional approach in the Helen",  and Verdenius  applauded this 
view (1981, p.1l8 n.17). This is an  artificial distinction,  and G.'s 
announcement that he intends  to  proceed through Aoy,a,uSs  is  not 
deceptive, as Verdenius thought. For the function of  the soul and the 
impact  of  (an  irrational)  logos  on  it  is  one  thing,  and  the 
examination  of this  function  and  its  impact  quite  an  other.  He!. 
proceeds  in  an  equally  logical  way.  i\l1  the  main  arguments  are 
"remarkably  orderly  and  well-sign-posted"  (NfacDowell  1982, 
p.17);  the  argumentation  is  apagogic,  as  is  the  case  in  the 
examination of the possible motives in Pal.  The examination of the 
impacts oflogos upon the human soul (8-14) and that of  vision upon 
it  (15-19)  proceeds with a good deal  of theorisation.  There is  no 
reason  thus  to  suggest  that  He!.  is  irrational.  G.  by  his  own 
admission uses Aoy,afl-0S  in his speech. 
E.1T1.0€L~a.L  Kcr.1.  O€L~a.L  -niA1'\ees  Kcr.1....:  EmQ€1gcr.,  Kat.  Q€1gat.  is  the 
MSS  reading,  and there  is  no  reason  to  change  it  to  Q€£gas  Kat. 
EmQ€£gas with Blass. MacDowell (1982) prints EmQ€1gcr.t.  Kat.  Q€1gat. 
T€  Td).:rfJes  ,  taking  the  ommission  of T€  as  the  product  of an 
hap 10 graphy.  But  this  is  probably  redundant.  The  second  Kat. 
replaces the 77  of the MSS ("for confusion of  7}  and  Kat.,  compare, 
for example, And. 1.78, Is. 5.5, D. 3.27",  MacDowell 1961, p.121). 
3 
Gorgias proceeds with  a praise of Helen  which  is  based on  the 
mythical account concerning her birth.  her beauty,  and finally her 
suitors.  Apart from these references in  3-4  very little  is  otherwise 
relevant  to  her person  in  the  speech.  Even  her  name  is  rarely 
mentioned in a speech which is intended to be an encomium for her. 
q,Ua€L ••• 1TPun-WV:  a recurrent motif of an encomium is  the connection 
of the  praised  hero  to  a  divine  parentage.  In this  way  the  praise 
138 becomes worthwhile, and at the same time  the  hero  is  distanced. 
from the human community, so as to avoid the resentment of  men. 
~:  the neuter plural adjective refers here to  one individual (see 
MacDowell 1982, p.34); cpo  Aiskh. Pers.2, 681, Eum. 487; in prose 
Thuc. 3.  821"'<1.  p.€CTa.  nov 1To/..l.nOV, 6. 77 on  aUK  "]WV€s  l"'elOE  ElO'LV. 
OUK  <i~AOV  ••• OAI:yol.S":  with this  double litotes  G.  stresses  that the 
superiority of  Helen is beyond doubt; notice that the presentation of 
her binh begins with the word ofj/..ov. 
\-L"T1'TpO~  \-La  A~Oa.~: Helen's mother was Leda,  the daughter of the 
king of Aetolia Thestius, who married her to  Tyndareos,  king of 
Sparta. When Leda was taking her bath in the River Eurotas, Zeus 
transformed himself into  a swan, so  as  to  avoid an eagle.  He hid 
himself away in her arms, and the product of their intercourse was 
an egg from which Polydeukes and Helen were born;  like Helen, 
"EplJ.6  was also born from an egg (cp.  Dunbar 1997, comments on 
695ff.) 
1Ta.Tpos  ••• 8e  -rupa.vvos: a demanding construction, concerning Helen's 
paternity: 'her real father was a god, but according to the rumours a 
mortal,  Tyndareos and Zeus,  of  which the one was thought to be 
because he was, whereas the other was shown not to be because he 
claimed that he was, and the one was the mightiest man the other the 
ruler  of all'.  Helen's  paternity  is  attributed  to  Zeus  (1),  and 
Tyndareos (2); the construction as perfectly balanced (1,2 / 2,1 / 1,2 
/2,1) It is worth mentioning that according to Pausanias (3.  17. 14), 
Tyndareos'  tomb  was believed to  be next to  the  temple of Zeus 
Kosmetas in Sparta (cp. Pausanias 3.  17.  14), which is tantamount to 
saying that they were both worshipped at  the same place.  Ol.a.  TO 
e\.va.1.  E.Oo~EV:  a  phrase highly reminiscent of B26.  Ika.  TO  <j>O.va.1. 
i)AE'YX~: MacDowell prints €/..exf}7J;  "~/..€yxf37J is translated by Diels-
Kranz 'die Fama trog', but it cannot mean this. If correct, it would 
have to  mean something like 'he was proved not to  be because he 
claimed he was'; but oui would then be absurd" (MacDowell 1961, 
p.121). Wardy (1996, pp.31-2) defends the reading of  the MSS, and 
139 interestingly he claims that "Gorgias daringly inverts the description 
of Tyndareus ...  The idea, presumably, is that so brilliant is the sight 
of Helen's  'divine beauty' (4)  that it immediately suffices to  give 
the lie to the mortal's pretension: we can clearly see that her beauty 
is  'divine' in the strict sense of the word" (see also p.156, n.9, and 
Porter 1993, p.276-7). For an unsuccessful mimesis of the Gorgian 
construction, see Isok. 10. 18. 
4 
LO"o6€QV  Ka.N..oS-:  Hesiod compares Helen with Aphrodite,  as  far as 
her beauty is  concerned (7]  ELOOS- EXEV  xpvO"e-rr.;' A<f;poo £  -rrys ...  fr.197, 
5),  and Homer compares her to  Artemis (€K  0'  .  El.ev7]  eUAUjLOLO 
eVWOEOS  u t/Jopo<f;o1.0  /  7]AVeev,  'APTEjLI.OI.  XpvO"7]I.UKa.rcp  €I.KVLU 
Od.4.121-2; see also  Od.8.  174; on lO"oeeov  see Furley 2000, pp.7-
15, esp.10). 
1r1..€l.a-ro.s- Se  lrAel.<TiOI.s-••• evELP')'a.au:ro:  'in many men she implanted 
much  love-desire';  with the  repetition of lTAel.O"T- G.  stresses  the 
great number of Helen's suitors  and the  strong  emotions  of love 
invoked in them by her. The story of  Helen's suitors goes that, when 
Tyndaros announced that he was planning to marry off his daughter 
Helen,  numerous  men turned up  in Sparta from  allover Greece. 
Tyndareos,  out of fear that if he favoured  one  of the  suitors,  he 
might provoke the wrath and the enmity of the rest of them, asked 
for  Odysseus'  support. The latter,  one  of Helen's suitors,  advised 
him to bind the suitors with a pledge: if somebody ventured to stain 
Helen's husband's  reputation,  all of them were obliged to  assist 
him. Helen chose Menelaos, and when Paris seized her, Menelaos 
adduced  this  pledge.  The  follow-up  is  well-known:  the  Trojan 
expedition. A catalogue of the suitors is  offered by Hesiod (fr.197-
204), Apollodorus, and Hyginus. 
Ev~ Se ...  aW\-La.1U:  the antithesis between €vL  and 1TOMa.  recurs in the 
context of 13,  where it  is  claimed that one '\6yos- persuades many 
people.  The  attractiveness  of Helen's  body  is  equally  strong. 
Helen's body has  the power to  join the cream of Greek men in a 
140 battle  against  a  common  enemy.  Bucbheim  (1989,  p.162)  has 
plausibly seen an affinity of the wording here with Empedoc1ean 
philosophy;  more  particularly  he  contends  that  "Denn  das 
Zusammenbringen  von  vie1em  durch  die  Attraktion  des  einen 
(namlich  der  Kypris  bzw.  Philotes  etc.)  ist  ein  empedokleisches 
Grundrnotiv; vgl. z.B. Emp. DK 31B  35,5 ...  oder B21, 8". Helen in 
this paragraph is  praised indirectly;  after the  demonstration of her 
noble and divine birth, the praise of the men she attracted proves 
analogously her own nobleness (cp. Hes.  fro  200, 34, 39: ou' dvepES 
E~OX'  a.PLOTOL ••. 1TOMa.  0'  EEov<a  o£.oov>,  jJ-€ya  KA,eo<s  EO'KE 
YU>VULKOS').  It is worth noting that this indirect encomiastic manner 
is  largely followed by Isokrates in his Helen, where a considerable 
part of the speech is devoted to  Theseus; "The real object of praise 
is the figure of  Theseus, that is, the city of Athens itself through its 
illustrious mythological representative" Wardy 1996, p.28 (cp. Isok. 
10.22-2). 
WV  ot  Il-EV ••• e.axov:  Immisch  thought  that  a  lacuna  follows  after 
1TA,OUTOU, to attain a symmetry: N(oun, gen.) {Imm. A(djective, gen.) 
dpXULOU}  - N (gen.)  A (gen.) N (acc.) - N (gen.) A(gen.) N(acc.) -
N(gen.)  A(gen.)  N(acc.), but nothing  suggests  that this  should be 
done (one should also notice the homoeoteleuton formed in the two 
central  phrases:  Euoo-g£av,  EUE-g£av,  and  the  repetition of sounds 
1TAou-,  -Ey-,  -YE-,  1TUA-,  strengthened by the three compound words 
starting with an EU-).  Rostagni (1922, p.l92, 195)  observes that in 
the  speech  of Pythagoras  to  the  young  (Iamblichus,  JIEpL  TaU 
JIU8UYOpLKOU  B£.ou,  8,  42-43),  there  is  an  encomiastic  speech  to 
wisdom (aocPLu)  "che ha per base l' identico  schema" (Untersteiner 
1961,  p.92).  Pythagoras,  according  to  this  source,  categorises 
praiseworthy  things  into  inborn  and  acquired,  permanent  and 
temporary. Wealth and offices are inherited privileges, which, when 
legated,  their owner seizes  to  possess  them  (Tel  oe  .Ov  1TPO€jJ-EVOV 
OUK  EXELII  aUTav  8,  43).  Physical  power,  by  contrast  is  a  mere 
personal (lo£.uS')  characteristic, which cannot be donated to  anyone 
141 (mix' 
...  ...  OLOV  Te  eLvaL  -rrap'  ErEPOU  f1-O.TaAa{3e'iv  8,  42).  To  all  the 
aforementioned  charismata  is  opposed  wisdom  (-rraLoet.a),  an 
acquired virtue, which, when achieved by a person, is never lost. On 
the contrary, the person who acquires it is in a position to impart it 
through  teaching  to  others  (0 vvaTO V 
p.e-raAapeZv  Ka.~  TOV  00111"0.  Ik7JO€V  T,rrov 
,  , 
a.VTOV 
ErEPOU 
EXeLv  8,  43;  notice 
that the opposite is  claimed in the Dissoi Logoi 6,  as  an argument 
against  the  teachability  of virtue:  if virtue  is  teachable,  then  the 
person who  hands  it  over  to  somebody  else  does  not  possess  it 
anymore). The fact that G.  calls  'wisdom' e-rrLK7IJ1'"oc;  ('acquired') is 
not  of  course  coincidental:  a  central  theme  of  the  Sophistic 
problematic  is  the  issue  of the  teachability  of wisdom.  On  the 
traditional view,  a person is  gifted with wisdom by nature; Pindar 
explicitly supports this conception when in his 2
nd Olympian Ode he 
contends  that  uo<jJoc;  <5  -rroMG.  eloWe;  cPvg..  The  fiftb.--century 
intellectuals  cast  doubt  on  this  idea;  wisdom  can  be  acquired, 
provided  that  one  wishes  to  learn.  Protagoras  maintained  that 
cPuuews  Ka.l.  dUK-r]U€WS  oLoauKa.ALa  oe'ZTaL  (80 B 3 DK). That wisdom 
is  thought of by Sophists  as  teachable cannot be doubted;  if this 
were  not  true  their  own  mission  would  have  been  a  self-
contradiction.  What  is  perhaps  more  radical,  is  the  fact  that  G. 
considers the wisdom of the Greek leaders to  be acquired; we may 
then assume that even Odysseus was taught wisdom, he did not owe 
it to his nobility. G.  is here an iconoclast of the first rank (note that 
Andromache attributes similar virtues  to  her husband in Eur.  Tro. 
673-4:  ae  0',  JJ  cPt.A'  "EKTOP,  e1xov  avop'  dPKouvTcf.  IkOL  /  fuvEaeL 
YEveL  -rrAOVTqJ  Te  Kdvope£q.  Ikeya.v). 
q,t.>"OV(KOU  q,t.>..o'Tt.!-LLas:  for  an  antithetical usage of these  words  see 
PI.  Parm.128e 1-2:  on  OUX'  v-rro  VEOV  cPLAoVLKLac;  OreL  a.UTO 
yeypcf.cP8a.L,  ill'  v-rro  1Tpea{3vTepov  cPLAMLlkt.a.C;· 
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OO"T't.S  \-Lev  OUV  •••  ou  A~W; a rhetorical aposiopesis; with this phrase 
G.  brings  the  praise of Helen to  an  end.  MacDowell (1982,  p.35) 
holds that the person referred to  here is  "Menelaos" who "married 
Helen and succeeded Tyndareos  as  king of Sparta". However, the 
construction is  ambiguous;  the participle  AUf3WV  may refer both to 
marriage ('I will not mention who ...  fulfilled his  desire  for Helen 
after his  marriage with her'),  and abduction ('I will not mention 
who ...  fulfilled his desire for Helen after having carried her of£,). 
Specifying Auf3wV,  would be tantamount to  the involvement in  an 
unpleasant and degrading narration. Both husband and lover receive 
G.'s bitter neglect. 
TO  ')lap  TO~S €Uio<Jw ••• oU  <pEp€I.;  'to say known things to  those who 
already know them. carries conviction to the speech, but it does not 
carry pleasure'  (KOp0S"  is  a recurring theme in encomiastic poetry; 
cpo Pindar O.  2. 95; P.  L 82-3,  8.28-32; N.  10. 20-2). Untersteiner 
(1961,  p.  62)  glosses  TEp,pI.V:  "motivo  edonistico  della  dottrina 
estetica di  Gorgia:  l' artista e un giusto  ingannatore ...  al  servizio 
della  T€P,pI.~;".  This  view  unjustifiably  systematizes  scattered 
evidence. The metarhetorical axiom serves as  an explanation:  'I do 
not  mention  the  person  ...  because  it  will  be  unpleasant  for  my 
audience,  although it would add credibility to  my speech'.  It is 
interesting that G.  concedes that information on known things adds 
credibility to  the speech, but he does not at the same time say that 
sacrificing things  already known for  the  sake  of pleasure  detracts 
from  the  credibility  of the  speech.  Is  this  mere  flattery,  or  a 
statement of the self-consciousness of the rhetor? 7rl.fJ"rL<;  and TEpcjJl.<; 
are  inextricably  interwoven.  Pleasure  leads  to  persuasion,  and 
certainly unpleasant speeches are unconvincing (see 13  ET€pcjJ€  KU~ 
e7r€I.(],€;  notice  that Philostratos  Test.  1,  2  holds  that  the  stylistic 
143 devices  of G.'  s  style  amount  to  a  ADyOe;  which  -ryo[wv  ea.v-rou 
yiYVETa.1.  Ka.1.  o-O{3a.pw"Epoe;  cpo  Isok.  5.  57 AOyOI.  -ryo[ove;  Eiva.l.  Ka.1. 
-rrL(j'jO-rEP0I.;  for the victimisation of audiences  through pleasurable 
speeches in Thucydides and G., see Hunter 1986). In later rhetoric it 
becomes a topos (cp. for instance the opening lines ofDemosthenes' 
On  the Crown);  in Segal's words, "through the artistic  elaboration 
of the logos as  a form of  poiesis a chain of emotional reactions will 
occur  leading  from  the  aesthetic  TEp!ne;  to  the  final  dvaYK7J  of 
7TEl.eW ...• The  aesthetically  satisfying  logos ... has  great  practical 
implications which lie within the form  itself' (1962,  p.127;  for a 
different  view,  see  Verdenius  1981,  p.1l8  n.  17).  Since  known 
things are boring, we may assume that G.  now widens our horizon 
of expectation. Something new (in Pal., novelty is  considered as  a 
merit  in speech,  Ka.I.VOe;  <5  Aoyoe;  26)  is  about  to  be said:  a  new 
method of  rational approach replacing the linear, mythical narration. 
TOV  xpovov  •••  u1TEp~a.s:  an  abstruse  construction;  TOV  xpovov  - TOV 
TOTE,  TciJ  AOYCP  - vuv. G. is able through his speech to create a speech 
diachronically valid, unbound by the reality of  the events of  the past. 
€..m.  -rT)v  cipx.f)v:  the transition is once more clearly indicated (cp. the 
beginning of  the syllogisms in Pal. 6). 
a.Lna.s:  the reasons that made Helen desert her husband and fo How 
Paris to Troy will be presented in ch.6. 
ei.Kos  1)v:  'reasonable'; argument from probabilities does not play an 
important role in Hei.  In fact, it is traceable only in the invention of 
the reasons  that made Helen do  what she did.  The absence of this 
type of argument in Hel.  should chiefly be explained by the fact that 
this  speech  does  not  seek  to  question  facts  or  actions  falsely 
attributed to  the defendant, as  is  the case in Pal. In this speech it is 
admitted  that  Helen's  departure  to  Troy  is  true  (cp.  E7Tpa.qev  a. 
E7Tpa.qev  6).  The demonstration of what might have happened and 
144 not of  what has happened gives G. the opportunity to create his own 
vital space. 
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Gorgias now presents the possible reasons for which Helen eloped 
to  Troy.  Norden,  cited by  Untersteiner  (1961,  p.93)  has  observed 
that Gorgias is the first to present his material in the order it will be 
developed in  the main body of  the speech.  The  reasons set forth by 
Gorgias  are  the  following:  divine  power  (developed  in  6), 
represented by Tyche,  the gods,  and Ananke, (natural) violence (7), 
logos  (8-14),  and finally love  (15-19).  The  argumentation  will be 
apagogic: each one of  them will be dealt with separately,  and it is 
also noticeable that none of  these reasons mutually excludes the rest 
of them.  The  list  is  also  exhaustive,  so  that the  recipient of the 
speech cannot easily conceive of  any other possible a.l-rLa.I..  It is also 
true  that  "his  four  alternatives  dissolve  into  a  series  of 
approximations  and analogies.  They  are  convergent to  a point of 
analogy"  (Porter  1993,  p.274).  A  close  examination  of the four 
reasons  shows  that  they  have  some  common  denominators:  the 
compulsion imposed by the divine power is attributed to  AOYOS; gods 
have  supremacy over men  in  violence;  love  is  a god with  divine 
power,  and it is natural for mortals to follow his commands etc.  In 
Porter's  words  again  (p.275),  "If Gorgias  is  trying  to  keep  his 
a.i-ria.1.  apart,  he  is  trying no  less  hard to  make  that text next to 
impossible. " MacDowell accurately observes that "the first reason 
is expressed by three phrases (each  being a dative plural noun with 
a genitive),  the other three by one phrase each  (a participle with  a 
dative),  so  as  to  produce a  symmerry:  three phrases precede and 
three follow the central E.1TP~E.V a.  E.1TP~E.V" (1982, p.35). 
i1  yCp  TUxlls  •••  ~q,L<Jll.a.a1..:  it is  interesting  that G.  combines  here 
divine  power  with  secular  processes  of public  decision-making. 
TUxlls  ~OUAllf.La.a1..:  -rUXTJ  personifie~ "is a goddess  with wishes  of 
her own; cf.  Pindar Olympian  Odes  12.  1-2, Soph. Antigone 1158, 
145 Menander Aspis 147-8, and Demosthenes Epistles 2.5" (MacDowell 
1982,  p.3S).  Pindar includes  her in  the Moirai  (fr.21),  and  it is 
possible that even gods may submit to  her wish (cp.  Trag.  Adesp. 
506 Kannicht-Snell: 1Tall7"WV  ropavvoo;  Tj  Tuxry  'aTL  TWV  8€wv). 
{3ov).:rjp.aaL  denotes  the  'wish'; its  usage here  in decision-making 
(cp.  PI.  Lg.  802c  TO.  TOU  vop.08€7'ov  (3ovA-rjp.aTa).  ~OUAE{,!1-a.cr'I.: 
Untersteiner (1961, p.92)  prefers X's reading,  K€A€Uap.an,  which, 
however, is  not in accordance with the political vocabulary of the 
passage.  {3ouA€vp.a,  in political vocabulary denotes the decision of 
the {3ovA-rj,  and generally a political decision (cp Hdt. 3.80 TOUTWV  0 
,  ,,,  tl.  \'  ~"  "  "A-.')!nth  apxryv  €X€L,Ov"eVILa-ra  oe  1TaVTa  €o;  TO  KOLVOV  ava'f'€p€L  •  e 
plural it can also mean 'contrivances', as  in Pind. Nem.  5.  28  (see 
also Sykutris 1928, p. 12). 
'Avci:YKllS  *",4>LCI!J-a.cr'I.:  'AvaYK7J  is  here personified, though this is a 
rare  instance  (Smith  1999,  p.130  argues  that  '<the  only  new 
personification  in  the  early  Classical  period  that  represents  an 
abstract concept is  also  a political entity: Ananke (Necessity) may 
be  represented  by  a  winged  woman  with  a  torch,  on  an  early 
Classical lekythos in Moscow"); it is a power that forces men to act 
in a manner which is independent of  their own wish (cp. Eur. Phoen. 
1000, 1063 aL  EK  8ewv  civaYKaL)  .' Avci.YK7J and Tuxry  are interrelated, 
since they are both superior to the gods (cp. Simonides 5. 21' AVci.YKq. 
8' ouoe  8eo~  p.axovTaL),  and it is  interesting that in Soph. Aj.  485 
they  are  conjoined:  1"ijs  civaYKa[ao;  ruxrys  OUK  €aTl.V  ouoev  p.€~~OV 
civ8pWrrOLo;  KaKOv.  tls.fJq,I.O}La.:  a decree,  a proposal  accepted by  the 
majority; MacDowell (1982, p.36) observes that the word is  rarely 
used for decisions of the gods,  although there is  one occurrence in 
Ar. Wasps 376-78: LV'  €L0-V  /  J.L7J  1TaTE~v 7'0.  / TO/:V  8€oZv  r/;7JCPiap.aTa. 
A very similar construction occurs in Empedocles  (31B 115DK),  a 
passage which G.  probably had in mind:  eaTr.  1"1.' AvaYKTf)  xp7]p.a. 
e€WV  t/n]cpLap.a  1TaAat.6v. 
146 <€p<.m.  a.Aouaa.>:  the  fourth  reason,  followed  by  most  editors; 
Immisch  added  <l5tjJel.  J.pa.a8eT.aa.>.  His  conjecture  is  attractive, 
because  the  development  of  the  fourth  reason  is  chiefly  a 
theorisation of the function of Oo/IS  ('vision'), and its impact upon 
r./roxfJ  ('soul').  However,  Immisch's  proposal  unjustifiably 
emphasises oo/I.S (notice that AOYos and ~[a. are in the dative followed 
by a participle), whereas it is clear that the fourth reason put forward 
by G. is love (cp.15 el  yap  epws- ~v <5  laura.  -rrpd.~as). 
e.L  iJ-h  ouv  •••  a:rroI..UTE.OV:  G.  passes  to  the  discussion of the  first 
possible  reason;  the  argumentation  here  is  apagogic:  in  the  first 
instance it is maintained that if Helen was forced by divine power 
(3Lel.  '10  -rrpWrov), the blame should be put on the blameworthy. This 
is  followed  by  an  argument  concerning  the  right  of might:  the 
stronger leads  and the weaker follows.  Lastly,  G.  particularises: if 
god  and  Tyche  are  responsible  (the  stronger),  then  Helen  (the 
weaker) should be exculpated. It is also important that the argument 
used  here  derives  from  or  reminds  of a  major  and  recurrent 
discussion of the Sopbistic movement: the relation between VOf1-os 
and  CPUals.  It is  impossible to  present  the  whole  issue here  (the 
reader is  referred to  Heinimann,  1945,  Guthrie  1971,  pp.55-131, 
Kerferd  1981,  pp.111-130,  Kahn  1981,  pp.92-108,  esp.  105-108, 
Beikos  1991,  pp.67-92).  It will suffice to  say that cpuaLS  denotes 
'nature', whereas VOf1-0S  signifies a human 'convention'. In the fifth-
century these two notions are polarised, and accordingly, in social 
matters, some intellectuals defend cpual.S, whereas some others VOf1-os. 
Some examples:  does  religion  exist naturally,  or is  it  created by 
men? Is  the superiority of Greeks  to  Barbarians natural,  or is  it  a 
matter of an  arbitrary belief?  This  theoretical  examination of the 
VOf1-0S  - cjJuaLS  polarity had an interesting implication for the ethics 
of power;  evidence  from  several  texts  shows  that  a  number  of 
intellectuals  gave  a  clear  priority  to  nature.  Callicles,  in  Plato's 
Gorgias,  seems  to  hold the  view  that law  is  an invention of the 
weaker members  of society,  which  is  used  so  as  to  control  the 
147 stronger.  An explicit demonstration of the  'right of the might' is 
found  in Thucydides'  description of the negotiations between the 
Athenians  and  the  Melians,  and  in  what  followed  after  their 
dialogue:  OL  D€  a'lTEK7"€LlIUlI  M7]AiwlI  oaovs  .f]{3wvrus  €Au{30ll,  1TuZ8us 
De  KU~  YVllUZKUS'  T,lIDpu1ToDLaulI  (Thuc.5.1l6).  In  Kahn's  words 
"What  is  new  is  not  the  theoretical  contrast between nomos  and 
physis but the positive evaluation of the latter as  freedom  for the 
strong, as  rule by those who  are naturally superior" (1981, p.107). 
Justice, thus, applies to those who are equally strong; cp.Thuc.5. 89: 
D£KaLa  Ell  1'"£!}  all8pW'lT€£lfl  AOYlfl  am}  rijS'  rC17JS  dlla.YK7]S  Kpill€TaL, 
DVVU7"a.  De  ot.  1TPOUXOvr€S'  1Tpa.aaovat..  Kat  ot.  da8€V€LS'  £Ur<wpoiJat.., 
the  latter  part  being  reminiscent  of G.'  s  7"0  D€  ~aaov  €1T€a8Ut.. 
Should we then assume that G.  was a supporter of the right of the 
might? Nestle (1940, p.229), based on this passage, asserted that G. 
was  an immoralist,  and admittedly he had several allies (a fervent 
one is  Harrison 1964, p.192). However, the alleged immoralism of 
G.  cannot be proved from this passage, and there is no supporting 
evidence that he encouraged it. Here the Sophist simply claims that 
generally  it  is  natural  (1TE<pVK€)  for  the  stronger  to  impose  his 
manners and his will on the weaker. In this case the stronger is the 
god, and there is no  doubt that the majority of Greeks believed in 
the omnipotence of the divine nature. They appeal to  their gods in 
order to support them in everyday life, they ask them to foresee their 
future,  they  stage  them  in  a  way  that  customarily  accepts  their 
unavoidable  power.  Accepting  that  divine  power  is  superior  to 
human, and using this disclaimer as  an argument (G. is not the first 
to exculpate Helen on the basis of divine responsibility; cpo fl. 3 .164, 
cited by MacDowell 1982, p.35) is  one thing, and using one's own 
superiority as an argument in order to justify one's ability to  impose 
one's  0\VI1  brutality  on  others  is  quite  another  (see  Tsekourakis 
1984,  p.657).  Athenians  did  not  need  G.'s  Hel.  to  commit  their 
atrocities in Melos. 
148 1'tpOP.11et.~: it would be attractive to think that apart from the phonetic 
similarity  with  -rrpo8vp.Lq.,  there  is  a  pun here  with  the  name  of 
Prometheus, the hero who was shackled by Zeus. 
eEO~ S' ...  KaL  TOtS  OX\Of..~: 'god is superior to men in violence, and in 
wisdom,  and  in  everything  else';  the  superiority  of gods  is  well 
attested in literature, so  that G.'s statement seems rather trivial;  cpo 
Hom: Od.  10. 306 8€o~ be  r€ -rrclllra  bVllallraL. For the superiority of 
gods in wisdom see the recurrent: 8€d  be  r€  -rrclllra  raaO'Ll!  Hom. 4. 
379,468, and Heraclitus B78DK T/3os  ya.p  aIl8pW-rr€wlI  p.ev  OUK  €X€L 
YVW,uas,  8€LOII  be  EX€L). 
1"'il~  SUO'KAeLa~ a:rroAU1"E:OV:  cpo  fr.22 where it is said that G. believed 
that a woman should not be known for her beauty, but for her good 
name  CJJ.iJ  r6  €Ioos  cL'\Aa.  riJv  begav  €Lllat.  -rrOMOC:S  yvWPLP.OV  rils 
YVllal.Kos) . 
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~(q.:  the  second  possible  reason  for  which  Helen  might  have 
travelled to  Troy; in general, the one-paragraph argumentation for 
this  possibility  is  marked by the  usage  of legal  terminology.  In 
Untersteiner's  words,  "Ie  distinzioni  sinonimiche  di  questo 
paragrafo  (~[q.-U~pCcrB11'  a.v6p.W~-a.OCKW~,  aTEP118El.aa-opq,avLcrBEl.CTa) 
dipendono da reminiscenze giuridiche" (1961, p.97). It is clear that 
this  terminology  is  anachronistic,  since  it  is  applied  in  a 
mythological context. 
U~PL~: the  interpretation of UpPI.S  is  always  a  difficult  task;  G. 
surmises that Helen was  seized, raped,  and finally suffered hybns. 
Thus  her sufferings  form  a  climax:  rape  is  certainly more serious 
offence  than  mere  abduction,  and  practising hybns is  worse  than 
mere rape.  It is probable, thus, that G.  wishes to  charge Paris with 
ill-motivation  as  welL  If  seizure  is  the  first  step  towards  violent 
sexual fulfilment, practising uppt.s  implies  an additional motive in 
149 committing  the  act of rape:  the humiliation of the  sufferer.  This 
reading is in accordance with some evidence that shows that J{3pt<)  is 
an  act  through  which  one  dishonours  another.  In Demosthenes' 
Conon  we  learn  that  the  defendant  was  attacked  by  a  mob  of 
youngsters,  and  that  their  act  was  not  simply  an  act  of brutal 
violence;  the  youngsters  committed il{3ptS',  because  their  intention 
was  to  ridicule him. il{3ptS'  is  thus distinguished from mere violence 
in  that  violence  is  used  for  humiliation  (cp.  Aristotle's  Rhetoric 
1374a 13-15; for a full discussion of il{3ptS'  see  MacDowell  1976, 
Cohen 1995, pp.145ff., Fisher 1992, and Cairns 1996). 
&r\AOV  o11. .•• eoua-nlX11O"ev:  G.  turns the first and the last verbs of the 
preceding period into participles, and the adverb  d.8I.K~ into a verb; 
the only new word is Eou<rT"1Jx"O"ev. 
~ci.p~a.pOS  ~ci.p~a.pov:  a polyptoton; the first  word is  a noun and it 
refers to Paris, who was not Greek. The second is an adjective, and 
it refers to his brutal deeds. The construction clearly underlines that 
his deeds were in conformity with his origin. We may safely assume 
that G.  shared the idea that Greeks are superior to  barbarians, and 
that the Greeks should unanimously fight against them (cp. fr.5b). 
KaL  AO'Y~ KaL  vO(-L~  KaL  €P'Y~: see MacDowell (1982, comment ad 
loc.);  he rightly observes that "the use of KaL  does  not mean that 
Paris  actually used all three methods .. .it is  just 'by any  possible 
means', just as  QtKaLW<)  KaL  d8iKW<)  means  'by fair means or four. 
Cf.  the oath quoted in Andokides  1.  97:  KTEVW  KaL  '\6ycp  KaL  epycp 
KaL  !fn7cPCP  KaL  rij ep.auTou  XEI.pl.,  UV  ouvaT<JS"  0,  ik UV  KaTa.AVa7J  ..,ryv 
o",p.oKpaTtav. ,. 
AO'Y~  (-LEV ••• -ruxELV:  the  repetition  of the  datives  stresses  that  the 
wrong-doer should suffer exactly the  same sufferings  suffered by 
the  victim.  G.  asks  'a tooth  for  a tooth  and  an  eye  for  an  eye'. 
dTI.p.LaS'  and  ~",p.La<)  can  both  be  legal  terms.  The  first  means 
'disfranchisement',  loss  of rights,  whereas  the  latter  is  used  of 
150 'punisbment' (cp. Dem.19. 126: TWV  TOI.OUTWV  0  v6p.o~ ecfVUTOV  ri]v 
~TfP.£uv  eivul.  KeAEUEI.).  The usage  of technical  forensic  wording 
within the frame of  mythological material adds verisimilitude to the 
speech, and brings it closer to every day city-experience. 
€i.K6~; 'reasonably'; from the aforementioned it follows that Helen 
should be the object of  our pity. 
OLKULOV  OUv:  'it is  appropriate to  sympathise with her and to  hate 
him'; this emotional reaction will be in accordance with our sense of 
justice, if, of course, we are ready to accept the possibility set forth 
by the  rhetor.  The second possible reason thus  transforms  Helen 
from  a  notorious  trouble-maker  into  a  sufferer.  The  following 
reason,  namely  "\6yo~,  is  hardly  less  violent.  Violent compulsion 
colours the whole attempt of  Helen's exculpation. 
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Et  oe  Ao')'os ••• a.mI:rllous: the third possibility; 'if  logos persuaded and 
deceived the soul'. G.'s speech becomes now impersonal (no doubt 
G. still defends Helen, but he deliberately avoids using the pronouns 
of  the preceding paragraph referring to Paris and Helen, and Helen's 
name is  hardly mentioned in 8-14; notice that where passive voice 
predominates in 7, the opening lines of 8 place the emphasis on the 
active  logos).  The theorisation  about  "\6yo~ has just commenced. 
AO')'OS:  a  polysemous  word  (see  LSJ),  as  can  be  attested  even 
through a rough examination of its occurrences in He!.  It would be 
convenient  to  render  the  word  as  'speech',  for  logos  is  still 
unspecified here,  it is  speech in  general.  1TELOUS  KUI.  -rTJv  ~~v 
a.=-nlous: cpo  12 ;\6yo~ yap  r/roxilv  0 rrEl.au<;,  a context that makes it 
clear that persuasion is a violent power with effects similar to that of 
divine will and natural violence. In this relation Wardy (1996, p.35) 
is  acute  in saying that "A conventional piece of forensic  rhetoric 
would plead compulsion on Helen's behalf; if  she were forced to go 
with Paris, she deserves to be exonerated, maybe even pitied. What 
151 one therefore  anticipates  is  an argument that she did not yield to 
persuasion.  Then  standard  polar  opposition  between  force  and 
persuasion entails that succumbing to  a merely verbal seduction is 
altogether blameworthy. Instead  ...  he [G.] unnervingly collapses the 
polarity".  Persuasion  will  be  examined  in  12-14  (on  7TEL8w  see 
comments  on  12).  Verdenius  (1981,  p.12S)  has  claimed  that  G. 
identifies  persuasion  with  deception;  this  is  not  true.  From  the 
discussion of persuasive  t\6yoS'  that follows,  it emerges  that t\6yoS' 
might be deceptive on some conditions only. It is equally wrong to 
ascribe to  G.  theories of deception, because they are unjustified and 
unsupported  from  other  evidence.  Kerferd's  view  (1981,  p.81-2) 
that, for G., t\6yoS' is always deceptive because human knowledge is 
incomplete is  a dangerous  use of evidence  from  ONE.  The same 
holds for Rosenmeyer's view that the Gorgian concept of deception 
lies  in  the  fact  that  speech  is  not  representational.  In  fact, 
Rosenmeyer's  analysis  illustrates  the  unjustified,  modem 
systematisation of  G.'  s views on apate, when he maintains that, "the 
term apate became prominent in the vocabulary of G.  because he 
placed a positive accent upon what prior to him had been regarded 
as a negative situation: the frequent discrepancy between words and 
things" (Rosenmeyer 1955, p.232). The word d7TG.T7J  is not frequent 
in G.' s vocabulary (in Hel.  it occurs twice:  8,  and 11  d7TG.T7JP-7"U,  in 
Pal.  once  33).  Much has  been said about fr.23  in relation to  G.'s 
'theory of deception'  as  well (see  for instance Untersteiner 1961, 
p.98), a fragment preserved by Ploutarkhos, where G. is said to have 
claimed that in tragedy, 'he who has deceived is  more just than he 
who has not and he who has been deceived is wiser than he who has 
not been deceived'. This fragment may clearly be used as  evidence 
against those scholars who commit themselves to  the view that it is 
methodologically safe to use scattered evidence on G.  as the basis of 
interpretation of  his texts. Fr.23 clearly refers to  tragedy and only to 
it. If by generalising we venture to  apply it to  every kind of speech, 
then we should be ready to  accept that Paris was more just than a 
152 person who has not attempted to deceive Helen through speech (and 
in 19  every effort is made to  establish that Helen's eye -not Helen 
herself - was seduced by Paris' body), and accordingly that Helen 
became wiser after her deception by Paris. But this is obviously the 
opposite from what G:s intended us to understand. 
AO,,!OS  QUvcl.O"'M'\s ...  e"m.-reAei.;  a famous description of  '\0"105";  there is no 
doubt that '\6y05"  is  here personified.  It  clearly acquires  a physical 
substance (we may note that in Sextus' account of ONE (86) '\0"105" 
is  presented as  having  its  own ontological  independence),  for  he 
possesses a body  (uwJJ-a;  see Guthrie 1969, vol ii, p.ll1 n.2). The 
incarnation of logos is  not a  Gorgian novelty;  it is  as  old as  the 
Homeric  poems,  where  €7T€a  (words)  possess  wings  (7T"T"€po€vm), 
with  which  they  travel  from  the  speaker's  mouth.  The  word 
Dvvaa-rrys denotes the ruler, the person who concentrates power, both 
secular and divine. The super-human power of  '\0"105"  implied by the 
word  Dvvaa-rrys  is  in  harmony  with  the  nature  of the  deeds  it 
accomplishes (e€LOrara).  To the all-mightiness of  '\0"105"  is opposed 
his minute body, and this establishes a further antithesis: '\6y05" is as 
effective as natural violence, which however presupposes a physical 
superiority. The personification is  so  strong that it almost compels 
us  to  visualise  it:  a  small,  physically  unimpressive  ruler,  who  is 
paradoxically proved to be extremely threatening. Buchheim (1989, 
p.164) cites an  interesting parallel from the corpus Hippocraticum, 
where  Dvvaa-rrys  is  also  involved  in  a  rationalistic,  physical 
explanation:  miro5"  De  (sc.  <>  a.-r,p)  JJ-Eywr05"  EV  rol.G'I.  7Tam  1"WV 
1TaV1"WV  Dvvaa-rrys  EG'1"£V,  JI€P~  1>vuwv  3.  Another  interesting 
implication of the description of  '\0"105",  is  that it is  associated with 
deeds;  '\0"105"  and  epyov  are  normally construed as  two  antithetical 
notions  in  Greek literarure (see note on  1;  the  opposition between 
them  amounts  to  a  rhetorical  tapas:  it  is  impossible  to  express 
through words  the honourable deeds  of important men;  cpo  Thuc. 
2.35.1-3, Lys.  2.1-2). G.  seems to  have remarked that speech may 
have a function equivalent to that of  acts: speech acts, it does divine 
153 things. In connection to the divine accomplishments of  .\6yoS' Segal 
(1962,  p.121)  is  telling:  ''The  significance  of the  attribution  of 
divine qualities to the logos is twofold. First, it continues the line of 
poetic  tradition  (e.g.  Iliad 2.  385 ff)  which regarded the  power of 
artistic  utterance as  a divine gift  ...  The second significance .. .is the 
power thus assigned to  it and the emotion it created. The association 
of  1"'0  eeLov with sheer physical force of  irresistible intensity appears 
in the three other places in the Helen where G.  refers to  the divine" 
(namely 6,  19,20). When G.  explains the 'divine deeds' of  .\6yo5" we 
soon find out that they all are related to human emotions. 
ouva.-ro.1.  -y<lp:  a schema etymologicum; logos is  a potentate (dynas-
tes) because it has the potential (ovvu-rUI.).  Adkins (1983, p.109-10) 
observes that "etymologically speaking, a dynastes  is  simply 'one 
who  can';  and  what  G.  says  logos  can  (dynatai)  do  is 
uncontroversial and based on empirical observation.  But since the 
'for'  clause  is  an  explanation  of dynastes,  and  follows  it,  the 
incautious  reader may  suppose  that  G.  has  justified  his  use  of 
dynastes in the full sense of 'potentate'; as  the reader will certainly 
have interpreted it, since dynastes never occurs in its etymological 
sense". 
Ka.L  q,6~ov  •••  k'1TCLu~-Tlaa.I.:  at  the  beginning  of the  paragraph,  G. 
alleged: 'if it was logos that persuaded and deceived the soul'; now 
he explains what .\6yoS'  can do  in the emotional world,  and he thus 
justifies his characterisation of  .\6yo5" as ruler. The demonstration of 
the impact of  .\6yoS' upon the soul is being developed. The emotions 
invoked by the omnipotent ruler are divided in a balanced manner. 
The first two, fear and misery are negative, the second two, joy and 
sympathy, positive. It should be noticed however that at  this  stage 
'\61'05"  is  presented as  a consolatory power,  for  it  removes  fear and 
misery,  and it  instils joy and sympathy. Segal (1962,  p.124) holds 
that  '1:he  order  is  perhaps  deliberately  varied,  for  joy  and  pain 
belong together as  the passive effects,  fear  and pity as  the  active 
154 ones",  and  he  compares  the  construction  with  19:  rox:rJS 
aypevp.ueJ'{  ....  1TupauKevuLs (pp.149-50 n.97), where the two inner and 
the two outer elements also "correspond in meaning". His comment 
on  J,\eov  E1TUVfijo-Ur.  (p.126)  is  too  subtle to  be true.  Based on the 
usage of the verb  E1TUVfijo-ar.  ('to augment') Segal assumes that G. 
assigns to  the soul the existence of a certain amount of  J;\eos before 
the coming of  '\oyos to  it. But MacDowell (1982, p.36), who claims 
that  ''the  verbs  are  varied  for  the  sake of rhetorical  balance,  not 
because  of any  difference  of meaning  between  the  first  two  or 
between  the  second  two"  seems  more  realistic  to  me.  For  an 
analogous presentation of the relation between logos and emotions 
cpo Soph. 0. C.  1281-3: 'Ta.  1ToMa.  yap  'TOI.  PTJP.UT'  iJ  'Tepo/UVTa  'TT.,  /  iJ 
, A..  ~  ,  U'f'WV7]TOI.S  'TT.VU. 
AU1M'\V  d.<I>~ELV: although G.  has not mentioned poetry yet, it is not 
irrelevant to  observe that this  phrase brings  us  very close to  the 
power that Hesiod recognises in poetry (see Heath 1987, p.6). 
9 
1"UU1"a  oe .•  J)EL~w: G. devotes the passage to the demonstration of  the 
power of logos,  a demonstration which consists  in two  examples: 
the  :\0Yos  of poetry,  the  :\oyos  of incantations.  In He!.  proof-
through-examples  plays  an  important  role  ill  the  overall 
argumentation,  especially  ill  passages  where  'theorisation'  is 
employed. 
OEl.  3E  KaL..axouovm.:  an obscure construction on which both Mss 
agree;  some  emendations:  coqar.  [cELqal.]  Diels,  Ka.coqa  cELqal. 
Immisch,  coqal.  oELqal.  Sykutris.  MacDowell rightly  observes  that 
'"no explanation or emendation so far suggested is quite convincing" 
(1982, p.36). Moreover, the agreement of the Mss suggests that our 
155 efforts should be based on the text as it stands. There have been two 
discrete  manners  of interpretation:  a)  oofv  is  an  indirect  object 
governed by OE~,fa.L (Untersteiner 1961, pp.98-9); this view is weak, 
for  the  syntax:  would require  a  genitive  (a.KOVOvTWV),  whereas  the 
existing  aKOVOVC7I..  clearly serves  as  the object of the  infinitive.  b) 
80fTJ is a dative denoting the instrument (N1acDowell 1982, p.36 'by 
opinion', Kalligas  1991, p.  223  'IJ-€CTqJ  -riis  1rE1roU111O'i]S '). The latter 
is  the only possible way of explaining the function of the dative in 
this  context.  However, the meaning ('to show it by the means of 
opinion') is unclear. The difficulty is primarily because G. wishes to 
add something new, which remains unclear. In the last sentence of 8 
he says:  I will show that this  is  the case. He then goes on to  put 
forward  something programmatic,  as  is  clearly  shown by  OE~  oE. 
The following Ka.i  is an obvious indication that what follows will be 
an addition of a new element to his discourse, and it goes without 
saying that G.  intends us to become aware of it, because the whole 
construction is otherwise redundant (the example of three different 
situational contexts which prove the ability of persuasion to mould 
the  soul in  13  is introduced without any announcement;  the same 
holds for 16, where the example showing that vision affects the soul 
is there introduced with a.vTiKa.  yap). Which is then the meaning of 
this  self-referential  sentence?  One  should turn  to  the  meaning of 
80,f0..  Throughout  He!.  the  word  'opinion'  (for  the  belief /  truth 
pseudo-distinction see comments on 11)  is  attributed either to  the 
producer of a logos (not necessarily of G.  himself; see 13), or to the 
recipients of it;  we may call the first as  'active', and the second as 
'passive'  opinion  (see  also  Segal  1962,  p.l11).  In  our  context, 
according to  the syntax we have adopted earlier, it is  a form of the 
'active' opinion that we have. 'It should be proved by the means of 
doxa to  the hearers'. I suggest thus that oo';a. here is  nothing but the 
rhetor's  'opinion'.  But his  'opinion'  is  admittedly  very  different 
from any other opinion. It is not simply his own opinion; his opinion 
aspires to be uttered in a general enough manner, so  as  to  acquire a 
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indulging in anachronisms, we would happily render 80fry  with the 
word 'theory', in so  far as  this term can denote a discourse which 
tends to universality. In this light, the whole sentence may acquire a 
fresh,  interesting implication. Apart from being construed as  a self-
reference, or as  an expression of self-awareness of how the speech 
should proceed, it can also be seen as a clear indication that the view 
that Gorgian teaching of  rhetoric is based solely on model-speeches 
which should be reproduced by students of  rhetoric is too simplistic. 
If He!.  is  a  model-speech,  it  notably  encloses  some  theoretical 
prescriptions  addressed  to  his  students.  The  present  sentence, 
impersonal  as  it  may  be  taken  to  be,  can  be  read  as  advice: 
persuasion should use theorisation, because it impersonalises a case. 
The way in which this  'theorisation' proceeds (or should proceed) 
will be demonstrated in the following paragraphs. 
Ka.t  VOJ.LL~W  Ka.t  ovoJ.La.~w: a pompous introduction of the definition 
of poetry;  vop.£~w emphatically stresses what he, the speaker, thinks 
of  poetry; it introduces a convention, in the way that a law (vop.- os) 
can be considered as a convention. 
TIJv  1rot'T]O'l.v •••  ll-€'·Ypov:  a definition of poetry, which introduces the 
first example; scholars, by paying too much attention to the meaning 
of the definition, have not realised that the definition itself has  its 
own independent value. Schiappa has recently observed that "Helen 
may be our earliest example of the practice of explicating precisely 
what a particular word means in one's own discourse" (1999 p.127). 
It is the last part of Schiappa's statement that interests us  more; for 
in his "own discourse", G. wishes to show that poetry is primarily a 
kind of .\oyos-.  Metre then is  not  a determinant factor as  far  as  the 
raw material of poetry is concerned; it is simply the formal element 
that  turns  a  speech into  poetry.  That the  emphasis  is  placed here 
upon  speech  also  emerges  through  the  analogous  wording  in  the 
discussion of incantations. There, as  here,  it is  the verbal aspect of 
spells that preponderates  (8~d.  .\oywv).  At any  rate,  it is  the drastic 
157 impact of  AO')'OS upon the soul that G.  wishes to exemplify through 
the paradigms of  poetry and incantations. An unavoidable  question: 
does  the confinement of poetry to  mere metrical  speech  entail  a 
scornful view of poetry on the part of G.? Is  he deliberately - and 
this is perhaps more serious - unqderestimating poetry, so  that the 
new genre represented by him should emerge (as Dodds explicitly 
states 1959, p.325)? My view is that G.'s line of  argumentation does 
not require here  a distinction between genres  on the  basis  of the 
presence  of the  absence  of a  formal  element  such  as  metre. 
Although from  the phrase  'poetry is  speech with metre'  one may 
infer (if  metre is taken in the wider possible manner, so as to include 
poetical mannerisms in general, see Segal 1962, p.  150 n.  102, who 
allows for that possibility) that poetry is nothing more than a kind of 
speech, there can be no better demonstration of how other kinds of 
speech  can  partake  of  poetical  formalities  than  one's  own 
participation  in  the  performance  of He!.  itself  Acute,  or  even 
commonsense hearers of  He!., could hardly overlook G.'s  poetical 
style,  as  it  is  well  attested  by  later  literature  (see  Introduction; 
poetical  style  is  explained  by  Aristotle  as  an  effort  of ancient 
speakers  to  balance  the  unimportance  of the  subject-matter with 
poetical expression Rhet. 1,  1404a24-27). There can be little doubt, 
then, that G.  aspires to  invoke through his speech (or rather through 
this  form  of speech)  the  emotions  that  he  will  soon  present  as 
invoked by poetry. In Segal's words (1962, p.127) "Gorgias, in fact, 
transfers the emotive devices and effects of  poetry to his own prose, 
and in so  doing he brings within the competence of the rhetor the 
power  to  move  the  psyche  by  those  supernatural  forces  which 
Damon is said to have discerned in the rhythm and harmony of the 
formal structure of  music". It would not be surprising, though this is 
mere speculation, if some day we learned that apart from  reading 
and  commenting  on  poetry  (cp.frs.23-25),  G.,  by  practising  his 
compositional skills, composed some poetical pieces as well. 
A similar conception of poetry to the one depicted here occurs in 
Isokrates' Evagoras 10-11, where it is claimed that if  one does away 
158 with  J-LErpOV  in poetical language, then our esteem  for poetry will 
soon  be  seriously  undermined.  Another  similar  context  is  to  be 
found in Plato's Gorgias 502c5-7; there, it is  also  stressed that, if 
one strips a piece of poetic creation of melody, rhythm, and metre, 
what is left over is speech (cp. also the description of  lyric poetry in 
Rep. 398d1, and the interesting experiment performed by D. Hal. in 
De  Compo  26  on Simonides  543  PMG).  The  view  that poetry is 
merely speech wrapped with formal elements is refuted by Aristotle 
in his Poetics 1447b  13-16:  7TATJV  oL  Q.VeplIJ7TOi  yE  avVc1.7TrOVrEe;  rqJ 
J-LErpov  ro  7TOLE~V,  eAEYEL07ToLOve;,  rove;  Se  €7T07TOWVS- OVOJ-Lc1.~OV(7LV, 
OUX  We;  Kura  ri]v  J-LiJ-LTJow  7ToL7J'T'(l.e;,  aAAa  KOLVfj  KUTa  ro  J-LErpov 
7TPOOUyopEvovrEe;.  ,  on  the  count  that  although  both Homer  and 
Empedocles  composed  texts  in verse,  TOV  J-Lev  7TOL rrriJv  SiKULOV 
a7ToKuAE~V, rov  Se  </JVOWAOyOV  J-LiiAAOV  17  7TOLTJT-ryV 
It  is  also  worth  mentioning  that  several  scholars  (pohlenz, 
Rostagni and most importantly Cataudella. all cited by Untersteiner 
1954,  p.  127  n.53,  who  follows  them)  have thought that Gorgias 
does  not  refer here  to  poetry  as  a  whole,  but solely  to  tragedy 
(contra Lanata 1963  and Bona 1974). This view, which is certainly 
rooted in the  verbal similarities of the  following  lines with some 
passages of  Aristotle's Poetics (some scholars have actually thought 
that  G.  anticipates  in He!.  9  Aristotle's  theory  of Kc1.8upOLe;;  see 
comments ad loc.) is obviously wrong. First, because tragedy would 
normally be  expected to  be described  as  a  spectacle,  whereas  G. 
immediately  after  the  definition  of poetry  uses  the  participle 
aKOVOVTae;  (as  far as  I know, this conspicuous point has never been 
detected so  far).  Secondly, because in the  definition of poetry  G. 
explicitly says 'poetry as  a whole' (Ci7Tuauv),  which means poetry in 
its  entirety,  poetry  in  its  different  kinds  (cp.  PL  Ion  532c  8-9: 
7TOLTJTLKTJ  yap  7TOV  eonv  ro  OAOV).  Thirdly, because the  emotions 
invoked by poetry in the human soul, as they are described in what 
follows,  are  not  the  monopoly  of tragedy,  unless  one  considers 
superficial  word-affinities  with  the  Poetics  as  a  fum ground  for 
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tragedy, should be described as  'speech with metre', when it is well-
known that every single piece of ancient Greek poetical creation is 
metrical. The identification of G.'s general reference to poetry with 
the genre of tragedy is clearly another concomitant of the view that 
he is putting forward theories which are not otherwise discernible in 
his texts. 
One more view should be added to  what has  already been said; 
that of de Romilly (1973;  see also  Segal 1962, p.128:  "the divine 
inspiration of the  poet  ...  plays  little  part  in the  actual poiesis for 
Gorgias"). Through a thorough examination of earlier tradition, de 
Romilly  concluded  that  a  change  m  the  standpoint  from  which 
poetry  was  traditionally  viewed  IS  observable  in  He!.  More 
particularly,  she  points  out  that poetry is  depicted  in He!.  as  the 
product of  human craftsmanship (r€xV'']),  it is not inspired by divine 
powers or the  Muses.  This view has been refuted by MacDowell, 
who claims that "the inference [sc. de Romilly's] is shaky, because 
the words  EVe€O~ and r€xvu~ 10  show that, for Gorgias, a T€XV7J  is 
not  incompatible with  divine  inspiration"  (1982,  p.37).  It should 
also be noted that ,\6yoS"  is not presented as  the product of human 
skill before paragraph 11  (from this point, and until paragraph 14, 
several kinds  of speakers  emerge:  abstract reference to  those who 
persuade 11; Paris implied 12, astronomers, 'rhetors', participants in 
philosophical conflicts 13). Before 11,  it is  logos in its endogenous 
potential that is focused on. 
aKOlJOV'TUS:  poetry  is,  of  course,  m  Greek  culture  primarily 
performed and recited, not read in libraries and studies (see Gentili 
1998, pp.4-5;  cpo  PI.  Rep.  603b  7-8  7]  KUL  Kurd.  ri]v  ciKO-r,V,  7]V  8-r, 
1TO£7]a~v OV0f-La.'0f-L€V,-). The oral performance of  poetry, usually in the 
form of 'folk-songs', was still current in Greece - and elsewhere of 
course - until very recently; one may be reminded of Erotokritos, a 
composition still recited by older people in Crete. 
160 ei.<TilA8€:  throughout He!.  a common pattern is used when emotions 
are  described;  here words  penetrate  into  humans  and  they  affect 
their souls.  This  pattern,  anachronistically  speaking,  is  basically 
'behaviouristic', in the sense that the words of poetry represent a 
stimulus which bring about certain psychological reactions, which 
manifest  themselves  through  physical  "symptoms"  (shuddering, 
tears  etc.;  see  Segal  1962,  Lanata  1963  note  ad  loc.,  pp.107f., 
Mourelatos 1982, 229-230, the first to  use the term 'behavioral' in 
explaining He!.  14, although he fails to observe that the same pattern 
is  used  in  15-19).  This  'psychosomatic'  pattern  (to  indulge  in 
modem medical terminology)  also  recurs  in the discussion of the 
impact of vision upon the soul in 15-19 (see Introduction), so that 
we may safely  claim  that  it forms  the  foundation  stone  of G. 's 
'theorisation'  in Hel.  In connection with this  structure we  should 
examine the verb €lcrijAe€, in relation to other expressions describing 
the S + soul process.  In  1 °  the  incantation  'meets' or  'is unified 
with'  (au'YY~yvop.€v7J)  the  opinion  of the  soul,  in  13  persuasion 
approaches to  logos (7Tpoawuaa);  in 15  vision 'moulds' (nJ7Tou-rar,) 
the soul, in 16 vision 'proceeds', 'comes' (€AeOuaa)  presumably to 
the soul, in 17  vision 'engraves'  (€veypaz/1€v)  the images of things 
seen on what we may roughly render as  mind (<ppov7Jp.a).  As far as 
AOyoS'  is  concerned,  there  is  always  a  mobile  element  (poetry, 
incantations, persuasion) which tends to approach the soul and enter 
it,  whereas in the case of vision there is  a more static process of 
stamping.  This  is  understandable  if we  are  reminded  that  the 
flexibility of  AOY0S',  indispensable for his mobility, is guaranteed by 
G. in his definition of  AOyoS' in 8: speech is an all-mighty ruler with a 
minute,  almost  invisible body.  AOYoS'  then  enters  the  human body 
physically, carrying emotional load. 
q,PLKl1  1t'epLq,O~OS  ••• q,I.A01t'ev&rls:  notice  the  sound-play.  With  a 
construction of three nouns with three adjectives G.  brings out both 
the emotions and the physical manifestations evoked by poetry (see 
Segal  1962, p.124-25). It has been though that G.  here  anticipates 
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in this context are reminiscent of Aristotle's Poetics. In 1453b 4-5 
for instance cppiTTELV  Kat.  eAEE'iV  coexist, whereas in the 'definition' 
of tragedy  he  claims  that  Ka.eapO'LS  is  attained  through  €AEOS  and 
cpo{3os.  The superficial wording similarities being asserted, we may 
move to the examination of those who move a crucial, if dangerous 
step further.  Pohlenz (1920,  p.142-78) pointed out the affinities of 
the  description  of poetry  here  with  tragedy.  Anticipation  of the 
'Ka.eapO'Ls-theory'  by G.  is  also  accepted by Duncan (1938, p.412) 
and Nestle (1908, pp.561-62).  A clearly circular argument can be 
traced in Untersteiner (1961, p.99) when he maintains that through 
these words  it becomes  evident that "G. pensa alIa tragedia" (he 
cites  S  ss, p.85).  Wollgraff (1952, p.93  n.5)  seems to  be able  to 
reach the conclusion that Aristotle makes use of  G.'s cpo{3os  (=cppLKTJ) 
and EAEOS, and not the word 7TOeOS.  This summary of  views is enough 
to  show  the  fragility  of the  arguments  put  forward  by  scholars. 
Furthermore, they all postulate that G. is referring to tragedy, which 
as  we have shown is  shaky,  to  say the least.  Similar emotions to 
those presented here can  be invoked in human soul through other 
kinds of poetry as well. Let us compare Hel.  with Plato's Ion  535c-
d: 
The performer 
EyW  yap  o-rav  EAELVOV  -n  AEYW,  oaKpuwv  Ej1-7TLj1-7TAaV'TaL  j1-0V  ot 
OcpeaAj1-o['  (hav  'TE  cpO{3EPOV  7]  OELVOV,  OpeaL  at  'TpLXES  Za-raV'TaL  V7TO 
cpo{3ov  Kat.  T,  KapoLa  7TT]Oq.. 
Sokrates  then  asks  Ion  the  rhapsode  if he  has  realised  that  he 
provokes within the audience the same emotions; here is Ion's reply: 
The audience 
KaL  j1-aAa  KaAWs- oloa'  KaeOpW  yap  €Ka.a-rO'TE  aV'TOlJs  avw8Ev  a7TO  'TOU 
{37}j1-a'Tos  KAa.OV'Ta.S  'TE  KaL  OELVOV  Ej1-{3AE7TOV'TaS  KaL  O'Vveaj1-~ouv'Tas 
162 T07s  A€yOP.€VO~S. O€'i  yap  P.€  Kal.  aq;oop'  aVTo'is  TOV  vouv  7TpOaEX€~v' 
Ws  ecl.v  p.ev  KAaOVTas  athovs  Kae[aw,  aUTOS  y€Aaaop.a~  dpyUpwv 
>..ap.{3avwv,  ecl.v  oe  Y€>"WVTas,  aUTOS  KAavaop.a~ dpyVp~ov d7TOMVs. 
In  this  dialogue  Sokrates  talks  with  Ion  the  rhapsode  about 
poetry;  a few  lines  earlier a clear reference has  been made to  the 
contents  of  Ion's  repertory:  recitation  of  Homeric  epic  and 
explanation  of it.  There  is  nothing  then  obstructing  us  from 
contending that it is epic that may create the same emotions and the 
same  reactions.  As  Heath (1987,  p.7)  has  pointed  out,  in Hei.  9 
"there must be a tacit limitation to  the 'serious' forms, tragedy and 
epic". 
Those entertaining the hypothesis that G.  anticipates Aristotle's 
Kaeapa~s are  manifestly on the wrong, because they explain it by 
projecting on it a notion  whose meaning is  still unknown to  us: 
unfortunately,  Aristotle  never  explains  what  the  meaning  of 
Kaeapa~s is.  There is  only  one  element that both G.  and Aristotle 
have in common:  the emphasis that they lay on 'pity and fear'  as 
emotions that are distinctly engendered by tragedy (and according to 
G.  poetry in general; cpo  Russel 1981, p.23). But the emphasis laid 
on  this  pair  of emotions  (along  with  7TOeOS  q;~A.07T€Ve7JS)  is  not 
inaugurated by G. Homer is  certainly aware of the power of  poetry 
to  offer pleasure by making people  experience negative  emotions 
(cp.  Od.  15.339-400,23.301-8; see also Heath 1987, pp.11-15, esp. 
p.11, and Macleod 1982, pp.4-8). 
q,ptK'TJ  1Tepl.q,O~os: the first word literally means 'shuddering', and it 
thus denotes the external manifestation of fear (cp. Soph.  E1.  1408, 
Trach.  1044;  for  occurrences of the words of this context in prose 
cpo  Thiele  1901,  p.238).  The  adjective,  normally  attributed  to 
humans  to  denote  intense  fear,  is  attested  combined with  fear  in 
Aiskh.  Supp.  736, as  MacDowell observes  (1982, p.37;  7T€p£q;O{3ov 
p.'  EX€~ Tap{3os). 
163 EAEOS  1TOAU SaK pUS:  the  nOlID  signifies  the  emotion  of  'pity', 
'sympathy' for the sufferings of another person. In Ion 535c6  EAEOS 
also  brings  tears  (cp.  7  where  G.  invites  us  to  'sympathise'  with 
Helen). For 1TOAVOUKPVS  cpo Eur. El.126: 1TOAVOUKPVV  aooveiv. 
1To8os  <pI.A01TEvth1S:  MacDowell defines the nOlID  (folIDd  only in A, 
which is  of course  correct; X has  ~£AOS) as  "longing for a person 
absent or dead" (1982, p.37; for a longer discussion see Segal 1962, 
p.124).  For  this  function  of poetry  cf.  PI.  Phil.  48a5-6  'leis  'IE 
note  supra.  MacDowell  observes  that  the  word  is  lIDparalleled 
elsewhere before Ploutarlchos (1982, p.37). 
,  ,  ,'\  '\  ,  ,I~_" '  ,  ,  ",  "  '  th  E1T  a.J\AO'TPI.WV",,\,,v;(11:  E1TL  governs EV7VXWLS  KUL  OVa-rrPUYLULS;  e 
meaning  is  that  through  poetic  discourse  the  soul  experiences 
emotions  of its  own in the joy or the  sorrow of strangers.  Poetic 
speech thus makes us react as if  the sufferings of others are our own 
sufferings  and  more  importantly  it  forces  us  to  partake  of their 
emotional state. It  reminds us thus of  the Platonic idea of  jLE8E~LS, as 
it is presented in Ion 535c, where the rhapsode admits that when he 
recites a passage from the epics he has the feeling that he is situated 
in the place where the action recited by him takes place. We may 
also  compare  the  Republic  605d  3-5,  where  we  read:  olae'  on 
XU£POjLEV  'IE  KUt.  €VOOV7ES  ryjLfis  UV70VS  E1TOjLE8u  O'UjL1TCl.axOV7E')  KUt. 
a-rrOVoa.'OV7ES  €1TULVOUjLEV  Ws- ayu80v  1TOL7]7TJV,  OS  av  ryjLfis  0  n 
10 
a.t  'Yap  ev8EOI.  •••  'YI.Vov-ra.l.:  'divine, word-incantations, bring pleasure 
and  remove  misery';  G.  turns  to  verbal  magic.  According  to  de 
Romilly (1975, ch.1) the function of  poetry, as it is developed by G., 
is  analogous to  that of magic  and she goes  on to  suggest that "he 
was  deliberately  shifting  magic  into  something  rational"  (p.20). 
MacDowell (1982,  p.38)  claims that the "the connection between 
them [sc. poetry and magic] is somewhat overstated by de Romilly" 
164 (criticised by Wardy 1996, p. 161 n.24). It is certain that poetry and 
incantations are connected in the respect that they both exemplify 
the power of  their vehicle, that is  ,\6/,0s-;  they both affect the human 
soul, and they both are divine, as  far  as  their deeds  are concerned 
(this is guaranteed in 8 and at any rate this is G.'s demonstrandum). 
That poetry employs incantatory tropes is shown by de Romilly, but 
it is  otherwise not explained or even implied by G.,  unless we are 
ready to  commit ourselves to  de Romilly's view that G.'s style is a 
rationalised use of magical features,  serving his practical need for 
persuasiveness. This, although it is not unlikely, cannot be proved in 
any way, and it is wise to bear in mind that Plato frequently presents 
rhetoric  as  a kind of incantatatory speech (see below). Magic was 
largely used by people with the purpose of  attracting the attention of 
their beloved, or of destroying a love-affair. When compared to  the 
paradigm  of poetry,  incantations  could  have  been  closer  to  the 
knowledge  of G.'s  audience  concerning  practices  followed  by 
everyday  people.  €1Tcpa'lj  ('incantation')  belongs  to  magIc 
terminology, it denotes the 'spell', and it is Ev8eos- because it appeals 
to  divine  power  (Segal,  however,  1962,  p.128,  based  on  the 
repetition of the word r€XV7]  in 10,  13  - see notes on 9 as  well -
emphasises  the  effects  of ,\6/,os  as  a human product;  see  also  de 
Romilly (1975), but I doubt that G. denies here the divine origins of 
spells;  human  ability  to  affect  the  soul  in  the  (divine)  way  that 
incantations do  is  one thing and their divine nature quite another). 
For one more time  G.  insists on the power of speech to  act,  and 
interact with the human soul.  Incantations may be curative:  cpo  PI. 
Charm.  155e5,  auro  J.LEV  eL7]  <pUMOV  n,  €mJ,Jo-ry  O€  ns  E1TL  r0 
<papJ.LaKqJ  d7],  7}v  ei  J.LEV  ns  €1TCi·ool.  aJ.La  KaL  xp0ro  aur4), 
1TaVra1TaaI.V  vYl.a  1TOW!.  ro  <papJ.LaKOV  avev  OE  rijs- E1TqJOf]S  ouoev 
o<pe'\os  eL7]  rou  <pu'\'\ov;  opposed  to  drastic  curative  methods  in 
Soph. Aj.581-2; for their use by the Pythagoreans, cpo  58Dl,13DK. 
Affinities with He!. 's  wording,  in connection with the function  of 
incantations  see  Eur.  Hipp.  478-9  elaLv  0'  €1Tcpaal.  Kat.  '\61'01. 
165 8EAK-rr]PW~'  /  4>aVfpETa[  n  ripOE  4>a.Pf-LaKOV  voaov;  this  passage 
integrates  terminology  which  appears  in  the  final  paragraph  on 
AOYOS  (14), which explicitly brings in medicine and which largely 
draws upon what is said here. Plato uses €1Tq;O-r],  so as to describe the 
impact  of rhetoric  on  audiences;  cpo  PI.  Euthyd.  290al-5,  where 
incantations  are  classified:  some  of them  appease  the  beasts  and 
cure, whereas some others appease  (K-r]ATJa~s) and console audiences 
in  civic  congregations:  T]  f-LEv  yap  TWV  E1T(pOWV  EXEWV  TE  Kat 
4>aAayyiwv ... i]  OE  TWV  O~KaaTWV  TE  Kat.  EKKATJaWaTWV  Kat.  TWV 
aAAWV  0XAWV  K-r]ATJaLs  TE  Kat  1Tapaf-Lv8£a  TVyxa.VE~  ovaa;  SO 
Thrasymakhos is said (Phdr. 267c=B6DK) to have had the ability to 
control the emotional reactions of  audiences:  opyLaa~ TE  av  1TOAAOVS 
af-La  8E~VOS aVTJp  yeYOVE  Kat  1Ta.A~v  WPYWf-L€VO~S  E1TC;1.0WV  KTJAE7.v;  cpo 
also Xen. Mem.  2.6.12-13: aMas  OE  nvas  oIaBa  E1T(poaS;  OUK  aAA' 
7]Kovaa  f-LEV  on  [JEP~KM7S 1TOMaS  E1TiaTaTO,  as  E1T4owv  rij  1TOAE~ 
E1TO£E~  aUTTJv  4>~AE7.V  aUTOV  (on  magic  and  G.  see  Parry  1992, 
pp.151-153) 
cruyywop.E.V'T\  'Yap •••  -Mjs  E'Irq>Of}S:  'when the power of the incantation 
meets the opinion of the soul'; the incantation comes close to  the 
soul  in  a  rather  physical  manner,  as  the  participle  attests  (the 
possibility that the imagery draws upon sexual intercourse cannot be 
ruled  out).  For  ovvaf-L~S of incantation,  cpo  PI.  Charm.  15Th;  see 
Untersteiner 1954, p.128 n.60. The word is picked up in 14, as  AOYOV 
ouvaf-L~S' in an analogy with medicine. In the light of that context, 
ouvaf-L~S can denote the action,  the potency of incantations,  in the 
way that we are referring to the action or the potency of  a drug. 
E.ee.A~€: a gnomic aorist; Verdenius observes that "when Homer uses 
the  verb  8eAYE~v of human  beings,  it  refers  to  skilful  speeches 
usually consisting oflies" (1981, p.122 with examples). Note that in 
Eur. Hipp.478 we find the expression A6yo~ 8EAKTT,PWL. 
'YO'TJ'T€Lq.:  'sorcery'; we have doubtful evidence (Test.3) that G.  was 
initiated  in  the  art  of magic  by  Empedocles  (aUTOS  1TapEiTJ  TqJ 
'Ef-L1TEOOKAE7.  y07]'TEVovn). 
166 ,),O'Tl'T"EI.a.S •••  EUfY11V'Ta.I.:  a demanding construction; Segal (1962, p.112) 
takes  it with ifmx:fJs ...  a-rran7f1-a:ra.  Another line  of inquiry suggests 
that o~aaal T'€XVal.  are particular arts of  f1-aYELa and YO'TfT'ELa,  and they 
define them through speculation (i.e.  Untersteiner 1954, p.116; see 
also  p.128  n.64  'poetry  and  artistic  prose'  and  so  Lanata  1963, 
p.201; this is refuted by Bona 1974, p.20. Verdenius takes it to refer 
to  "the  art  of E"lnp06s  and  that  of the  orator"  1981,  p.122  n.37). 
MacDowell (1982, p.37) gives the most satisfactory solution: "the 
two  genitives  define  the  two  T'€XVal.:  i.e.  'there  exists  an  art  of 
sorcery and an art of  magic"'. According to this reading G. says: 'In 
addition (DE),  two arts, that of sorcery (Y07JT'ELa),  and that of magic, 
have been invented'; the rest of the construction explains the two 
arts. If  this explanation is to be accepted, the presentation of  YO'TfT'ELa 
along with f1-aYELa  may seem rather abrupt, and the information that 
two  arts  have  been  invented  may  appear  as  a  redundant  and 
incoherent insertion. But one should bear in mind that they are both 
now  elevated  to  arts,  and  that  f1-aYELa  is  an  uncommon word in 
Greek literature (this may be the first occurrence of  the word, unless 
Timotheus  51.  102)  antedates  G.  At  any  rate,  G.  says  here 
something new,  for  he  classifies both sorcery  and magic  as  arts, 
although  the  fact  that  this  is  a  novelty  is  not  prima  facie 
understandable.  This  formal  classification  is  stressed  by  owaal. 
T'€XVal.,  (which shows that these two  T'EXVal.  are distinguishable, but 
G.  does  not bother to  explain  why they are);  G.  is  fond of using 
D~aaoS', and then explaining it (cp. Pal.:  Dwawv  DE  T'OV'TWV  QVT'WV  2, 
D~a  o~aawv  Vf1-LV  €7Tl.DE£~W  T'po-rrwv  6,  o~aawv  yap  T'OVT'WV  EVEKa 
-rra.VT'ES'  -rra.vT'a  -rrpa.T'ovaal.v,  :ry  KEPDOS'  T'l.  f1-ET'l.0 VT'ES  :ry  ~77f1-£av 
cPEVYOVT'ES'  19;  Epitaphios:  Kat  owaa  aaK7}aaVT'ES'  f1-a.;tI.O"T'a  wv  OEI., 
yvwf1-7]v ... ). 
11 
oaol.  oe  o<Yous •••  -rrt..a.aa.ViES:  'how many have persuaded how many 
people ...  ', not  'all  those who  persuade  ... '.  G.,  in this  particular 
167 case, does not generalise, as some modem scholars do; it is wrong to 
see a Gorgian 'theory' of  deception everywhere, especially when G. 
makes careful announcements: some persuaders prefer falsification, 
some do not; in any case G. seeks to show that Helen was the victim 
of a  malicious  persuasion,  and  it  would  have  been  foolish  to 
emphasise the honesty of her seducer's speech (MacDowell  1982, 
note ad lac., compares the construction with Palatine Anthology 7. 
740. 6 yui~ D(T(r7]S  oaaov  €xc:r..  JJ-0PLOV  and Soph. Aj.923 OLOS"  WV  oZws-
€Xc:r..S",  to  show  that  "subtler  authors  employ  this  exclamatory 
polyptoton  ...  to express a contrast"; but it is a contrast brought out in 
Pal.  22  ...  TOWVTOS"  WV  TOLOVTOV  KUT7JYoP€ls'  a~wv yelp  KUTUJJ-u8C:LV, 
OLOS"  OLU  Aeyc:r..S",  Ws- dva~wS"  dvu~£qJ). With the repetition of  DaoS"  G. 
refers to  the-speech maker, the recipients of his  speech and to  the 
subjects of  the speech itself. 
el.  \-L€V  'Yd.p •••  ~v: <JvVOLaV>  is Reiske's satisfactory addition; A has 
0JJ-0wS"  ~v,  and X  DJJ-0WS"  wv;  in either case DJJ-0WS"  does not give an 
appropriate meaning.  G.  clearly intends to  contrast what happens 
(Tel  vvv), that is  lack of memory, judgment, and prognostication, 
with an ideal situation in which men, by possessing these qualities, 
would  not have  been the  victims  of a  false  speech.  MacDowell 
(1982,  note ad lac.)  gives the simplest and thus more economical 
solution; he takes  DJJ-0WS"  as a dittography from the preceding 0JJ-0£WS-, 
and obelises it;  0JJ-0[WS- then gives the meaning 'not with the same 
intensity'. Sauppe'  s ipraTu (after °  AOY0S")  certainly smoothens the 
meaning,  but  it  is  palaeo graphically  unjustified.  Kerferd  (1981, 
p.81), who seems to  accept 0JJ-0r..oS",  claims that "if men did possess 
knowledge,  the  logos  would  (visibly)  not  be  similar  (to  that  of 
which they possess the knowledge)". This thesis has been refuted by 
MacDowell mainly on the basis of textual points; but apart from his 
valid arguments,  one should also  add two  more:  a)  Kerferd  1981, 
pp.81-2 (for scholars before him see Untersteiner 1954, p.128 n.65) 
foists  on  G.  a  distinction  between  'opinion'  and  'knowledge' 
(Untersteiner  1954,  p.  116:  "  The  contrast  is  not,  as  usually 
168 believed, between truth and opinion ...  but rather between two ways 
of knowledge:  on the one side stands doxa ...  on the other side is 
logos"  and  ''thus  [logos]  overcoming  by  an  irrational  ct  the 
impossibility of acquiring objective knowledge ...  "), which does not 
appear in Hel.  (though it  appears  in  Pal.  i.e.  3),  and which is  a 
systematisation of scattered  evidence  (the  opposition  knowledge-
opinion is of  course traced in Plato's Republic, for which see Annas 
1981,pp.190-216, and Plato elsewhere concedes what he calls 'true 
opinions',  SagaL  aJvrf1E'!s  for  which  compare  Menon  97 e-98a).  In 
Pal.  the  distinction  merely  develops  the  argumentation  and  it  is 
intended to  question the reliability of the opponent (thus in 24 it is 
called a7TLO'"TafraTOV  7Tpayp.a),  who relies upon Saga.  Moreover, Saga 
is  presented  here  as  the  common,  not  the  only,  existing  human 
condition,  as  it is  frequently taken to  be.  b)  Kerferd (1981, p.80) 
transfers  evidence from  ONE,  where  it is  admittedly claimed that 
A.ayoS' is different from things; but conclusions based on comparisons 
of  G.'  s texts are not safe. 
When we tum to  the  actual  argument  we find  out that  G.  here 
clearly  sets  forth  the  state  of mind  of the  audiences  so  that  a 
deceptive  A.ayoS'  may  be  established.  The  potential  of logos  to 
persuade is not solely an intrinsic characteristic of it; audiences play 
an  important  role  as  well.  But  why  the  absence  of these  three 
abilities  leads  to  the  evil  of Saga  is  not  clarified.  Probably  G.'  s 
thought  is  as  simple  as  the  following:  most  people  lack  critical 
approach to  reality which is  attained through memory of events of 
the past (offering a ground of experience), ability to judge present 
conditions,  and  finally  the  possibility  to  foresee  possible 
developments  of a  certain  issue  on the  basis  of what  given  and 
present information dictates. 
a.Ma.  vUV  'YE:  MacDowell's aMG.  vvv yE, which is closer to the Mss, 
gives the exact meaning. 
EU'TrOPWS  €x.EI.:  a  further  proof that  G.  does  not  mean  that  the 
acquisition of  these qualities is unattainable. 
169 introductory sentence becomes now  'most people on most issues'; 
again G.  avoids saying everyone. The person who persuades is here 
absent, for he is the one who compels most men to resort to  06~a.. 
~v  oo~a.v: 'opinion', for which, as Segal (1962, p.ll1) remarks, no 
alternative is offered. 
o-UIJ-~OUAOV: 'counsellor'; oo~a. is almost personified. 
€lhuX£a.LS:  a lectio  recentior for  a1'1JX[a.~S",  AX;  Untersteiner (1961, 
p.102)  prefers  the  latter  reading  and  explains:  "vuol  dire  che  l' 
opinione porta a ou  'T'UX€iv,  di  modo  che  questo  ou  TUX€iv  risulta 
<Tq,a.A€POV  Ka.L  d.~€~a.LOV,  cioe  i  due  aggetivi  presentano  valore 
prolettico"; but G.'s argument is that those who employ  86~a. as  the 
product of  misjudgment provides those who employ it with tentative 
and lame success.  EU1'1JX[a.~S" has been accepted by Sykutris and most 
ofthe editors. 
o-UIJ-~OUAov  ••• 'Tt'a.PExOV"ia.L:  cpo  Isok. 8.8  aAA'  Ws- OO~7J p.ev  xpwp.€vovS", 
o  n  av  nJX1)  oe  YEV7]<TOP.EVOV,  OVTW  O~a.VO€La8a.~ 'Tt'EpL  a.UTWV. 
...  ouv 
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a.L-n.a. ••• Ex€L:  the  text  is  heavily  corrupt;  only  an  ad 
sententiam restoration is possible. G.  clearly seems to  introduce the 
subject  of persuasion,  which  according  to  him  is  as  effective  as 
natural violence and compulsion. I render this portion of the text as 
follows:  'what reason disallows  us  from  believing that Helen has 
come because of speech, equally unwillingly, as if she had violently 
been  seized?  Persuasion  makes  one  lose  one's  own  reason;  for 
although  persuasion  does  not  have  the  form  of compulsion,  it 
[persuasion]  is  as  strong  as  it  [compUlsion]  is'.  Some  points:  I 
remove vp.vovS"  and I replace it with AOYWV  because  G.  a few  lines 
later says  'if it was  speech that persuaded her. .. ', which seems  to 
expand the  analogy between persuasive speech and  compulsion.  I 
prefer oUX  EKOV<Ta.  instead of  UKOV<Ta.,  because it fits better the MSS' 
170 senseless reading UV  ou  veav  ovuav. For efrJAae7]  and v07]JLa  instead 
of  Al a De  vovS",  cpo  17 effJAauEv a  1>o{3oS"  TO  v07]JLa). 
Persuasion according to Buxton (1981, p.31; readers are referred 
to  his  detailed  discussion of peitho;  in this  context only relevant 
aspects of  it will be developed) "is a continuum within which divine 
and  secular,  erotic  and non-erotic  come together";  this  dualism is 
apparent in Hel.  (for depictions of her in  art where Peitho is  also 
present see  Shapiro  1991,  pp.190-8):  speech is  a  great ruler who 
accomplishes  divine  deeds  8,  persuasion is  equally effective with 
'compulsion',  already  personified  in  6,  where  it  is  listed  among 
other divinities, but in 13, persuasion's potential to  mould the soul 
will be exemplified through purely "secular" (to use Buxton's term) 
paradigms. 
A vital aspect of G. 's discussion of persuasion is that he equates 
it  with  violence  (fi£a  as  opposed  to  1TELeW  is  also  discussed  by 
Buxton, 1981, pp.58-62; see 0' Regan 1992, p. 14-5). This equation 
is  rather radical (but see Pindar P.4.216-9  J1-aun~  1TELeOVS",  Aiskh. 
Ag.  385  (3LiiTal.  TaAaLva  IIELew,  Eur.  Hec.816  IIELew  De  rTJv 
rupavvov  dVepW7rOLS"  J1-ov7]v),  because normally persuasion is viewed 
as  a civilized, non-violent way of trying to  make others consent to 
your intentions, whereas natural violence is  considered as  a means 
of  making  someone  follow  you  unwillingly  (see  Aristotle's 
Eth.Eud.1224a 39  1]  1TELeW  rij (3£q.  Kat  dvaYK7J  dVnT£eETaL;  notice 
that he  places  both  'violence'  and  'compulsion'  in opposition to 
'persuasion' as  G.  does). In Lysias 2.  19  it is  the decisive element 
that  illustrates  the  superiority  of men  over the  conditions  of the 
beast:  87]p£wv  J1-Ev  EPYOV  Elval.  iJ1T'  dU7]AWV  {3£q.  KpaTE£.aeaL, 
dv8pW7rOI.S"  De  1TPOa7JKELV  VOJ1-lfJ  J1-ev  opLual.  TO  D£Kawv,  AOYW  DE 
1TELuaL;  see also Isok. 3.  6, 4.  48,  15.  254;  see also PI. Kriton 4ge-
51e, Xen. i\1em.1.2.10.,  Soph. Ant. 354f. Soph. Phil. 102-3 reads:  TL 
D'  ev  36AlfJ  DE£.  J1-c1.AAOV  7}  1TE£uavT'  ayE LV;  /  ou  J1-iJ  1T£87]Tal.·  1TpOS" 
{3£av  D'  OUK  UV  Aa{3oLS", where Odysseus seems not to  recognise any 
effective  way  of  taking  Philoctetes'  bow  other  than  either 
171 persuading or forcing him to surrender it. Herodotos brings evidence 
that  when  the  Andrians  refused  to  contribute  money  to  the 
Athenians during the Persian Wars, Themistokles claimed wS'  7]KOLEV 
'Ae7]VUZOL  1TEP~  €WVTOVS'  EXOVTES'  ovo  eEOVS'  J1-EyaAovS',  llELew  'IE  KUI. 
'AVUYKU£ 7]V  (interestingly enough Ploutarkhos  Vito  Them.  21  has Biu 
instead of 'AvaYK7]). 
It is  clear,  I hope,  that persuasion in Hel.,  is not the  civilized, 
non-violent  and  human  canonical  persuasion.  Persuasion  through 
words can be seen as  a civilized means of making people adhere to 
one's  views  if and  only  if one  is  prepared  to  racognize  in  the 
recipients  of logoi  the  possibility  of free  will.  G.,  by  equating 
persuasion  to  avaYK7],  ultimately  rules  out  the  existence  of this 
possibility, because, as Ostwald observes, "they [sc.  avaYKuL]  exert 
compulsion only because those affected by them perceive no viable 
alternative  course  of  action  is  open  to  them"  (1988,  p.19). 
Persuasion is  an  art that 1TavTu  yap  v<p'  UVT7]  OOVAU  OL'  €KOVTWV, 
aM' ou  oLa  {3t.uS'  1TOLOZTO  (PI. Phil. 58a-b; note that the emphasis is 
not  on  oLa  {3t.uS'  through  violence,  but on the  enslavement).  The 
willingness of  the persuaded person to be persuaded can be opposed 
to  the  unwillingness  of the  victim of persuasion in Sappho  PLF 
1.18:  T£VU  07]i5TE  1TE£eW  /  .].auY7Jv  [ES'  aav  <pLAOTaTU;  T£S'  a'  IJJ  / 
tJ/a]1T<p',  aOLK7JEL;  /  KU]~  y[  ap  ui  <PEVYEL,  TUXEWS'  OLW~WL, /< ui  OE 
owpu  J1-TJ  OEKET',  aAAa  OWaEL>,  <at.  OE  I1-n  dJ£AEL.  TUXEWS'  dJLAT,aEL  / 
KOUK  EeEAOWU>.  The meaning is  that persuasion is  the only other 
power that  can be equally  effective  as  natural  violence,  not  that 
persuasion is not violent. Plato (Phlb.58a-b) admittedly corresponds 
to  what  may  be  considered  purely  Gorgian:  persuasion  has  the 
compulsive  effects  of  physical  violence.  In  Buxton's  words 
"Gorgias propounded what amounts to  the most radical confession 
of faith inpeitho known to us from Greece" (1981, p.53). 
(,  1T€l.aas  •••  1TOI.OU\-LE.VOl.s:  no  English word can accurately render the 
meaning of  1TE£eELV.  Buxton (1981, pA8) observes that "the middle 
1T€t.6o\-Lul. can usually be translated by one of  the three English words 
172 'obey', 'trust' or 'believe'. All three have in common the notion of 
acquiescence in the  will  or opinions of another.  Correspondingly, 
the  active  1TEOl.8w,  conventionally  translated  as  'persuade',  can 
perhaps best be understood as a factitive, meaning 'get (someone) to 
acquiesce  in  (some  belief or  opinion)',  or,  more  explicitly,  'get 
one's way over someone in such a way that they  1TE01.8EOoBUL'"  (see 
also MacDowell 1982, p.  39). Persuasion is  thus here presented as 
making the persuaded soul consent to  what is  said and act in the 
manner dictated by the persuader (since there is a chiasm avval.VEOUL 
- AEYO/kEVOI.S  - m8Ea8al.  - 1TOI.OV/kEVOI.S  expressing  the  standard 
antithesis between word and deeds).  ilv  E1TEOLO'EV:  G. theorises about 
A6yoS',  so  that generalisation is  necessary;  every persuaded soul is 
enslaved  and bound from  necessity.  -TtVcl.'YKaO'E:  cpo  PI.  Sph.  /kETO. 
1T€1.80Vs  dvaYKa£as. 
/)  !-LEV  ot;v  1TEOLaas ••• KaKws:  G.  reuses  the  passive/active  VOIce 
interchange: passive voice for Helen (the victim),  active voice for 
Paris  (the  wrongdoer),  which  further  stresses  the  affinities  of 
persuasion with physical violence. In this context, the subject of  the 
active verbs is  speech, whereas that of the passive voice the soul. 
Wardy (1996,  p.43,  following  Adkins:  see n.26  on p.161)  claims 
that the "  'he' and  'she' in the last sentence refer indifferently to 
logoslParis, soullHelen". This may be true, and there is nothing to 
suggest that  G.  did not  intend it to  be construed in this  manner. 
However, his  disclaimer "the deliberate feminisation of the psyche 
plays on the Greek cultural assumption that the female as such is  a 
passive  object  shaped  by  a  dominating  masculine  force.  Thus, 
perhaps,  every  male  citizen  who  yields  to  rhetorical  logos  is 
comparable to a man  ...  whose masculinity is thereby humiliated: the 
successful orator performs physical rape" is beyond my imagination, 
and does  not add much to  the interpretation.  Wardy (1996,  p.161 
n.28), in corroborating his  view,  cites Dover's statement that,  "It 
seems to  have been felt  that the boy who  yielded had assimilated 
himself to  a  hetaira" (1974,  p.2IS).  But when 1T€L8w,  G.'s actual 
173 subject,  is  brought  in we  find  out that  it  can be exercised  by a 
woman as well: "a number of scholars have persisted in identifying 
Peitho  exclusively with the  pattern:  man persuades  woman.  This 
quite simply flies  in the face of the evidence" (Buxton 1981, p.37, 
who compares a passage from Athenaios where a prostitute from the 
temple  of Aphrodite  at  Corinth  is  named Peitho),  and  concludes 
"Peitho  was  thought to  be  operative  both in  this  and  the  reverse 
pattern".  One  may  also  be  reminded  of  how  Menelaos  was 
'persuaded' not to  kill Helen, when the latter exposed her breasts. 
f,LcL'T'"!'\V:  'unjustly', 'undeservedly'. 
13 
on  8'  -TJ  1TEL6w ••• E'TU1Tc.OOa.'iO:  'that when persuasion meets  speech, 
the soul is  moulded by it ...  '; the description of the process of the 
'moulding' of soul is  once more physical (see note  on  9;  for  the 
nJ1TOS-- metaphor see  Segal  1962,  p.  142  n.44).  E71J1TWO"UTO  is  an 
aorist  of experience;  G.  frequently  uses  gnomic  aorists  in  He!., 
especially  in  passages  where  he  argues  by  using  'theoretical' 
generalisation (E1TOL7]O"uv,  €T€p!f;€  KuL  €1T€LO"€  13,  EAV1T7]O"UV .••  14). 
)(p-TJ  f,LU6ELV:  'one should  observe'  (cp.  Hdt.7.208  0  De  TOUS- €~W 
€J.Luv8UV€ ••• KuL  TO  1TA7j8os- EJ.Luv8uv€ ... ).  Dies'  addition  (p.U8€LV 
OpWIITU)  is  redundant.  G.  brings  in  three  examples  from  three 
situational  contexts:  the  discourse  of the  'astronomers',  speeches 
from  court-rooms,  philosophical  quarrels.  In  all  these  types  of 
discourse  persuasion  is  involved.  Even  'scientific'  speculation 
involves persuasion, and we are almost invited here to  be reminded 
ofParmenides' appeal to Persuasion in 2.3-4. 
1TPW'iOV  f,LEV:  introduces  the  first  example  (D€VT€POIl  De...TpLTOV 
<De»; G. always indicates the structure of  his arguments. 
f,LE'iEWpoAOywv:  'astronomers',  'physical philosophers';  though  the 
emphasis is on those who observe the universe, it may also include 
wider, interdisciplinary speculation, including physics, cosmogony, 
mathematics etc. G.  is not referring to  an activity which by his time 
174 had declined;  for,  in spite of the fact  that  Thales,  the proverbial 
astronomer (cp. AI. Clouds 180) who is said to have foreseen a solar 
eclipse (Hdt.  1.74) belongs to the early 6
th century, Anaxagoras and 
Hippias (to mention two prominent figures) developed astronomical 
theories in the second half of  the 5
th century. Aristophanes' Clouds' 
main  theme  is  modern  intellectual  activity.  Sokrates  is  there 
presented as  the head of a Thinkery CcPpovna-rf]pwv)  where several 
disciplines  are  taught,  one  of which  is  astronomy.  When  first 
Sokrates  appears in the play he pompously states that he 'observes 
the sun', and when Strepsiades asks him why he is sitting in a basket 
hanging from the ceiling he replies: OU  yap av 7TOT€  /  Eg7]iJpOV  op8ws-
Ta  fl.€TeWpa  7Tpa.Yfl.aTa  /  €l.  fl.'"  Kp€fl.a.(Jas- TO  v07Jfl.a  Kat.  r7JV  cPPOVTLoa 
(see Dover 1968, esp. pp. xxxvi-xxxvii). 
1"0.  a:m.(J1"a  Kal.  Ci3"t..a ••• E1Tot"rrav:  'they  made  that  which  is 
otherwise unbelievable and unseen visible to  the eyes of opinion'; 
the  'eye of opinion'  belongs  to  the recipients  of the  logoi  of the 
astronomers,  and  the  changeable  opinions  belong  to  themselves. 
Judging  from  the  argument  from  antinomy  in ONB  G.  must  be 
pointing  at  the  views  held  by  different  philosophers;  with  the 
development of astronomy,  a new  'theory' takes  the place of the 
prevIOUS  one.  Ci'TT'l.(J1"a  Kat  Ci3"t..a:  what  the  opinions  of the 
astronomers  refer  to;  a  passage  from  Anaxagoras'  59A42  reads: 
7j~wv  oe  Kat.  (JeATJv7JV  Kat.  mJ.vTa  Q.(JTpa  ~f.8ovs- €lvaL  Efl.mJpOVS-
(JVfl.7T€pL~7JcP8evTas- V7TO  ri]s- a1.8epos- 7T€pLcP0pas ... €lvaL  oe  rryv 
(J€~TJv7Jv  KaTW1"epW  'IOU  TJ~£ov  7T~7J(JLWT€POV  TJfl.wv.  V7T€peX€LV  oe  TOV 
7j~wv fl.€ye8€L  rryv  JI€~07TOVV7J(JOV.  TO  oe  cPWs- r7JV  (J€~TJV7JV  1'-7]  rOWV 
€X€LV,  a~~a  a7TO  'IOU  TJ~[ov  ...  None  of  the  remarks  made  by 
Anaxagoras can be ascertained through human senses; what he says 
can  only become  clear if one  is  ready  to  accept  his  rationalistic 
approach.  The  opposition  between  the  a07J~a  Kat.  a7TL(JTa  of 
intellectual rationalisation and commonsensical views is, of course, 
exploited in Aristophanes Clouds; in 376-78, for instance, Sokrates, 
the  Aristophanic  representative  of intellectualism,  'explains'  to 
Strepsiades how a thunderbolt is created: when the clouds are filled 
175 with  much  water  they  collide  with  each  other  and  burst  forth. 
Strepsiades' 'eye of  the opinion' is unskilled, and he offers his own 
explanation:  XWrav  XE~W,  KOJ-LLMj  {3povrq.,  1Ta1Ta1Ta7T7T(i.~,  6'xrrr€p 
EK€ZVaL  (when I  shit,  what a  thunderbolt, just like  they  do  391). 
<jxz.l.ve:oBal.:  'to become visible', 'make something appear'; it would 
be tempting  to  assume  that  G.  is  playing with a  second possible 
meaning of  the infinitive, since cpa£V€a8aL  can also denote the rise of 
a star (cp. Hom. n.1.477, 2.456, Od.2.1; Hes.  Works and Days 598 
€vr' av 1TpWra  cpavfj  a8Evo~'  Qp£wvos). 
'rous  cLva.YKaI.OlJs ••• cLywvas:  in this second example the agent of the 
speech  is  absent,  so  that the  meaning of the word  d.vaYKa£ou~ is 
unclear  (cp.  10  a[  yap  EVe€OI.  DLa  AOYWV  €1TI:pDal.).  Two  lines  of 
interpretation  have  been  suggested  (see  also  Buchheim  1989, 
p.169): a)  'the persuasive argumentation that compels the hearers to 
accept it' (Melikoff-Tolstoy 1929, p.28), or (b) 'argumentation used 
under compulsion'  as  opposed to  the speeches of the astronomers 
and the philosophers which are unbound from necessity (Immisch 
1927,  Sykutris  1928,  MacDowell,  1982,  pp.39-40,  Gagarin  1994, 
p.67  n.26;  Wardy  1996,  pp.162-3  thinks  that  it  affords  an 
interpretation  combining both meanings).  (b)  is  also  accepted by 
Diels  who  brings  in  Pl.17zt.172e  aUK 
,  ......  \  1"  ,., 
€YXWP€L  1T€PL  au  av 
,  e  '  , ,  ~  -LJ  "  "  "  "  "''>'  €1TL  UJ-L7]o"(JJ(]'L  rau~ /\oyau~ 1TOL€LauaL,  a/\/\  avaYK7]v  €XWV  a  aVrLoI.KO~ 
ECPEC1ITJK€V.  (a)  could be corroborated from  12, where persuasion is 
related to  compulsion; but if  we turn to Pal.  4, we find out that the 
situation in which the hero  is  entangled is  described as  1Tapov~ 
d.v6.YK7]~, that is he is under compulsion to defend himself; moreover 
DXAO~ in this context can be something more than a mere mob, since 
in Grg.  453b6, 455a4 Plato refers, not without contempt, to juries as 
DXAOI..  Both intepretations are strong enough, although (b) seems to 
me to fit the context better. 
E.LS ••• OXAOV:  a fine antithesis (cp. 4 where Helen's one body attracted 
many  male  bodies);  speech  has  the  power to  unify  people  in  a 
consent  through  pleasure.  DXAOS"  is  unjustifiably  taken  by 
176 Untersteiner (1961, note ad lac.)  to  refer to  the Eliastai (see  the 
preceding note). 
€.'Tept¥E  Kal.  E.1l'EL<TE:  cpo 5. 
TExVTJ  ypacf>eLs •••  Aex.8ELS:  Immisch wrongly adopts ETPEif;E  (see Segal 
1962,  p.149  n.  93).  The  homoeteleuton  underlines  that  T€XV7J  in 
some  cases  is  the  counterpart  of truth.  The  common  assumption 
about  G.  is  that he was  entirely uninterested in truth.  This  is  not 
correct;  what  G.  says  is  that  a  realistic  approach  to  common 
experience shows that in some cases at least the form of a speech is 
directly related to its persuasiveness (palamedes is the first obvious 
example).  At any rate,  even seen under the  light of opportunism, 
factual truth provided chiefly by witnessess is undoubtedly the most 
convincing  means  of persuasion  (see  MacDowell  1982,  pAO, 
Gagarin  1994,  p.58).  ypa<j>ELS:  when  G.  was  composing  He!., 
writing was  already used in law-court speeches'  composition (see 
Gagarin  1994,  p.60-3,  and  1997,  pA-5 and 32-4).  In Against the 
Sophists, Alkidamas openly criticises the using of writing in early 
rhetoric;  at  any  rate,  G.'s  teaching  of rhetoric  must  have  been 
considerably  enhanced  by  writing,  so  that  we  can  hardly  be 
persuaded by Aristotle's  disclosure  that  G.'s teaching  was  solely 
based on memorisation of model-speeches (see fr.14,  with notes). 
Examination  of structure  and  formal  elements,  emphasis  on  the 
arrangement of reasoning and the transition from the one argument 
to  the other, these along with other technical aspects of rhetorical 
skill must have been taught more efficiently with the use of  writing. 
<j>LAO<T6<j>wv  Mywv  cl.Jl-LAAaS:  'in  the  debates  of  philosophical 
speeches';  rfnA6aocpo<;  qualifies  A6ywv  (cp.  PI.  Phdr.257b5-6  dAA' 
CbTAw<;  7rpo<;  'EpWTU  f1-ETCl  cpLAoa6cpwv  A6ywv  TOV  {3£ov  7rOL frrUL). 
Several  scholars  have  endeavoured  to  identify  particular 
philosophers; Untersteiner (1961, p.105) follows Bux (1941, pA05) 
who  thought that G.  refers to  the Eleatics. Dies  (1913, p.205)  and 
Nestle (1940, p.326) think that G.  has in mind eristic philosophers, 
Diirnmler  (1889,  p.35)  prefers  Sokrates  himself.  But  it  is  not 
177 necessary  to  identify  any  specific  philosopher;  G.  wishes  to 
emphasise the readiness with which philosophers put one view aside 
and employ a new one in their discussions, so  as  to  fulfil the need 
for new arguments (so correctly SUss  1910, p.S4, MacDowell 1982, 
p.40). 
YVWIl-1'JS  Tci.xos:  Immisch rightly suggests that YVWfl-TJ  does not equal 
8ogu; it is the 'organ of  thought' as in Heraclitus  (1927, p.33; cpo PI. 
Lg. 672b).  YVWfl-TJ  can be construed as  the process of the production 
of a view and the view itself Flexibility in thought is  what really 
distinguishes  philosophers  from  astronomers  and  the  more  static 
speech-makers. This suggests that G. has in mind philosophical, oral 
discourse. 
,  'Q'  ,  €UIl-€Ta.t-'0I\OV ••• 1T1.CTTI.V:  the  attachment  to  a  (still-born)  VIew  IS 
changeable because of  quick thinking. The passage is reminiscent of 
Menon,  in connection to  what is  known as  'true opinion';  in that 
context 'opinions' are compared to the statues ofDaidalos (97e-98a 
KUAOV  TO  xpfJfl-a  Kat.  7TaVT'  ayaea.  €pya'oVTa~· 7TOAVV  O€  xpOVOV  OUK 
€e€AOVa~  7Tupafl-€V€~V,  aAAa.  Opa.7T€T€VOVa~  €K  rijs  ifroxjjs  rou 
aVepW7TOV).  €U\-L€Ta.~OI..OV:  a  rare  word,  which is  normally used  of 
human  character  CIsok.IS.  243,  Xen.  Hell.  2.3.92;  but  cpo  PI. 
Rep.S03c9: OUKOUV  ra.  f3€f3a~a 0.15  mura 7jeTJ  Kat.  OUK  €uf-L€raf3oAa). 
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I..0'Y0V:  the  word  is  used  twice  in  the  sentence  here  it  means 
'relation'. 'The impact of  speech upon the order of  soul is analogous 
to that of the order of drugs upon the nature of  body' (drugs / body: 
logos / soul ).  The comparison is  more complicated than it appears 
to  be;  its second element could hastily be identified with medicine, 
but  the  shadow  of magic  has  not  been  removed.  The  magical 
terminology of 10 is  largely reiterated, especially in the description 
of the  emotions  experienced by human soul  through  speech.  The 
<papf-LUKOv,  a  double-edged word,  also  attests  to  that,  since  it  can 
178 either be a medicine or a poison; the most poisonous function of 
speech is  'malicious persuasion' (1TELeOl.  nVL  Kwdj). To this respect 
l\oyoS'  also  acquires a double function:  it is both a <j;apfl-aKov  and a 
poison.  So  when Segal  claims  that  "the processes  of psyche are 
treated ...  as  being  susceptible  to  the  same  kind  of control  and 
manipulation by a rational  agent  as  the body by the drugs of the 
doctor" (1962, p.l04; see also de Romilly 1973, p.162, 1975, p.2l) 
he fails to see the other side of  the same coin. A similar view is also 
traced in Demokritos'  B31,  cited by Segal (1962,  p.l04):  laTpLKij 
1TaeWV  a<j;aLpEiTa£.. MacDowell (1982, p.40) cites Isokrates 8.39, who 
perhaps was influenced by G.:  TWV  fl-EV  1TEPI.  TO  o-wfl-a  VOOlJfl-aTWV 
1ToM.al.  8Epa1TEl.aL  Kal.  1TaVTOOa1Tal.  TOl.S'  laTpolS  EVP7JVTaL,  Tal.S'  OE 
if1vXal.S'  Tal.S'  ayvoovo-aLS'  Kal.  YEfl-Ovo-aLS'  1TOV7JpWV  €1T£.eVfl-LWV  OVOEV 
eo-nv  aNtO  <j;apfl-aKov  1Tl\ijV  l\oyoS',  see  15.  180-5.  l\oyoS'  is  still  a 
fundamental  element of psychotherapy,  and Antiphon could have 
been the first to establish a clinic: En 0' WV  1TpOS'  rij 1TOL'ljo-EL  TEXV7/l1 
al\v1T£aS'  avvEa-r7}o-aTo,  WO"1TEP  TOI.S'  VOo-OVo-LV  n  1Tapa.  TWV  laTpwv 
8  '  ~  I  'v 'e  '  v,  ,  Epa1TE£.a  V1TapXEL'  EV  n.OpLV  <p  TE  KaTaO-KEvaO-fl-EVOS'  OLK7Jfl-a  n  1Tapa 
-rTJv  ayopa.v  1TpoEypmpEv,  on  ovvaTaL  Totk  I\V1TOVfl-EVOVS'  OLa.  I\oywv 
8Epa1TEvELv,  Kal.  1TVVeav0fl-EvoS'  Ta.S'  al-r£aS'  1TapEfl-VeEI.TO  TOVS' 
Kafl-vOVTaS'.  vOfl-£~wv  OE  -rTJv  TEXV7JV  el\aTTw  i]  Kae'  aVTov  Elva  I..  €1T1. 
P7]T0PLKijv  a1TETpa1T7]  (Antiphon  A  6  DK).  The  analogy 
medicine/speech is obvious  (WcnrEP  TOI.S'  VOo-OVo-LV ... ), and it is  also 
clear that Antiphon focused on the cure of 'depressive syndromes'. 
Medicine is  also used by Plato as  the antipode of rhetoric; in Grg. 
456b  Plato has  G.  claim that rhetoric  is  superior to  any other art, 
because it is through rhetoric that he persuades the patients to accept 
the  hardships  of curative  methods  used  by  doctors.  In  465el 
Sokrates concludes that rhetoric is  for the soul what the products of 
unhealthy cookery are for the body,  and this  cookery has  already 
been  defined  as  the  opposite  of medicine,  in  the  way  that  hair-
styling should be opposed to  gymnastic ("Plato was not the first to 
draw analogies between the arts. But his conclusion stands in sharp 
179 opposition to the view of  the historical G., who claimed that rhetoric 
was  to  the  mind what medicine was  to  the  body" Dodds,  1959, 
p.227; but it escapes Dodds' attention that G.  does not speak of a 
merely  positive  contribution of 'medicine'  to  the  body;  see  also 
Phdr.  270b1ff,  17zt.167b-c; Aristotle Rhet.1355b8-14). For rhetoric 
as magic in Plato see n.  on 10, and for the psychotherapeutic power 
of  poetry 9). 
Tci.;t.V~  •• Tci.;t.S:  speech affects the 'order' of  the soul, the 'prescription' 
of  drugs affect human body (cp. PI. Pol.294e TIJv  1"OU  AVaL1"€AOUV1"OS 
1"OIS  aWfLaaL  1TOL€La8aL  1"U~LV;  see  Segal  1962,  p.141  n.  37, 
MacDowell 1982 p.40). 
ciMCL  XU!-Lous:  'humours', a plausible emendation of  cl.MaXOU (AX); a 
balanced coexistence of  the humours in the body is a presupposition 
of  health.  Ancient  medicine  accepted  the  existence  of  four 
'humours' in the body: aLfLa,  c/>M.YfLa,  and the two kinds of  XOA7}  (the 
'yellow' and the 'black' one). 
KCLI.  TO.  !-LeV •••  1TCLUEL:  cpo  Eur.  Hipp.512  our'  E1Tl.  f3Auf37J  c/>P€VWV  / 
1TaVa€L  voaov  rijao',  7]  aU  fL7J  yev7J  KaK7}. 
OUTW  KCLI.  TWV  :\o'Ywv: speech is a c/>upfLaKov;  G. is attributing to  AOYOS 
powers which are traditionally recognised as  belonging to  'drugs'. 
In  Od.  4.  220f£  Helen  mixes  wine  with  a  c/>UPfLaKov,  which  is 
v7]1T€v8es  1"'  axoAov  1"€,  KaKWV  E1Ti)':TJ80v  a1TUV1"WV,  in the way that 
AOYOS  in the present context can bring pleasure and make the hearers 
take heart.  But there are speeches that Ec/>apfLuK€VaaV  (as we would 
say in modem Greek, speech is  a  c/>UPfLaKo  and a c/>apfLuKL),  that is 
they poisoned the soul, and they killed it, that is they made lose its 
independence through charming. 
ot  !-Lev  EAu1M'jaCLv •••  KCLTE.O"M"\<YCLV:  positive and negative emotions; the 
aorists are gnomic. 
a.KOUOVTCLS:  I  suggest  a  semicolon  after  cl.KOVOV1"as;  what  follows 
should be stressed as  it brings  out the more destructive  power of 
speech, in the form of  malicious persuasion. 
180 1TEl.eOI.  'TLV1.  KaK-ij: 'with an evil persuasion'; this kind of  '\'0Y0S'  does 
not simply affect the soul in a positive or a negative manner. The 
ability of  speech to invoke emotions in the soul is a milk-and-honey 
aspect  of its  action,  when it is  compared to  the  lethal  dose  of a 
malicious  persuasion.  The power of this  kind of persuasion  as  a 
,papf.LuKov  equals  the power of the  ,papf.LUKU  used by Medea  (Eur. 
Med.1l26, 1201); in her case death is brought to  her own children, 
whereas 'malicious persuasion' kills off every soul. The acceptance 
on behalf of G.  of the existence of this  kind of persuasion is  also 
depicted  in  Plato's  Gorgias  457c,  conveyed  through  a  wrestling 
metaphor. The teaching of  rhetoric, however, is morally neutral; the 
only person to be held responsible for its misuse is the one who uses 
it  for  malicious  ends  (see Dodds  1959,  p.212).  Plato  in this  case 
certainly does justice to  G.; he certainly objects to the possibility of 
morally neutral teaching of  rhetoric, and this is exactly why he does 
not need to  misrepresent G.  'TLVI.:  it is tempting to  assume that it 
means a 'quantity' of persuasion (cp.  '\'0YLaf.L0v  TLVU  2), in the way 
that one would speak of  the 'dose' of  a ,papf.LUKov. 
k<papl1c1.KEUaaV  Kal.  k~E'Y0.ftTEuaav: 'they poison and charm the soul', 
not in the past, but achronically; Untersteiner (1961, p.107) thinks 
that Plato is parodying G. when he says that Love is D€LV(k  y07]S'  KuL 
,papf.LUK€vS'  KuL  aoqnaTIJS' (Symp.203d). 
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G.  asserts to his audience that he has completed his examination of 
speech-persuasion as a possible reason for Helen's elopement,  and 
proceeds with  the fourth possible reason,  namely love.  This fourth 
reason  corresponds  to  what  may  be  called  the  'traditional' 
mythological account;  Helen fell  in  love  with  Paris,  and for this 
reason  she  deserted  Menelaos.  By  bringing  love  into  his 
argumentation,  he integrates  in  his  speech  the  cornerstone of the 
poetical (2)  accusations against Helen.  Love,  now,  is  undoubtedly 
an  invincible deity,  and one may have thought that  G.  could argue 
181 in  the way he argues in  6; in fact he partly does so,  when in  19 he 
reminds  us  of the  divine  nature  of love  (€pwc;).  The  main 
argumentative line,  is,  however,  different:  love is elevated from an 
e.xcuse to a serious reason. This elevation is based on argumentative 
patterns which are very similar, if  not identical,  to  those employed 
in  the discussion of  speech in  8-14. Instead of  referring to  love,  G. 
refers  to  vision  (and  this  mutantis  mutandis  reminds  us  of 
Lykophron, who,  when he found it hard to praise the lyre as he was 
asked to  do, praised a star bearing the name Lyra,  cpo  83A6DK) by 
rationalising a  common  idea of Greek literature about how love 
springs  (see  Introduction).  Once  more  the  logic  of  the 
argumentation is based on analogy: ifvision affects the human soul 
in the way it is shown it does,  then Helen's falling in love with Paris 
because  of love  is  not surprising.  The  rationalistic  approach  to 
vision is built up as follows: the objects of  our vision have their own 
nature  and  vision  can  affect  our  soul  (15);  this  can  be  shown 
through the example of  frightful images perceived by soldiers in the 
battlefield (16),  and it can  also  be attested that shocking images 
lead to  madness.  Fine  arts  by contrast  contrary provide us  with 
pleasure (18); we should not then be surprised if  Helen's eye fell in 
love with Paris.  The argumentation here,  as in 8-14, relies much on 
a behavioural examination of  vision,  as  it is  mainly shown  in  the 
example  of soldiers  which,  of course,  entails  that psychological 
parameters play an important role. In short, in  15-19 G.  attempts a 
rationalisation  of  a  notoriously  irrational  emotion;  this 
rationalisation is  based on  the demonstration of  how and why love 
is an invincible power. 
-rTJv  -ri1s  AEYO!-LEV'Tls ••• aLnav:  'the  accusation  of the  impropriety 
which is  said to  have been committed'; G.'s wording belongs to  a 
cautious advocate. The name of  Helen is not mentioned; it is not the 
accusation  itself,  but  an  impropriety  which  will  be  refuted;  the 
impropriety  has  not  been  committed,  it  is  said that  it  has  been 
committed. 
182 a.  yap  0pW\LEV •••  ETUj(e:  'the objects of our vision do  not have the 
nature we want them to  have, but the one each of them happens to 
have';  the  first  step  of the  argument  is  an  axiom.  Vision  is 
dependent on the nature of the objects we see,  not on the person 
who  perceives  them through  his  senses.  Early  Greek  theories  of 
vision  fall  into  three  groups.  "According to  one  the  eye  was  the 
agent, sending out rays from its own 'fire' to the object; according 
to another it received more or less passively 'effluences' or 'images' 
directed to  it from the object; in the third, both eye and object are 
active ...  "  (Guthrie,  1969,  vol.ii, p.234).  G.  here clearly builds his 
argumentation by attributing a passive function to  the eye, without, 
of course,  putting  forward  or  being  himself committed  to  any 
'theory of vision', which would, anyway,  fall  short in the light of 
the  SUbjectivism  adopted  in  the  second  major  part  of ONE.  He 
simply wishes to reach the conclusion that Paris, as an active object 
of vision, was perceived by Helen's passive and thus irresponsible 
eye. 
oLa  oe  •••  1<J1T'OU'T'aL:  the new information is that soul is  'moulded' by 
OrpLS.  Psychological parameters of  sense-perception are thus brought 
in,  and the use of  71nrov-rUL  further attests to the analogies between 
the  discussion of love-vision and  that  of speech  (cp.13).  'T'OLS 
'T'P01T'OLS:  'the character'; the values accepted by a person, and which, 
by and large, make him behave accordingly. It is  better understood 
from  the  example  in  16,  where  it  is  claimed  that  instances  of 
deserting because of fear show the power of vision to make the soul 
adopt  manners  which normally  are  uncharacteristic  of it  (cp.  PI. 
Leg.841c5:  'n5  TE  8EO(JE{3€S  a.p.u  KuL  qnAcrnp.ov  KuL  TO  p.TJ  TWV 
(Jwp.aTWV  aMQ.  -rWV  -rp07TWV  rijs  rpvx:fjs  Ov-rWV  KUAWV  YEYOVOS  EV 
E7T/.8vp.£q.). It is hard to see if  Tp07TOS  is a synonym of  Ta~LS in 14, but 
at  any  rate  both  Ta~Ls  and  -rPWOL  of soul  are  affected  through 
emotions instilled through speech and vision respectively (cp. Segal 
1962,  p.l04 "a term  [sc.  tropoi]  which  may  itself have  physical 
connotations like the taxis of  the psyche in 14"). 
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a.unKa.  ')'ap ...  EK'1T"Aa:yEV'TES:  the  text  IS  corrupt,  but  the  general 
meaning  is  clear;  the  textual  problems  have  been  discussed  by 
Donadi, who,  however, wrongly assumes that G.  does not refer to 
real  battlefields,  but to  a  restaging  of Aiskhylos'  Seven  Against 
Thebes  in 405, which in this view serves as  a basis of dating He!. 
The argument is too fragile (see MacDowell 1982, p.41) and it has 
not been influential. Some remarks about the reading I adopt: (a)  E:1TL 
1TOA.ejJ-Lq.  ()1TA.LaeL  is  Sauppe's  good  conjecture,  for  E:1TL  1TOA.ejJ-LoL~ 
()1TA.LaeL  A,  and  €1Ti  1TOA.€jJ-L  0' 1TA.LaeL  X,  where  an  alternative 
()1TA.La7j  is brought in, perhaps as a correction. In A, the function of 
()1TA.LaeL  is  unclear; Diels-Kranz (recently Buchheim)  adopt ()1TA.La7j 
X  , but the subject of  the clause OTav ... remains unclear. (b) TOU  oe 
1Tpo{3A.T]jJ-aTa  AX,  Diels  suggests  1Tp6{3A.7]jJ-a,  presumably  because 
aA.eqL-rTJpLOv  is  singular.  However,  "since"  1Tpo{3A.T]jJ-a-ra  "unlike 
aA.eqL-rTJpLoV  is  a  noun,  there  is  no  reason to  reject  the  plural  as 
several  editiors  do"  MacDowell  (1982,  note  ad  loc.;  see  also 
Sykutris 1928, p.16 n.2). (c)  8ecLa7]TaL:  from Sauppe's eZ  8ecLa7]TaL, 
for el  8ecLaeTaL  AX; Sauppe's emendation, with the omission of  eZ, 
gIves  a  normal  temporal  clause.  MacDowell  conjectures 
E:1TL8ecL~aL, which is closer to  el  8ecLaeTaL,  but it can be the case 
that eL  in both AX is due to  the fact that the verb comes two lines 
after OTav. 
1rOAEtLLa. •••  1rOAEtLLOV ••• 1rOAep.LQ-:  a  polyptoton,  combined  with  an 
hyperbaton (1TOA.€jJ-LOV ...  KoajJ-ov),  stresses the intensity of the stimulus 
that makes an army fly. 
KOap.OV ••• aL07tpou: shields are made out of  bronze, swords and spears 
are made out of  iron (cp. PI. Lg.956a). 
'IOU  tL€v •••  1rpO~A-TJtLa.Ta.:  MacDowell  (1982,  p.4l)  compares  the 
chiasm with that in 3  TOU  jJ-€V  yevojJ-€vov ...  L1Lo~. 
184 cr.A~·r\'T-T]pl.ov:  'something that keeps  off'; it should be taken with 
KOcrp.oV,  because it is the bronze and iron weapons of the enemies 
that keep the soldiers off  them. 
1T'pO~A~p.a:rn.:  cpo  Aiskhylos'  Septem  539-40  €V  Xa;\XTJAa.TqJ  cra.K€L, 
KVKAWTqi  crwp.aTo<;  7Tpo{3A-ryp.aTL,  which also brings out that a cra.KO<;  is 
made out of  bronze. 
hapa.x~  KaL  E,..a.P~E:  the  subject  is  Otj;LS.  The  alarm  caused  in 
vision leads to the alarm of  the soul. It seems thus that mpaxf] is not 
experienced only by the human soul, but by vision too. The external 
manifestation of  this internal emotion is flight. 
<pEU')'OUcrl.V  EK1T'Aa.')'EV'TES:  the subject is  absent, but a word denoting 
'soldiers'  fits  the  sense;  MacDowell  plausibly  suggests  that 
"posssibly 7TOAAOI.  has been lost from the text by haplography before 
1T'OAAO.KLS",  Panic,  as  an  emotion  caused  in  battles,  appears  in 
Thucydides  (see  Segal  1962, p.108,  143  n.50,  de  Romilly  1988, 
pp.167-172). 
taxupa.  ')'a.p ...  etaqlKLa&r]:  AX give TJ  dA-ry8€La  rou  vap.ou,  which does 
not make sense; several emendations have been proposed: crvv-ry8€La 
Diels,  €7TLA7]8€La.  Immisch.  I  prefer MacDowell's  (1961,  p.21)  TJ 
dp.€/I'€La  which gives  good sense  with the  Mss'  €lcrwK£cr87]  (Diels 
accepts Reiske's €gwK£cr87]). The verb €lcrqJK£cr87] is also in conformity 
with the recurrent pattern of  the physical entrance of  an element into 
the soul (cp.  €lafjAe€  9,  crvYYLYVOP.€V7]  10,7Tpocrwucra  13, EAeoucra  in 
the following line; here it is fear through which the ignorance of  law 
enters the soul). 
1'OV  cr.1T'O  TIlS  otjse~: specifies the type of fear; another type of  fear is 
the one caused through poetry 9,  and generally speeches in 14. 
cr.P.Ei..llaa.L:  for AX's dcrp.€V£craL  (see Donadi (1977-78), p.58); AX's 
reading  is  absurd,  since  dcrp.€vicraL  means  'to  bring  pleasure'. 
Donadi is however ready to accept it on the basis that it refers to the 
feelings  experienced by the  audiences  of tragedies  through  their 
Ka.8apcrLS  from the emotions of fear.  But the thesis that G.  has here 
tragedy in mind has already been refuted (a further argument against 
185 it can be derived from the context of paragraph 17, where G.  says 
that he will not mention any other examples of things causing fear 
because they are the same as  those already mentioned; this clearly 
shows  that the  fear of the  soldiers  in battle is  merely one among 
other  possible  examples  demonstrating  the  potential  of vision  to 
evoke emotions in the souls). 
Ka.t.  'IOU  ci:ya.8ou ••• 'YI.VO!-LEVOU:  a symmetrical construction;  the order 
after  the  verb  is  the  same  in  both  phrases:  Object  (genitive)  + 
Prepositional Phrase (OLd. + accusative) + Participle (genitive). Apart 
from the homoeoteleuton the isocolon and the hyperbaton traced in 
both  cases  (rov  ...  KpLVOfL€VOV,  rov  YLyvOfL€1I0V),  each  partiCUlar 
syntactical  entity  contains  the  same  amount  of syllables  in both 
phrases,  and  it  is  also  worth  noticing  the  correspondence  of the 
syllables  stressed.  Moreover,  a  play  with  the  sounds  can hardly 
escape our attention. Two levels are discernible here: the public and 
the  individual  one.  The  Ka;\.ov  refers  to  the  responsibility  of the 
soldier  to  defend  the  interests  of his  city  as  it is  prescribed by 
conventional civic rules (KpLIIOfL€1I0V; for a similar use of  the verb cpo 
Soph. Aj.443-444), and as a matter of fact it is related to the honour 
with  which  the  city  should  embrace  his  individual  efforts.  The 
a.ya.86v  on the  other hand is  associated with the personal gains of 
each soldier. 
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1\0"1  OE:  'in the past'. 
Kat.  'IOU  1i'a.pOVTOC; ••• xpov<.p:  a hyperbaton which plays with the double 
meaning of the word 'TTapwv;  psychic  sanity is  present  ('TTap6I1ros-), 
until  a terrifying  vision deranges  it  Ell  rqi  'TTapovn  xpOVCfJ  (at this 
very moment). 
1i'OMOI.  oe .••  1i'EpLE1i'Eaov:  an a fortiori  arrangement of the results of 
the  following  sentence;  all the three elements  (unjustified labours, 
terrible illnesses and hard-to-cure insanity) refer to the aftermath of 
facing horrible images from the past. The observation comes from 
186 common human experience  (we all  know that many people who 
fought in both W orId Wars suffered from nightmares, and that some 
of  them ended up in clinics), but it is ingeniously integrated into the 
discussion of vision,  as  it  forms  the  climax of the description of 
negative emotions experienced because of fearful visions.  l-La:ro.(oI.S 
unlike  Immisch  and  Untersteiner I  prefer (with  MacDowell)  A's 
reading,  because  /LaTaf.o~<;  1TOVO~<; gives  a  better sense;  it means 
'aimless labour' (for a similar use cpo  PI. Tim.40d4-5 TO  A.Ey€~v av€v 
similar wording is employed in Pal.  25, where madness is  defined 
as  accomplishing  aimless  actions  (epyo~<;  emx€~p€l.V  aovvcfTo~<;, 
aav/upopOL<; ... cp. also 68C3DK: eyw ... oe  y€A.W  TOV  av8pW1Tov,  avof.7JS 
,  "-,,  'A-.  \'  '\'  ",  ye/LOVTa ..•  /L  7]O€/L~  7JS  eV€KeV  w't'e/\~  7]<;  a/\yeovTa  TOV<;  aV7]VVTOV<; 
',A  d D  21  69  '  ,,,  """  '  /LOxvOV<;,  an  em.  .  : /Lav~a  yap  Law<;  ea'TLV  V1T€P  ovva/LLV  'TL 
1TOLel.V; see Segal 1962, p.118). 
ouma:ToLS  !Lav(aLS:  it is interesting that some kinds of madness are 
regarded by G.  as  not  aVLaTo<;  (incurable),  but ovaLaTo<;  (hard to 
cure). 
ELK6vas  •••  kv€ypatjsEv: not the object of our sight itelf, but the image 
of what we saw is  engraved  on  our mind.  <ppovtl!LaTos:  different 
from 'IOU  1TapovTo<;  CPPovTJ/LaTo<;;  it is closer to zf;vxTJ in 15. kV€ypatjsEv: 
is  used  metaphorically  (engraved),  as  in  Xen.  Cyr.  3.3.52  el 
/LEA.Aova!..  To~aUTaL  oLavowL  eyypacpTJaea8aL  av8pu'moL<;  Kat  e/L/Lova 
eaea8aL). 
KaL  Tel.  !LEV  OELl-LaTouv-ra. ••• ro  AEy6!LEva:  'many of the things causing 
fear are passed over, for they are similar to those which have already 
been mentioned'; it is  reminiscent of the  TcL  /Lev  aAAa  Ka8cf1T€p •.. 
"the stock formula used in drafting amendments  .. , etc., in order to 
avoid needless repetition" (Dodds 1959, p.199). 
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tiMe:.  ll-.fJv: a new example is introduced. 
ot  l'pa4>Eis:  'painters'; painting,  as  a form  of art,  also  exemplifies 
how vision affects human souL In fact,  paintings and statues have a 
very  similar  function  with  that  of poetry,  and  generally  artistic 
speech. According to  Simonides painting is tacit poetry, and poetry 
speaking  painting  (0  .E~p.wvC87p  TTJV  P.EV  ~wypacp[av  1To[7]a~v 
atW1TWaav  1TpoaayopEvE~,  TTJv  OE  1TO[ 7]aw  ~wypacp[av  AaAovaav),  a 
statement which brings out the difference between the raw material 
of poetry and painting and the common effects they both achieve. 
Ploutarkhos, who actually preserves Simonides' remark, comments 
on it: UA7J  Kal.  Tp01TO~S P.~P.fpEWS owcpepova~, TeAos  0' dp.cpoTepo~s €V 
tmOKEtTal.  (JIOTEPOV  'Ae7]vaLO~  KaTet  1TOAEP.OV  7]  KaTa  aocpLav 
€VOO~OTEPO~  246F).  This similarity between poetry and fine  arts  is 
also traced in Plato, in his more elevated theoretical criticism of arts 
(cp. Rep.  603b  6-7  P.1.P.7]T~KT]  KUTa  TTJv  ol/nv  KaL  TTJv  dKOTJV;  Arist. 
Poet.  1447a  18-20  Wa1TEP  yap  Kal.  xpwp.aaL  Kal.  axr7p.aaL  1ToAAa 
P.Lp.ovvTa[  nVES  d1TE~Kcf.~ovTES  ••. €TEPOL  OE  oLa  TfjS  cpwvfjs ..• ). 
01UV  EK  1l'OAAWV  •••  a.1l'Ep'Ya.awVTal.:  the  mimetic  character of arts  IS 
discernible  in G.'s discussion  of fine  arts;  in the  process  of the 
production  of a  work  of painting,  the  painter  chooses  his  raw 
materials from the real world, so as to make his work as similar to it 
as possible (cp. Dissoi Logoi 3,10  €1T1.  O€  Tas  Texvas  Tpe1jJop.aL  KUI. 
Ta  TWV  1TOL7]TWV.  EV  yap  TpaY<fl001Todq.  Kal.  ~wypacpiq.  oans  Ka 
1TAELaTa  E~a1Tarij op.ow  TOtS  dA17tVOLS  1TOLewv,  OUTOS  apLaTOs).  The 
mimesis-theory  is  fully  developed  by  Plato  in  his  Republic, 
especially in books  3 and  10.  In Plato's view,  the  artist  is  twice 
removed from truth, since his work is a mimesis of the real world, 
which, of  course, is not identical with his ideal world of  Forms. The 
mimetic character of arts is also examined by Aristotle in Poetics; it 
is  the  mimetic  chracter  of works  of art  that  gives  pleasure  to 
humans,  for  p.Lp.EZafJaL  is  inherent  in  them.  Nevertheless,  in  the 
context of  Poetics d1TEpyaa[a  (the technique) is  an alternative cause 
188 of  pleasure, which occurs when  f-LLf-L7]O"IS does not offer any pleasure, 
because one has never seen before the object of  the mimesis, that is 
the model of the artistic reproduction (oux  fJ  f-LLf-L7]f-La  7TodlaE~  -ri]v 
~oov-ryv,  clMa  oLa  -ri]v  d,7TEpyaaiav  7]  -ri]v xpoav  7]  OLa  TOWV77JV  nva 
a.M.7]v  alT[av,  Arist.  Poet.  1448b18).  Moreover  OIj;L~  in Aristotle 
acquires a technical character (it denotes  'spectacle'), and it is  one 
of  the constituent elements of tragedy, but the one less peculiar to  it 
(1450b17), for a good tragedy does not need any staging or actors 
and what is more KVpWJT€pa  7TEP~  -ri]v  d,7TEpyaa[a  nuv  15Ij;EWV  ~ TOU 
Kat  aW\La:rwv:  it has been suggested (Nestle 1940, p.235) that G., in 
saying that a work of painting is  produced by the  use of several 
xpwf-LaTa  and axiJf-LaTa, has in mind the case of Zeuxis's painting of 
Helen for the temple of  Hera in Croton. According to the tradition, 
Zeuxis used as his models the most elegant parts of  the bodies of  the 
most handsome girls of  Croton (cp. Pliny NH 35,64, Cicero de Inv. 
2.1.3; cpo  also Xen. Mem.  3.10). This view cannot be proved on any 
possible  basis,  nor is  it necessary  to  assume  that  G.  has  a  real 
incident in mind, but it is a charming speculation. The basic colours 
used  in contemporary painting were four (white, black, yellow, red; 
cpo Democritos A135DK = Theophr. de Sensu 73, and the rest of  the 
colours KaTa  T7JV  TOVTWV  f-L£g~v). It is not clear if  G. refers to the four 
basic colours as  7ToAAa, but it is more likely that more than the basic 
colours  are  meant  here.  Empedocles  (B  23  DK)  describes  the 
production of  numerous elements with a painting-metaphor which is 
similar  to  G.'s  wording:  Ws- 0'  67TOTaV  ypacP€E~  d,va8-ryf-LaTa 
7TOLKI.AAwaLV  /  d,V€PE~  d,f-LcP~  T€XV~ 1mo  f-L7}TLO~  ED  oEoaw-rE,  /  OLT' 
E7TE~  ODv  f-Laplj;waL  7ToAvxpoa  cPapf-LaKa  XEpa[v, /  apf-L0v[7J  f-LE£gavTE  Ta 
f-LEV  7TA€W,  aAAa  0'  €AaaaW,  /  €K  TWV  ELoEa  7Tomv  d,ALYKW 
7TopaVvovaL,  /  O€VOpEa  TE  KTL'OVTE  Ka~  d,v€pa~  ... (for the identity of 
the four basic colours with the four basic elements of Empedocles' 
philosophy see Guthrie 1969, vol. ii, p.148). 
189 <i:rrEp'YaO"WV'Ta.L:  'to complete a work' (cp. PI. Soph. 235e1); Immisch 
(1927,  p.26)  translates  imitantur,  but  this  presses  the  point  too 
much. That G. regards the arts as  mimetic is  simply implied here, it 
is not stated explicitly. 
TEp1TOUO"t.  -M]v  0tPLV: it is interesting that, whereas AOyOS' has a psychic 
action,  painting  is  pleasurable  to  vision:  vision  and  soul  can 
experience the same emotions (notice below eeuv  ijOEI.UV  -rrupeOXEro 
rol.S'  of-Lf-LuaLv; see Segal 1962, p.106, 143 n.45). 
-Tj  TWV  aVOpLaV'TWv ••• ep.ya.aiu:  G.  brings in another kind of fine arts, 
namely sculpture. 1TOI.TJO"t.S: not poetry, but 'creation'. kp-ya.aia.:  Plato 
would  have  probably  called  it  reXY7J  XELpOUpyLKT];  it  echoes 
G.-rrEpyaawvruL. 
8ea.v:  Keil's  emendation  (accepted  by Diels)  for  the  MSS  oaov; 
Dobree  reads  voaov  (followed  by  MacDowell  1982,  p.42  who 
explains "there is  something 'wrong' with one's eyes, because one 
seems to see a man when one is really looking at paint or stone"), 
which is undoubtedly very close to  the MSS reading; but I prefer a 
more plain reading here. 
TEp1TELV:  I accept MacDowell's emendation (Diels proposes K7JAELV), 
since it is likely that the MSS reading (-rr08EI.V)  is due to dittography 
(1To8oS' in the following line). I also take it that ra.  f-LEv ..• ra.  oe  refers 
to  fearful  sights  (16-17)  and products of art  (18)  respectively;  G. 
nowhere seems to attribute negative emotions to the fine arts. 
1TOAAa.  oe  1TOAAOLS  1TOAAWV: a polyptoton. 
1To8ov ••• aw\-LaTwv:  Immisch  (1927,  50-1)  refers  to  the  case  of 
Pygmalion, the sculptor who  falling in love with his  own creation 
(Galateia) asked Aphrodite to  put life into it. The active relation of 
the person who has before him a piece of sculpture is paralleled to 
the state of the soul when it is affected by poetry. Poetry makes the 
soul  suffer  an  rowv  -rrae7Jf-LU  (9),  whereas  sculpure  EVEpy6.'ErUI. 
longing,  it  makes  you  feel  that  the lifeless  material which stands 
before you could be (or actually is) the obj ect of your passion. This 
is  the  climax  of G.'s  description  of the  emotional  response  to 
190 illusions:  T€pr/JI.';,  l..{rrT7j,  xap6.,  EI..€OS-.  <jJpiK7j,  <jJo{3os-,  EI..€OS-,  -ryoov-r], 
e6.paos- are all strong emotions; but nothing is like Epws-.  G. could not 
have prepared more  efficiently the  passage from  the world of the 
artistic illusion to  the particular case of Helen which follows. Now 
we know why love is a strong emotion. Helen's example will simply 
be  one  more  example  which  shows  that  love-through-vision  is 
unavoidable. 
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€t  ouv:  the  passage  to  the  particular  case  (see  below  as- El  f.LEV 
eEOS-... ,  EL  0'  €O"Tl.v ... );  it marks  the  analogical  argumentation:  if 
Helen fell  in love,  this is  nothing but another example that shows 
that vision affects us (see Sykutris 1928, p.16). 
T41  'TOU' AAE~6.vopOu  ••• -Ttaee.v:  only in texts of high-level diplomacy 
can one find such a circumspect wording: it was not Helen who saw 
Paris, but her eye (an eye can never be held responsible). It is  the 
eye which is emphasised here, because it was the function of  vision 
which was being developed  from  15  up  to  this  point.  Helen is  a 
sample  in  the  laboratory  of vision-experiments,  not  a  morally 
responsible person. And the body of Alexandros (that is Paris) can 
double the pleasure (-rya8ev) that a lifeless statue can give. 
n  6a.ull-a.a'T6v:  if this  question had been posed at the beginning of 
this text it would have seemed absurd;  after the theorisation about 
vision it is intended to be construed as a natural thing. 
6€os ••• ouva'T6s: the god is "Epws-, the winged divinity; G. reiterates the 
argumentation that he has already used in the discussion of the first 
reason  ((;  7jaawv  is  a generalisation, 'the inferior', as  is  made clear 
from  the  neuter TO  ~aaov in  6).  Different authors  attribute Love's 
parentage  to  various  divinities:  v ApTfS'  - 'A<jJpOOLT7j,  Ovpavo,-
'A<jJpOOLT7j  - OVpavo,  - TfJ.  In Plato's Symposium  203b-203d his 
birth  is  rationalised;  he  is  the  son  of JIopo,  and  JIEv[a  and  he 
becomes Aphrodite'S attendant because he was born on the day of 
her birthday. Like most (if not all of) the divinities mentioned in 6, 
191 Eros can impose his will upon both humans and gods (cp.  Hesiod 
Theog.  116-122,  Soph.  Ant. 787,  but  cpo  a.vepc/rTnvov  VOOiJp.u). 
eEO~  ••• <€x.wv>:  another polyptoton; <Wv  exeL> is Blass's emendation 
(followed  by Diels;  see  also  MacDowell  1982,  p.42,  and  1961, 
pp.121-2,  whose  conjecture  disturbs  the polyptoton). 
picks up  OVVUP.LV (cp. 8). 
8t)va'io~: 
vO<TT]t-Lu:  from this point until the end of  the paragraph everything is 
expressed  in  isocola  and  homoeoteleuta;  Untersteiner  holds  that 
"tale concezione dell' amore e  in genere estranea al popolo ellenico 
e a soi  poeti" (1961, p.119), but one of its  standard adjectives in 
lyric poetry is II.v(JLp.ell:f]s. In Soph. Antigone 790 the chorus says that 
the  person who  has  it  is  'mad'  (p.ep.7Jvev;  cpo  also  Tr.  445,  491, 
544;see Biggs 1966, 227-31), and in Plato's Symp. 207a-b we read 
Ta.  7Te~a.  KUL  Ta.  7TT7JVcL, 
~,  , 
VO(JOVVTU  Te  7TUVTU 
OLaTLeep.evu.  Prodikos  (B7DK)  contended  that  emevp.iuv  p.ev 
OL7TlI.u(JLua-8eL(Juv  epWTu  elvuL,  eparru  oe  OL7TlI.u(JLua-8evTu  p.uviuv 
yiyvea-8uL. 
~AeE  ••• :  gnomic aorist expressing a general statement about  vEpfJ.JS, 
not Helen. The pairs that follow are antithetical: ifJUx:fjs  a.ypevp.u(JLv 
and epWTos  a.VcLYKULS  are opposed to yvwp.7Js  !3ovll.evp.u(JLv and TeXV7JS 
7TUPU(JK€VULS  to  the  extent  that  the  former  are  beyond  human 
manipulation, whereas the latter are deliberate actions. 
tJsux1i~  a.YPEU t-LU01.:  'snares of the soul'; cpo  Aiskh.  Cho.998 aypevp.u 
87Jpos;  Reiske's  emendation  TUX7]S  is  not  irrelevant,  since  the 
wording throughout this paragraph picks up that of  6, but there is no 
other reason to suggest changing the MSS' reading. 
~Ot)AEUt-LU01.: cpo 6 
€PW'iO~  a.va.')'KaL~: 'compulsion oflove'.  Indulging in love is not thus 
solely  a matter of personal  ignorance  (dyvo7J/Lu),  but a  matter of 
succumbing to a super-human, uncontrolled power. 
1TapUO'KEUaL~:  'premeditation';  the  point  is  that  there  was  no 
intention, and consequently that Helen is free of responsibility. The 
192 word  has  forensic  overtones,  as  many  examples  illustrate;  cpo 
Antiphon 6.19 JL7]8'  EX  7TapaaK€vfjs  Y€V€afJaL  rov eavarov  rqJ  7TaL8£; 
in the hands of orators it becomes a tapas for the speakers to  claim 
that they have not prepared a speech, that they are a7TapaaK€VoL. 
20 
1T~ OUV  wil: Bona (1974, p.1l) rightly maintains that XPTJ  is related 
to  that in 1.  The refutation of the responsibility of Helen has  now 
been completed, and G.  is now able to  claim that it is just to  hold 
Helen as a reprehensible person. 
EL'iE  ••• :  the reasons that made Helen depart are repeated here in the 
reverse order of  that in 6. The end of  He!.  indicates that G.  intended 
his work to  be cyclical. In the beginning of his speech G.  sets out 
the task he hopes to undertake, he then argues for it and at the end of 
the  speech we find ourselves once more at the starting point (for 
ring-compisition see Groningen 1958, pp.51-56; for a discussion of 
the  use  of this  technique in a prose  author,  see  Herington  1991, 
pp.149-60). 
€7Tpa~eV a €1Tpa~e: cp.5 
1TaV'iWS: "not just 'completely', but 'in all four cases'" (MacDowell 
1982, p.43; cpo Pal. 12). 
21 
ci.CPELAOV:  the self-referential conclusion is stressed by the fact that all 
the verbs expressing what G. has done are placed at the beginning of 
the clauses (EV€JLELva,  E7TELpae7]V,  E{3oVA:f]87]v). 
'it{}  VO(.Lt.p  OV ••• AO"!OU:  X  MacDowell emends it to  T'ij  yvwJL7J  7]v,  but 
X's reading makes sense. G.  (as Bona has shown, 1974, p.12), in a 
self-referential statement (AOYCfl  refers here to this particular speech), 
claims  that  he  'stuck  to  the  conventions'  he  laid  down  at  the 
beginning  of his  speech  (the  enactment  of a  law  is  regularly 
expressed with the verb rie7]JLL  e.g. Dem. 18. 6). This convention is I 
think the programmatic announcement in 2, that the same man oUght 
193 to  say what ought to  be said,  and refute those who blame Helen. 
Untersteiner (1961, p.lll) associates the word with the rhetorical 
law "fonnulata, per Gorgia, da Plat. Phaedr., 267  A ...  e da Cicerone", 
but this  seems  very unlikely.  G.  surely refers  to  something which 
should be traced in his own speech. 
194 11 a  The Defence of  Palamedes 
I. The Myth 
Homer has nothing to tell us about Palamedes;  I the earliest source of 
information is  the Cypria,  followed by the preserved fragments of 
the  tragic  poets.  As  a  matter  of fact,  our  knowledge  is  chiefly 
formed by texts of later antiquity, which obviously involve a good 
deal  of repetition  and which occasionally  drift  into  interpretative 
approaches of  the mythological elements. 
In  this  chapter  I  shall  present  the  mam  incidents  of 
Palamedes' life,
2 that is his birth, the unmasking of  Odysseus' false-
madness and his contributions to  the Greek army, his unjust death 
and finally the manner in which his father sought to take revenge. In 
addition,  some  light  will  be  thrown  on  his  inventions,  which 
establish him as  one of the  most resourceful  (1TOPL/LOS)  heroes  of 
Greek mythology.3 
I  cpo  Arist.  Poet.1451a26;  in Phi1ostratos'  view,  had  Homer  integrated  in  his 
narration  Palamedes  he  would have  unavoidably  given  a  degrading  image  of 
Odysseus (Life of  Apollonius 4.16). 
2  The  fullest  survey  on Pa1amedes  can  be  found  in  Lyra  (1987).  A  critical 
approach to the sources has been attempted by Scodel (1980) 43-63, esp. n.7 (see 
also  Jouan 1966, pp.339-363). For the needs of the present dissertation, a linear 
narrative order will be sufficient. 
3  Stanford (1954), p.2S7  n.8  calls him "a kind of superfluous Prometheus in his 
inventiveness and a superfluous Odysseus in his prudent counsels". 
195 a)  The hero's birth 
Palamedes'  father  was  Nauplios,  the  son  of  Poseidon  and 
Amymone; 1 however, we cannot be certain about his mother, since 
according  to  Apollodoros  (Bibl.ii.1.5)  there  are  three  different 
versions:  the  tragic  poets  make Palarnedes'  mother Klymene,  the 
daughter of Katreus;  according to  the  author of the Nostoi  it was 
Philyra,  and if we adopt the  version  of Kekrops  his  mother was 
Hesione. Palarnedes' mother - whoever she was - also gave birth to 
Oiax and Nausirnedon, of  whom only the former plays an important 
role in the myth of  his brother. 
b)  Palamedes' inventions 
In  Aristophanes  Frogs  1451  Dionysos  sarcastically  compares 
Euripides to  Palamedes, the wise man, obviously with the purpose 
of mocking  him.  Apart  from  the  possibility that  this  may be  an 
allusion to Euripides' play Palamedes, the obvious point of  the joke 
is that Euripides' foolishness is opposed to the proverbial wisdom of 
Palamedes. 
If one were asked to  describe Palarnedes'  personality with one 
single  word  one  should  surely  chose  the  word  resourcefulness 
(€trTTop£a).  This  hero  should  be  considered  as  the  archetype,  the 
model of a hero who - by the means of his resourcefulness and his 
wisdom (ao~£a) - sacrifices his life for the sake of the development 
of the  community  in  which  he  belongs.  However  different  the 
inventions attributed to him, their common denominator is that they 
all contribute to the development of an already civilized community. 
As M.  Detienne has accurately pointed out "Palarnede ne se signale 
pas par la decouverte du feu,  des vetements ou de  la nourriture qui 
viendraient separer les hommes et les betes"? 
I  Virgil  Aen.2.82  says  that Palamedes  belongs  to  the  family  of BelliS  (Belidae 
nomen Palamedis), for Amymone was the daughter of Danaos, the son of Belos; 
see also Phillips 1957 p. 267-8, esp. n 4. 
2 Detienne (1986), p.1228. 
196 This  characteristic of his  inventions  is  explicitly expressed in 
G.'s text; in Pal.  30, the hero lists his inventions as  a further proof 
of  his morality and as a justification of his self-characterisation as a 
great benefactor of  the Greeks and of humanity in generaL All the 
inventions listed there - with the exception of the battle lines - are 
followed  by  a  short  comment  on  their  significance  in  the 
development of the community:  laws  are the written guardians of 
justice, letters serve as the tool of the (  collective) memory, weights 
and measures make commercial transactions easier, numbers are the 
guardians  of money,  the beacons  are  the  more  powerful and the 
fastest  messengers,  and  lastly,  games  are  the  best preoccupation 
during leisure. 
Generally the inventions of Palamedes can be sub-divided into 
the following categories: 
1.  Writing;  this  invention should be associated with the art of 
numbering! and with the board-games,
2 since in Greece the basis of 
arithmetic  is  the  knowledge  of the  alphabet  and  the  art  of the 
numbers uses the same tools as the action of  counting,
3 Palamedes is 
1 Alkidamas, Od.22, Soph. Nauplios (fr.432 Radt), adesp. 470. 
2  Sopholdes  Nauplios  (fr.429  Radt)  Kai.  7TEO'O'o.  Kai.  7TEvTaypafLfLa  Kal.  i<V{3wv 
{3oAa£,  Palamedes (fr.479 Radt) 7TEO'O'OVS  Kv{3ouS  TE,  TEp7TVOV  apy£as  aKOS;  SchoL 
Eur.  Or. 432 Kv{30US,  7TETTOVS,  Myth. Vat.35  tabulam. The difference of the games 
of  7TETTO£  from that of the  i<V{3o~ is explained by Hesylchios:  o~a</J€pE~  OE  7TETTe£a 
-rei>  t/rq</Jous  fLETaK~voiJO'L (see note in Jebb - Pearson 1917, p.85). Suidas s.v refers 
to  the  invention of these  games by Palamedes  with  the  word  Tci{3Aa.  Both the 
calculation of numbers and the games described here were based on  'fij<Po~; "En 
Grece,  Ie  calcul  se  fait  communement  avec  les  jetons,  appeles  psephoi  qui 
designent a  la fois  les cahiers de comptes, les jetons de vote, les pieces de jeux et 
encore des ossolets utilises dans des pratiques divinatoires, dans des consultations 
oraculaires" Detienne 1986, p.1129. 
3  In Plato's Phaidros  274d.  we are  told that the  Egyptian god Theuth invented 
numbers, arithmetic and geometry, astronomy and the game of draughts and dice 
and above  all letters. All these inventions are  attributed by different authors  to 
Palamedes  as  well.  That the  art of arithmetic presupposes  the  existence of the 
alphabet is  shown in Plato's Gorgias,  where  Sokrates points  out that the art of 
197 not the only mythical person considered as the inventor of  the Greek 
alphabet or the transmitter of  the Phoenician one. He is  sharing this 
invention  with  Orpheus,  Cadmus  and  Linus.  In some  versions, 
Palamedes  appears  as  the  inventor of letters;  1  from  several  other 
authors we can draw the conclusion that he was thought to be either 
the transmitter of the Phoenician alphabet,
2  or the person who was 
credited with the addition of  several letters. 
3 
ii.  The organisation of the Greek army;  the military hierarchy is 
attributed by Aiskhylos to Palamedes Cfr.l82 Radt): KuL  TugLapxuc;  t 
KuL  aTpUTapxuc;  KuL  €KUTOVTapxuc;  t  ET.agU ... The invention of the 
tactics of  the army is also important (jJ.€'YLaTOV  Elc;  7TI..EOVEKrrlJ.LUTU in 
G. 's words,  30),  since before  Palamedes'  inventions  the  soldiers 
acted like animals. 
4 
Palamedes is also said to  have invented the system of watches;5 
moreover, when the Greek army was in Aulis, and the soldiers were 
'arithmetic' uses  logos,  and Aristophanes'  Wasps  960-1:  eyw  if  e{3ouII.6p.7JV  av 
otille  ypap.p.aTa,  /  Zva  p.7J  KaKoupywV  eveypa(j/  ",plv  TOV  1I.6yov;  moreover,  the 
Scholiast on Eur.  Or.  432  says that  by inventing letters,  Palamedes made the 
distribution of  food easier. Since the computation of equal proportions of food 
should naturally be based on arithmetic, we may assume that when the Scholiast 
links  the  distribution  of food  to  the  invention  of letters  he  brings  out  the 
association of the arithmetic with the use of letters. Detienne (1986, p.  1129) says 
that  "La notation  numenque utilise  les  signes  de  l'  abecedaire:  connaitre  ses 
lettres, c' est deja savoir ses nombres. Et entre les nombres et les jeux de loisir  ... 
comrne tous les Grecs, Platon n' etablit pas une difference radicale". 
I  Stesichoros  PMG  213,  Alkidamas  Odysseus,  22,  Chrysostom  XII.21, 
Philostratos Heroicus X.I, Tzetzes Antehomenca, 320. 
2 Schoi. Eur.Or. 432. 
3 Euripides Palamedes (fr.578)  iirf>wva  Kat.  rPwVOVVTa  (]'lJMa{3a,  TE  BEL, ... ; a full 
discussion of the letters added by Palamedes can be found in Berard 1952 - 1953, 
p.76; see also Philips 1957, pp. 277-8. 
4  Dio Chrys.  13.21  links the invention of numbers to the subordination of  '~EL" 
since  until  then  the  commanders  were  not  able  to  count  their  soldiers,  as  the 
shepherds count the sheep of their flocks.  Cpo PI. Rep.522d. 
5 Sopholdes' Nauplios (fr.432 Radt; see Jebb - Pearson 1917, note ad loc., p.89), 
Schol. Eur. Or.432, Eustath. ad Il.  2.308. 
198 quarrelling about the proportions of food provided to  them, it was 
Palamedes  who  made  the  distribution  impartial  (dV€1TDI:Tf1TTOV). 1 
Sophokles
2  also credits Palamedes with the invention of the Greek 
wall. 
iii  Communication  through  signs;  cppuKTwp£a3 is  the  beacon  by 
which the  soldiers could make signals to each other. It is exactly by 
means of this invention that Nauplios avenged the death of his son, 
by drawing  the  Greek  fleet  returning  from  Troy  on the  rocks  of 
Caphereus.  In  addition,  Palamedes  taught  men  how  to  use  the 
observation of the stars for the needs of navigation and he is  also 
depicted in some sources as a connoisseur of  astronomy.4 
iv. Weights and measures; this pair is associated with numbers and 
this triad (dpLef.LoL,  f.LETpa,  crraef.La)  is probably a locus communis of 
the Greek world. 
5 
v.  It is  worth mentioning that Palamedes  was  also  considered a 
poet; in Eur. fr.588 he is called 'the nightingale of  the Muses' and in 
fr.580 he is called a friend of  music. This aspect of  his personality is 
also  reinforced by Suidas according to  which Korinnos  composed 
an  epic  poem under the  title fliad,  dealing with the Trojan War, 
which  was  still  in  progress.  This  poet  appears  as  a  student  of 
Palamedes,  who  used  the  alphabet  invented  by  his  teacher. 
I  Schol. Eur.  Or.432; Aiskhylos (Palamedes fr.182  Radt)  says  that a third meal 
was  given to  the  soldiers  a'iTOV  0' eiOEVo.L  oLciJpLao.,  /  apLaro.,  oel:1TYo.  06p7To.  e' 
o.i.peLaeo.L  TpLTo.. 
2 Nauplios (fr.432 Radt); see also my note on Pal. 12. 
3 Soph. Nauplios (fr.432 Radt) and Schol. Eur. Or.432; G. Pal.  30 and Alkidamas 
Od.22 are using the word 1TVpaoL 
4  Soph.  Naup/ios  (fr.432  Radt);  in  Phil.  Her.II.3  we  learn  that  Palamedes 
explained an eclipse; see also Jebb - Pearson, p. 89. 
5  Genzmer  1952,  p.482; Sopholdes Nauplios  (fr.432  Radt).  Eur.  Palamedes  (fr. 
578)  XP7Jf.LaTWV  f.LETpOV;  the Scholiast on Eur.Or.432 and G.  30 combine the f.LETpo. 
with  aro.8fLa,  whereas  Alkidarnas  accumulates  the  inventions  separately. 
Philostratos (Her.II.l) says that before Palamedes, ouae  VOfLLafLo.  7Jv  ouae  aro.8fLd. 
Ko.i.  {.LETpo.  ouae  dPL8f.L€l:v.  According  to  Aristoxenos  the  musician,  the  fIrst  to 
invent weights and measures was Pythagoras (fr.12 DK). 
199 Moreover,  Suidas  on  Palamedes  says  that  he  was  himself  a 
composer  of epic  poetry  (€7r07rOLOS)  and  that  his  poems  were 
destroyed by the descendants of  Agamemnon. 
c)  The Trojan Expedition and the Madness a/Odysseus 
According to Dictys (I.4), when the Greek commanders received the 
news  that  Helen  had  been  seized  by Paris,  they  were  in  Crete. 
Palamedes then took the initiative to organise the Trojan expedition 
and he suggested that some representatives should visit Odysseus in 
Ithaca and persuade him to join the Greek army. 
When the commanders arrived in Ithaca Odysseus, not willing to 
join the  Greek army,l  pretended that he was  mad.
2  There are two 
versions concerning his madness: Odysseus either yoked an ox with 
a  horse  (or  an  ass)  3  or  he  started  sowing  his  land  with  salt. 
Palamedes, unlike the other leaders, was not deceived by Odysseus 
and thus unmasked his stratagem. He threatened Odysseus that he 
would kill T  elemakhos, either with his own sword or by putting him 
in the way of the plough.4 Odysseus then admitted that he was not 
1 An explanation of  his keeping back is given by Hyg.Fab.95 si ad Troiam isset, 
post vicesimum  annum  solum  sociis  perditis  egentem  domum  redierunt.  The 
Schol.Od.24.115 says that Odysseus reluctance was not due to cowardice, but to 
his  awareness that the expedition would be hard.  His  reluctance is  hinted at in 
Aiskhylos,.Ag. 842 and Sophokles, Phil 1025 (see n.2l). 
2 This must have been the content of Sophokles' tragedy  'OovuueuS'  Ma~v6f1-evoS' 
(see  Jebb  - Pearson  1917,  p.115-ll8). Cicero  de  OffIII.26.97  claims  that  the 
madness of  Odysseus is an invention of  the tragic poets. 
3  Hyg.Fab.95, Pliny NH 35.129 a horse;  Lykophron 815  and Schol.  Lykophron 
815  an ass. Loukianos 10.30 does not specify ('TO  'TWV  lJ7re~evYf1-EvWV  a.aVf1-c/xvvov). 
It  is  striking  that  both Aiskhylos  (Ag.842)  and  Sophokles  (Phil.l025)  present 
Odysseus joining the  Greek army  ~uyeLS' exactly  as  he  yoked two  inappropriate 
animals. 
4  Apollod. £pit.III.7,  Luc.lO.30; Pliny HN XXXV  129  says that Parrhasios had 
painted in Ephesus a picture, depicting Palamedes threatening to  kill Odysseus' 
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that Odysseus never forgave Palamedes for making him desert his 
home and his beloved land for twenty years. 
d)  Palamedes' Death 
In Polygnotos' 'Nekyia' Palamedes was depicted with Thersites and 
Ajax of Salamis playing dice,  while the other Ajax was watching 
them. I  All of these heroes were some of the victims of Odysseus' 
maliciousness, but we should preferably make a distinction between 
Palamedes' case and all the other ones, since it is clear that our hero 
was the victim of a personal and abysmal hatred. As Stanford put it 
"other ruthless actions (sc. of Odysseus) ...  had at least the excuse of 
being pro bono publico".2 The cause of this particular hostility was 
of course Odysseus' resentment. But whether Odysseus' decision to 
kill  Palamedes  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  latter  unveiled  the 
pretence of the former in Ithaca or to  his resourcefulness remains 
unclear,  for some authors attribute Odysseus' plot generally to  the 
resentment caused by Palamedes' incomparable wisdom and others 
to his unmasking of Odysseus' 'madness', and as  a consequence to 
his obliging him to part from his family. 
There  are  several  different  versions  concernmg  the  plot 
employed  by  Odysseus.  The  Cypria  tell  us  that  Odysseus 
accompanied  by  Diomedes  killed  Palamedes  while  they  were 
fishing by drowning him.
3 A very cruel version is given by Dictys:4 
son (cp.  Plout.  Mor.lSa).  The plough-version  is  preserved by Hyg.Fab.95  and 
Servius ad Aen.lI.Sl. 
1 Pausanias X.31.1.  Sokrates, in Plato's Apologia 41 b 1-2  says that in Hades he 
will meet Palamedes and Ajax, the son of Telamon, who were the victims of an 
unjust verdict. 
2  1954, p.S4. 
3 Jouan (1966, n.6 p.357, with further reference on this issue) maintains that, since 
Homeric heroes did not normally eat fish,  the fact that they went out fishing is  a 
sign that there was a famine in the Greek camp. 
4 Belli Troiani lI.5. 
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had found a treasure in a well; they then asked him to go down, and 
when he reached the bottom they stoned him; this very well became 
his tomb. 
The most famous  story is  that Palamedes was  the victim of a 
stratagem conceived by Odysseus.  Hyginus says that Odysseus told 
Agamemnon that he had a dream that the camp should be moved for 
just one night. Agamemnon, following Odysseus' advice, moved the 
camp and it was then that Odysseus buried some gold in Palamedes' 
tents with a letter ostensibly sent by Priam to Palamedes, written by 
a Phrygian captive. The following day the letter and the gold were 
found  in Palamedes'  tents  and  Agamemnon  was  persuaded  that 
Palamedes intended to betray the Greeks to the Trojans.
l  The end of 
all these stories is common: Palamedes was found guilty and put to 
death.
2 
e)  The  revenge 
When Nauplios, Palamedes' father, learnt about the unjust death of 
his son he sailed out to  Troy to  obtain justice for the killing of his 
son.
3  The  Greeks  treated him  scornfully  and  he  left  unsatisfied, 
I The same account is given by Apol!. Ep. III.8; Eur. Or.432 is slightly different: 
Agamemnon  and  Diomedes  are  presented  as  accomplices,  and  the  Phrygian 
captive, after writing the letter is  killed and the task to  place the letter with gold 
under Palamedes' bed is  undertaken by a slave.  See also Phillips (1957, p.271 
n.22). 
2  This  intricate plot is  an invention of the  tragic  poets.  Polyaenus  LProhem.62 
says that this stratagem was related (g.Qovcn)  by the tragic poets. See also Koniaris 
1973 pp.8S-112, Scode! (1980), Sutton (1987). Scodel (p.140; with bibliography) 
thinks that Euripides' Palamedes was referring to  the prosecution of Anaxagoras 
and Sutton (p. 133-142) to the trial ofProtagoras. 
3 Naupliosmust have appeared in Aiskhylos' play (see Jebb-Pearson 1917,vol. ii., 
p.133, Scodel 1980, p.52 and Woodford 1994, p.165). That Nauplios went to  the 
Greek camp in Troy is  attested by Apol!. 6.8 and Scho1.Eur.Or.432. Pearson also 
suggests (1917, p.133) that Nauplios' arrival occurred in Sophokles' Palamedes 
as well. 
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1  But  how  did 
Nauplios learn about the killing of his  son?  Apollodoros and the 
Scholiast on Euripides' Orestes do not give any explanation. On the 
other hand, the Scholiast on Aristophanes' Thesmophoriazousai 771 
provides us  with the information that Euripides  in his  Palamedes 
presented  Palamedes'  brother  Oiax  writing  on  oars  what  has 
happened to his brother, in the hope that they would reach his father 
Nauplios. 
No  matter how Nauplios found out about the shameful death of 
his  son,  he  certainly  decided  to  take  revenge.  Again,  there  are 
several versions  about the manner in which Nauplios avenged the 
death of  his son. The most famous one is that when the Greek fleet 
was returning to Greece, Nauplios used false beacons so as to draw 
the  ships  onto  the  rocks  of the  extremely  dangerous  cape  of 
Caphereus in Euboia. This version can probably be traced back to 
the Nostoi and according to  Tzetzes to  a poem by Stesichoros,
2  and 
it was certainly lrnown during the fifth century. 
According to  several other sources, Oiax spread the news to the 
wives of the Greek commanders that their husbands were unfaithful 
to them and as a result they deceived them with several lovers. 
3 
1 Both Apoll.  6.8  and Schol.Eur.  Or.432 say that every man in the army agreed 
(Apoll. Xap~~op.€VWV, Schol.  Kexap~ap.€vov) with the king.  Jouan (1966, p. 353-4), 
says  that  Agamemnon  probably  did  not  allow  Oiax  to  bury  the  corpse  of 
Palamedes as he had not allowed Teukros to offer a funeral to his brother Ajax. 
2  Posthomerica 750; at any rate it is certain that the fIrst to use this story in the 5
th 
c.  BC is  Sophokles (cp.  Jebb-Pearson  1917, p.80);  in Euripides'  Helen  767 we 
read: Tcl  Nav7Tl..£ov  T' Euf30~Kcl -rrvp7TOI..7)p.aTa  (cp. also 1125f.; see Woodford 1994, 
n.29 p.166). The stratagem of Nauplios can also be found in Strab. 8.6.21, Verg. 
Aen.l1.260, Lykophron 384-386, Phil. Her.1l.15, Apoll.  6.11, Loukianos 45.46, 
Hyg. Fab.116. 
3  Clytemnestra with Aegisthus etc; see Apoll. Epit.6.9-11, Hyg. Fab.l17, Dictys 
6.2. In Euripides' Orestes 431-4 is said that Oiax persecuted Orestes so as to take 
revenge for the death of  his brother: Tive,  7TOI..LT(VV  €~a!-U)../..WvTaL  ae  yfj>; /  or~, 
TO  Tpo£a,  pIao, dvatj>epwv  7TaTpL  / avvfjKa'  llaAap.7)oov, ae TLp.wpei  <jx5vov. 
203 Nauplios  is  also  said to  have pwrished Odysseus by throwing 
Penelope  into  the  sea,  or by causing the mother of Odysseus  to 
commit  suicide,  by  spreading  the  false  news  that  Odysseus  was 
dead.! 
II. Gorgias' Defence of Palamedes and the myth 
G.  does  not  make  ample  use  of the  mythical  elements;  his  own 
method is chiefly based on a logical argumentation which develops 
with the invention of probabilities substituted for the facts  as  they 
are  known  from  the  myth.  For instance,  in the  first  part  of his 
reasoning,  instead  of trying  to  prove  that  it  was  Odysseus  who 
placed  the  gold  and  the  letter  ostensibly  written  by  Priam  in 
Palamedes'  tent,  he  presents  the  preparatory stages  of an  alleged 
treason. 
At  first  sight  the  defence  of a  mythical  person  in  the  fifth 
century,  who  as  everyone knows  has  already been condemned to 
death by mythical judges,  is  a paradoxical  composition and it is 
difficult to  find a parallel example from the literature of our times. 
How would the listeners or the readers of  The Defence of  PaZamedes 
have perceived the resuscitation of a hero defending himself in the 
first  person  and  addressing  his  opponent  in  the  second  person? 
Which was  their reaction when Palamedes states that the trial has 
nothing to do with his death, but with the manner of  his death? How 
did contemporary legal terms uttered by a mythical person sound to 
their ears? All these questions justify our description of this speech 
as a paradoxical composition. 
It  is  clear  that  two  levels  are  discernible  in  Pal.,  the  one 
contrasted with the other: the first level forms the background of  the 
speech; it is the level of the tradition. The second level is the logical 
1 Penelope: Eustath. Od.p.1422,8; Anticlea: Eustathios on 1.  202, but this is not in 
accordance with Od. 1  1.197ff. 
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fifth  century.  But  this  contrast  is  superficial,  for  however 
paradoxical the title of the speech may appear,  the argumentation 
developed in this speech does not distort the myth, not at least in the 
form(s)  preserved to  us.  G.'s persuasiveness does  not rely upon a 
selective presentation of  the mythical events; the narratio (CJLm(n~) 
is totally absent from his speech. On the contrary the basic mythical 
motifs  serve  as  a  presupposition  of our  understanding  of  his 
argumentation.  The  characterisation  of the  opponent  for  instance 
does not include any reference to his pretence of  madness in Ithaca; 
it  is  merely  based  on  the  demonstration  of  the  logical 
contradictions of  his accusation.  I 
Palamedes serves here as  a symbol: he is the best example of a 
just person who by supporting the community becomes its victim. 
Palamedes'  personality  is  the  contrasting  background,  which 
manifestly brings out the injustice of his  accusers. But the case of 
Palamedes is for an additional reason advantageous to  G.'s forensic 
skill:  the  opponent  is  the  symbol,  the  archetype  of eloquence  in 
Greek mythology? In other words, G.  - by defending Palamedes -
implies that rhetoric is not a malicious art by its nature, since one 
may use it as a 7TULYVWV so as to write an encomium for a notorious 
woman such as  Helen, but one  can  also  use it  so  as  to  defend  a 
tragic victim of a knavish plot. Moreover, he  implies that if one  -
like  himself - were  to  use  speech  effectively,  one  should  not 
abandon  oneself into  despair,  even  if his  opponent  is  a  man  as 
eloquent as Odysseus.
3 
1 Stanford 1954, p.260 n.18 says that "nothing noteworthy is said about Odysseus 
elsewhere  in  this  excessively  stylized  speech";  but  G. 's  intention  was  not  to 
compose a biography of Odysseus. 
2 See Stanford 1954, pp.71-2, p.255 n.10. 
3  Long (1982, p.238)  is  certainly right when he  points  out  that "Gorgias  could 
make the worse appear the better cause, but he could also  apply equally strong 
eloquence to  an innocent man's defence, a point often overlooked in assessments 
of the  Sophists which reflect the  bias of Plato".  Poulakos (1983),  who  read the 
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worth  making  a  distinction,  which  will  save  us  from  a  serious 
misunderstanding. The Defence of  Palamedes is in part a more fact-
bound speech than the Encomium of  Helen. This is understandable if 
we consider that in the former G.  attempts  to  acquit Palamedes of 
the charges brought against him, whereas in the latter he intends to 
offer  a  logical  interpretation of the  acts  of Helen.  I  But the  term 
'fact-bound'  when  applied  to  speeches  dealing  with  mythical 
persons is probably misleading, if we do  not make it clear that by 
using this term we do not mean the 'facts' of  the myth, but rather the 
facts  invented by G.  with the method of probabilities. Seen in this 
light, the term  'fact-bound' does not mean that G.  - who is  not 
under the same constraints as an orator like Lysias or Demosthenes 
who defend real persons - has to refer to or be conscious of  the real 
facts. It means that G., by the invention of  probable facts, intends to 
proceed with an argumentation less theoretical than the Encomium 
of  Helen,  an  argumentation that substitutes  the  'real'  facts  of the 
myth with the probable factuality of a hypothetical case of treason. 
The presentation of  the necessary stages that Palamedes should have 
employed  if he  had  wished  to  give  away  his  compatriots,  for 
instance, not preserved in any mythological narration; they are not 
'real' mythological facts, but facts  invented by G.  for the purposes 
of  his argumentation. 
The most abundant use of the mythological elements is made by 
G.  in his presentation of the inventions of Palamedes; all  this part 
(30) of the self-characterisation of the hero is intended to  show that 
the defendant was a person of  high moral standards. The inventions 
mentioned by G. have already been discussed and generally they are 
Encomium of  Helen as a metaphorical defence of rhetoric, might have found more 
explicit arguments in The Defence of  Palamedes. 
1 In He!.  5,  G.  says that Helen did what she did  (€1TP~€V a €1Tpag€v),  whereas in 
Pal.  the facts are disputed; in this respect he seems to be conscious of the (rrcz(],LC; 
theory of  Aristotle (see Introduction). 
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authors. 
It  is  also  interesting  that  some  inventions  of this  hero  are 
mentioned as  the means that he might have used, so  as  to  ferment 
treason.  In (6)  we are  told that it is  impossible to  send a message 
without the  use  of letters,  which as  we know is  one  of his  most 
important  inventions  and  in  (9)  he  concedes  that  he  might  have 
made a pledge with Priam by  obtaining an amount of  money. In (10) 
he  says  that  there  are  many  sentinels  in  the  camp,  so  that  the 
transportation of money was impossible and in (12) he holds that it 
was impossible to climb the wall of the. Greek camp, because it was 
full of  watches. The letters, the money, the system of  watches are all 
mentioned  in  30,  among  his  inventions,  and  even  the  wall, 
according to  Sophokles (fr.432 Radt) was his own invention. It is 
difficult  to  say whether G.  deliberately  used these  aspects  of the 
resourcefulness  of his  client  or not.  But even  if this  is  a  mere 
coincidence it still adds much to  the persuasiveness of this part of 
the  speech,  seeking  to  prove  that  it was  actually  impossible  for 
Palamedes to perform the actions that he was accused of. Everyone 
could  recognise  that  these  inventions  were originally intended to 
support  the  Greek  anny and  one could hardly imagine  the  great 
benefactor of Greece using his  inventions  as  a tool for  malicious 
ends. 
1 But even if some judges failed to  grasp this obvious moral 
antinomy, Palamedes, by implying that even his inventions were not 
of  much  help,  reinforces  the  argument  at  stake:  that  is  the 
impossibility of  the commission of  the actions that he is accused of. 
The most important aspect of the use of the myth is probably the 
regular  use  of the  notion  of resourcefulness  (Ev7Top£a).  This  is  a 
recurring theme in The Defence of  Palamedes, which establishes the 
tragic  profile  of the  hero.  In  the  prologue  of this  speech  the 
lOne should note that Palamedes at the end of  the recitation ofms inventions (31) 
declares that the only reason he refers to them is  to  prove that it was impossible 
for a man who engages in those tasks to perform any immoral actions. 
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find  a  way to  express  himself.  The  hero,  who  was  traditionally 
deemed as an example of  resourcefulness (who made the life of men 
-rroptj.Lov  E.g  a.-rropov  30),  is  now  found,  compelled by a  situation 
externally imposed on him, in a state of great difficulty in helping 
himself. The man who by his talented nature was the benefactor 0 f 
the  community  is  compelled  to  defend  himself  against  the 
accusations levelled by the same community. In his own words, his 
opponent accuses him of  wisdom and resourcefulness (25). Even the 
judgment is not €v-rropo~ (35), because it is not possible to reveal the 
truth  with  words  (especially  words  which  are  the  products  of a 
situation of  a.-rropia). 
G.  is  deliberately playing with the word a.-rropia;  should a man 
like Palamedes be in such a situation, then anyone within the frame 
of  the polis, whether it is a benefactor of it or not, could be found in 
his  place.  Men  involved  in  political  intrigues  - inspired  by  the 
irresistible lure of  political vainglory - always found a way into the 
arena of  politics through conspiracy and detraction. Even at the most 
humble level of personal animosity men sometimes prefer to  settle 
their disputes by mud-slinging tactics. Within a social frame where a 
man might be brought before a court of law any number of reasons 
(political antagonism is just one obvious one), everyone, even a man 
of Palamedean morality,  should, in one way or another be able to 
defend himself efficiently through words. But this is exactly what G. 
professed to do. 
III. The argumentation 
The opening paragraph of Pal.  presents the three main stages of a 
trial:  the  prosecution,  the  defence  and  finally  the  judgment  are 
presented in their natural order.  The defendant makes it clear that 
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death for all men with an open vote. As a matter of fact, the raison 
d' etre of  this speech of  defence is not merely death, but the manner 
of it, that is a DLKal.OS  or {3[al.Os  (violent) death. The overall result of 
the  opening phrases  is  two-fold:  on the  one  hand  from  the  very 
beginning of the speech the orator G.  interprets in a relativistic way 
the consequences of the charges brought against his client so  as  to 
create the frame in which he will develop his argumentation - and he 
thus indirectly underrates the power possessed by the jurors; on the 
other  the  sophist  G.  is  trying  to  remove  from  the  minds  of his 
audience the mythical account that presents Palamedes'  death as  a 
fact and he thus prepares the transition from the realm of  myth to the 
real world of  courtrooms. 
The  argumentation develops  with a disclaimer referring  to  the 
aforementioned notions of  {3£a and OLKTJ  (2); the defendant states that 
the jurors totally control {3La, whereas he rules over dike. This seems 
natural since he recognizes that the jurors have the power to  work 
their will on him (f3ovA6p.€vo~ ovv-r]CJ'€a8€), whereas his only power is 
OLKTJ, that is the knowledge of  his innocence. The power of  the jurors 
is  more  than  enough to  put him to  death;  the  knowledge  of his 
innocence is not enough at all. What he (and every man in his place) 
is compelled to do is to prove with words that he is innocent, since a 
mere statement of  innocence would hardly convince the jurors. 
The notions of knowledge (€1TLcrrap.€vos)  and opinion  (oo~a~wv) 
are presented in the following paragraph as  the only possible bases 
upon  which  Odysseus  could have  built  his  prosecution.  What  is 
surprisingly interesting is  the  fact  that G.  admits  on behalf of his 
client that, if the prosecutor had relied on opinion he would have 
been a just man, as if  he had relied on know ledge, provided that his 
motive was to  save Greece, not to  catch up  Palamedes in a web of 
contrivance.  I  say  surprisingly,  because  in  (24)  opinion  is 
emphatically described as  'the most unreliable thing'  (d-TncrrOTaTOV 
7Tpayp.a)  and a common state of the human mind  (KO~VOV  a7TaCJ'L).  Is 
209 this a real contradiction? The answer is given by G.: Odysseus does 
not rely on lmowledge because Palamedes lmows  that he has  not 
committed the crime of which he is  accused and at any rate it is 
impossible  to  have  lmowledge  of  something  that  has  never 
happened;  the only real possibility is  that the prosecutor relies  on 
opinion. But this is exactly what Palamedes has to show. 
With a string of rhetorical questions  depicting his  difficulty  in 
expressing  himself with words (4) the defendant states that he is in 
a situation of  d:rropia.;  unproved accusations lead to panic  (€K7TA7Jg~~), 
and  because  of this  embarrassing  emotional  situation  Palamedes 
faces  d7TOpia.,  a typical state of entangled tragic heroes. This tragic 
profile is reinforced by his statement that the only way to overcome 
his difficulties is to  be dictated a solution by truth and the present 
compulsion (d.v6.YK7J)  and by the fact that he (as well as the whole of 
humanity) is well aware that he is a resourceful (7TOpt.P.OS-)  person par 
ex:cellence.  But what do  the words  truth and compulsion mean in 
this  context and why are  they described as  'dangerous  teachers'? 
Truth is  the lmowledge of his  innocence,  that allowed him say -
although this is not a desirable privilege - that he rules over SiK7J; 
truth in other words is the presupposition of 8f.K7J,  that now must be 
substituted by the argumentation  (Jl.oyos-),  which will not be truth, 
that is a mere statement of  innocence, but an approximation of  truth, 
that  is  to  say  a  complicated  process  based  on  well-organised 
reasoning.  Compulsion means the limits imposed on the defendant 
and generally on a speaker by the situational context of a court of 
law. Palamedes, like innumerable other innocent men, has to defend 
his own life and his honour not by choice, but is compelled to  do  so 
(for compulsion and probabilities see Introduction). 
The keystone of G.' s argumentation  is  stated at the end of the 
prologue (5).  His  programmatic statement runs  as  follows:  if I had 
wished,  it  would have been impossible to  betray the Greeks to  the 
barbarians  (6-12)  and  if it  had  been  possible  I  would  not  have 
210 wished to  do  it (13  - 21). It is clear that the schema followed here 
consists in a combination of  opportunity and motive. 
The  discussion  of the  lack  of opportunity  is  by  its  nature 
associated with real facts. But this does not mean that G.  constructs 
his argumentation on the basis of  real facts. Palamedes is a mythical, 
not a real person. The myth provides G. with the raw material and to 
a certain extent it frees  him from  a  fact-bound  account.  In other 
words the myth gives the teacher of rhetoric a way to  demonstrate 
the effective use ofprobabilities (eLK07"a). 
This part of  Pal. is based on a model combining probabilities and 
the process of  elimination. The use of probabilities consists in the 
fact that G.  does not present real facts. By using the basic elements 
of the  mythical  account  he  offers  the  necessary  stages  usually 
employed  by  a  person  who  commits  the  crime  of treason.  The 
presentation of the sequence of the arguments and the way in which 
the coherence of the argumentation is  maintained is  perhaps more 
interesting than a detailed discussion of the stages recapitulated by 
G.  with an asyndeton in 11  ('1 met him [  sc. Priam], we negotiated, 
we  understood each other, 1 took money from  the enemies  and 1 
escaped from the watches, I hid it'). 
G.  makes  an  abundant  use  of  conditionals.  Stage  A  was 
necessary for stage B, but stage A was impossible; but even if stage 
A was possible then stage B was necessary for stage C etc. In this 
way each conditional introduces a new argument (that is a necessary 
stage) and at the same time it highlights the presumptiveness of the 
previous argument. The same schema is  used in the ONE, where G. 
argues  that a)  nothing is,  b)  if it  is,  it is  not lmowable,  c)  if it  is 
knowable,  it is  not communicable. The keyword  for  this  kind of 
argumentation is concession. 
Palamedes has shown that it was impossible to betray the Greeks 
to  the barbarians and the discussion of motives itself is  introduced 
as  a concession to  the conclusion of the  first part:  "Even if it had 
been possible for me to perform these actions had I really any good 
reason for doing itT 
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honour, security, helping friends and harming enemies, avoidance of 
a fear, or of  a labour or of  a danger. 
The main aspects of the argumentation dealing with motives are 
the  following:  a)  each motive is  treated separately, b)  the motives 
are surveyed under the prism of popular morality and c)  according 
to  G.' s typology two types of motives exist universally: the positive 
and the negative one. 
We  may start with the first aspect:  I consider that  the  motives 
presented here are conceived of (as the stages of the first part of the 
argumentation) on the basis of probabilities, in the respect that they 
are  derived from  common experience.  But each one is  dealt with 
separately since the persuasiveness of  the present argumentation lies 
in the  exhaustive accumulation of motives  gradually proved to  be 
worthless.  In addition the motives  are not mutually exclusive and 
we can hardly add any other possible motive. 
This part is apparently a survey of  popular morality that regularly 
appeals  to  traditional values.  The intention of the defendant is  to 
dispose  the judges in his  favour  by showing  them  that  he  is  a 
respectful  man.  Two  examples  will  be enough:  in  15  Palamedes 
suggests  that  one  may  claim  that  he  betrayed  Greece  with  the 
intention  of monetary  gain.  But  as  he  says  'I have  a  moderate 
amount of money, and I have no  need for much. Those who spend 
much money need much, not those who are superior to  pleasures of 
nature,  but those who  are  slaves  to  pleasures  and seek to  acquire 
honours  from  wealth and  show'. That self-restraint  is  a  common 
idea of popular morality  is  shown  by  Plato's  Gorgias  491 d9-11, 
when Socrates agrees with 'most people'  (oL  7TO;V,\O£)  that a person 
with  self-control  is  the  person  who  is  prudent  (aw<ppwv)  and 
possesses self-restraint. A number of  other texts are in support of the 
same idea. The second example is  taken from  paragraph 18, where 
Palamedes  says  "But  was  I  anxious  to  assist  friends  or  harm 
enemies? For someone might commit injustice for these  reasons." 
We have evidence from Plato's Meno71e (= fr.19; see comments ad 
212 lac.), and probably from Xenophon's Cyropaideia 1.6.31 that acting 
unjustly with  the  purpose of helping your friends  is  an idea put 
forvvard by G. 
Let us  now pass to  the third aspect; in a proverbial fashion G. 
maintains  that  human  motives  are  divided  into  two  discernible 
types: human actions are either the result of the pursuit of  gain or of 
the avoidance of  loss. Profit is elevated here to  an absolute criterion 
of  human action. Under this light, the means employed are of minor 
importance; what really matters is the attainable aim. The probative 
value of  this generalisation is obvious: Palamedes has shown that he 
had not had any motive. The only thing that he would have achieved 
ifhe had given away his compatriots to the enemy, would have been 
to harm himself His life would have been unlivable. G., instead of 
making his  client say that he  is  a just man (as  he will do  later), 
makes  him  say  why  he had no  reason  to  be lUljust.  Hence,  my 
suggestion  that  the  persuasiveness  of this  method  lies  in  the 
exhaustive  accumulation  of  motives.  Now  we  can  add  the 
theoretical generalisation, which comes as  a result of both the self-
consciousness of  the rhetor and the knowledge of  the devices of his 
art. 
The  following part of Pal.  is  an  examination of the credibility 
and the validity of the accusations. Palamedes now uses the second 
person,  adding  theatricality to  the  speech,  and he  begins  with an 
interrogation  (epcfrrryalS)  of the  prosecutor.  The  keyword  of the 
opening  paragraph  is  the  word  'worthless'  (dvC£gws-).  But  the 
characterisation of the litigant as  dva.qwS'  is not a mere description 
of his  (ethos);  in  the  case  of the  opponent,  G.  does  not  derive 
elements from  the stock of mythology (although he could do  so  as 
he  implies  in  27:  'I do  not  want  to  introduce  in  reply  the  many 
enormities, both old and new'), as  he will do  later (30) in the short 
biographical account of his client, nor does he indulge in a general 
disparagement  (oLU~oAf]). On the contrary Odysseus' ethos surfaces 
through  a  rationalistic  examination of the  groundless  basis  upon 
213 which he has based his accusations. The argumentation is twofold: 
the  defendant  first  (22-24)  is  endeavouring  to  prove  that  his 
opponent has based his accusation on an unproved  opinio~ not on 
clear lmowledge, and he then (25-27) locates contradictions of  logic 
in the argumentation of  the opponent, which prove that he is a liar. 
Two  points of the truth/opinion argumentation require scrutiny. 
Palamedes  makes  it  clear  to  Odysseus,  that  if he  really  has 
lmowledge of  the crime allegedly committed by him, this can be due 
to  three reasons: a) he was an eyewitness, b) he was an accomplice, 
or c)  he was told by an accomplice; the senses are here elevated to 
the sole vehicle permitting access  to  lmowledge;  the value of the 
triple  distinction  is  evident:  it  transforms  the  opponent  from 
prosecutor into an accomplice or a witness. Not only is Odysseus an 
unreliable  prosecutor,  but he  is  also  an  unreliable  witness.Unlike 
Odysseus,  Palamedes  is  not  able  to  produce  even  false  witness. 
Therefore, it is  evident that he does  not possess knowledge of the 
real facts and that he trusted his opinion (ooqa.).  But with regards to 
ooqa.,  no one is wiser than anyone else, since opinion is nothing but 
the common state of  the human mind. 
The contradictory nature of  the accusations and the inconsistency 
of the opponent are shown by means of a schema of logic as well; 
Palamedes  complains:  'Where you  [sc.  Odysseus]  say  that  I  am 
artful (TEX77EV-ra.)  and clever (OE!'VOV)  and resourceful  (7T6p~p.ov), you 
accuse  me  of wisdom,  and  where  you  say  that  I  was  betraying 
Greece, you accuse me of madness'. But wisdom and insanity are 
opposed to  each other and they cannot coexist in the same person. 
He  then  (26)  poses  a  question:  'do  you  think  that  wise  men are 
witless  (dvo+-ovS")  or intelligent (cpPOVLp..OVS")?'  If he thinks that they 
are witless, his argument must be merited as a novelty but refuted as 
untrue. If he thinks that they are  intelligent, then Palamedes, as  an 
intelligent person, would have never taken the risk to  endanger his 
own life and act wrongly for the sake of  precarious benefits. So ifhe 
is  to  be considered a wise man he  has  not performed the  actions 
214 accused of; ifhe had performed the actions accused of  then he is not 
a wise man: in both cases Odysseus is not telling the truth. 
In the rest of  the speech Palamedes addresses the jurors; this part 
can  be  divided  into  two  sub-units:  the  first  one  (28-33)  is  self-
referential  (to  you,  0  judges,  about  myself)  and  the  second  one 
refers to the judges (to you and about you). 
The  self-referential  account  is  a  short  autobiography  of 
Palamedes.  After a  statement  that  what he  is  about  to  say  may 
inflame the resentment of  the judges, Palamedes defines the account 
of his  own  life  that  follows  with  a  legal  term:  'For I  am  now 
undergoing  scrutiny  and  furnishing  an account  of my  past  life' 
(€u8vva~ Ka~ t\oyov  U1TExW).  €U8vva.  was the examination of a public 
official's conduct. Palamedes is  a  mythical hero, so  the content of 
his account is his previous life and achievements. The legal term is 
deliberately  chosen  by  G.,  since,  what  for  others  would  be  a 
compulsory examination, is presented here as  a discretionary option 
of the hero in order to  defend his own life. Palamedes is of course 
compelled by the present situation (d.vaYKaLOv)  to  refer to  himself, 
but it is  G.'  s own choice to  define this  presentation with  a legal 
term. 
The  self-portrait highlights  both the benefits  he  offered to  the 
community and his incomparable morality. He first claims that his 
life  is  faultless  (d.vap.cfp7IJTo~  )  and  that  he  himself  is  a  great 
benefactor  of humanity,  since  through  his  inventions  he  made 
men's  life  resourceful  (1TOpt..P.OV)  and  wellordered  (K€Koap. 7Jp.€VOV ). 
After a presentation of  his inventions (30), in an apologetic tone, he 
declares (31) that the reason why he reiterated all these benefactions 
to  the judges was  to  make it clear that a man applying himself to 
such  moral  preoccupations  is  not  to  be  considered  capable  of 
applying himself to  such immoral actions as  treason. The argument 
reminds  us  of the  one  used  by  Palamedes  when  he  proved  that 
wisdom and insanity cannot coexist in the same man. The last stroke 
of his  brush creates  the picture of his  conformity  to  morality:  he 
215 does not offend the elderly, he helps the younger, he does not resent 
prosperous m~  he experiences  sentiments of pity for those who 
suffer,  he does  not disdain poor men and he  values  virtue  above 
wealth; he is a good citizen, he is obedient to his commanders, he is 
a conscientious man. 
And  suddenly  Palamedes  remembers  that  he  is  not  the 
appropriate person to  praise himself;  though he  does  have a good 
excuse: he was compelled to do  so by circumstances (KaLpoS")  and by 
the (unjust) nature of the accusations.  KaLpoS"  is  a prominent notion 
of rhetorical theory; probably G.  himself had written a treatise on 
KaLpoS"  (see fro  12, with notes). But what does this term mean? It has 
been shown that the word does not obtain the meaning 'profit', or 
'opportunity' as usually translated. In the present context, the word 
means  'the  present  situation'  ,  in  other  words  it  signifies  the 
situational context and the pragmatic conditions in which Palamedes 
is  defending his  life (see  also  notes  on He!.  2).  In this  light it is 
important that the word is  combined with compulsion (1}vaYKaae); 
the rhetor composes his speech in a frame  already  created by the 
situations:  the  nature of the  audience,  the  nature  of the  case,  the 
personality of the defendant etc.  Apart from being a skilful writer, 
he must also mow when and in which context an argument is likely 
to be demonstrated more effectively. 
His  apostrophe to  the judges develops with the presentation of 
the criteria upon which the judges must base their judgment so as to 
reach  a just decision,  and of the  dangerous  consequences  of an 
unjust decision. Palamedes first claims that it is  not appropriate to 
try to move them with lamentations and with the help of his friends. 
On the contrary, what he does is to  try to show them the truth, not to 
deceive them. 
This is  Palarnedes' responsibility; their own responsibility is  to 
focus  their attention on deeds, not words, to  value the examination 
of truth above accusations, and to  deliberate for  a longer period of 
time so  as to  make sure that they will reach the proper conclusions. 
216 This is what serious men do, when they recognize the seriousness of 
the situation and the definitiveness of  their decision. 
Palamedes in a proverbial phrase declares that it is impossible to 
demonstrate the truth through words, because if  it were so, then the 
judges would have  already been able  to  reach a  conclusion from 
what has  been said.  This  is  why they  must keep  him imprisoned, 
until they make up  their minds. This will permit them to  come up 
with the right decision. And then he claims that it is their reputation 
which is  at stake. And a bad reputation is worse than death. So, as 
Odysseus  had  been  transformed  from  a  prosecutor  into  an 
accomplice or a witness,  G.  now claims that the judges' life is  in 
danger, as is the life of  his client. If  they put him to death it will be 
they, not the prosecutor who will stain his good reputation, because 
the final decision belongs to them. 
With the statement that it is inappropriate to remind good judges 
of  what has already been said, Palamedes concludes the case for the 
defence.  We know that Palamedes was finally put to  death; was it 
because G. was not his advocate? 
217 NOTES 
1 
"  fl-EV  Ka.1'"T1'YopLa. •••  KpLa'l.c;:  the  words  Ka...-rryopia.,  ci:rroAoyia  and 
Kp£aL~ represent all the three main stages of a trial and it would thus 
be preferable to  follow Deichgraber's <Kal.  1]>  KpiaL~; Ka.rrrropLa  is 
the  speech  delivered  by  the  prosecutor  and  d-rroAoy£a  the  speech 
delivered by the defendant. From the very beginning of his speech 
G.  uses  legal  terms;  it  is  a  common  practice  of G.  to  present 
mythological subjects  in the  legal phraseology of his  time,  as  he 
intends to  make his audience (or his readers) believe, that they are 
attending a trial of the fifth century B.C.  G. 's Pal.  is  probably not 
the first d-rroAoyia  of the hero in Greek literature: "a speech of this 
kind probably occurred in the Palamedes of  Aiskhylos as well as in 
the play of Euripides bearing the same name" ( Jebb-Pearson 1917 
voLii, p.  132;  cpo  Aiskh. Fr.182, Eur. Fr.578). Plato also  implies a 
speech  of defence  in tragedy:  Lg.856c.  llayyeAol.Ov  yovv,  e</n]v, 
a-rpa.rrrrov  'Aya.p.ep.vova  €V  raZ~  rpaywoialS  llaAap.7Jo~  EKao-ror€ 
d-rrocPaiv€L. Polyaenus also gives the information that the tragic poets 
presented a trial  in which Palamedes  was  defeated by Odysseus: 
olav  O€  KdKELVO  a-rparfnnlp.a  'Oouaaews- oL  rpayqJool.  ~8ouaL 
(polyaen. I prohoem.12)  The word  Kp£aL~ means 'the judgment of 
a court'. 
ou  1Te.p~  ea.va/rou  'YL-yv€.TCI.I.:  'the trial  has  not  to  do  with a  death 
penalty'; Y£yV€'TQ.L  was proposed by Aldus, and given that G.  defines 
the  object  of his  speech  the  indicative  expressing  an  irrefutable 
argument seems more likely than the inf.  yLYV€afJaL.  The disclaimer 
stated here  is  one of great importance because it does  not merely 
mean that P.  does not care about his life. The orator's intention is to 
remove from the minds of his audience the mythical narration that 
presents P.'  s death as a fact, while at the same time to  'legalise' the 
218 existence of his  speech.  The raison  d' etre of his  defence is  not 
death as  suc~  but the manner of  this death (but when it comes to the 
responsibility of the prosecutor and the judges, Palamedes stresses 
that death is a serious and irrecoverable penalty: ro/l.p.us- avopa  1TEP~ 
8avcirou  OUOKE'V;  24, orav avopEs- avopa  1TEP~ 8avcirou  Kpivwu~v, 34). 
-iJ  q,Ua1.s:  'nature';  the  personification  of physis  in  a  context 
dominated by legal terms  is  a reminiscence of the nomos / physis 
controversy  (Heinimann,  1945,  Kerferd,  1981  ch.  10,  12,  Kahn, 
1980 p.  105-108)  and it is remarkable that the criminal proceedings 
of a  court of law  are  instituted  here  by physis.  Nevertheless,  we 
should neither suppose that G. expresses his personal point of view 
nor that  he  declares  against  law.  In fact,  physis  is  used  here  to 
underline that  what is at stake is not death itself, but the manner of 
this death (oI.KaiWS"  /  f3,aLWS",  p.Er' OVE'OWV)  and as a consequence the 
idea of 'natural death' is  explicitly reflected in the word  cpv(J~s- and 
not  implicitly  in the  word  OI.KaLWS"  (Sykutris,  1927  p.  860).  The 
association of the nomos / physis controversy with death appears in 
Antiphon: "<0 0' aJ> ~fjv  €a-n  rfjS'  CPV(JEWS"  Ka~ ro  a:rr08avELv,  Ka~ 
ro  p.ev  ~fjv  aur<oLS->  €CJrI.V  a1To  rwv  gup.cpEpovrwv,  ro  oe  a7T08avELv 
a1TO  rwv  p.-r,  fup.cpEpovrwv  (DK87B44 coL 3). 
q,c.'VEpcl.  -rU  ljs.fJq,~ ...  KaTE.t¥ll<l>ta-a.TO:  'physis has decreed death for all 
men  with  an  open  vote';  cpavEpa  Ijsfjcpos- emphasises  the 
definitiveness of the decision of physis, as  it is  usually associated 
with  oligarchic  governments:  Lys.13.37  01.  p.ev  yap  rpl.ciKOVra 
€Kci87Jvro  €1TL  rwv  f3ci8pwv,  ou  VVV  01.  1TpurcivEI.S- KaeE~OVral.·  8150  8e 
rpci1TE~al.  EV  rqi  1TpoafJEv  rwv rpl.ciKOVra  EKE£afJ7JV·  riJv  8E:  r/Jfjcpov  OUK 
ELS- KaoL(JKouS- at\.Aa  cpavEpav  E1Ti.  ras- rpa1TE~as- ravras- EOE£. 
r£8EafJal.;  Thnk.4.74.  Kai.  rovrcuv  1TEpl.  avaYKcia-avrEs- roy  8fjp.ov 
r/Jfjcpov  cpavEpav  81.EvEYKELv  (cf.  Xen.  Hell.  2.4,10,  and PI.  Lg. 767d. 
Dem.19.239). 
1T'EpI.  ok  rijs  a:np.l.as  Kal..  rijs  11.p.iis:  'dishonour'  and  'honour' not 
'deprivation of the civil rights';  anp.i.a was a penalty imposed for 
various  offences;  a  case  of hereditary  ar£.p.£.a  for  treason  is  that 
219 imposed  on  Antiphon,  Archeptolemos  and  Onomakles  who  had 
been sent by the 400 to  Sparta to  treat for peace cPs.PI.  Vita  An. 
834a; cpo Thuk. 8.90.1-2). 
-rro-repa.  fl.E  ~  •••  ci:rro8a.vEl.v:  G.  now states the kernel of his speech 
by  using  an  antithesis  heavily  weighed on the  second clause,  on 
which  he  lays  the  emphasis.  8t.KClL~  ci'TI'a8a.VEl.v:  'whether I  will 
deservedly  be  punished',  not  'according  to  nature'.  The  latter 
interpretation was proposed by Sykutris (1927, p.  860); Heinimann 
(1945,  p.105)  has  shown that  this  meaning  of O£XClI.OS"  occurs  in 
Solon  (fr.ll)  and  in  medical  contexts  opposed  to  {3£ClI.OS". 
Untersteiner  (1954,  p.138  n.l)  follows  Sykutris  and  compares 
U.XClLOS"  with Aiskh.  Chao  996  (€VO£XOv  <pPOVTJP-ClTOS"),  where €VO£xoS" 
seems to  have a  different meaning (see Garvie  1986, note ad lac; 
Soph. El.  37 €vS£xovS"  IJ<pClyas  fits  better the present context). The 
interpretation of oLxaLWS- d1TOeaveZv  as  natural  death  especially in 
opposition to {3£al.OS"  is apparently reasonable, but those who support 
it do  not take into  account the following sentence, where P.  states 
that he rules over OLX7J  (cp.36 €a.v  dSf.xws- d1ToxTeiv7]T€  p-e); it should 
thus be preferable to see in oLxaLWS- its common meaning ('justly', 
'based on the right criteria'; see also note on 33).  ~t.a.L~ 
a.-rr08a.VEl.V:  a violent and udeserved death will be imposed on him by 
the jurors. To die with dignity is an archaic ideal regularly depicted 
in tragedy and associated with the fame of a hero after his death. A 
{3i.al.OS"  86..vaToS"  will stain Palamedes' reputation for ever (cp.  Soph. 
Aj.479-480 dN\ ':r,  Xa.A.Ws- ~7]v :r,  xaAwS"  Te8v7Jx€VaL I TOV  evyevij XPTJ)' 
2 
Tau  fl.EV  OAOU:  we should  take  OAOV  with ,OU  /-LEV  as  well as  with 
Xpa,el.Te,  as  P.  and his  jurors  do  not rule  over the  same  OAOV;  'I 
totally rule over the one thing (OLX7]S")  and you over the other (f3Lac;)'. 
-Mis  fl.EV  8LK'ls  ••• U!-'-El.S:  P.  rules over OLXTJ  because he knows (5) that 
he is  innocent, and jurors rule over {3£a  because they can kill him if 
they decide so  (cp.  Hom n 16.  385  OTe  Aa{3pCYrCITOV  X€EL  uowp  / 
220 , 
eLV 
OUK  <iJl.eYoV1"'es-).  The opposition between 8f.KTJ  and {3La.  is emphasised 
by the chiastic arrangement of the sentence -which brings P.  in the 
middle - and the repetition of  the pronouns: vfJ-e'i)" •.• eyw  .•. eyw  ••. ufJ-e'i)". 
ci.-rrOKTELVa.l. ••• pa.OLWS:  G.  places the infinitive at the beginning of the 
phrase to  emphasise its violent  meaning and creates a hyperbaton 
that  binds  together  the  verb  with  the  participle.  'Yap  fl-E:  the 
sentence explains the meaning of  rij)"  fJ-€V  8f.K7]S' .•. UfJ-e'i)",  so  A 2, s fJ-EV 
is  not  necessary  (Skouteropoulos  p.231).  OUvTJ<TEa8E  ~oUA6fl-EVOl.: 
the  combination  of the  two  verbs  will  be  the  basis  of P.'s 
argumentation  (ouTe  yap  {3ovA:ry8eIS  eQVvclfJ-7JV  av  OUTe  8vVclfJ-evo)" 
e{3ovA7fJTJV  epyoL)"  e7nxel.pe'iv  TOWVTOLS"  5). What for his jurors is  an 
indisputable right, becomes for him the object of  his speech. In other 
words,  the jurors have the right to  use violence in order to  work 
their  will  on  him  and  he  has  to  prove  that  he  is  not  a  traitor. 
Potential opposed to  truth is frequent in prose (cp. Hdt 7.15;  TI1UC. 
3.39.3,6.34.1,6.57.3; Isok. 20.2, 12.143). 
3 
o Ka.-n1'Y0pos' OOU<T<TEUS:  The  only  reference  to  the  name  of his 
prosecutor; Ka.TWOPO)"  is used here as  an adjective. It is  remarkable 
that G. uses only one qualitative adjective to characterise Odysseus: 
TOAWTJPoTa.Te  (24). 
i1  <Ta.q,~  kmO'Ta.~EvoS  ••• i1  Oo~~(1)v:  Knowledge  is  opposed  to 
supposition; but in  5, P.  claims that he is well aware of the fact that 
Odysseus  does  not rely  on  knowledge.  Coulter  suggests  that  "It 
should  be  noted  that  at  the  very  beginning  of the  defense  the 
familiar  and  important  distinction  between  doxa  and  aletheia  is 
introduced" (1964, p.280),  but the  emphasis  here is  not placed on 
the  knowledge  /  opinion  antithesis,  but  on  the  motives  of the 
plaintiff. In both cases - if his motives were moral - he had a good 
reason to accuse him.  1TP00l.OOvra.:  One of  the few elements from 
221 the myth that occurs in Pal.  is that Palamedes had been accused by 
Odysseus of having attempted to betray Greeks to  the Trojans (see 
Introduction).  ~v'  Ex\cl.oo.  -nns  ~a.p~ci.pOl.s:  'EMas is  repeated 
three  times,  probably  because  P.  wants  to  proclaim.  his  patriotic 
feelings.  As far as we know G.  shared the traditional ideas about the 
superiority  of Greeks  to  barbarians:  -reI.  p.ev  Ka-reI.  -rwv  j3ap{3a.pwv 
-rpo7TaLa  Jp.vovs  a.7TaL -rEi:  -reI.  oe  Ka-reI.  -rwv' EM-ryvwv  ep-ryvovs  Cfr.Sb); 
probably he was pushing through the idea of Panhellenism as  well 
(fr.8a). 
y' a.p:Tj:  'in a certain way' (LSJ); the manuscripts have oo~a.~ov-ra. P.E, 
but  Diels'  correction  maintains  the  symmetry  between  the 
participles (J(l<jJOk  bncrra.f-LEvoS  and oo~a.~wv in the nominative, both 
of  which refer to Ka-njyopos. 
miis  ya.p  ~Ux.>  •••  11.l.I-wpou\l-evoS";:<oux>  is  necessary  because  the 
sentence expresses a positive statement (Denniston 1954, p.  86;  cpo 
for  instance PI.  Soph.  240c2).  The passage  explains  in detail  the 
phrase 01. 'EVVOl.aV  rijs '.£.\AMos. The accumulation of the benefits is 
expressed with an asyndeton. 
eL.  OE  <pe6v~  ••• ~v  a.L.-n.a.v:  the second probability; the motives of  my 
accuser are immoral. The three motives - expressed by three datives 
- are not mutually exclusive.  <pe6v~: the first probable motive is 
envy, which was caused either by P. 's inventiveness or because of 
the  stratagem  he had  used  in  order  to  reveal  the  'madness'  of 
Odysseus  (cp.  Xen.  Mem.4.2.33.  -reI.  De  JIaJ..ap.-ryoovs- OUK  a.K-ryKoas 
-rou  'OOVUUEWS"  Schol.  Eur  Or.  432 
,  , 
E7Tt. 
-rOt.OVOE  n  UKEVWPOUUt.  Ka-r' au-rou).  KaKO'T"exv£q.:  'the suborning 
of perjury',  'conspiracy'  (LSJ)  is  a  very  rare  word;  the  latter 
meaning is more reasonable in our context. 7TCLVOUPY£q.:  'knavery'; it 
denotes  a  degraded  form  of uo<jJf.a  (cp.  PI.  }vfenex.246e  -rraua.  -rE 
E1T'(.rrrr]f-L7!  XWPL~OP.EV7! ot.KaLOaUv7]S"  Ka~ -rijs- aM7!S  a.perfjs- rravovpyf.a. 
ou  uo<jJLa  <jJaLvE-rCLL;  cpo also Lys. 22.16 and rravovpyeL  at Pal. 18). 
222 O"I.lVefl-rtK€:  'fabricated the charges'; P.  deliberately does not use 
the verb  €7ro~eZ'T'o (as at 3 and 5), as he implies that Odysseus made 
the charges up. 
ux,..m:p ••• av  eL'T}:  8~'  €x€Zva  refers  to  ei.  p..ev .•• T'Lf.LWpovp.eV05";  the 
antithesis is symmetrical both in form and in content (the opposites 
Kpa7"La-r05"  /  Kr1.KLa-r05"  along  with  the  last  words  of each  sentence 
create an impressive assonance). 
4 
a.V€·rr£(lEI.KTOS-:  'unproved';  it  was  probably  G.  who  coined  this 
compound word (see Introduction), which is unattested elsewhere in 
the  prose  of classical  times.  G.  implies  that  Odysseus  has  not 
brought evidence against him.  EK1TA'T}~I.V:  "the  result  of  a 
groundless accusation" (Segal 1962, p.1l7). The same word is used 
in  He!.  16  to  describe  the  terror  created  by  apsis.  Groundless 
accusation causes panic (€K7rA7]gL5"),  leading the defendant to  d7rOpLa 
(cp.  Antiphon  5.6.  'T'au'T"  oJv  EK7rA7]gLV  7rOM7]V  7rapeX€LV  dvaYK7] 
EG'Ti.  'T'q;  KLVOVV€VOvn).  ci.1TOpELV  T~ AO')''!!:  P., in the psychological 
state of  EK7rA7]gL5",  is helpless because he is in need of  words, and his 
d7rOpLa  is  only  superficially  opposed  to  7rOp~p..f.JJT'EpWV,  because 
'compulsion' and 'truth' are dangerous teachers (cp.  Aiskhin.2.41: 
av'T'ov  p..ev  eaKlJ.YTTT'€  Ka~  rryv  d1TopLav  rryv  EV  'T'q;  AOYCP  avp..{3aaav 
eavTq;;  for  a  different context see PI.  Ion  536c  7r€P~  p..ev' Op..-rypov 
OT'aV  T'L5"  p..v7]a8fj,  eV7ropeZ5",  7rep~ oe  'TWV  aAAwv  d7ropeZ5"). 
av  \l.~  n  ...  \l.a80):  The only way to  overcome his  difficulties  is  to 
learn something from truth and compulsion.  ci.A~8EI.a.: in He!.  it is 
defined  as  the  virtue  of iloyo5":  Koap..05" ...  AOycp  OE  dATj8€l..a  (1);  the 
word is  associated with O~Ka£W5" and 8£K7]  of chapters  1-2.  P.  knows 
the truth because he is  aware of the fact  that he has not committed 
the crime with which he is charged (for knowledge see Hel.11).  -M)S-
-rra.pouOils  ci.vci."fKl1S:  'the present compulsion'; dvaYK7]  describes the 
situational context of the trial. P.  has to  defend himself in a court of 
law,  and thus create a speech dictated by dvaYK7]  in order to  prove 
223 that he is innocent (32  <>  oe  1rapwv  Kal.pO~ TJvaYKaU€  KaL  -mvTa  ••. )  . 
In He!.  13  we  find the phrase Totk  dvaYKa£ov~ ol.a  AOYWV  dywva~ 
opposed to  the speeches of  philosophers. So a speech delivered by 
someone because he is compelled to  do  so  dvaYKaLo~ is  dvaYKaLo~. 
Diels  compares  this  passage  with  a  passage  from  the  Platonic 
dialogue  Theaeretus  (172e)  oi.  oe  ell  dOXOAL~  T€  de~  Aeyoval.  -
KaTE1TELyel.  yap  uowp  pEOV  - Kai.  OUK  eyxwpeL  1repi.  ou  av 
emevp.f]awal.  TOVS"  AOYOVS"  1roLeiafJal.,  d,\.,\' dvaYK7]1I  exwlI  <>  dVTl.OI.KOS" 
ecpEUT7]KEII . 
SLi5aG1<a.Awv ••• TUXwv:  OI.OaUKaAoS"  is  the  'teacher',  and  the  words 
d,\f]8e  1. as"  and  dllaYK7]S'  are  thus  personified  (cp.  Lys.  12.78. 
Oel.VOTaTWv  epywlI  OI.OaUKaAoS"  KaTaa-raS")  E'TTLKLVOUVO'iEpwv  il 
1rOpLI-LW'iEpWV:  'more dangerous than resourceful teachers'. Why are 
truth and compulsion dangerous teachers? In the particular context 
the  word  dAf]8el.a  does  not  strictly  mean  truth.  If P.  remained 
confident in his belief that truth can release him from the charges he 
would not deliver a speech of defence at all. Mere declaration of  his 
innocence would have been enough. But the orator is well aware of 
the fact that judges are not usually convinced by truth; P.  is not a 
witness  but  the  defendant  and  he  knows  that  his  only  hope  of 
salvation is  his  speech. That is  exactly why we should not expect 
him simply to state the real facts. Instead, he will substitute the facts 
of  his case with probabilities (eLKoTa) and logical reasoning, because 
this is what truth means under the compulsion (dvaYK7]) imposed by 
the pragmatic situations of  a court oflaw. So, in 33 where he claims 
that  T(~  aacpeaTaTqJ  ol.KaiqJ,  ol.oaqavTa.  TdA7]8eS" ...  f-L€  oei  ol.acpvyeiv 
TIJv  aLTl.aV  TalJT7]V,  he  means  that  he  has  revealed  the  truth,  not 
necessarily that he has managed to  do  it by demonstrating real facts. 
In Phaidros 25ge, Plato  attacks the probability arguments, because 
rhetors  are  not  based  on  truth,  but  on  what  passes  with  their 
audience for truth, d,\Aa  TO.  oo~aVT' av 1TAf]8el.  OL 1T'ep  OI.KaaOvatV  (for 
the Platonic polemic see Introduction). The difficulties provoked by 
dvaYK7]  are  better  understood  in  the  light  of another  Gorgianic 
224 passage,  which  deals  with  the  same  problem;  in  He!.  (13)  G. 
proposes that in forensic procedures et5>  1\6Y05>  1TOAVII  OXI\OIl  ETeptPe 
KaL  E1TeuTe  T€xJnJ  ypatj;e£s.  OUK  d)"'T]8ef.q.  l\ex8ef.5>  (see note ad lac.): 
the defendant knows that he delivers his speech 'under compulsion', 
and  the  speech  of the  prosecutor will  probably  be  proved  more 
effective (for a different discussion of the passage see Coulter 1964, 
p.280-284, who focuses on the doxa / alerheia antithesis). 
5 
on  \-LEV  OUV •••  TO  \-L"  I'€VO\-L€vov:  P.  claims that Odysseus does not 
rely on knowledge (of truth), but bases his  accusations on opinion 
which  is  defined  as  a1TLaTOTaTOIl  1TpaYf-La  (24).  Untersteiner 
compares the idea expressed here with G.'s ONE: "This proposition 
seems  to  be universally valid, but in  fact  it is  not so,  as  G.  will 
prove, not only at the end of this speech but also and especially in 
his  great  epistemological  work  [sc.  nep~  TOV  f-L7J  5111"05>]"  (1954, 
p.33).  I  am not convinced that  this  passage  should be examined 
within the  scope of that text,  since  first  the  reading of the  latter 
depends much on the intention attributed to it, and secondly because 
it is  evident that by polarising opinion and knowledge Palamedes 
provides himself with the opportunity to  employ an argument from 
antinomy  (see  Introduction).  The  structure  of the  period  is  an 
example of the style of G.:  the chiastic arrangement is  emphasised 
by  the  striking  repetition  of  cognitive  verbs,  underlying  P. 's 
conviction:  ou  aatj;ilJ5>  <el'8w.;>/aatj;ilJ5>  oi'8a  - aVlIoL'8a  yap  €f-Lau1"0 
aatj;ilJ5>  /ou'8'  EOLX'  01TWS"  all  el'8ef.7].  The  repetition  of the  adverb 
cYatj;ilJ5>  offers added emphasis to  the cognitive verbs.  ~i.o~>: in a 
context  dominated  by  cognitive  verbs  the  suggestion  of Reiske 
seems reasonable. OUO'  EOI-X':  Radermacher's emendation is closer to 
the Ms' ou'8€  OUX,  than Diels' ov'8€  oia '.  OV:  Diels is perhaps right in 
adding all  after eiaeL7]  ns, since the phrase does not mean ignorance 
of the  'existence'  of that  which  has  not  happened,  but  that  one 
cannot  claim that he  is  aware  of the  truth of something that  has 
225 never happened (this use of the Greek verb  'to be', which Kahn 
(1966, p.249) terms veridical, is, of  course, frequent in the ONE). 
€t  oe  otO\-LEVos •••  Ka'M1"Y0p[av: this sentence picks up  the wording of 
3. 
01.0.  (lLau-tiJv  u\-L~v  km.oo.;w  Tp01'T'ttlV:  'I  shall  demonstrate  in  two 
different  ways  that  he  does  not  tell  the  truth';  it  is  a  common 
practice of G.  to describe the stages of his speech and the transition 
from the one to the other (see Introduction). 
OUTE  y2Lp  ~OUA1'JeEI.S  •••  Ef3ou;":~a"v: 'For if I had wished I would not 
be able nor I would have wished if  I were able'. With the chiastical 
arrangement  of rhyming words  G.  presents  the  keystones  of his 
argumentation.  The first part will be discussed  in ch.  6-12  (  12 
7T1J.VTWS"  apa  Kat.  7TaV'i7]  7Tav-m  7TpaTTel.V  d.8vvaTov  ~v fL0r.)  and the 
second in ch. 13-21. 
The first part of  the main body of  the defence (6-12) is  based on  a 
model,  combining  probabilities  (elKoTa)  with  the  process  of 
elimination  (d.7Taycurr7J.  The  use  of probabilities  consists  in  the 
deSCription  of the  stages  normally  employed  by  someone  who 
commits  the  crime  of treachery  and the  use  of the  process  of 
elimination  in  the fact that the defendant gradually demonstrates 
that each one of  these stages would have been impossible, and as a 
consequence  that  even if  he had wished,  it would not have been 
possible  to  betray  his  compatriots.  But  the  keystone  of his 
argumentation  is  concession,  which  pushes  the  argumentation 
forward in two ways: on the one hand the conditionals introduce the 
new  argument  and on  the  other they  underline  the  presumptive 
character of  the previous stage (8  Kai7Tep  ou  yevofLEvoV,  11  Td.  fL7] 
yevofLEva).  The verbal e.xpression of  this twofold concession requires 
attention since it is based on repetition:  7 ciMd.  87]  TOUTO  T4I  '\oyq.t 
OVVUTOV  YEvEa8Ur.,  8  d.J\Aci.  87]  Kat.  -rOUTO  YEVEa8W,  11  Kal.  07]  Toivvv 
yevEa8w.  Bux (1941, pp.394-398) suggested that G.  '5 argument is 
based on the method of  reductio ad impossibile (0  or.eL  -rOU  d.8vvaTov 
226 O11Moytap.6s-)  described  by  Aristotle  in  his  Analytica  Priora; 
Untersteiner follows him:  "The argumentation  in  P.  relies  on  the 
demonstration of  logic " (1961, p. 112); so does Skouteropoulos who 
claims that "the schema used does not come from the dicanic action 
but from  the  logic of  natural philosophy" (1991,  p.  258,  n.14). 
Long  claims  that  Gorgias  "proceeds  by  the  'Chinese  box' 
sequence" both in  P.  and in  his treatise ON'B  (1982, p.l35) and he 
compares the method applied in  P.  with Se."Ctus  Empiricus' method 
of  eliminating alternatives and he considers that "it is likely enough 
that  Se."Ctus  Empiricus,  or his source,  were influenced directly  by 
Gorgias  in  their method of  eliminating alternatives" (p.  236).  The 
same scholar takes the view that the method used here is  radical: 
"In  a  casual way  e."Camples  of the  technique can  be found in  the 
Attic orators,  but I  IolOW of  nothing comparable to  its  use  in  the 
Palamedes"  (p.  235,  examples  n.  5,  p.  241).  To  sum  up, 
probabilities and logic are both discernible in  the first part of  P.  's 
defence  and they are  both related to  the nature of this part,  that 
deals  with  real facts  and not with  motives  (for  the  method of 
argument see Introduction). 
6 
AO"!OV:  'argument'; the word has a great range of  meanings, but it is 
clear that here it means argument (note that ;\oyoS"  in the following 
lines is used to  denote 'oral communication'). The first argument is 
that he was not able to betray Greece to  the Trojans (ciOVVUTOS"  E1.fu) 
and  it  is  reasonable  to  suggest  that  the  word  ;\0Y0S"  includes  the 
argumentation as welL 
11"PWTOV:  'first'; with a temporal adverb G.  says what he is  going to 
do  first.  It is  interesting that the wording is  arranged in a manner 
that  harmonises  the  sequence  of the  facts  with the  stream  of the 
logical  reasoning  attempted throughout this  section  (6-12)  by  G.: 
Err!.  TOVTov ... rrp6Yrov,  rrp6Yrov  apx7Tv,  TJ  O€  a.pxT!,  rrpo  yap  nuv 
iJ-E,UOVTwv ... rrpoTEpoV. 
227 "1"0\3"1"0:  Blass prefers TavTa; it is not necessary to  follow him. since 
the plural epyocs (5) is pejorative. whereas in this context the word 
has a neutral sense. The repetition introduces us to the ;\6yoS'  /  epyov 
relation (TOVTOV  TOV  ;\6yov - TOVTO  -:rpa.TTE!'V). 
AO')'OS;  'speech'  generally;  G.  does  not  define  here  what  kind  of 
speech he means, because he states a general principle which is not 
confirmed by the real facts  of this particular case.  The  ;\6yovS'  and 
,\6yol.  refer  to  the  specific  case  discussed  here  and  take  on  the 
meaning'  discussions', or even 'negotiations'. 
l-L-rl'T"'  EKE1.vou ••• kA8o\l"'rt)s;:  Although  the  meaning  of the  period is 
generally clear, there are some textual difficulties. Two readings are 
worth quoting:  (a) p.fr' €p.ov  -rrpoS'  €KELVOV  €Ae6v"I"oS';  and (b)  [.L7rrE 
<rov> -rrap' €[.Lov  -rrpoS'  €KeLVOV  €Ae6vTOS';  The first is  the reading of 
A  (followed  by  Kalligas),  and  (b)  was  proposed  by Blass,  who 
adopts  the -rrap'  €[.Lov  of A2.  If we were to  go  with Blass  then the 
meaning would be that P.  did not send anyone to  Priam, as  Priam 
did  not  send  anyone  to  P.  The  reading  of the  Ms.  is  slightly 
different:  'if  he did not send anyone to  me and if I did not go  to 
him'. It does not seem necessary to correct the Ms .• since in 7- 8 G. 
discusses  the  alleged  negotiations  between  P.  and  Priam.  The 
symmetry is  striking: both phrases end with participles that form a 
homeoteleuton; the symmetry is also supported by the pansosis. 
'Ypal-Ll-La:nuv:  'letters'; it is  not necessary to  read ypa[.L[.LarEl.WV  with 
Diels (,tablet on which one writes', LSJ), since the  emphasis is not 
necessarily  placed on the  writing  techniques,  but rather upon the 
impossibility  of communication  (cp.  Eur.  IT 594:  KOVcPWV  €Kan 
ypaf-Lf-La.TWV  (jW'i7JpLav).  The letter here is  not the same with the one 
known from the myth. as  the latter is a part of Odysseus' stratagem 
and ostensibly sent by Priam to P. with the gold. 
<iq>l.K'T"(1.1.:  'arrives';  this  is  an  'empiric  perfect'  that  sets  forth  a 
commonly accepted truth and we should translate it with the present 
tense. 
228 7 
a.M.a.  &rt: "After a rejected suggestion" (Denniston 1954, p.241); cpo 
8,  18. 
~  AO,,),I.!>  Ouva:rov  ')'€VEaea.l.:  Bekker changes  the verb  to  YEvea8w; 
Long (1982, p.241 n.4) agrees with him: "Gorgias is not stating real 
possibilities, but conceding possibility for the sake of his argument, 
only to  demolish it later". But the dative Tqi  :toyq.J  means  'for the 
argument's sake', 'supposedly' (cp. the beginning of6, where :toyov 
also  means  'argument', and  W<;  dOVVClTOS",  which has  now become 
8VVClTOV  YEvea8ClI.),  and  thus  Bekker's  alteration  is  unnecessary, 
unless a pleonastic expression is required here; but this is doubtful 
(cp.  11  KCl~  8",  TOI.VVV  YEvea8w  ••• ,  where the imperative is  clearly 
meant to denote that what is said is for the argument's sake only). 
KClt  O-Tt  -ro~vuv  •••  E")'W:  KCl~  8",  TOI.VVV  occurs mostly in Plato (cp.  11; 
see Denniston 1954, p.578 (2), n.l). The period - and generally ch. 
7 - is a striking example of  the style of G  .. It is remarkable that here 
the hyperbaton (aVvELJ.LL ••• KaKELvqJ  EYW)  creates two chiasms the one 
(external)  containing the other (internal):  1.  aVvELJ.LL  - aUVECTTI.  -
,.....  "  "  "2  ,.....  ,  ",  KClKEI.VOS"  EJ.LOI.  - KClKEI.VqJ  eyw,  •  KClKELVOS"  - EJ.LOI.  - KClKEI.Vq.J  - EyW. 
The first obvious result of  this arrangement is to isolate the persons 
from their actions. The second one is that due to the word-order the 
transitive verb a-VVELJ.L1.  appears here as intransitive, and thus we have 
the impression that P.  and Priam met separately 'he met me and I 
met him'; this idea is explicitly stated in the sentence 1TOTEPCl  J.LovoS" 
j.Lovq.J;  The overall result is that the form depicts the content, that is 
the impossibility of  the alleged encounter. 
nvi.  nS ...  tL0VOs  tL0vl.!>;  This passage creates autonomous sub-units by 
using small sentences in an asyndetic arrangement which gradually 
reaches the main point, that is  the impossibility of communication 
(cl:t:t ' dyvo-ryaDj.L€V  Totk  dM-ry:twv  :toyovS"). 
~EM"I1V  ~ap~cipl.!>: on G.'s opinions on the superiority of Greeks see 
3.  1TWs  cl.K01JWV  KClI.  AE")'WV;  The participle clKOVWV  here means 'hear 
and  understand'  (cp.  Aiskh.  Pro  448  KAVOVTES"  OUK  7]KOVOV). 
229 Language is  usually conceived as  a strong criterion of nationality; 
Herodotos (8. 144) claims that the unity of  the Greeks is reflected in 
four different aspects of their common life,  one of which is  their 
common  language  (o'u-Oy'\WO'aov).  a.yvo~aofLE.V:  the  Ms  reads 
ciyvof]aw,U-€v;  but  G.  goes  on  (ci,.\Ao.  p.e8'  ep,U-iJvEWS:)  with  the 
discussion of  the alleged '\oyo£.  with Priam. 
illa.  fLee'  EpfL'T1VEws;:  'was it  with the  help  of an  interpreter?',  a 
hypophora with cLVi.d.;  the idea is  that if their negotiations had been 
assisted by a translator, then the latter would have been aware of  the 
content  of their  discussion.  For  EP'u-iJV€V~,  cpo  Hdt.  3.38  €rp€,O, 
1Tap€OV,WV  ,WV  'EMf]v{JJv,  KaL  Q£.'  /:pp.iJVEws  p.av8avovTeJ)v  ,0. 
Aeyo,U-€va.  Hall  maintains  that  "Gorgias ...  exploited  the  problem 
involved in making mythical Greeks  and barbarians  communicate 
with  one  another"  and  compares  "the  argument  invented  for 
Palamedes" (1989, p.1l7 n.  56). The word /:PP:TJV€VS- is  also  applied 
to  someone  who  can decode  an  intricate  meaning  (in  relation to 
poetry see PI. Ion 534e4 o~ oe  1ToL7J7"aL  ovaev  aAA'  7}  Epf.LiJV7j:;  €laLV 
nov 8ewv). 
8 
fLE:ra.  TOU-rOtlS:  'after the speeches'; the plural here refers to  AOYOL  ill 
the middle of 6,  and not particularly to  dAAf]AWV  AOyov~, since G. 
simply intends to remind us of  the general idea ofthe first argument. 
mO"TLV  OOUVa.L  ICa.l.  8E~a.aea.L: 1T£ans- is  'that which gives confidence', 
'a pledge'; the  meaning is  that after the  discussion  it would have 
been  necessary  for  both  parties  to  give  a  pledge.  The  1T[aTe(.~ 
discussed in ch.  8-10 are the following:  1.  an  oath (8),  2.  hostages 
(8),3. money (9,10; it is interesting that all of them would involve 
p.a.propes-,  as  Palamedes  explicitly  says  when  he  mentions  the 
possibility that he communicated with Priam by using an interpreter: 
rpL,o~ apa.  p.a.p7lJs-..• 8). With his argumentation P.  will prove that it 
was  impossible to  bind Priam with a pledge  (cp.  Pl.  Phdr.  256d. 
230 O€0Ext'al.). 
-rr01"epoV •••  E.p.eN..EV;  The  first  possible  pledge  presented  by  the 
defendant  is  an  oath;  the  untenability  of  this  possibility  is 
demonstrated  on  the  basis  of morality:  in  what  way  would  the 
enemies  have  trusted  the  very  person  who  betrayed  his  own 
compatriots?  All  the  other arguments  concerning  1T1.a-r€~~ will  be 
attributed to  difficulties provoked by the circumstances. The same 
idea recurs in ch.21, where 1T1.a-r~~ is presented as a prerequisite for a 
livab Ie  life  (cp. L ys.12. 77  1T1.a-r€~~  aV1"ot:s  epYqJ  O€OWKWs- Ka~  1Tap' 
€.J<€1.VWV  OpKOU~ €lJ...7]rpWs- and AI. Lys.1185). 
O!l-1']P0I.;  'hostages'; this is one more invented possibility (we do not 
know of  any exchange of  hostages from the mythical accounts) used 
to add verisimilitude to the speech. The exchange of  hostages was a 
common  practice  during  wartime  and  at  the  suspension  of 
hostilities,  and  as  a  consequence  the  exchange presented in this 
context - initiated by a traitor - seems strange (see Amit 1979, p. 
129-147). But at any rate we have to  suggest that it helps  G.  to 
develop his argumentation. 
olov E)'W •••  ,-wv  UI.EmV  1"I.va: We know that P. had two brothers, Oiax 
and Nausimedon; we do not have much infonnation about the latter 
and we  ought to  suggest that G.  here refers  to  Oiax, whose name 
appears in several sources. As far as we know, Oiax took part in the 
war of Troy and according to  Hyginus  (Fab.117)  he was the one 
who infonned Clytaemestra about the relations of  her husband with 
Cassandra and  it was this  news  that led her to  plot Agamemnon's 
death.  He also  tried to  persuade the Greeks to  banish Orestes after 
the  death  of his  mother  (Eur.  Or,  430-4).  The  Scholiast  of the 
Thesmophon'azousai  tells  us  that  Euripides  ID  his  tragedy 
Palamedes  presents  Oeax  sending  the  news  of the  death  of his 
brother to  their father, Nauplios: 0  yap  EvpmC87]S  EV  '14)  llaAafl·:fJ07J 
E1TOI.7]Ge  TOV  oraKa  TOV  aO€Arpov  llaAafl:r,oous  E1T~ypa!f;al.  €[~  '1"a~ 
vaGs  JOV  8avaTOV  aVToG,  Zva  cP€P0f.L€VUI.  aUTal.  eAeWG'LV  els  TOV 
Na.U1TAI.OV  TOV  1TaTepa.  UVTOG  Kat  G.1Ta.yye£AlLXJL  TOV  eavaTOV  aVToG. 
231 OXnrEp  orag  -rcfj  Nav-rrAf.lJ!  ypa.CPEI.  ev  -rcfj  IIa>..ap.-TJo7J  Evpt.-rr£oov.  <5 
ya.p  orag  e-yxapa-rrEI.  -rroMaZs- -rrAa.Tctt.S- -ra.  -rrEPi.  -rau  IIa>..OfI.-TJo7JV  Kai. 
dcpLTj(jLV  Els- ea.Jtaaaav,  Wo-rE  p.df.  ye  nvl.  -rau  Nav-rrA/.ou  -rrpoa-rrEaE£.V 
(Schol.  Ar.  Thesm.  771). It would be senseless to  mention Priam's 
sons, because they were no  less than fifty (among them Hektor and 
Paris)! 
E.p.oL  'T'E.  ••  nu.p'  o4Lou:  the paris  os  is  in  combination with the  -rE  •••  TE 
structure  (see  Denniston  1954,  p.503)  sets  off the  fact  that  the 
exchange  of hostages  would have  been  a  secure  pledge  in equal 
terms.  1Tt.O'TO"ra:ra.:  The opposite word recurs in ch.24 attributed 
9 
<P-rlO'El.  'Tl.S:  The future of the verb  ¢>TJp.£  is  used here instead of a 
potential mood and offers variety to the speech, as  G. uses it instead 
of the  constructions  with  Y£YVEdJat.  (7,  8,  11)  denoting  the 
concessio, and it serves  as  an anticipation of a possible argument 
that  could be used against his  own  reasoning  (-rrpoKa-ra.ATjtPt.S-).  In 
effect, no one claimed that P.  was paid by Priam,  and even in the 
mythical account the money placed by Odysseus in his tents was not 
a part of  the preparations for the betrayal, but P.'  s 'recompense' for 
a  crime  already  committed.  This  suggestion  is  reinforced  by the 
supposition in 10 (eyw  0' e';eAeWV ... €da7jAeEV);  but the myth tells us 
that  the  money  was  brought  to  P's.  tents  by  a  slave  bribed  by 
Odysseus.  The  creation  of alleged  charges  gives  the  orator  the 
opportunity  to  demonstrate  his  skills,  and  thus  offer  rhetorical 
education. 
aUK  Ei.KOS:  'it is not likely'; Untersteiner remarks that this is the only 
occurrence  of the  word  in  this  text,  because  as  he  explains  the 
argumentation here relies  on  the  truth /  opinion  antithesis  (1961, 
pp.117-18; for the probabilities see notes on ch.6 ). 
232 trrrOUflY11tJ-a."!"OOV:  'services' . 
.,.{~  OUV  ~v 'it  KotJ-I.011;  The  question is  adverbial:  'how could one 
transfer  the  money?', not  'Who  was  the  go-between?'  (Kennedy 
1972, p. 56). 
'TT'~  S a.v  exO\J-l.o-EV  <i1  ELS>  i1  1TOMo~; Eis- was  proposed by Keil, 
but  it  is  possible  that  an  7]  before  it  was  ornmitted  due  to 
hap  10 grap hy. 
-rroMw  -yC.p ••• cJ>EflO\J-EVOV  -Tjv:  the  struCnITe  of  the  antithesis  is 
symmetrical;  the  two  participles  (KOI).L~6v-rwv  - KOfJ-i~ov-ros-)  are 
placed at the beginning of the  sentences in the same place and the 
repetition of the quantitative words  (notice that he does  not write 
dltiyov but uses a litotes) bind the period together (1TOMWV  - 7TOMOI. 
- €VOS- - OUK  cr.v  7TOltV)  chiastically.  Il-Up-ruPES  -Ml~  E.m.~oUA:iis: 
'witnesses  of the  plot'  (for  E1TL{3ovlt7j  cpo  Thuc.  4.77);  G.  was 
certainly aware of  the use and the misuse of witnesses (see 23), and 
generally of  what Aristotle later termed a-rEXV0l.  7Tio--rELS-. 
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'ittJ-Epa.~  i1  Vt.lK"O~; the genitives express time; note that G.  passes to 
the discussion of the time that the alleged crime took place without 
indicating it  (possibly the  schema of 7TPOo-{30lt7j),  but this  may be 
explained  by  the  fact  that  he  goes  on  dealing  with  the  same 
argument. 
ilia. <vuK,.6s>: it is better to make this a question corresponding to 
ill'  7JfJ-Epas-; 
ilici. ')'E •••  ,.OI.OU,.OLS:  'but the light is an enemy of such things';  ciMcl 
yE  is very rare, 'objecting, in hypophora' (Denniston 1954, p.23). 
El.EV:  the word is  simply transitional,  'Well' (cp. Eur.  Tro.  944);  G. 
makes the assumption that P.  finally escaped the watches in order to 
pass to the next argument. 
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a'U~A80I-L€V  •••  EKp1)~U: With this  chain of verbs  G.  summarises  the 
stages of the  alleged treason discussed in detail  in 6-10;  all  these 
necessary stages invented by him with the assistance of  probabilities 
(what  a  man  who  is  planning  to  betray  his  country  would  be 
expected to  do)  have been proved logically impossible. This string 
is given in asyndeton (cp. 21  J.Ae€'7W,  </JUlI-frrW,  J.Lup71Jp7]aa,w),  which 
introduces the  last general argument of this  part and consequently 
this is  the last concession of the defendant. EAU80v  AU~WV: cpo  ReI. 
4: Au{3ovau  KuL  ou  Aa8ovau. 
eOEL  o~-rr01)  •••  k,,/EVE'iO:  'I should perform that for the sake of which 
all these had been done, shouldn't I?'; 8frrrov  is slightly ironical, and 
thus I render it with the expression 'shouldn't I?' (Denniston 1954, 
p.267).  Palamedes  now  passess  to  the  commission of the  act  of 
treason  itself,  as  the  repetition  of  7TpaT7E~lI  in  11-13  shows 
('TT'paT7E~lI,  'TT'paT7WlI  11;  'TT'pii~~~,  'TT'all,($  a.pu •.•  'TT'paT7E~lI  12; 
'TT'paT7E~lI  ). 
'TOU'TO  'ToLwv •••  a.-rropW'TEpov:  notice the allitteration.  -rWV  ELP1'\I-LEVltlV: 
refers to  all the hypothetical stages developed in 6-10. It was even 
more difficult for him to commit the act (for the reasons that he will 
present in 11-12) than it was to prepare it. 
7Tpa:T"TltlV  fLEv •••  l1  fLEe'  €''TEpltlV;  we  should  make  this  a  question, 
because there  is  clearly another anthypophora here;  the following 
construction  starting with cLU'  oUX  is  the  answer that  the  rhetor 
gives to the question. 
'TWV  a'UVOV'TltlV:  Reiske's correction is preferable to  the Ms' reading 
nuv  VVV  OV7WV;  aVlIE~iJ-1.  appears  in the next line  and probably  G. 
indulges in another repetition here. 
ns  UI-Lwv  ~{,voL3E; AE,,/ETltl:  the deed was not the work of one man; 
the meaning is, 'I could not perform this action by myself and thus I 
needed accomplices: they must be among you'. The same argument 
is used for the prosecutor in 22  EL  OE  J.LE7€XWlI ..• 
234 OoUAOI.S  OE  ~  OUK  a:m.a-rov;:  'How could one believe that I used 
slaves?'; the idea is expressed with a litotes. 
EKOV1"€S •••  KClT"Tl1'0pouow:  <T€>  Reiske;  single  TE  IS  rare  In prose 
(Denniston 1954, p.  503;  cpo  Pal.  8,  and Hel.  14), but it occurs in 
Antiphon (see Gagarin, 1997, p.27).  E1r'  EAEUeepl.~: 'so as  to  be 
liberated'  (see MacDowell  1978, p.  83);  Lys.  7.16  EV  yap  av  7]07] 
on  Err'  EKEI.VOLe;;  -ryv  KU~  J.p.€.  np.wp-ryaCla8aL  KU~  aUToLe;;  p.-rpnJaaaLv 
J.AEv8EpoLe;;  YEvEa8aL.  XELj.L~Oj.L€VOI.  TE  01.'  ci.vci.1'K'TJv:  'forced by 
torture';  the  phrase  expresses  the  process  of basanos,  that  is  the 
statement  given  by  a  slave  under  torture  (see  MacDowell  1978, 
pp.245-247  and  1964,  p.79  n.22,  and especially Thiir  1977).  The 
evidence given by a slave  was  taken into  account only if it was 
given under torture  and usually  the  courts  trusted the  veracity of 
their statements  (cp.  Isaios  8.12  Kai.  orrOTav  OOVAOI.  KU~  J.AEV8EPOI. 
rrapayevwvTul.  KUI.  oe7J  eVpEefjvaf.  n  nov  ~7JTovp.evwv,  ou  xpfjaeE 
TULe;;  nov  J.AEv8epwv  p.ap-rvpLuLe;;,  dX\a  TOlle;;  OOVAove;;  f3uaavf.~ovTEe;;, 
OUTW  ~7JTELTE  EVpel.V  -n,v  d:l.Tj8ELUV  TWV  yeyev7]f.Levwv).  Nevertheless, 
it is  wiser to  assume that the orators had an opportunistic opinion 
about  the  reliability  of  slaves,  that  depended  much  on  the 
circumstances of each  individual  case;  Antiphon,  for instance,  in 
5.32 maintains  that the  statements  of slaves  are  affected by what 
they consider as  advantageous  for  them  (00"  av  J.KEI.VOI.e;;  f.LeAAW(IL 
XapLEl.aeUL)  whereas in 6.25, he takes the view that torture compels 
them to  tell  the  truth  (KUI.  EgEI.7]  p.€V  TOlle;;  eA€v8EpOVe;;  opKOLe;;  KUI. 
rrLaTEO'Lv  dvuYKa~Ec.v,  a.  TOLe;;  EA€v8epOLe;;  p.eyLaTU  KUI.  rr€p~  rrAELaTOV 
EaTLV,  J.gE£7]  oe  Toue;;  oovAove;;  €TEpULe;;  dvaYKULe;;,  vq;'  WV  KU~  ~v 
p.eAAW(ILV  a.rrOeavEZaeUL  KUTEL7T<)VT€S",  Op.ws- dVUYKa'ovTUI.  TdA7]8fj 
AeYELV).  OL'  ci.vci.')'K'T]v:  opposed  to  EKoVTEe;;.  KClT"Tl1'Opouaw: 
'denounce', not  'bring charges  against someone'; the verb  is  here 
intransitive (cp. Lys.14.46, Aischin.1.175). 
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KPEL1"iOVQ.s  Up.Wv:  'the enemy in larger numbers than you'; the idea 
is that it was not practical for P. to bring in enough of  the enemy. 
U1TEp  1"€'I.X€wV:  an 'Ionic' form, instead of  the 'Attic' TE~XWV; the wall 
of Troy was built by Poseidon and Apollo and it was  app7JKToV  (ll. 
21.447), whereas the Greek wall was constructed by mortals in the 
hope that it would protect themselves and their ships (ll.  14.67-68). 
a.1TQ.'V1"Il.  yo.p  1Tt.."P'fl  q,ut..<1Kwv:  Diels prints CPUAUKWV;  the same word 
appears  in  10  but  the  meaning  is  there  different.  The word here 
refers  to  the guards of the  walls,  not to  the watches.  In the iliad 
(10.56) we learn that the Achaean wall possessed a CPVAQ.KWV  tEpOV 
TEAoS" that counted seven leaders and one-hundred warriors under the 
supervision of each leader (9.80-88). It is interesting that a similar 
argument  is  employed  by  Helen  in  Euripides'  Troades  (955-8), 
where she claims that it was impossible for her to  escape from the 
Trojans, and that the guards of the wall can serve as  her witnesses 
(implying that each time she attempted to escape they stopped her). 
a.pQ.:  'logical' cpo  7TQ.VTWS"  C1.pu ..•  (Denniston 1954, p.40-1) 
u1TQ.(8pl.os  yo.p ••• a.ouvQ.'iOV  -Tjv  \-1.01.:  G.  closes the argumentation of 
the  first  part  with  a  striking  repetition  of 7TUV1'"-,  that  creates  a 
remarkable  alliteration.  The repetition  is  not  confined  to  the  last 
statement  expressed  in  the  last  line,  but begins  in the  preceding 
period,  which  deals  with  the  openness  of the  military  life.  The 
intention  of the  rhetor is  to  create  a  gradual  intensity  before  he 
reaches  the  conclusion  of this  part.  A  parody  of this  kind  of 
rhetorical expression can be traced in Plato's i'vfenex.  247a WV  EVEKU 
KuL  7Tptirrov  KuL  UaTUTOV  KuL  o~ci  7TUV1'"OS"  7TCiauv  7TQ.VTi»<;  iTpOeU}-LLUV 
7TEl.paa8E  EXE~V,  07TWS"  }-LciJ\~aTu  •••  u1ToL8pl.os:  'outdoors';  cpo  Xen. 
An. 7.6.24  U7TULepW~ 0'  E~W  EaTPU1'"07TEOEUE7'"E.  }-LEaoS"  O€  XELfJ-WV  ~v 
<1Tcl.V1"€.S>:  Reiske's  suggestion  is  correct,  because  it  adds  the 
missing subject and maintains the symmetrical arrangement with the 
repetition of the same word (miV1'"ES")  in the place of the subject of 
236 the  same verb  (OpWaL  /  opwrrraL)  repeated  in the  active  and the 
passive voice; -rrav-ras-,  proposed by Blass, seems unlikely as it does 
not  give  any  solution  to  the  missing  subject  and  disturbs  the 
symmetry. ml.~  cipa. ••• a.ouva  .. rov  -flv  (.1.01.:  the argumentation of  the 
first  part  creates  a  circle,  as  the  conclusion picks  up  the  opening 
words. The defendant has just proved that even if  he had wished to 
betray Greece to the barbarians he would not have been able to do it. 
In  the second part of  his speech Palamedes discusses in  detail the 
second part of his  programmatic  sentence  (5  oU.,-e.  Quva.p.e.vos-
E.~ou>.:~~v); he argues that even if  he had been able to  commit the 
crime of  treason,  it would have not been advantageous for him.  The 
examination of  possible motives is presented as a concession to  the 
first part.  P.  concedes - for the sake of  his argumentation- that it 
was possible to perform actions,  which  have already been proved 
impossible (et  (.I.cl.ALa-ra.  1l'a.v.,-wv  e.ouva.P.l1v ..•  ). The method of  this part 
is  a  combination  of  probabilities,  in  the  respect  that  he  invents 
probable motives  that would justify his  action  (notice  the  use of 
potential moods), and of  a survey of  a demonstration of  an idealised 
morality,  in the respect that our actions must be in accordance with 
what is commonly accepted. But we should not assume that Gorgias 
implies that a man should be moral just because this is a good thing. 
In  the  frame  of the  sophistic  relativism  he  treats  each  motive 
separately (as  the four probable reasons  that  made Helen follow 
Paris  in  Helen),  under  the  light  of the  most  important  cn"terion 
expressed in  a general and proverbial way in  ch.19:  men perform 
these  actions  either as  they pursuit gain,  or because  they  try  to 
avoid  a  loss.  Each  individual  action  then  should  be  judged  In 
connection to the crup.<?€POv and the W¢E.A.LP.OV.  The motives presented 
are  the  following:  a)  power,  b)  monetary  gain,  c)  honour,  d) 
security,  e) helping friends and harming enemies or e)  avoidance of 
a fear,  or of a  labour,  or of a danger.  Two  types of motives  are 
discernible:  the positive,  where  a  man  takes  active  initiatives  in 
237 order  to  gain  advantages  and  the  negative  where  a  man  is 
compelled  to  act  in  a  certain  manner  so  as  to  avoid  a  loss. 
Untersteiner (1954, p.135) who bases his interpretation of  this pan 
ofPalamedes on the  'epistemological' treatise of  Gorgias.  links the 
main  idea  of will  to  the  knowability of the  object that had been 
willed  and  suggests  that  "now  the  new  pivot  consists  in  the 
impossibility of  knowing that which  cannot have been  willed.  and 
therefore that which. since it does not exist as willed.  cannot be the 
object of objective knowledge ".  But I  am  inclined to  believe  that 
Long (1982. p.237) is on the right track when he claims that:  "This 
is rhetoric at its purest.  We  are being told that Palamedes plays all 
the roles which should dispose the judges in his favour,  and that it is 
their role.  as judges. to expect to hear such a recital of  virtues II and 
that he knows  "of  no more comprehensive survey of  Greek popular 
morality ".  The rhetor must be aware of  these motives.  so as to  add 
credibility to his speech.  One more point is worth our attention.  Up 
to  ch.19 Gorgias deals with the motives and he then (20-21) passes 
to the discussion of  the unlivability of  the life of  a traitor.  These two 
chapters  undoubtedly belong to  the  second part of the  speech  as 
well,  as  they  present the  negative  consequences  of the  immoral 
actions that precede and because Gorgias explicitly states that he 
has  reached  the  end  of his  argumentation  dealing  with  the 
impossibility of  the e.xistence of  such a will at the end of  21. 
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OKE.tfsaaBE  KO~vij  Kat  ,.OSE:  Reiske  prefers  -rOLIIVII,  but  the  same 
phrase, as Diels has shown, appears in Plato's Protagoras 330b (see 
also  Cr.48d,  nIt. ISle, Alc.1l7c, 124d, Lach.I8/d, Gorg.498e), and 
it is  not necessary to  change the :vis's reading. The orator calls  for 
the  attention of his  audience with a verb of thinking, as  he does  at 
the beginning of  ch.20. 
1'Tp0cr-i1KE  ~ou~"&TivaL  •••  E;ouvci.~,,v; the verb  71pOafjKE  introduces us  to 
the discussion of motives; P.  does not simply say 'for what reason 
238 would I have wished', but 'for what reason was  it appropriate  to 
wish'.  ei.  P.cl.AL<TTCt:  it is  not necessary to  add  Kat.  with Aldus, 
since  fUlAurra  expresses  the  needed  concession  sufficiently;  what 
follows is  a concession to what has already been proved impossible 
in ch.6-12. 
KCLK01"iJ"'TU:  "wickedness';  the  word  is  not  very  common:  it  has  a 
considerable appearance in Herodotos (cp. 2.124,126,128, 3.80 and 
elsewhwere),  and  it  appears  also  in  Thoukydides  (5.100)  and 
Antiphon (6.1). 
1TpO~Ka.:  'without  any  gain',  here  adverbially;  cpo  PI.  Ap.1ge  OL~ 
Toue;  p.£yl.O""I"Oue; ••• KctKLO""I"Oe;:  f.L€yf.a-rou~  K!'VQVVOU~  refers  to  all  the 
necessary stages for the preparation of the  treason, as presented in 
detail in ch.6-12, and -rr,v  f.L€yLa-r7JV  KaKOrrrra to  the crime that he 
allegedly committed. In this phrase Calogero (1976, p.413) discerns 
a prelude to  the famous Socratic principle nemo sua sponte peccat. 
The  admittedly  impressive  similarities  between  the  Defence  of 
Palamedes  and the Platonic Apologia both in fonn and in content 
were first demonstrated by Gomperz (1912, p.9ff.), and discussed in 
detail in more recent articles (Coulter 1964 and Feaver-Hare 1981). 
Notice the schema etymologicon. 
a.M'  E.V£Ka.  TOUTCJ.lV;  (Kat.  a.u8Le;  1Tpoe;  TOS'  E.1TctV£1.P.L):  Sauppe reads 
TOU,  and  the  Ms  TOUTWV;  our  decision  depends  much  on  the 
interpretation of  the TOO€  in the brackets, which should be taken with 
the  TLVOS"  EV€Ka.  of the opening sentence; however, the Ms' TOVTWV 
gives  a clear meaning,  as  it  is  a specific  reference  to  the  detailed 
discussion  of the  motives  that  follows;  it  also  makes  easier  the 
passage  to  the  first  proposed  motive,  expressed  with  the  word 
-rrOTE:POV of  at next line. 
""'pa.VV£LV:  in a general sense 'gain dominion'. The first reasonable 
motive with which the defendant proceeds to  the argumentation of 
the second part of  his speech. 
239 a.IJ\'  U\LWV;  a.IJ\'  a.ouva:rov: Aldus deletes the second dMd, but it is 
preferable to  retain it and add a  question mark before it,  and thus 
produce one more anthypophora, of which this part of Pal.  makes 
an overuse. 
'7"OO'OU-rwv  Kat  -rOI.OU"iC!.lV •••  -mJI..EWV:  this is  a brief, indirect E7TaI.VOS- of 
the  defendant's  compatriots,  who  are  presently  his  judges.  The 
meaning is  that it would be impossible to  gain power over them, 
since they possess so many strengths. Some of the virtues cited here 
recur in G.'s Hel.  4, where he praises the suitors of  Helen. But here, 
the main element of praise, that is  CToq;La,  is not mentioned at  all. 
This fact is understandable, if  we consider that P. has the monopoly 
of CToq;ia,  and  as  all  men aclmowledge  his  wisdom,  which  was 
proverbial (see note on ch.16). Furthermore, it was unadvisable for 
P. to stress his wisdom, for fear that envy might be felt by the juy of 
the  Greek  leaders  (cp.  note  on  E7T£q;eovov,  28).  The  E7TaI.VOS- is 
defined  by  Aristotle  as  AOYOS- €j.Lq;avL'wv  j.LEYEeOS- apErijs- (Rhet. 
1367b28), and elsewhere he divides the ayaea into those acquired by 
our efforts  (SvVaj.LEI.S)  and those attributable to  mere chance (ruX'lv 
1360b28);  a  typology  of praiseworthy  elements  is  presented  in 
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1440b: SEi:  SLEAOj.LEVOV  rijs  apErijs  ayaeel. 
Kat.  Tel.  EV  avrV rV  apErV  aVTa. In Iamblichus' De Vita Pythagorica, 
we  find  that Pythagoras,  in a  speech addressed to  young people, 
made  a  distinction  of  praiseworthy  attributes,  between  those 
assimilated and those which are inborn (WCTTE  TWV  j.LEV  cLUwv  TWV 
E7Tal.VOVf.LEVWV  Tn  f.LEV  oux  OLOV  TE  Eival.  7Tap'  eTEpov  f.LETaAafkLV, 
oiov  rryv  PWf.L7JV,  TO  KaMos,  rryv  uYEiav,  rryv  avopEiav,  Tel.  OE  Tav 
7TPOEf.LEVOV  OUK  EXEI..V  aVTOV,  oiov  TOV  7TAOVTOV,  Tas  apxel.s- ETEpa 
7TO'Uel.  TWV  7TapaAEL7T0f.LEVWV,  rryv  SE  ovvaTOV  eivaL  Kat.  7Tap'  €TEPOV 
f.LETa.Aa{3ELv,  Kat.  TOV  SOVTa  f.L7JOEV  ij-rrOV  aVTOV  EXEI..V  8,  42-43). 
a.pl.CT1"El.al.:  this  is  probably the only occurrence of a.purrEia  in  the 
plural, which is anyway a very rare word in prose (other occurrences 
include: Pl. Lg.942c, 943b; Lyk. Leokr.71.4). After apLCTTELal.  Blass 
prints  f.Laxwv,  and although all the virtues are expressed with a noun 
240 with a genitive, we should rather suggest that the symmetry is better 
maintained without Blass's addition:  genitive noun, genitive no~ 
dPLOIE'iUI., noun genitive, noun genitive. 
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Eo\.<)  wv  1'l'OMOUS;  'for I am one and they are many'; the author of the 
Anonymous lamblichi  clearly  allows  for  the  possibility  that  one 
single man can impose his will on the majority, but at the same time 
he overtly stigmatises the means by wich this is achieved:  oEL  yap 
TOV  avopu  TOUTOV,  oS"  rryv  OLK7]V  KUTaAVG"EI.  KUI.  TOV  vop.ov  TOV  7T-G.G"L 
KOI.VOV  KUI.  G1JP.~€POVTU  d~Ul.pTjG"ETa.L,  doup.6.vTLVOV  YEV€0-8UL,  EL. 
P.€MEI.  G1JII.TjG"El.V  TUUTU  -rrupa  TOU  -rrIl.Tj8ovS"  1"CtlV  dv8pu'mwv  dS"  WV 
-rrupa  -rrOMwv  (7.15). 
12. 
1'l'e£(]"Q.s  'Tl  ~t.a.oUtJ-evo<);  see  notes  on He!. 
ilia.  "Ie  -ro.U-ro. ••• 3E1;a.a€ut.:  'but it is  very  foolish  to  accept  and 
concede these things';  (.Lwp£a.s:  Untersteiner (1961, p.120) explains 
that  "il  disprezzo  comperso  nella  parola  !J-WPLU  corrisponde  al 
criteria  intellettualistico  dell'  epoca",  and  he  compares  the  word 
with Anonymus lamblichi (7,13), where p.wpiu is attributed to  those 
who believe that someone can become king or tyrant without using 
devious  means  (cp.  also  Soph. Ant.  469-470,  G"O~  0' €L.  OOKW  VUV 
Hdt. 1. 13 1,  PI.  Prot.  317a,  Thuc.4.64.1,  5.41.3). 
SE~a.a€a.t.:  Diels  prints  7Tl.OI€UG"UL,  but  he  suggests  that  7Tl.OI(jjqUL 
would fit equally well, meaning 'ransom given for freedom', but the 
Ms' reading gives  a very clear me3.Iling  (TO-UTa..  internal  acc.).  G. 
simply states that it is  not reasonable to  accept that the barbarians 
would prefer slavery to power, just in order to recompense P.  for his 
services. The infinitives are close synonyms, but G. uses the schema 
EV  ol.a  ovoLv. 
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a.M.a.  XP'llll-a.'TU •••  KEK'T"TW'CU.:  Blass prints j.LErpLa.  j.L€:v,  but the contrast 
here is with the preceding clause. p.E.'TPI.a.:  'enough money' (cp. Xen. 
(vr.2.4.14. aM' el  8EAeL<;,  e</nJ,  Ej.L€:  TrEj.Lr/JaL,  LTiTiEa<;  j.L0L  Trpo08et.<; 
OTT"C)aOL  oOKovaL  j.L€7'pLOL). 
a.M.'  oUX .••  ~Sovwv: self-restraint is connected to  the popular view of 
aW<j;poaUv7J.  As North (1966, p.93) puts it in her comparison of the 
moral aspects of  Pal.  to  those of  Hel., "such conformity to  tradition 
is  probably  more  essential  in  a juridical speech - even  a  model 
speech  - than  in  epideictic".  That  such  an  expression  was  of 
common use is shown in Plato's Gorgias 491d ovoEl:v  TrOLKi;"ov,  aM' 
Wo-rrep  o[  TrOMOl.,  aWcPpova  QV-ra,  KaL  EYKparij  avrov  eavrov,  rwv 
i]oovwv  KaL  ETiL8vj.LLWV  apxovra  rwv  EV  e<lvr4J  (cp. Pl.R.430e-431a, 
Xen.Cyr.8.L32.,  Is.3.44;  see  Dover  1974,  pp.124-6,  208-9).  An 
echo of this kind of morality can be traced back to Hesiod's Works 
and Days (286-292). Schmid (1940, p.68) claimed, and Untersteiner 
followed him  (1961,  p.  122),  that what is  stated here  contradicts 
G. 's aesthetic views, where hedonism is dominant. But if  we believe 
the testimonia (T  est. 13 ), the idea expressed here is in conformity to 
G.'s way of life; when asked to explain how he attained  longevity 
he  answered:  'because I  did nothing  for  my own  pleasure'  (see 
Introduction). And what is more important, G.  is  chiefly interested 
in producing a perfect portrait for his  own defendant, not in being 
consistent with his personal views. 
a:rro  1rAOU"T"OU •••  K-roa6<lI.:  'from wealth and showing off'; The same 
idea  is  found  in  Xenophon's  Oeconomicus  14.10,  where  the 
difference between a greedy and a cPI..Mmj.Lo<;  is  that the latter wishes 
€Traivov  KaL  Tl.j.L7]s- €VEKa  KaL  TrOVE{;V  01TOV  OEZ  Kat.  KLVOVVEVE1.V  Kat. 
aLaxpwv  K€POWV  dTrExe08al.. 
fJoa.p-rupa.  m..O"'TOv ••• €O"'Te:  'My witness  is  my  life,  and  you  are  the 
wimesses  of this  witness';  the  Ms  reads  1Jre;  but  a  hortatory 
subjunctive is  more usual in the first  person plural.  Blass's  €are, 
242 setting off  a real fact seems more likely (cp. And. 1. 37 EV  up.Zv  ya.p 
~crav  01.  AOyOt..  Ka£  p.ot.  up.e'iS"  'T'ov.wv  P.c1.p7"VpES"  Ecr'T'e,  and 
Dem.21.18, Lys.10.1, 12.74)  mtpol.x0p.e:vov  ~(.ov: repeated in 22 and 
29.  G.  conceives  of a  stratagem;  given  the  lack  of witnesses 
(ouOE'T'epoS"  -ryp.wv  -rrapExe'T'at.  p.c1.p7"Vpa  22)  he  transforms  the judges 
into  wimesses,  as  he will  soon transform  the  prosecutor into  his 
accomplice. 
16 
Kal.  p.."v:  'progressive' (Denniston 1954, p.351) 
np.-Tis  e:VEKa.:  'for honour'; this is the third possible motive. 
p.ecrws  <j>pOVl.p.os:  'moderately  wise';  but  P.  was  not  only  a 
moderately  wise  man,  but  also  a  man  chiefly  honoured  for  his 
wisdom. Notice that </Jpovt.p.oS" recurs in 26, opposed to  dvo-r]'T'ouS"  and 
closely related to the concept of  wisdom. 
Ka.K0'T"T1'TOS: 'wickedness'; see note on l3. 
Enp.wp.'llv  ••• em.  <1'O<j>(.~:  With  the  chiastic  arrangement  P. 
characterises both the judges and his virtue with the same adjective. 
His intention is not merely to flatter the judges, but also to stress his 
own virtue, given that it is  important to  be praised for  something 
honourable by honourable men. This is an indirect praise (as the one 
of the  suitors  of Helen  in  his  He!.  4).  The  wisdom  of P.  was 
proverbial  (cp.  AI. Frogs  1451  ev  y' W llaAc1.p.7]OeS",  W cro</JW'Tc1.'7J 
</Jvcrt.s and PI. Phdr.261d). 
17 
a.cr<j>a.AeLa.s  OUVEKa.:  'for the sake of security'; notice that the opening 
words  of this  paragraph  (KaL.  J-I-7Jv  ouo')  are  identical  with  the 
preceding  one.  Blass  rightly  corrects  ria</JaMs  to  dcr</JaAeCas  and 
deletes wv. The insecurity of the life of a traitor will be discussed in 
ch.20,21, in terms of a {3£oS"  d{3£W'Toc;.  In Plato's '-vfeno  (71e) the idea 
that  the  man who  possesses  dpe-rTJ  takes  precautions,  in  order to 
ensure his dcr</Ja.Ael.a. is attributed to G  .. 
243 ,.oV  (.LEV  ya.p ...  d.'Tt.ll-aJ;,€I.: the explanation of  why one who betrays his 
country becomes  an enemy of the law,  of justice, of gods and of 
men is given with a striking repetition. Diels rightly proposes that TO 
O€  eeiov  dnj-Lci.~EI. should be placed before TO  OE  7TAfj80~  ow.c/>8e[pel., 
as  G.  would hardly  avoid  the  creation  of one  more symmetrical 
period (cp. Hei. 7). 
ci~el.a.v:  G.  enjoys  circular  composition  and  thus  he  closes 
another paragraph with the word that he uses in its first sentence. 
18 
ilia. o..q  <l>C\ous •••  ciOLK-TJO"€L€V:  'But was it because I wanted to  help 
my  friends  and hann my  enemies? For this  is  a  good reason for 
someone to  act unjustly'; this is  a traditional concept. It is possible 
that G.  himself considered that someone who acts according to this 
concept is  in conformity with the requirements  of dperr]  (cp.  PL 
Meno  71e  TOV~  j-LEv  cPLAOV~  ED  7TOI.Eiv,  TOV~  0'  Ex.epOV~  KUKW~; 
evidence  is  also  offered  by  Xenophon  (Cyr.L6.31:  OI.WPI.'E  oE 
TOVTWV  a.  Te  7TpO~  TOV~  cPLAOV~  7TOI.7]7"€OV  KUt.  a  7TpO~  Ex.ePOV~  ...  KUt. 
TOV~  cPLAOV~  OLKUI.OV  erT]  E~U7TUTa.V  E7TL  ye  dyu80  KUt.  KA€7TTeI.V  Tei 
TWV  cPLAWV  E7T!.  dyu80) if, of course, we believe, with Nestle 1939-
1940,  that  the  OI.Oci.o"Ka.AO~  of this  passage  is  G.  (more  important 
information on this issue is provided by Ploutarkhos, for which see 
fr.21  with notes ad loc.)  Helping friends  and hanning enemies is 
presented as a justification ofan unjust act (cp. Dissoi Logoi 3.6; on 
the relations of this common concept and justice see Blundell 1989, 
p.SO).  Untersteiner (1961, p.122; see also  1954, p.179) claims that 
the meaning here contradicts  d~l.w in 31, and thus  there is a 01.0"0"0s-
i\oyos- which is  peculiar to  G.'s ethics, and this can be explained on 
the basis of  KUI.P(J,.  This interpretation seems biased, since in 31  G. 
asks the judges to treat him exactly as he treated them, that is justly. 
a:ya.ewv •••  ~  1T'pa.~t.s:  The  criterion upon  which  men  should rely  in 
order  to  reach  a  secure  estimation  of the  effectiveness  of their 
actions is  the acquisition of a good. Up  to  this point G.  deals with 
244 motives related to the pursuit of gain'.  E.")'K"I"'TlO"l.v:  Reiske proposed 
K-rijaLv  for the Ms' senseless  €XnaLV,  but since  €YKT7pLV  (adopted 
by Kalligas) is closer to  the Ms' reading, which offers a compound 
word, it should preferably be adopted. It is certainly a rare word, but 
it is traced in Xen. Hell. 5.2.19, and Arist. Oec.1347a2. 
19 
TO  OE  AOl."rrOV  eO"Tt.v ••• :  In this  paragraph  the  negative  aspect  of 
motives  is  discussed  briefly;  the  phrase  means  that  after  the 
elimination of all the positive motives, what is still probable is  that 
he  performed these  actions  in  avoidance  of a  loss  (for  a  similar 
construction see PI. Soph. 219d5). 
Ei:  'T'I.Va.  <!>O~OV  •••  KI.VOUVOV:  'in avoidance of  a fear, or of  a labour or of 
a danger'; in this context the words may refer to military virtue. In 
Hel.  16  these words are used to  describe the psychological state of 
fighters  who  face  the  armature  of their  enemies.  m5vOV:  the 
inconveniences of military life. A good soldier should normally be 
able to  endure them and this was considered as  a moral behaviour; 
cp. Xen. Hell. 5  .1.16: ED  raTE  OTT.  Ta.ya8d.  Ka~ 'Td.  KaAd.  €K-rrJaa-ro  OU 
(the subj ect is TJ  ·mJALS'). 
1Ta:vTES  mlll'Ta. ••• q,EU"!OVTES: This is the definition of human motives: 
the actions of men obey this rule universally. What is said does not 
correspond to  the conformity to  tradition and common ideas of the 
preceding  chapters.  On  the  contrary,  this  economical  formulation 
demands both the analytical skills and the accuracy in expression of 
an intellectual. And this potential is of  course attributable to  G  .. 
oaa.  oe ••.  KaKWS  ~a.UTOV E1TOI.OUV:  It has been assumed that after the 
word 7TavovpYEI.'TaL  there is  a lacuna;  the emendations proposed are 
the following:  a)  <p.aviaS'  EaT1.V.  oaa  be>, proposed by  Sauppe and 
adopted by Untersteiner, b)  <KaKOI.S'  7TEPLf3a.AAELV  ErwBEV  P.Eya.AOLS' 
'T(JV  1Tpa.'T'TOV'Ta.  Ws- De  P.a.ALaT'  av>  Keil and Diels, and c)  S  ykutris 
245 (1927 p.859) and Melikoff-Tolstoj suggest that it is not necessary to 
assume that there is a lacuna. Sykutris considers that G.  could have 
easily  passed  from  a  general  statement  to  the  particular  case  of 
Palamedes; he thus adds oe  after KrJ.KWs- and he deletes - with Aldus 
- yap, although he does not make up his mind whether it should be 
attributed  to  a  dittography  from  the  following  rrpcl.TT'ELV,  or to  a 
misreading of  an abbreviation added to the margin. Melikoff-Tolstoj 
(who inserts the necessary o·n) brings evidence that the stucture oou 
oe ... <on>  KrJ.KOk ••• rrJ.vrrJ.  [yap} rrpcl...-rwv,  OUK  aD7JAov  is  possible in 
prose.  I  consider  that  (a)  and  (b)  presuppose  a  great  dose  of 
conjecture.  (a)  links  this  passage,  with the discussion of madness 
(25-26) which seems to me irrelevant to the content of  this passage. 
(b) renders a more neutral sense, but repeats what G.  says after the 
lacuna.  I  think that we should follow  Sykutris,  as  his  suggestion 
does not affect much the reading of the Ms, and because G.  could 
easily pass from a general statement to the particular case of P. (cp. 
HeL  8-9 TrJ.VTrJ.  oe  wS'  OVTWS'  €XEl.  OE£~W. DeL  De  KrJ.~  oofrj  oe'i~rJ.l.  TO'iS' 
,  ,  )  a.KOVOVUI.  • 
~tW!l-a.  'TTpO,,!ovwv:  'the dignity of my ancestors';  cpo  Dem.18.149 
TaS'  oe  KOLvaS'  rrporJ.LpeueLS'  ElS'  Ta  KOLva  TWV  rrpoyovwv  a.~LWIl-rJ.T' 
LEfla.  'Tra,"rp4ia.:  'ancestral cults'; cpo  Bekker, Anecdota 1.297 rrrJ.Tp(jjrJ. 
A€yOVUI.V  01.  PTrrOPES'  xpTJIl-rJ.TrJ.  KrJ.L  KTTJIl-rJ.TrJ.  KrJ.~  TorrovS',  rrcl.TpLrJ.  oe 
Ta  e87J  KrJ.~  Ta  V0Il-l.Il-rJ.  KrJ.~  Ta  Il-vaT7jpLa.  KrJ.L  TaS'  €OpTcl.S',  rrrJ.TpLKoV  oe 
cpt.AOV  .:ry  exftpov, but hardly can the meaning be separated. We should 
suggest that at least the two first words take over different meanings 
in different contexts (cp. Dissoi Logoi 3.7, Is.  2.46, Din.  l.99; see 
Strauss 1993,24-5). 
a.  O£  "lTlicn. •••  ~Vexel.pLaa.: 'I would have entrusted what are commonly 
considered  the  most  precious  things  to  those  who  have  harmed 
them'.  ci.OLK-Tjaa.cn.V:  Diels, for the Ms' a.ClLK7]8E'i(n;  active voice is 
needed, because P.  refers to  the Trojans, and we do  not expect him 
to call them a.OI.K7]8E'iUI..  G. attempts a reductio ad absurdum. 
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O1(~.j1a.aBE  OE  Kctl..  -roSE:  the phrase picks up  the beginning of ch.13, 
as  G.  constantly invites the judges to  follow his vivid reasoning by 
using their own minds. The idea of 20, 21  is  that if P.  had betrayed 
Greece, his life would have been unlivable both in Greece and in the 
territory of  the barbarians. 
a.~LW"!"oS" 0  ~LoS": 'an unlivable life'; Untersteiner says that "this is  an 
Empedoclean  expression"  (1961,  p.124)  and  he  compares  it  to 
31B2,3.  But  Calogero  (1976,  pAlS,  n.14)  has  shown  that  this 
passage is irrelevant, and that the Empedoclean phrase, as  given by 
Untersteiner, is  a conjecture of Scaliger. He also points out that the 
same  expression  occurs  in  Plato's  Apology  38a  (there  it  is 
aV€;E'T'acrT"OS- f3Los- that is unlivable), to  which we may add Antiphon 
2.2.10:  €'TrL  T€  yap  rij TOLOVTOU  ow.cp8opCf,  af3LWTov  TOV  AOL'TrOV  f3Lov 
oLCI;w  (see also Xen. MernA.8.8, and Ar. Wealth 967-9). 
ci:rrEI.XE1"O  !-L0l.:  literally,  'hold oneself off a  thing',  but here  the 
meaning is 'who  ...  would not have attempted to kill me'  . 
Ka.MLO"'M'}S  1"I.!J-l1s: namely, (IoCPl.o,s- (cp. 16). 
1TCLfl0I.X0!J-EV<tl  ~L<!.l •••  a:rroppLt/sa.V1U;  These 'TrOVOL  will be discussed in 
his brief autobiographical  account of ch.29-32.  The idea is  that it 
would not be reasonable to reject his fame and all the efforts he has 
made in his previous life for ape-Til. 
21 
m.<I1"~ av  8I.EKEL!J-"T1V:  it picks up  ch.8, where P.  claimed that even 
the barbarians would not believe him. The person who  betrays his 
country  to  its  enemies  comes  to  be  considered  untrus!VIonhy  by 
those same enemies as well. 
a:m<I1"01"a.1"OV  Ep-yov:  the  action  1S  called  ci-m<ITOTo,-r-oV,  but 
ci~LaJ61""a'ToS'  is  in  fact  the  man  who  performs  such  actions 
(enallage) . 
247 ci.1TO~aAOVTa.  - EK1t'EaOVTa.  - <P"I'OVTa.:  Reiske  reads  d7rof3aAWV, 
€K7r€(JWV,  cpuywv,  and Diels follows him. Untersteiner (1961  p.124) 
on the other hand follows Sykutris (1927), who has shown that the 
verb  dvaAci.{3ol.  can take on the meaning CPt.AI.KWs- u7rooex€0'8al.  and 
Cpt.Ao~Evf.av  d7ToOI.OOval.  (he compares the Plato's Epistle 7.329d) and 
that the phrase 0  oe  7TL(rnV  instead of 7T1.a-rI.V  oe  is  dictated by a 
reversal  of the  subject  (cp.  7T€P~  'TOtl'TWV  oe  Aeywv  4).  011.  IJ-E:V 
ouv ...  ou,.'  av  OUVcl.P.EVOS"  Ej30UAOP.1lV:  it is necessary to  add a phrase 
repeating the keystones of his argumentation, since it is a common 
practice of G.  to  create circles. j.J.€'Td.  'TaV'Ta  in 22 also indicates that 
G.  intends  to  go  on with a  new argument.  It would be better to 
adopt  Leo's  conjecture  which  corresponds  to  the  order  of the 
argumentation of  6-21, rather than Keil's, which reverses the order. 
In  the following part of his speech  22-27,  Gorgias  addresses the 
prosecutor.  He  elaborates his argumentation with an interrogation 
(erotesis),  which  is  addressed  directly  to  the  litigant.  It  is  thus 
reasonable that this part of the Defence is written  in  the second 
person,  which  obviously adds  theatricality to  the  arguments.  But 
given  that  this  speech  does  not refer to  real facts  the  questions 
posed by the defendant are never answered by the prosecutor.  The 
overall result of  this interrogation is to cast doubt on the credibility 
of  the prosecutor; this is achieved by two different ways. In  22 - 24, 
the  emphasis  is placed on  the  truth  /  opinion  antithesis.  In  other 
words,  Gorgias discusses in  detail what has already been outlined 
in  5,  namely the suspicion that Odysseus has based his charges on 
86~a. In  25 - 26 his efforts are concentrated on the demonstration of 
the contradictory character of  the charges brought against him  by 
Odysseus,  who  had  claimed  that  in  P. 's  personaliry  there  is  a 
coexistence of  two opposite,  and mutually exclusive characteristics 
(p.av(a  /  (Joq,[o.).  In  27 he introduces the descnption of  his  EmELKES 
ethos. 
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-rrpO$  ,.ov  Ka:rr]"}'OpoV  SLa.Aex&Tlva.L:  G.  introduces  the  erotesis; 
Coulter (1964  p.276, p.302, n.23) notes that an interrogation of the 
opponent is  also  found  in the Platonic Apology 24b-28a and  that 
"although rare,  is nevertheless  found in three of the Attic  orators" 
(Dem. 46.10, Lys. 12.25 and 22.5, And. 1.14). 
n.VL  'Tl'O-rE:  'What  in  the  world  do  you  trust  then'  accurately 
translated  by  Kennedy  (1972  p.79);  it  may  be  that  G.  uses  a 
prosbole, as  he passes immediately to the question at stake.  'T£v~  is 
neuter  and  expresses  both  d.A#7e~a.  and  Soqa.,  and  7TO'T€  adds 
intensive force (cp. PI. Ap.21b). 
-roLOU'T"O$ •••  Ka.'Ml'Y0pels:  the first 'TOl.oihos- refers to  Odysseus and the 
second  to  P.  himself and  they  have  a  bad  and  a  good  sense 
respectively;  the  alliteration of It  I  is  worth attention as  well  (cp. 
Soph. Phil. 1049 ou  yap  'TOI.OV'TWV  8ei:,  'TOI.OV'TOS- eliJ-'  eyw). 
otO$  wv •••  a.vd.~1.a.: my suggestion is a combination of  the emendations 
of Blass (ota.  AeYElS  ~) and Kalligas  (oIoS"  WV  ,\EYE~S- dis  dvciq~os­
dvciq~a.). The former emended the ol8cis- yE  raws- of A,  but the ora. 
,\EYE~S- can hardly be explained by ava.g£lP. Kalligas prints Blass's dis, 
but  he  does  not  adopt  oia.  '\€YE~S-,  which  creates  a  Gorgianic 
symmetrical chiasm. The sophist is well aware that the judges in the 
context of a courtroom consider the ethos (oIos- wv)  of the litigants 
as presented in their logoi (oia.  ,\EYEI.S"),  and this is why he will not 
try to present the negative aspects of Odysseus as  a 7TpoaW7Tov  at all 
(cp. 27; see Introduction). Odysseus' ethos will be presented only in 
connection with the  proportion of truth  that  can be  traced  in his 
words, whereas P. will fully discuss his own ethos in 28-32. 
€.i.o~  a.KPI..~~ i1  oo~ci.~U)v;: the idea expressed in 5 will now be fully 
developed. These are the qualifications that transform Odysseus into 
either a.qwS"  or dvciq~os-. But as  will be shown (22-24), the prosecutor 
is  lacking  the  first  and  relying  on  the  second;  hence  his 
chracterisation as  avcigl.oS" from the opening lines.  Oo~a.z;,U)v:  IS 
249 more emphatically opposed to  an  absolute knowledge than OOKEZV 
(Schmid cited by Untersteiner 1961 p.12S). 
a.  !-Lev  ya.p  a.~: this  possibility  will  be gradually  refuted;  the 
schema used for  this  refutation is  based on a string of hypotheses 
(U3wv,  jJ-ETexwv,  1T'IJ80jJ-EVOS').  The objective knowledge of a deed is 
presented here as much dependent on senses. G. is clever enough to 
transform  the  prosecutor into  an  eye-witness,  an  accomplice or a 
mere  witness  of the  crime  allegedly  committed by the  person he 
defends (see note on 11). 
TOU  <p.E.T€x.OV'iOS">:  Blass's addition of the participle contributes to 
the cohesion of the text, since the idea is-repeated (TOU  jJ-ETexovToS' 
,  ,  )  aKovaaS'  . 
q,pO.aov ••• -rov  xpovov:  <TOV  TPO-rrOV>  is  the conjecture of Blass; 
Radennacher's suggestion is  rppa.aov  TOUS  TP07TOVS  (1914 p.88 n.l) 
and he  does  not seem particularly interested in the number of the 
noun ("in irgend einer Form"). The suggestion of  Blass is preferable 
since  the  singular  corresponds  better  to  the  T07TOV  and  )(povov. 
Radennacher  has  also  pointed  out  that  the  last  two  categories 
express the notion of  Kac.pos.  Kennedy, who follows him (1963 p.66-
7), holds that "Any given problem involves choice or compromise 
between two  antitheses  so  that consideration of kairos,  that is  of 
time,  place,  and  circumstance  (e.g.  Pal.  22),  alone  can  solve  the 
dilemma and lead to  the choice of relative truth and action".  This 
seems to  me an irrelevant remark: literary Kac.pos  (see fro  13) should 
be distinguished from the argument built on the examination of the 
circumstances in which the crime that Palarnedes is accused of was 
allegedly committed. Buchheim (1989 p.180, n.29) believes that in 
this  expression there is  something ("erwas")  from  the threshold of 
the  philosophical  categories  of Aristotle  (Categories  IV  1  b25 ff). 
Kalligas  maintains  that  this  is  the  first  time  that  a  rhetor  creates 
probable arguments based not only on the 7TpoaW7Tov  as  Cora.-x  and 
T  eisias  did,  but  on  the  p lace,  the  time  and  the  particular 
circumstances  of the  case  he  deals  with  (1991  p.259,  n.21);  cpo 
250 Quint. Inst. Grat.  3.  15 sed quid res poscat, quid personam deceat, 
quod sit tempus,  qui iudicis animus intuiti,  humano quodam modo 
ad scribendum accesserimus. 
kAeETW •••  tLap-rup11oUTW;  one more asyndeton creating a  climax (cp. 
10 avv-rj1l.80fJ-EV ... ). 
ouoe:repos  UtLwv:  neither  the  prosecutor,  nor  the  defendant  have 
called a witness. P.  has said in 15  that the most credible witness he 
can produce is his own life. 
23 
Wo;  aU  o/1:1s:  the phrase refers to  yevofJ-€VWV;  P. has already stated that 
he has never performed the deeds of  which he is accused (5). So the 
meaning is 'according to your account', namely that P.  betrayed the 
Greeks to the Trojans. P. uses material from the opponent's speech, 
which was delivered before the speech of defence. But as this is  a 
model speech, it is G. who creates the opponent's statementens only 
to be answered in the defence of  the hero. 
-rn.  \JoEV  'Yo.p ••• tLap-rtJp11&Tjva.l.:  'It is impossible to bring evidence for 
something  that has  never happened';  the  Ms  reads  dyEV7]Ta.  7TlJJS" 
dovva:ra  fJ-UPTlJp7]8fjVUL  which  makes  perfect  sense,  and  no 
emendation is required (7TWs- <OUK> dOVVUTU  Aldus,  7TWS"  av  OVVULTO 
Radermacher,  followed  by  Kalligas,  7Ta.VTWS"  dOVVUTU  Keil).  The 
impossibility of having knowledge on the  truth of something that 
has  never  occurred  (  cpo  5),  now  turns  into  impossibility  to 
communicate something that has never happened. This shift reminds 
us  of the argument of the incommunicability of truth in ONB.  1rWs 
adds ironical tone to argument 
'TrepL  SE  TWV  'YEVO\-LE.VWV ••• EUPEI.V:  The  passage  presents  textual 
difficulties.  The  suggestions  can  be  divided  into  two  groups:  a) 
Die1s and Reiske, followed by Kalligas (who prints Diels' addition) 
suppose  that  there  is  a  lacuna bet\Veen  clMa.  and  aof.;  the  former 
prints <KuL  dVUYKUZOV'  dMo.> ...  <TE  fJ--r,>  fJ-0vov,  and the latter <KuL 
8f.KULOV  KuL  1ra.vu  clVUYKUZOV> ...  ovv  .ryv  OU  fJ-0vov,  b)  S ykutris  -
251 followed by Untersteiner and Buchheim - has shown that it is  not 
necessary to  assume the existence of any lacuna,  for it  leads  to  a 
misinterpretation  of the  phrase,  and  thus  he  prints  7Tep~  Se  nov 
yevof1-€VWV  ou  p.ovov  OUK  d3UvaTov,  dAAo.  Ka~  pq.Swv,  ouoe  p.ovov 
pq.owv,  dA.\o.  ao~  f1-€V  OUK  ~v oiov  <Te> f1-ovov  p.cr.p'TVpa"  elMO.  Kal. 
tj;euoof1-aprvpa,  eupe'iv  (Untersteiner and  Buchheim  do  not  print  a 
comma after the p.ap'TVpa,).  I follow  (b) because the necessity of a 
f1-ap'TVp£a  in a context discussing the possibility of such a p.ap'TVp£a 
seems irrelevant (see Buchheim 1989 p.lS0, n.30). The equitability 
(raov)  does  not  imply responsibilities,  but  the  possibility  (or the 
impossibility)  for each litigant to  bring witnesses.  Odysseus  could 
make  his  accusation  more  credible  (7TLO'TOT€pav)  if  he  called 
witnesses  (22),  and  this  implies  that  the  use  of false  witnesses 
(which explains the pq.owv) cannot not be overlooked. And to put it 
in a more cynical way the one who is facing the dvcr.YK7J  (defined in 
chA as a dangerous teacher) is P. who defends his life, not Odysseus 
who wishes to put him to death (see also Untersteiner 1961 p.126). 
ouo€.'repov: picks up ovoETepov of  22, where P.  states a fact, whereas 
here it is  explained why he is not able  to  bring witnesses of any 
kind. 
24 
on  fl-EV •••  <J>a.vE.pov:  the subjective lmowledge of 5 expressed in the 
first  person  (aaq;w,  olSa)  became  through  the  argumentation  an 
objective and obvious (q;av€pov) truth. 
TO  o-q  AovlTov •••  3o~c1~e.I.V:  given that  Odysseus  does  not  lmow  the 
truth, he relies on doxa, et tertium non dalUr.  TO  8~  AOI.7TOV:  cpo 
19. 
e.L-ra:  expresses surprise and sarcasm (LSJ);  cpo  .Ar.  Wealth  79  EZT' 
eaiya"  motho, wv; 
ToA~'T1pOTa.T€": with a negative sense (cp. Antiphon 2.3.1  civa~8-r"  Kal. 
TOA.p.7JpO,).  This is  the only adjective used in the characterisation of 
Odysseus. 
252 ei.~: Saga  plays an important role in G.'s 
rhetoric. The word has both an active and a passive sense, as  it can 
be  used by the metor in order to  impose his  own opinion on his 
audience through the power of logos and at the same time it is the 
thing  that  men chiefly  trust  although  it  is  a:lTLo-rOTaTOV.  In other 
words a rhetor must be aware of the fact that men, unable to have a 
thorough knowledge of  things, are condemned to rely on their 86';0., 
which in Hel.  13- is opposed to  T€XV7J,  not to  truth as  in Pal.  (see 
Segal 1962,  145, n.59, and note on Hel.  11) and this knowledge in 
combination with the effectiveness of speech (.\01'0,  T€XV7J  ypacp€£, 
He!.  13  ) - defined as ovvucrM]S  fJ-€yas  in He!.  8 - is what offers the 
rhetor the possibility to mislead his audience (So';a  is found again in 
35). 
'TTEpI.  Sava:roll  OI.WKELV:  'bring capital charge against someone' (cp. 
Xen.  Hell.  7.3.6  £J  allOp€,  1ToA'2TaL,  ~fJ-€7s  TovTovai.  TaUS 
a.1TOKELvallTas  Eucppolla  OI.WK0fJ-EV  1T€pi.  8alluTov); it is interesting that 
the outcome of Odysseus' conspiracy in the myth is used by G.  as 
the penalty with which P. is threatened. But betrayal was not always 
punished with death penalty (see MacDowell, 1978, p.177). 
T04~s: picks up TOAfJ-7JpO'T'aT€;  his acts correspond to  his character 
(ethos). 
-ro  yE  3o~a.oul.  •••  <70q,oYrepos:  86ga  is  something  that  all  men  are 
sharing (but in He!.  11, one finds a more elaborate discussion of it). 
This phrase creates a logical gap:  how would Odysseus be able to 
approach and state the truth, since he,  as  everyone, is  a victim of 
saga?  The only way was to  trust his  senses  (22)  and  then bring 
evidence  of what he has  seen  or heard.  But  his  intentions  were 
obviously  other  than  to  produce  an  accusation  on  the  basis  of 
knowledge  of truth.  KOI.VOV  a:rra.crt.  'TTEpI.  'TTa.v-rWV:  doxa  is  here 
presented as  the state of mind of all men, whereas in Hel.  11  some 
men,  namely  those  who  possess  the  .\6·ywv  T€:XV7J,  have  freed 
themselves  from  the  bonds  of doxa.  It  is  evident  that  doxa, 
conceived of as a universal state of  the human mind, detracts much 
253 from the prosecutor's credibility. ~ep05:  the comparative is here 
ironicaL 
ill OU"T"E •••  SO~5: Goebel (1989 p.48-9) compares this passage with 
Antiphon 2.2.10  and says:  "What is  subjectively a  conjecture  is 
objectively a probability, and it is clear that G.  is here exploiting the 
antithesis of truth and probability in the same way as Antiphon [ ...  ] 
the 'knowledge' he claims is merely his own 'certain knowledge"'. 
25 
ao4>tav  Kat  !l.a.vtav:  G.  is using these antithetical notions, so  as  to 
prove that the prosecution is  inconsistent (the so-called dillema or 
dillematon). It is impossible to give one definition of  what G. means 
by the word aoo/La,  since it is his common practice to  describe the 
same  notion  in different ways  (cp.  Hel.  KOOP_OC;  rjJuxfj ••. aoo/La  (1), 
aocpLac;  €1TLKrfrrOU  (4),  cpLAoaocpwv  AOYWV  (13); in Pal.  uo/'  uJ-Lwv  €1Tl. 
aoo/Lq.  (16),  rwv  cLAAWV  aOo/Wrepoc;  (24);  fr.23  <3  r'  d7Ta-riaas 
oLKaLcYrepoc;  rov J-L7J  d7Ta'T'fJaavroc;  Kal.  a  d7Ta"1"7j8€~c; croo/Wrepoc;  rov p.7J 
ci7ra:rry8€.-vroc;).  The discussion of  the various meanings of  the word is 
a very difficult issue (for a detailed analysis see G1adigow 1965; see 
also  Kerferd 1981  pp.24-25).  Buchheim has accurately stated that 
p.avLa  and aocpLa  are also traced in the Symposium, where Plato is 
trying to bring them together under the prism of  Love (203e5; p.av£a 
and epwc; combined, in Phaidros 242a and 244aff See also Prodikos 
DK B  7:  €meup.Lav  p.€.v  6L7TAacrLaaee'iaav  epaJ'ia  eIvaL,  epaJ'ia  o€. 
OL1TAaaLaaeevra  p.aviav  yiyveaeal.). 
1"€XV-T1E'V'1"C1.  1"E  •••  7TOPI.+LOV:  Buchheim (1989 p.180, n. 32) observes that 
these adjectives are '·sophistic" and can be found in the description 
of Love in the Symposium  (203d5ff);vEpws-...  e7Jp€ur7Jc;  oe1.VOc;,  deL. 
nva,  1TA€KWV  p.7JXavuc;,  Kai.  cppov-rycrews- E1TLeUP.-rrrT7'  Kai.  7TOpLiJ-O" 
cpLAocrOCPWV  OLd.  1Tavroc;  'TOU  ~[OU,  bel.vo,  Y07J<;  Kai.  cpapiJ-aKeUC;  KUI. 
aocpwr-ryc; (see also note onHel. 14).  OEl.VQV:  see Voit 1934 p.  10 
(cited by Untersteiner 1961 p.126).  7T6pl.tLoc;;  in the Symposium 
203b3  II6po,  is  presented  as  the  father  of  v  Epwc;  and  can  be 
254 considered as  the representative of practical wisdom (cp.  Alkman 
fr.S  Page  with  Most  1987).  The  idea of elJ7TOpia.  is  deliberately 
omnipresent in the Pal.  (4,  10,  11,  30; see Introduction), associated 
with the wisdom (aoepia.)  of P.  G.  deliberately repeats this word in 
all  the possible forms,  since he intends to  underline the main and 
more  important  virtue  of P.  as  known  from  the  myth  (  30  -rev 
a.v8punnvov  (3f.ov  -rrOpLJ.LOV  Eg  ci.-rropou)  and  to  present  him  as  the 
representative  of practical  wisdom.  At  the  same  time  he  draws 
attention to  the difficult position into which he has been brought by 
Odysseus: if a  -rr6pLJ.LO~  man like P.  is  in a situation of  a.-rropia.,  then 
what would have happened if  one among us (or of  the audience) was 
brought into the same situation? Could G.  puff more effectively the 
crucial necessity of  his art? 
p..a.vta.  ya.p ••• Ka.'ia.a-n1<TEL:  the  definition of J.La.via.  is  given in three 
levels:  a)  madness is  to  perform impossible,  disadvantageous  and 
disgraceful  deeds,  which  b)  harm  your  friends  and  help  your 
enemies and which c) will make your life ignominious and insecure. 
The dSUva.1"a.  Jpya. is similar with the fJ-a.-ra.LOL~  -rrOVOLS" in Hel.  17. The 
second  level  picks  up  18,  where  helping  friends  and  harming 
enemies is presented as  a good reason for someone to  act unjustly. 
The (b) joined with (c) in their positive perspective are presented in 
Plato's Meno 71e  (=fr.19;  see notes  ad loc.)  as  G.'s definition of 
dvopeS"  a.pe-nj.  Madness related to  the helping friends  and hanning 
enemies topos appears in Aiskh. Pro  975ff. (see Padel 1995, pp.206-
7). a<PaAEpov:  cpo He!.  11  aepa.A.epa.lS  eVruX{a.LS. 
OaTL~ 'iOV  a.U'iOV ••• t..EYEL;  Mazzara (1982,  p.125ff)  noticed that the 
argument  follows  a  logical  schema discussed  by  Aristotle  in  his 
i'vfetaphysica  (IV  3-4);  (see  also  Buchheim  1989  p.180,  n.34  and 
Introduction). 
26 
'1TO'iEpOV  'iOU~  CTO<PoU~  ••• q,povtp..ous:  with  -rrO-repOV  G.  introduces  an 
argument from antimomy (see Introduction); for this reason he treats 
255 cPpovf.J.WV~  as  a  synonym  of CTOcPOV~,  which  are  distinguished  by 
Aristotle  in  EN  6,7  1140a2S  .. 28:  OOKE~  oT,  cPpovf.{J-ov  ELVal..  1"'0 
ovvaa8al..  KaJl.Ws"  {3ov;\EvCTaa8al..  -rrEpL  1"'(:1.  atmp dya8d  Kat.  CTV{J-cP€pOV1"'a, 
OU  Kant  {J-€PO~,  orov  7T'oZa  7T'pO~  uyf.ELav  77  -rrpo~  lcrxr5v,  Wd 7T'po~  1"'0 
EV  ~1jv  o;\ws-;  note that the characteristics that Aristotle attributes to 
cPPOVL{J-O~ are similar to those brought in by G. a few lines later. 
KaI.VO~ 0  A0'YO~: The Ms has KEVOS"  which does not create the schema 
Kal""  a.PCTLV  Kat.  8€CTLV  that G. means to  employ; from the antithetical 
structure  (KaLVo~  ... Wa) we  may  infer  that  G.  probably  merited 
KaLvo;\oyf.a (cp. He!. 51"'0  yeLp  1"'0~S"  el86CTLv ...  cPEpeL.  and  Pl.Phdr. 267 
KaLva  l"'E  dpXaLws- l"'a  T' Evavna  Kal..vcLis-).  The same sylistic device is 
attributed by Aristotle to Theodorus Rhet.1412a26 1"'0  Kal..vd  ;\€YELV, 
that means novelties in the style). But it seems that the criterion for 
an effective Kal..vo;\oyf.a  was its truth or its verisimilitude (cLU'  OUK 
d;\7]8-rj~). InHel. K6CT{J-O~ for ;\6yo~ is  d;\-rj8ELa (1). 
iJ-a.M.ov  atpELaBa.I. ••• ci.'Ya.ewv:  'prefer bad  things  to  the  goods  that 
already  exist';  Calogero  (1976  p.414-5)  has  discerned  here,  as 
eslewhere,  similarities  between  Pal.  and  the  Platonic  Apology. 
7TUpovrWV:  -rrp61"'EPOV  nov,  Ms;  my reading  (based  on Diels's  -rrpo 
-rrapovTwv) requires less drastic alteration. 
01.'  ci.iJ-cj>chEpa. •••  tjsEUO-TJ~:  cpo  PlApol.25e W<rrE  crV  yE  Kal""  d{J-cPOl"'Epa 
o/EVCY'fJ.  This is the 'logical' inferrence resulting from the use of the 
argument from antinomy. 
27 
a.v-n.Ka."1""Tl'Y0p-TlCTO.I. ....  1"'UU'Ta.:  dvnKa7""1Tlopf.a.  (what i\ristotle would term 
as  OLa.f30;\f])  is  just implied;  G.  with  a  rhetorical  d-rrOCTLUrrrryCTts"  (ou 
j3ov;\o{J-a.I..)  avoids  going  into  detail,  and  prefers  to  pass  to  the 
description of Palamedes' ethos (l"'oZS"  €{J-o~S"  dyaeo~S"; see Siiss  1910 
p.56, Untersteiner 1961 p.112, p.128).  ~O{'AOiJ-a.I.>: Aldus' addition 
256 of  the verb is necessary before yap,  and it is possible that G. himself 
meant to stress the d7TOUc.uJ.n-ryav; with an dvaa-rpo1rfl. 
In  ch.  28 - 36 P.  addresses the judges. His apostrophe is twofold: 
first  (28-32)  the  defendant will try to  draw  their attention  to  his 
ethos,  and then  (33-36)  he will proceed by explaining the  criteria 
upon which they must rely, in order to dispense real justice. 
28 
-rrpo~  15'  {,I-La.~  •••  Et1TELV:  G.  juxtaposes the jurors and the defendant 
(7TpO~ 0' ufJ-as ...  1T€P~  €fJ-0iJ;  cpo  1T€P~  UfJ-wv  7TpO~ ufJ-as 33). In this way 
he passes from the interrogation of  the prosecutor to  the apostrophe 
of the jurors.  It is  possible that this  use  of the  pronouns  is  also 
suggestive of  the u7T6KpL(n~.  KpL'mL:  rarely used for the jurors; it 
usually refers to the judges of  poetic contests  (cp. Lys.16.21). But 
G.  is not bound by the situational context of a real courtroom and 
above  all  his  intention is  to  provide rhetorical  instruction  which 
demands a more general and flexibly applicable wording (but in his 
conclusion he uses the word OI.Kaa-ras). 
€.-rrl.4>6ovov  I-LEV •••  7Tpoo-TjKOv-ra.:  G. has in mind a general rule dictated 
by the  context of a  trial;  the  idea is  that  the  speech must be in 
conformity with TO  Deov. In other words he must say the appropriate 
things in the appropriate time (Kal.p6~), as P. will claim in ch.32. P., 
lacking witnesses, is compelled to  offer an account of his previous 
life  and  to  describe  his  €7TL€I.K€S  ethos.  But he  also  knows  that 
speaking in praise of himself can be considered a  sign of vanity. 
This is  why he has to  explain the reason why he  indulges (llDI.a-rov 
fJ-0I.)  in  a  self-referential  discourse.  Notice  that  the  period  1S 
dominated  bv  antithetical  clauses.  €.-rrl.ch8ovov:  'invidious';  it  1S 
J  • 
interesting that cf;e6vo~ and cna{3ol.:ry are also the motives attributed by 
Socrates to  his  prosecutors (pI. ApoL  18d, 28a).  The defendant of 
Lys.  24  claims  that  he,  a  poor  and  disabled  man  is  unjustly 
257 prosecuted,  as  his  life  deserves  more  €1Ta.1.1I0~  than  <P8fJllo~,  which 
implies that men are prone to  envy men of consequence (the same 
common idea is expressed adverbially in Soph-4j.157: 1TPO~ yap  -rOll 
€xov8' 6  ¢J36vo~  Ep-rre~; cpo the Epitaphios). P. himself (3; see note on 
¢J36vo~)  suggested  that  one  of the  possible  motives  of his  own 
prosecutor is  ¢J3611o~  and  in his  self portrait he will state that he 
himself is  not  ¢J30V€PO~  to  prosperous  men.  Otll'  a.VEK..a.:  Diels 
emends the reading of the Ms  to  all  elKo-ra.;  but the word of the Ms 
is  quite  frequent in prose (cp.Pl. Lg.861d,  Tht.  154c,181b), and at 
any rate  I cannot  see why  G.  should refer to  probabilities in this 
context. Provided that we accept the minor addition <p.7J  G.lI€K-rci.>, 
the reading of the Ms gives  a perfect meaning:  'what for someone 
who  is  not prosecuted  is  not  tolerable,  this  very thing  becomes 
appropriate for someone who is prosecuted'. 
vUv  yap ••• u'TrExw:  P. briefly summarises what he is going to discuss 
next;  G.  deliberately integrates  in his  text an outline of this very 
text, as he intends to provide his students with  general instructions 
concerning the structure of a persuasive speech. The wording here 
belongs  to  the  legal  terminology  of Athenian public  life;  E1i8Uva. 
combined with  A6you~  (notice  that  G.  employs  an ev  81.cL  8UOLlI) 
refers  to  the  process  of the  examination  of a  public  official's 
conduct as  a whole (MacDowell 1978 pp.170 - 172; cpo  Lys. 9.11, 
24.26,  30.3,  5;  information on the process  of the  examination of 
public officials is given by Aristotle in his AP 48.3, 54). Here, P., a 
mythical  hero,  is  going  to  give  an  account  of his  public  life 
voluntarily. G.'s stratagem is one of  high intelligence, as P. will not 
undergo this investigation, but he will create it himself (this is why 
it  is  1l8w-rov  for  him  to  do  so),  in order  to  prove  that  he  is  a 
benefactor of the community. The overall result of this anachronism 
is  to  add  verisimilitude  to  the  text;  a  more  important  reason  is 
perhaps that G.  implicitly draws the attention of his students to  the 
way in which  such an  account  should be composed,  so  as  to  be 
effective. 
258 q,80vlioul.: picks up  J:rr[cp8ovov. 
a.va:YKaiov:  P.  is  in  a  condition  of dvaYK7J  (4);  it  is  the  'TTapovera 
dvaYK7J  (namely  that he is  accused of terrible  crimes  that  he has 
never committed,  Ka77fYop7Jp.€VOV  OE!.Vci.  Ka.L  tPEUOfj)  that make him 
refer to  his  own merits  (cp.  Dem.  18.  4).  P.  defends  himself by 
referring to  acts (34), but he is  also  aware that the way (that is  the 
time,  the  form  of his  speech etc)  in which he  is  going to  present 
them is more important than mere facts, hence the apologetic tone of 
this passage. 
EV  e.i.OOC71.v ••• -ilSI.a-r6v  Il-0l.:  what for others, namely the process of a 
public  examination, is  an ordeal for  P.  is  a pleasant process.  The 
phrase  EV  EL06er!.v  up.iv  'to  you who  are  aware  of these  things' 
reminds us  of  TO  ya.p  To'iS'  ELooer!.v ... ov  CP€PEI.  in HeI.  5 (see note on 
ch.26).  The phrase is  not in contradiction with what is  said there, 
since the kairos has changed. Here the repetition of the defendant's 
benefactions  (who  has  already  explained why  he  is  about  to  do 
something ?mLcp8ovov) corroborate his statement of  innocence. 
29 
a.A1'J&Ti:  Odysseus' charges have of course proved to  be nothing but 
lies. 
'TrpOS  ull-US  'TrEpt  EIl-0u:  picks up  the  first  line of ch.28;  but here he 
refers to the speech of  the prosecutor. 
€LP1'JK€V  WV  €l.P1'JK€V:  Kalligas, contra mundum, deletes  Jiv  Erp7JKEV; 
but the  repetition  is  in accordance  with  the  Gorgianic  style  (cp. 
E'TTpa~EV  a.  E'TTpa~EV ReI. 5,  20). 
oU"'W$ ••• ouva.,.al.:  'thus  his  speech  has  the  power of an  unproved 
abuse';  EAEYXOS'  means  'proving wrong  through  an  investigation', 
and  AO!.OOpLa.  is  by  its  nattlre  a  groundless  abuse  (cp.  PI.  Ph dr. 
267al). 
259 30 
OUK  (iv  ~EUaul.P.'T1v  •••  E.Ae'YXea.'T1v:  the wording deliberately picks up 
the words used by P. in his criticism of  the account of Odysseus. His 
Aot.Qopia.  does not have e;\EYXos and the charges brought against him 
are QE£.va  and tjJEVQfj, whereas he relies on real facts. 
eUEfry€"nlS:  'benefactor';  P.  calls  his  inventions  EUEPYE<Jial...  This 
word expresses an important Greek value. The term in this context 
could be associated with the function of  EUEpyE<Jia in the relations of 
states. Probably G.  intends to place emphasis on the contribution of 
P.  to  the unity of the Greeks  (as  is  shown by the word  'ElJ..Tjvwv; 
up.Wv  refers to  the judges who  are  the  flower of the  Greek army: 
cp.33 and ch.13). Karavites (1980, pp.67 - 79) discusses the term in 
the light of intercity relations and brings evidence from Herodotos 
and  Thucydides;  he  concludes  that  "there  were  traditional 
assumptions which were expected to affect the conduct of  the Greek 
city-states in their mutual relations [  ...  ] the attitude of  the Greeks in 
the Fifth century toward the principle of euergesia is indicative of 
the  importance  the  Greeks  attached  to  their  traditional  values. 
Furthermore, whenever infractions of euergesia were observed, the 
Greeks  criticised  the  violators,  regardless  of the  cause  of the 
infractions"  (p.79).  Probably  P.  appeals  to  these  common  values 
shared  by  the  jurors  and  this  is  why  he  refers  to  the  Greeks 
separately. However, one may possibly see in this context another 
manifestation of G.'s Panhellenism, which was  fully  developed in 
his  Olympic Oration (cp.  Soph.  Trach.1 045-1111,  where Herakles 
presents the EUEPYE<Jl.at.  which he 0 ffered to  Greece). 
OU  \l-0vov ••• <Ka.I.>: Reiske, followed by Diels and Kalligas; Sykutris 
(1927  p.862)  suggests  OUKOVV  TWV  VUV  OVTWV,  clJv\ci.  <Kal.>; 
Radermacher  (1941  p.175-6)  follows  him  and  prints,  - Kal.  TWV 
a:rrcLVTWV ..• ,  aUK  OUV  TWV  VUV  OVTWV  cl,\-\ci.  Kai.  TWV  f.LEMOVTWV  ELvat.; 
-rropl.p.ov  ~  a:rropou:  the Leitmotif of the  speech;  G.  has repeatedly 
used the  1TOP- words (see note on ch.25).  Buchheim compares this 
260 phrase with PI. Grg.  448c:  ef.l:rrE~p£a  p.EV  yap  1TOl.a  Tall  alwlla  iJ~1I 
1TopEVEatJal.  KaTa  TExrn7I1,  G.1TELpl.a  oe  KaTa  ruxrJV. 
KEl<0ot-L1lp.kvoV  ~  cixoap.ou:  K6ap.o~ is  the first  word of He!.;  it is 
extremely  difficult  to  interpret  this  word.  Tne main meanings  of 
KO(jf.l-O~  are  a)  order  and  b)  ornament.  The  second  meaning  is 
irrelevant to this context (as in the context of  He!.), because I do not 
understand how the invention of laws, letters etc can adorn human 
life. In this context the word 'order' seems more likely, meaning the 
order  in  a  human  community  produced  by  the  knowledge  of 
practical  wisdom  (this  interpretation  is  in  accordance  with  fifth 
century  theories  of progrees,  see  Guthrie  1971,  pp.60-3,  and 
Introduction).  But I  am inclined to  believe that the term remains 
uninterpreted  and  untranslatable  and  that  all  the  interpretative 
approaches involve a great dose of  divination  . 
..a.~€l.s  T€  1rOAEtLI.Kc:'S •••  aAU1T'(>V  ol.a'ipl.~.ftv;  For a discussion of P.'  s 
inventions see Introduction. 
31 
TO  'YC:.p  EK€LVOI.S •••  a.ouva-rov:  these are two contrasted and mutually 
exclusive things.  The logical schema is  similar to  the one used by 
P., in order to  show that the prosecutor's charges are contradictory 
and  that  the  prosecution  is  inconsistent  in  25  - 26.  It  is  not 
reasonable to  assume that an inquisitive man, whose mission is  to 
help men, can also be prone to badness. 
a.~1.W  O€ •••  d.SI.K1l81;val.: the idea that one should treat others exactly as 
one is  treated by them can be found in several Gorgianic passages: 
Hef.  7  a.~r.o~  oVv ...  ~1Jf.l-l.a~  ruXEZII;  fr.6  vf3pLCT1"a~  EL~  ... €v  TOLS'  8E~1I0LS'. 
Buchheim (1989,  181) has discerned that this attitude is censured in 
PL Rep. 359a-b. 
32 
261 OUK  a.v<Uc:j>eA~s: a litotes; cpo  XfY17at(.LOV  in 36, and oVTe  ••• a:X1YT7O'TOS  ill 
32. 
TOtS  €u-ruxoU01.V •••  O~K-ri.PP.WV:  cpo  fr.6  eepa1TOVTe5:  (.LEV  TWV  ci.8LKlIS 
8vOTtJXouv-rwv,  Ko/l.a(j'ja~  o€  TWV  ci.8£KlIS  ev-ruxouv-rwv. 
OUT€  1T€V£aS •••  1Tpo"T1.P.WV: see note on 15. 
o 1TapWV  KaLpos  -Tjvci.-yKa.a€:  it  is  wonh  attention  that  the  word 
ci.vaYKa.Zov  is  found in the opening chapter of this part of Pal., and 
the  meaning  of the  whole  phrase  is  very  close  to  rils  1TapouO"T]S 
ci.vaYK7]S"  at  4.  The rhetor claims that he was compelled to  proceed 
with a self-portrait because of the difficulties of his case. In other 
words it does not merely matter what one says, but it is equally (or 
more) important when (where, how etc) he is saying it. 
-ra.U-ro.  Ka.'T'1'J'¥OP'llP.E.vov:  picks up  Ka-rrr;op7J(.LEVOV  OeLVeI.  Ka.~  tj;ev8fj  ill 
28. 
33 
1Tept  up.wv  1TPOS  up.ci.s •••  -rils  a.1TOAO'¥£a.S:  from  the 1TepL  E(.LOU  1TpOS 
D(.Lci.s the defendant passes to the Tel.  1TpOS  TOlls- OLKaO'Tas which is the 
last part of his argumentation. Once again G. gives to his audience 
(and to his students) the opportunity to notice what he is doing and 
with  a  proleptic  phrase  he  announces  what  he  is  going  to  do 
(1TaUaO(.La.L  rijs  ci.1TO/l.oy£as),  that is to end the defence. 
OtKTOS  p.ev  oUv •••  1TCLpa.I.'T'1'J01.s:  SUss  (1910 p.56) has maintained that 
the  rhetorical  cornmon  practice  expressed  here  is  taken  from 
Thrasymachus'  vEl.eoL;  but since our knowledge of the content of 
this treatise (evidence is  given in 85B5,6) is  wanting, we can take 
the argument employed here as a rhetorical tapas. Antiphon (fr.lc in 
Gagarin's edition,  1997)  follows  the same trunk:  line,  1Tepl.  TOU  (.L-T] 
E/l.eeZv  D(.LclS  e(.LE  eoeTj87J  oe£aas  (.L-T]  EYW  oaKpVat  Kat.  LKeTial.S 
1TeLpW(.Lat  U(.Lcl,  ci.va-:reieeLv  and Socrates, as  depicted in the Platonic 
Apology, presents  e;\eOL  as  a cornman practice in the courts of law 
(38e), and states that although he faces  the heaviest penalty, he will 
not be tempted to  employ them so  as  to  be pitied (ibid 34c), eoeTj87J 
262 TE  Kat..  (.KET€Ua-E  TOUS"  OtKUO"'T'aS  j.Lc:ra.  1TOMWV  aaKpvwv,  1TULOtU  TE 
a.ir,ou  dva.{3,{3a.uafJ-€vo~,  LVa.  0  1"L  fJ-cf).La-ra.  eA€-rfJ€£  7] .•. eyw  oe  ouoev 
a.pa.  1"OU'T'WV  -rro'-r7uw.  Aristotle (Rhet.  1354a16-18) holds that ow{3oA-iJ 
ya.p  Ka.L  €A€O~  Ka.L  om  Ka.L  1"(1.  1"O,a.U'T'a.  -rra87]  rij~  ifrox:fJ~  au  -rr€pt. 
1"OU  -rrpaYfJ-a.1"o:;- ea-r1.v,  dMa.  -rrpo:;- 1"OV  O'Ka.~V.  O~K1"OS:  here, 
'lamentation';  cpo  And.  1.48  1]v  oe  {3o-iJ  Ka.t.  Oi.K1"O~  KAa.OV'T'WV  Ka.t. 
OOVPOfJ-EVWV  1"a.  -rra.pOV1"a.  Ka.Ka.  m::LpC-L'M'jO"l.s:  'entreaty', is a rare word 
(cp.  Dem.  Phil.  3,  37  Ka.t.  1"LfJ-wpLq.  fJ-€YCC71"iJ  1"OV'T'OV  EKoAa.(av  Ka.t. 
-rra.pa.£ 1"7]U1.,  ou o€fJ-L ' 1]V  ou oe  uvyyv  wfJ-7] ). 
€v  OXA~  iJ-Ev •••  XP11al.iJ-a.:  the  word  0XAO,  ill  this  context  has  a 
negative sense  as  it is  opposed to  the leaders  of the  Greek army, 
who will remained uninfluenced by emotionla appeals.  In Hel.  13, 
-rrOAV,  DXAO, is opposed to the power of one single speech and in that 
context it has a neutral sense, as  in the Gorgias 455a3 of Plato ova' 
apa.  O,Oa.UKa.At.KO:;- 0  pfJ-rwp  ea-r1.v  ot.Ka.a-r7JpLwv  1"€  Ka.t.  1"(OV  a.MWV 
DXAWV.  Untersteiner (1961  p.132) holds that this is  an  anachronism 
and that the word refers to  the Eliaia that consisted of more judges 
than the mythical court of G. 's text. But we should not go  that far 
since we do not have evidence that G.  undervalued the Eliasts. We 
can preferably read this phrase as  an example of how a rhetor can 
effectively dispose the judges in favour of the defendant and as  an 
indirect  praise  to  the  ethos  of P.  who  prefers  truth  to  silly 
supplications (for a comparative approach of the word DXAO, and the 
semantic similarities in G.  and Thucydides see Hunter 1986 pp.412-
429 esp. n. 6 and 38). 
1"OLS  -rrpW1"OI.S  ~Ual. 1"WV  • EM-TJVtLlV  Ka.l.  OoKOUal.:  the phrase is an echo 
of the  ot.a.  1"0  €Lva.t.  EOO~€V in  He!.  3  and  probably,  though  not 
necessarily,  of sophistic  relativism.  The  idea expressed here  is  in 
striking accordance both in form  and in content with fr.26.  Notice 
that  the  importance  of the  coexistence  of  ELVa.t.  and  OOKEi:v  is 
reinforced by the. homoeoteleuton. 
ou  q,o..wV .••  O~K1"OI.S:  the  repetition  of words  or  phrases  in  reverse 
order is  characteristically Gorgianic (cp.  He!.  20, where he  repeats 
263 the possible reasons for which Helen followed Paris to Troy). In this 
way he creates a long chiasm which brings together the two opposed 
elements, that is  the leaders of the Greeks  and a mob:  OlKTO~  KuL 
A~TUL KuL  cPO  .. wv  71'UpUl.rrpL~ - EV  0X;\.qJ  - 71'Upd.  8' up.Zv  TOZ,.  1TPW-rO~~ 
OVUL  nuv  '£Mf]vwv  .•• - OU  cP[;\.wv  {307J8€£U~,. ...  OrKTO~''. 
~  0'0.¥a-rci.~  o"KaL~  ••• -rTJv  aL..rf.av  TaU'T'i\v:  the  wording  of the 
phrase  picks  up  the  beginning  of Pal.,  where  8£KTJ  (2)  has  been 
opposed to {3f.a  and  a;\.7p€LU  (4) described as  dangerous teachers. P. 
has now shown the truth and it is not necessary to  try to  deceive the 
judges.  For  TO  8£.Ka~ov  meaning  'criterion',  'test',  cpo  Antiphon 
6.24, Dem.S4.27. 
34 
uj.Lcis  OE.  XP11 ••• VOj.Ll.tEOLV:  P. demonstrates - in the form of  antithetical 
pairs - four different principles upon which the judges will have to 
rely in order to  reach a conclusion that will be in accordance with 
truth.  But  at  the  same  time  these  suggestions  bring  out  the 
problematic of  justice and pose the question whether a court of law 
can dispense real justice. Hence the anxiety of P.  and the density of 
the text.  'TOLS  AO"/O  ..  S •••  'TOLS  Ep,,/o  .. s;  it is  strange that  G.  (through 
P.'  s mouth) does not feel very confident and he asks the judges to 
pay more attention to  deeds than to  the (prosecutor's) words.  How 
could  this  be  justifiable  for  the  man  who  claimed  that  A6'Y0~ 
8vvci~  p.€yu~  EG'TI.V,  and  who  is  presented  as  the  first  one  to 
develop  rhetoric?  Untersteiner (1954  pp.137-138)  interprets  it  (as 
always) under the light of the 'epistemological' treatise ONE.  Long, 
(1982  p.237)  who,  I  am  inclined to  believe,  has  more  accurately 
than anyone else understood and interpreted Pal., is not on the right 
track  when  he  says  that  "Undercutting  his  own  rhetoric  G. 's 
comments  on the  gap  between eloquence  and the  perspicacity  of 
truth are an ironical admission that he is only an advocate. His job is 
not  the  revelation of truth,  but the provision of the  best possible 
264 arguments on his client's behal£'~ The case here is not the same as 
that in Hel.;  Odysseus seeks to put P. to  death, so  a 1Ta.iyv,ov or an 
ironical  tonality would have been extremely dangerous.  I  suggest 
that the answer to this question can be found in 35 (€i  J-LEV  oUv ...  OUX 
ov-nJJ5  EX€L;  see note ad lac.). 
, 
Tas  a.i. -ri.a.s  -rWV 
1TpOKP~VEl.V: it picks up  29  (OVTW';  AOLQOpia.v  OUK  Exovaa.v  E),€yxov); 
the  prosecutor's  al  T£a  is  nothing  but mere  AO,QOpLa.,  whereas  the 
defendant's argumentation is an EA€yxOS- (29), based on probabilities 
and reasonable arguments.  IJ.'TlOE  -rOV  oAl:Yov  xpovov ••• KpvMlv:  G.  is 
perhaps  referring to  the time limitation imposed by the clepsydra; 
what  is  questioned  with this  antithesis  is  the  possibility  that the 
defendant can defend the whole of his  life  (TOU  1TOMOV)  and the 
judges reach the truth in a limited period of  time (oALyov  xpovov).  In 
Plato's Gorgias 455a5-6 Socrates says: ou  yap  o-0rov  0XAOV  y' ClV 
ouvaLTo  ToaOUTOV  EV  oAiyqJ  xpovqJ  OLQa.qa.L  OVTW  J-L€ya.Aa  1Tpa.YJ-LaTa 
(cp.  PI.  Ap.37a oALyov  xpovov  dM7JAOlS  OLaA.€YJ-L€ea.  and  19a;  Tht. 
201a). This practice is characteristically depicted in fr.30;  Antiphon 
(fr.79)  in  a more  serious way claims that T€W';  J-LEV  ya.p  <5  1TOAVS-
xpovos- TOU  oALyov  1TLa-rOT€POS- ~v (cp. also Aristophanes Aves 1694-
1701 = fr.Sa). 
expressed  in  a  general  way  it  refers  to  specific  parts  of the 
argumentation:  oLa{3oA7J  is an aLT£a  on the level of AOyo,  (p.7JOE  Ta.S' 
alTiaS' ..• ),  whereas  1T€l.pa  is  knowledge resulting  from  the  scrutiny 
(€/\EYXWV)  of epya  (cp. Soph. Trach. 590-4: OVTWS'  EX€L  y' f]  1TLa-r,S', 
1T€LPWJ-LEV7J. 
TO'i.S  a:ya.8o'i.s  civopa.O'l.v: the phrase is deliberately repeated in 35. 
€UAa.~€i.a.S:  the  word,  as  Schmid  (1940  p.S83,  n.S)  has  first 
discerned,  is  a  sophistic  notion  and  it  is  related  to  KO-LPOS';  P. 
challenges the judges to  think of their own avJ-L<pEpov  by allowing a 
sufficient period of time (see n. on xpovoS';  cpo  TOV  OE  1TA€£W  xpovov 
€1TLJ-L€£VaT€)  and  by  using  1TPOVOLU  until  they  reach  a  faultless 
265 conclusion. eVII.ci.{3ew.  can be defined then as the precaution taken by 
someone, in order to  avoid being exposed  to  dangers or reaching 
ineffective  decisions  (for a  similar  forensic  use  of the  word  cpo 
Antiphon 2.3.11: 11'0l1.li.7]  eVII.ci.{3ew.  ufl-iv  TOVTWV  1To~TJ'€a EO'Ti,  and PI. 
Apol.  17a-b:  J.Lcl.Aurra  O€  aUTwv  EV  EeaVJ.Lao-a  TWV  11'0MWV  WV 
EtPeuaaVTO,  TOUTO,  EV  0  ElI.eyov  Ws- Xp7]  uJ.LaS"  eVlI.a{3eiaeaL,  J.L7]  U1T' 
EJ.LOU  E~a.1Ta-rrfJfrre,  Ws- oeLVOU  DVTOS"  iI.€YELV).  This rationalistic, and 
probably  opportunistic  way  of  thinking  IS  opposed  to  a 
straightforward  heroism  and  it  can  be  (under  the  oppression  of 
authoritarianism it certainly is) perceived as  cowardice (cp.  TrGrFr 
3,  1052.7  oi.  yap  11'0VO~  Tl.KTOVa~  -r7]v  Euavop£av,  /  TJ  0' euil.ci.{3ELa 
aKoTov  €XeL  KaT'  '.£Mci.oa,  /  TO  OLCl{3LWVal.  J.LOVOV  c1.El.  e7]pWJ.LEV7]).  A 
striking example of the way in which the word can be interpreted as 
prudence,  when  the  purposes  of  the  argumentation  alter  is 
Demosthenes  19.  206 Tl.Va  0' OUTOL  J.L€V  aTOII.J.LOV  Kat.  OELII.Ov  11'pOS" 
TOt;'  oXil.ovS"  <paaLv  Elval.,  eyw 0' Euil.a{3fj. 
,  ""  ,  I  ,,\  \  Th  d'  I  d'  I  'TO.  OE  aVTlKea1U  •••  !l-Il.JV\Ov:  e wor s  aV7]KEO'ToS"  an  aKEO'TOS"  mean 
'irrecoverable'  and  'recoverable'  respectively.  Stephanus' 
emendation c1.KEO'TWV  (for Ms c1.V7]KEO'TWV)  is certainly correct, since it 
preserves  the  antithesis  (cp.  Antiphon  5.  91).  G.  is  using  three 
medical  terms  (c1.v-ryKEO'Ta,  c1.KEO'TWV,  c1.vl.a-ra.)  linked  to  the  idea 
expressed  in  35:  TJ  O€  TqJ  {3£qJ  vOo-oS".  In  other  words,  the 
irrecoverable  effects  of their ill-decision will  turn out to  be their 
chronic  ailment.  Blass  (1887,  p.77)  has  compared 34,  35  and 36 
with Antiphon's 5.86,  91,  89,  where the similarities both in form 
and in  content are  striking (cp.  also  Lys.  4.20  LKETEVW  uJ.LaS"  Kal. 
c1.vn{3oil.w,  EII.E.ryaaTE  J.LE .•. J.L7]O€  c1.V7]KEO'TqJ  O"Ufl-<popij.  11'EPI.{36.'\TJ'e). 
'iWV  OE  'iO~OU'iWV  •••  KPL.VW<nV:  the general ideas of the preceding lines 
are now brought to the very case ofthis speech. civopes  civopa:  one 
more example of the originally Gorgianic usage of repetition, where 
the subject and the object are juxtaposed.  1TEpI.  8ava:iOU:  picks 
up the 11'EpL  8av6.Tov  OWJKELV  24, where P.  discusses the criteria upon 
which the  prosecutor has  based his  Ka7IJYOpl.a  (namely his  ooqa), 
266 whereas  here he is  discussing the criteria upon which the judges 
must (or must not) rely. 
35 
+  " 
OtlV, ••  a:rro  'TWV  €LfYTJtLE.VWV:  this  hypothesis  has  raised 
numerous interpretations; Untersteiner interprets the  text under the 
prism of  what has been termed as Gorgianic a:miTT] and of the "terza 
proposizione  del  trattato  gnoseologico-ontologico"  (1961  p.133). 
Kerferd  (1981  p.81)  links  it  to  the  truth  /  opinion  antithesis  and 
maintains that "What is needed is to  attend not to  logoi but to  real 
facts. Earlier in the speech Knowledge of  what is true is opposed to 
Opinion (par. 24) and we are told that logos by itself is inconclusive 
unless we learn also  from  actual Truth itself (par.  4)".  Long, who 
takes a different view, criticises Kerferd's assumption and says that 
"on his  client's behalf Gorgias,  the orator,  plays  a part which his 
audience will recognize as  quite self-conscious, stylized advocacy. 
The  supreme  irony  and  instance  of this  role-playing  appears  in 
section  35  [  ...  ]  I  find  no  deep  conceptual  or  epistemological 
significance in these remarks, nor am I tempted to see them as a part 
of a consistent Gorgian philosophy on the  obscurity of reality".  I 
consider  that,  as  Long  puts  it,  the  meaning  of this  passage  is 
perfectly  clear  and  I  doubt  whether  its  interpretation  is  less 
sophisticated if we confine it to  the particular context. But I do  not 
follow Long in the respect that this is a 'role-playing' as  the latter -
certainly  traceable  in  He!.,  where  combined  with  the  'self -
conscious stylized advocacy'  appear in a more appropriate context-
would not be in conformity with the  intentions of Pa!.,  that  is  the 
acquittal of P.  G.  is  simply dealing with a fabricated charge which 
was  solely  based  on  words;  he  thus  recognizes  that  the  most 
effective (and tragically the only) weapon of  his client is  the logical 
argumentation  that  preceded.  What  is  questioned  then,  is  not 
267 generally the possibility of the words to  express the truth, but the 
impossibility of bringing the judges by means of argumentation to 
the same level of knowledge. the knowledge of something that has 
never happened  (cp.  23).  This  is  why  d).7}8EW.  (and  d.va:YK7J)  are 
described (4)  as  dangerous teachers. Since his words cannot make 
the decision of the judges easier, mere statement of his innocence 
would  have  been  equally  persuasive.  But  this  is  what  d.va.YK7J 
means:  the tragic  d.7Topiu  in endeavouring to  prove your innocence 
by  using  words  in a  process  which by narure  is  based solely  on 
words (cp. PI Tht.  201 b-c o-rUV  8I.KUif.rJS  7TELa8WOW  OI.KuO'"ra.L  7TEPi.  ~v 
l06v·n  fLoVOV  E(]'1'W  El8evuL,  MAf.rJS  8e  fLTJ'  'T'UV'T'U  TO'T'E  E~  dK07]S" 
KpivOV'T'ES",  d).:r,efj  8o~uv  AU{30V'T'ES",  aVEV  EmO"T'fJfL7JS"  €.KPI.VUV,  oped. 
1TEW8ev'T'E5,  EL1TEP  EV  E8iKUaa.V,').  eihropos: G.  deliberately picks up 
d.1Topiu  of 4.  His  d7TOpiu  of words is  now an d.7Topiu  of the judges 
who  must not rely  on words.  His judges and himself have been 
brought to  the  same situation:  he has to  defend himself and they 
have to reach a decision for a crime that has not been committed. 
aWp.u:  here it means  'life';  it is  a frequent word in G:s preserved 
texts  (Hel.  1,  4,  8,  14);  P.  asks  the judges to  use his  'life'  as  a 
pledge, until they reach their verdict (the word has  recently been 
examined by  Musti 1993, pp.853 - 864, but he does not discuss  the 
meaning of  the word in Pal. 35). 
<l>uA.ci~a  .. re  ••• Em.p.eI.Va  .. re  •••  1T"OL-itO'a  .. re:  G.  places the rhyming verbs  at 
the end of  the clauses  adding emphasis to the stages that will secure 
real  justice. 
oALyov  xpovov. 
ui.perw-repos ••• a1.axPas:  with a  masterstroke  G.  - on  behalf of his 
client  - tells  the  judges  that  they  are  facing  the  possibility  of a 
penalty worse than death.  The phrase echoes the beginning of the 
speech (1), where P.  had claimed that the very object of the trial is 
not merely death, but the manner of this death (seen note ad loc.). If 
they  now impose on him a  death penalty  (1"'7jS"  De  (3f.u<;  UfLEL<;  [sc. 
KpU'T'ELTE]  ), then they themselves should prefer death.  8O~s 
268 a.Laxpa.s:  a rhetorical topos; cpo  Is. 4.  95 see Dover 1974 p.227 and 
my note on ch.1. Ill-reputation is here presented as an illness. 
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ea.v  SE ...  4>avepOv:  Socrates claims the  same thing  at PI.  Ap.  38c: 
,  ~  \',  Cll. TI.ClV  KClt.  u1TO  TWV  ,BOUA.OfJ-€VWV  ...ryv  1TOA.I.V 
A.OI.OOPELV  tVS"  l:wKpa:rry  cl.1TEKTOVClTE.  The  argument  that  a  death 
penalty unjustly imposed by a court of law is  as wrong as homicide 
is found in Antiphon 5. 92 KClI.  fJ-7]v  ...ryv  ra-ryv  yE  OVVClfJ-I.V  EXEI.,  o(rnS" 
Kat.  -r-IJV  at-ria.v ••• o Ka"M)'Y0pos:  cpo  Antiphon 5.  89 Kal.  OUK  raov  eO'"T"I. 
'T"OV  'T"E  O/.UJKOVTa  fJ-TJ  op8es  ClLnclaa8al.  KClI.  ufJ-aS"  TOUS"  OI.KClO'"T"C1s  fJ-TJ 
op8w,  YVWVClI..  T]  fJ-EV  yap  'T"OUTWV  Cll'T"LClal.S"  OUK  EX€/'  'T"eA.oS",  dA.A.'  ev 
UIl-LV  eO'"T"I.  KClI.  rfj 8£K7]. 
d6EOV,  a.OLKOV,  a.v0\-Lov:  a striking asyndetic privative tricolon which 
G.  probably  borrows  from  poetry  (cp.  Hom.  n.  9.  63:  dcppTrrwp 
d8ell-l.O"1"oS"  dv€O"1"l.oS"  eO'"T"I.V  eKELvoS",  Soph.  fro  4 Radt: w,  wv  a1Tat.S"  'T"E 
KdyJVClt.g  KCl.V€O'"T"WS";  for  a  polysyndetic  privative  tetracolon,  cpo 
Antiphon 1.22:  d8€fJ-t.Ta  Kat.  dvoat.Cl  Kal.  d'T"€A.EO"1"a.  KClI.  dV-ryKOU(J7"Cl; 
al  1 71'  '8  - "\  -)  cpo  so  ._  . Cl  EWS"  Kat.  ClKI\EWS"  • 
•  EMcioos,~EM'TlVES,~EM'TlVa.: one more striking repetition, combined 
with an anadiplosis, which brings together the Greek defendant with 
the Greek judges. 
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In a very short epilogue G.  uses a statement that regularly occurs in 
oratory;  before good judges it is  inappropriate to  summarise what 
has been discussed in detail. 
Ka.t.  -rraUO\-La.L:  P.  fulfils  his  promIse  (OV 
d1TOA.OyLClS" 33). 
,  , 
EL 11'WV 
OLa.  \-La.KpUiv  eLp11\-LEva.:  P.'s jury are not ordinary jurymen (OXA.l!J  33, 
<pClVA.OUS"  o  I.Ka(J7"clS") ,  and  therefore  the  usual  dVClKE<paA.Cl[uxnS"  IS 
neither appropriate nor necessary. 
269 TOUS  OE  -rrp<z'rroUS  -rWv  1TpW1-wv:  for a similar construction cpo  He!.  3: 
on  p.ev  oov  CPVU€L ••• To..  -rrparra.  TWV  -rrpan-wv. 
~EM"va.S  'EM~V(J)V: another anadiplosis with these words  (cp.36), 
which amounts to  a funher attempt on the part of the defendant to 
appeal to the patriotic feelings of  the judges. 
270 6  Epitaphios 
Several  hypotheses  have been put fo:r;vard  about the  date of G.'  s 
Epiraphios.  Blass  (1887,  p.62),  who  agrees  with  Wilamowitz, 
placed it in the  second half of 420,  almost  immediately  after the 
peace of Nicias  (so  Untersteiner 1954,  p.  95;  see  also  p.98  for  a 
summary of suggestions).  Schmid (1940,  iii,  p.75)  proposed 412, 
whereas  Aly  (1929)  thought  that  it  was  delivered  by  G.  himself 
some time between 421  and 416.  Mathieu (1925,  p.24)  entertains 
the view that it was composed after 382 and similarly Loraux 1986, 
p.431  n.32 claims that 'The  epitaphios dates  from  the early fourth 
century" and she explains (p.382 n.72) that the datings of those who 
place  it  in  'The  aftermath  of the  peace  of Nicias ...  rest  on  the 
interpretation of the  text of Philostratos  (the  Athenians'  eros  for 
empire)  as  an  allusion to  Athenian ambitions  before  the  Sicilian 
expedition".  She  then  concludes  that  "it may  also  refer  to  the 
climate  of the  years  following  395,  when  the  Athenians  were 
thinking of  rebuilding their empire and were allied with the Persians 
against the Spartans. Indeed the Olympicus is incontrovertibly dated 
to  392. The similarity of inspiration in these two  orations might be 
an argument in favor of  a closer dating". 
It seems thus that scholars mainly tend to  date the Epitaphios on 
account of  historical events, which seem to them more or less fit the 
overt generalizations propounded in the preserved fragment.  Before 
even  asking  ourselves  if the  present  text  'reflects'  the  political 
environment in Athens of any given period (Untersteiner 1954, p.95 
takes  it for  granted that it does),  we  should first  assess  our feeble 
lmowledge about G.'s life. Untersteiner for instance contends (1954, 
pp.93-4) that after G.  had visited numerous  Greek cities, "he must 
have returned to  Athens at the time of his  Funeral Orarion", thus 
271 providing us  with a  perfectly smooth sequence of events, which, 
however, relies heavily on a circular argument. 
To  these  views  we should  add Buchheim's hypothesis  (1989, 
p.190) that the Epitaphios was actually delivered by G. himself; this 
scholar bases his speculation on TIlUC. 2.34: rJ.v-7p  1JP7JJ.L€VO~  U1TO  -rijs 
1To;\eWS",  ik  <Iv  yvWJ.L7J  re  aOKij  J.L-7  rJ.~vero~  eIval.  KaL  rJ.g~WaeL 
1TPOTJK7J,  ;\EyeL  E1T'  avrOL~ E1TaI.VOV  r6v  1Tp€1TOVra,  which, according 
to  him,  shows  that  the  speakers  of  the  Epitaphioi  were  not 
necessarily  Athenian  citizens.  I  find  his  contention  inconclusive; 
firstly,  because the passage he  quotes  does not explicitly mention 
foreigners,  although  it  is  well-known  that  Periklean  rhetoric 
frequently stresses Athenian tolerance and openness, as opposed to 
the  Spartan  'xenophobia'  (cp.  Thuc.  2.39).  Secondly,  G.'s 
Epitaphios, or the extant portion of  it, has all the characteristics of  a 
model-speech, and it serves thus more as  an exemplification of the 
elements and the qualities that a speech that belongs to  this genre 
should possess. 
My view is  that the Epitaphios cannot be dated; it is  a model-
speech with no specific references to historical events. In fact, there 
is no good reason to suggest that G. was actually in Athens when he 
composed the Epitaphios, and its affinities with later representatives 
of this  genre ought not to  be explained on this basis. This speech 
could have been composed anywhere,  although it was, of course, 
designed to meet Athenian expectations. In fact, G.  was a relentless 
traveller CIs ok. 15.155-6 =  Test.18) and it is hard to decide whether 
he wrote the  speech in Athens  or elsewhere  (Philostratos, Test.  1  , 
who  says"  DE  E1TLr6.cpw~,  OV  aL7j;\eev  'Aef]V7]CfI..V  probably did not 
have more firm knowledge than modem scholars who entenain this 
hypothesis do).  G.'  s Epitaphios combines, I am inclined to believe, 
both the qualities of a model-speech and the formulaic elements of 
the genre it purports to belong to. 
272 NOTES 
-n.  -yap  a.~v  ••• -rrpoaE.i.va.I.;  the  construction  is  picked  up  in  Plato's 
lvfene.'Cenas 234c: oZ  OU7'W  Kci1Ws'  E7TaI.VOVal.v,  Wo-r€  Ka.1.  'lei  7TpOaOV7'a. 
7TOI.KiMOV7'€S"  Y07J7'€voual.v  ~p.wv  'leiS"  <froxas.  It has been shown (see 
Vollgraff 1952,  p.5-7,  Loraux  1986,  p.313)  that Plato  intends  his 
readers  to  construe  this  passage  as  an  allusion  to  G. 's  own 
Epitaphias, and it is worth pointing out that this is  attained both by 
the citation of  the Sophist's own words and mainly by the reference 
to  the form of his speech; the charming of the audience (yo7J7'€ia is 
itself used  in  HeI.  to  describe  the  effects  of Aoyo5";  see  Vol1graff 
1952, p.5 n.2 and my comments on Hel.  10) is the result of  Qvop.a.al. 
1TOI.KiAAov7'€S",  as  it is certainly true that the style of this sentence is 
even more Gorgian than that of  the other texts of  G  .. Plato's point is 
that through Epitaphiai each and every  citizen has his own share in 
a polished, if  untrue, praise. But Plato is no less competent in using 
Gorgian style,  for as  Loraux puts  it "parody is  the only effective 
weapon against the mirage of the epitaphioi" (1986, p.312;  cpo  for 
instance PI. Menex.247a ilJv  €V€Ka  Ka.i.  1Tpw-rOV  Kai.  VOTa7'OV  Kai.  81.0:. 
1TaV7'05"  1Ta.aav  1Ta.V7'WS"  1Tpo8u[.LLav  1TEl.pa.afJE  EX€I.V  01TWS"  [.La.AI.OTa  [.LEV 
U1T€p{3a.A€T.afJE  Kai.  ~[.La.S"  Kai.  7'ovS"  1TpoafJEv  EUKAELt;z.). 
eL1T'el.V  OUVa.L!-Lllv ••• oel.:  another antithetical chiasm;  it  is  a common 
Gorgian feature  to  oppose  ability  to  willingness,  and  it  may  well 
have been that in view of its general applicability he had developed 
it to  a tapas of argumentation. Having said that, we should bear in 
mind (as Loraux invites us  to  do)  that this polarity is  in the present 
context  integrated  in  a  text  with  its  generic  restrictions  and 
peculiarities;  in  this  light  it  should  be  seen  in  relation  to  the 
normative  distinction  of the  £pitaphiai  bet\Veen  what  can  be 
expressed through words and the excellence achieved by the acts of 
273 the  dead.  Loraux  (1986,  p.228,  n.25)  offers  a  good  number  of 
parallels  from  other  exponents  of the  genre  and  concedes  that 
"'whereas  the  epitaphioi  oppose  logos  to  erga,  Gorgias  seems  to 
have no  other aim but that of making a speech  (€l1T€'i:lI  8vlIaLf.L1JlI) 
according  to  the  'rules'  (a.  8€£:);  there  is  no  reference  to 
'reality"'(1986, p.432, n.52), and she explains this deviation on the 
basis of the autonomous nature given to logos by the Sophists. This 
explanation draws upon a systematisation of what 'Sophistic logos' 
is  and  it  seems  to  me  unnecessary;  when  Palamedes  gives  an 
account of his achievements (30), no  such distinction is discernible 
and  he  is  there  presented as  being  conscious  that  his  beneficial 
activity may cause the envy (~e6vo~) of his audience. Similarly, the 
'human envy' that G.  wishes to  avoid will certainly be provoked by 
the excellent deeds of the dead, and at any rate  a.  8€'Z,  apart from 
referring  to  a  speech  in  compliance  with  the  'rules'  may  also 
plausibly be taken to refer to 'words that are needed to do justice to 
the acts of the dead' (.  At any rate a few lines later speech and acts 
are clearly presented as separate (Ka~ A.€Y€LlI  Ka.~  ITI.YCiv  Ka~ 1TOI. €'i:v). 
Aa.eWV  j.LEV ••• q,eovov:  G.  wishes to  avoid the divine punishment and 
the resentment or the envy of the living; Vollgraff 1952 (note ad 
lac.) explains the phrase as the concomitant of G.'s awareness of  the 
"audace des theses qu' i1 va presenter". However, what G. intends to 
say is what he ought to  say, which is  dictated by the excellence of 
the  dead  and  their acts.  What  lies  behind his  confession that  he 
wants to  avoid divine and human resentment directed at him is  the 
implication that, if he is  to  praise the dead with words consonant 
with their qualities,  this  avoidance  is  almost  impossible  (envy  is 
very common in encomiastic poetry;  cpo  for ecample Pi. 0. 6.  7-8, 
P.  1.  84-5,7. 18-9, 11. 26-9,1.  1. 43-4, and Ba. 3.  67-8, 5.  187-90). 
It comes  as  no  surprise  that  this  element  can be traced  in  other 
preserved £pitaphioi; In Thucydides'  2.35 Perikles is  presented as 
saying that 0 j€  a.1T€LPO~  E(jj'tV  a.  Kal.  1T)..€Ovci.~EoVal.,  8i.a  cp86vov,  EL. 
n  U1TEP  rTJv  au-rov  cPVITLlI  UxOU€L ..•  -rcp  8€  U1T€pf36.M.ovn  au-rwv 
274 tjiJOVOVv-rES  7j07]  KaL  d-rnCTTovow  (see Race  1990, pp.73-4).  When 
Demosthenes  is  about  to  praise  the  dead  for  being  'the soul  of 
Greece', he also  expresses his hope that KaL  tjiJovos  p.€V  d-rrE!.7]  TOV 
'\oyov  (Dem. 60. 23; cpo PI. Mene...r:.  242a4) 
~ve€OV  IJ-ev ••• ro  Ittnt-rciv:  'the virtue  they  possessed was  divinely-
inspired', not 'they received virtue as  a divine gift', because in that 
case  EKEKT7]VTO  would have  been an inappropriate  oxymoron (cp. 
CTocpLas  €7nK-rrTrOV  HeL  4,  with  notes);  what  they  shall  then  be 
remembered for is a divine characteristic, though their mortal physis 
is  a human one.  Vollg:ra.ff's  (1952, p.10) view that the virtue here 
has affinities with the definitions of it in Meno, namely the ability of 
a citizen to  govern others, relies much on his presumption that the 
qualities ascribed by G. to the dead in the rest of the Epitaphios are 
peculiar to the teaching of  the Sophists. 
-rroMel.  IJ-ev  8-Ty •••  AO)'WV  OpeO,"!1U: the two clauses are complementary 
and  by  and  large  they  express  a  very  similar  pattern  (this  is 
highlighted by the chiastic arrangement); the invariable stability of 
(written)  law represented by the two  central phrases TOV  av86.oovs 
OI.KaLov ••• llOP.OV  dKpl.{3e£as is opposed to the variable, personal feeling 
of  justice,  inherent  in  every  man,  which  takes  shape  after 
consideration of the existing individual situations of every different 
case  in its  own right (notice  that this  is  almost explained by the 
TOVTOV  llO/-LL{OVTEC;  ••• ,  where  a  different,  divine  'law' shared by all 
humans  is  said  to  have  been  the  law  that  they  established  and 
respected).  TO  1TI1POV  e1Tl.€LKE.s:  Spengel's correction -rrpq.ov  distorts 
the emphasis that G.  lays  on Kal.poS";  -rrapov,  the MSS reading, here 
takes  on  the  meaning  'that  which  on  each  different  occasion  is 
€7nEI.KES"'  as  opposed  to  the  rigid,  and thus  au8aoES"  8l.Kal.Ov.  The 
E7n€I.KES"  ('fairness')  /  81.Kal.OV  polarity  is  hardly  restricted  to  G.; 
Herodotos  3.  53  already  contends  that  -rroMoL  nov  OI.KaLWV  7"(1 
€7n€I.KECTT€pa  -rrpoTL87]CTL  and it also  appears in a context where the 
notion  is  meant  to  be  understood  as  Sophistic  in  Aristophanes 
Clouds  1399-1400  (see  Pucci  1960,  pp.13f.);  Aristotle  defines  it 
275 both  in EN.  1137a31f,  1143a21-22  (see  Gautbier-Jolif (1970), 
pp.432-3  and in the Rhetoric (1374a26-8) where he maintains that 
yeypufLfL€VOV  VOfLOV  8L.KULOV, and he then (1374bf.) goes on to discuss 
E1T'LEl.KES'  in more detail in connection with different types of human 
action by distinguishing between  afLapT7JfLu  and dOf.K7JfLU,  afLapT7JfLu 
and druX'lfLU. and by explaining for whom it is  to judge on the basis 
of  e1T'LeLKES'  and upon what criteria one does so by employing it (cp. 
also  Isok.  7.33;  note that at  Soph. o.C 1127, Oedipus in praising 
Athens before Theseus, includes  e1T'LELK€S"  among other properties -
namely 'TO  Evae{3€S",  'TO  fL-r,  z/1ev8oa'TofLe!.v  - peculiar to  this city). An 
exhaustive discussion of passages related to  e1T'LeLKES" is provided by 
Vollgraff  1952,  pp.10-20).  A  far-fetched,  over-systematised 
treatment of 'fairness'  in  G.  is  developed by Untersteiner (1954, 
pp.176-8), who sees it as  a solution to  the problem posed by tragic 
dilemmas. Vollgraff(1952, pp.11-12) observes that the emphasis on 
e1T'LeLKES'  and  AOYWV  op8o'T7]'Tu  betrays  G.'  s  intention  to  praise  the 
characteristics of those who have received the Sophistic education, 
and therefore, that what is  said here refers neither to  the civic nor 
the  military  potential  of the  dead  as  it  normally  happens  in 
Epitaphioi. It is possible, especially in view of  the connection of  the 
whole saying to  kairos, that G. praises the opportunism of the dead 
and  their  rampant  political  ambition,  characteristics  which  are 
readily  ascribed  to  the  Sophists  (this  is  discernible  both  in 
Untersteiner's  and  Vollgraff  s  analysis;  Loraux,  1986,  p.228-9  is 
also ready to discern Sophistic relativism in the formula, her crucial 
opposi  tion  to  V  0 llgraff  s  thesis  being  that  G.  "has  turned  to  the 
advantage of  his own thought themes proper to the funeral oration'). 
However, there is  nothing to suggest that, when G.  praises the dead 
for  their preference  for  E1T'LELKES',  he  does  so  because 'fairness'  (as 
opposed to  rigid law)  avails men with greater freedom in justifying 
acts that serve their own aufLcPEpov.  As Loraux herself claims, it may 
mean  that  "the  Athenians  are  on  the  side  of the  oppressed"  (a 
276 recurring theme  in the Epitaphioi)  or that "before being  'violent 
toward  the  violent',  they  are  good  at  seeking  agreement"  (an 
element which she traces in Lysias' Epitaphios 20). In addition, they 
are 8€pa:rroVT€S'  TWV  a.8£xWS"  oUo-rvXOUVTWV  and Koil.ucrruL  TWV  a.O£KWS" 
€VTtJXOUVTWV,  characteristics that necessarily go  far beyond what is 
required  for  a person to  be simply  law-abiding.  E1TL€I.KES'  then  is 
peculiar to  active citizens, who are ready to  act complementarily to 
the demands of the laws, when their conscience dictates otherwise. 
VO\-Lou  clxPI.~ELus: the rigid 'accuracy of written law', as  opposed to 
the flexible and creative attempt to  achieve rightness in  speech. In 
Aristotle (Rhet.  1374bll-12 E1TL€LXES'  as  fJ.7J  1TpOS'  TOV  il.oyov,  ctMa 
1TpOS'  rryv  OL(IVOLUV  'IOU  V0fJ.0eETOU  opav)  il.0Y0S'  represents  the exact 
words  of the  laws,  in modern Greek TO  ypa.fJ.fJ.U  'IOU  VOfJ.OU  ('the 
letter of the law'). Aristotle, unlike G.,  uses I.oyov  to  denote  'obey 
the laws to the letter without demur' . 
AE)'EI.V  •••  m.'y<iv:  'saying and avoid saying and doing'; Sauppe and DK 
after 1TOt.€LV print xuL  Eav,  which is a plausible addition as  far as the 
antithetical structure of the sentence is concerned, but which is not 
necessary for the sense, and since it does not appear in the Mss I do 
not  see  fit  to  include  it  in the  text.  Vollgraff (1952,  p.22-23) 
provides evidence showing that oeov  and KUt.pOC;  can be treated as 
synonyms. However, his  association of  KUt.pOC;  with opportunism is 
less  happy (for  a  discussion of KUt.pOC;  see  fr.13  with  comments). 
Knowing  when  to  speak  and  when  to  remain  silent  is  rather  a 
common  criterion  for  the  evaluation  of someone's  respect  for 
decorum (cp.Aiskh. Cho.582, Isok. 2.41; for l.eY€LV  TO  OEOV  see He!. 
2). 
)'Vw\-L1'\v  <Kut.  pW\-L1'\v>:  the  phrase  extends  the  distinction  between 
speech and deeds;  the addition has been proposed by Foss.  nSI.f1:TJv 
could be an  alternative,  and one which admittedly disentangles  us 
from  the  implications  involved  in  the  body  /  mind  opposition. 
Nevertheless,  combined  intellectual  and  physical  potential  is  a 
recurring theme in Epitaphioi; in Lysias 2 it appears in 41, 42 and it 
277 undoubtedly dominates Perikles' one in Thucydides 2,  especially in 
connection with the ability of  the Athenians to enjoy an intellectual 
civic environmen4 while always being on a military footing (cp. for 
instance  KaL  p:iJv  KaL  nov  'lTOVWV  'lTAeLaTa,  a.va-rrav;\.a,  rij  yvwfJ-7J 
E'lTOpw-6.fJ-E8a  38; (nacpepcwrClJl;  yap  07]  Ka~ -rOOE  eXOfJ-Ev  WaTE  rO;\.fJ-iiv 
rE  01.  aUToL  fJ-cf.)..'aTa  KaL  'lTep~  WV  E7TLXELp-rya0fJ-Ev  EK;\.oyL~Ea8aL 40). 
Similar  views  about  the  Athenians  are  expressed  in  the  famous 
comparison of the Athenians with the Spartans, which Thucydides 
puts  in the mouth of the Corinthians (1.70). Vollgraff (1952,  p.28-
30)  cites  again  a  number of parallels,  but most significantly  one 
from  the  tragic  poet Agathon:  yvwfJ-7J  Q€  KpELaaov  EaTLV  7j  pWfJ-7J 
XEPWV  (fr.27); Agathon was one of G.'students, and he is presented 
in Plato's Symposium delivering a Gorgian speech on  epClJl;,  so  that 
the line quoted probably supports the reading KaL  pWfJ-7Jv,  because of 
Agathon's familiarity with his master's works. 
6epa.1TOVTES •••  EUTUXOUV'iWV:  'compassionate  to  those  suffering 
undeservedly,  committed  to  punish  those  who  enjoy  undeserved 
prosperity'; the theme of compassion is too  common in Epitaphioi 
for Vollgraff's (1952, p.31) contention that G. means that "l'advocat 
ou l'homme politique qui desire faire carriere ne doit pas se charger 
d'affaires de peu d'interet, genus causarum humile, mais aspirer a  se 
faire  en grand style Ie  champion des pauvres et des  opprimes et se 
poser comme denonciateur du vice et des actions injustes, pour que 
l'  opinion pubIique Ie porte aux nues" to be true. His argument that 
what Aristotle names a.peraL  Kae'  ETEPOV  are dealt with after aEfJ-vO~ 
fJ-€V  'lTpO,  TOt),  Beou"  is  an  attempt  to  have  what  G.  says  here 
construed  independently  of what  seems  to  be  a  locus  in  other 
Epiraphioi, presumably because G.  was  a Sophist. Nevertheless, if 
we  turn to  Pal.  32  we find  that the  hero  contends that  he  is  TOLS" 
€v-ruxovaLV  au  qiJovepo"  TWV  QUa-ruXOVVTWV  OiKTLPfJ-WV, which shows 
that neither text is  a basis for generalisations concerning "la pensee 
de  Gorgias";  for it  is  appropriate  for  a defendant to  claim that he 
does  not  resent  the  prosperity  of  others,  whereas  Epiraphios 
278 provides  a  suitable  context  for  the  metor  to  counterbalance 
compassion for sufferers with the punishment of those causing the 
sufferings. In the former context. if the speaker had been presented 
as  Ko:taa-rr]s-.  he would have been in danger of being thought of as 
1TO:tU1TPa.yiJ-WV;  in the latter. the dead being collectively characterised 
as  Ko:tacrrai,  they are elevated to  public benefactors. This is  not the 
only  place  where  the  Athenian  dead  are  praised  for  this  virtue: 
Lysias  employs  it  repeatedly  in  his  Epitaphios  (Toue;  j1-EV 
clO~KOVj1-€1I0ue;  E:teouvTEe;  14  and  1TpOeVj1-WS"  yap  ToZe;  dO~KOU/L€VOI.e; 
7jgoual.  (307]8~aovTEe;  22;  TOtJe;  /LEV  aMove;  dOLKouvTae;  €Ko:taaev  16, 
Toue;  KaKoue;  KO:ta.~OVTES"'  19),  Thucydides  2.  40  Kat.  j1-0VOL  OU  TOU 
gu/L~€pOVTOe;  /Lillov  :toYl.a~  7j  rijs  Deveepiae;  Tq)  1TLcrrq)  doeWs-
nva.  W~E:tou/Lev, and Mene.:"Cenos  244e3  Ws- del.  :tLav  ~1.:tOLKT£P/LWV 
EcrrL  Kat.  TOU  7jrrovoe;  eepa7Tie;  (referring  to  Athens;  cpo  also 
Isok.4.53  o~o  0",  Kat.  Ka'T7]Yopoua£  TLveS"'  T,j1-wv  Ws- OUK  opeWs-
(30UA.EUO/L€VWV,  on  Toue;  da8ev€aT€pove;  El8£a/Leea  eepa7TEveLv). 
au6cl.oELS  npos  TO  O"UtL<pepov:  it  is  far  from  clear  what  the  exact 
meaning  of the  phrase is  and how it should be explained. in the 
context of an Epitaphios; Vollg:raff's view that G.  does not refer to 
the interests of  the city as a whole is again based on his presumption 
that  G.  praises  the virtues of the pupils of the  Sophists,  and thus 
their  aptness  to  serve  their own interests.  This  he thinks  is  also 
evinced  by  the  absence  of  any  reference  to  oLKaLov;  more 
particularly  he  claims  that  "IT  ne  dit  pas  a l'  eloge ...  qu'  ils 
pratiquaient lajustice dans 1'exercice de leurs fonctions publiques et 
dans  Ie  commerce avec leurs concitoyens" (p.36),  and this absence 
is  taken  to  confirm  Plato's  presentation  of G.  in  Gorgias.  But 
VoUgraff fails  to  observe that later G.  says  O£Kaw~  OEo  1Tpoe;  Toue; 
clcrroue;  Tqi  LaC!J  (although  in  his  comments  ad  loc .•  pp.73ff.,  he 
strives to show that o£KawL has nothing to do with 'justice'). I would 
prefer  to  take  1Tpoe;  TO  auf14€POV  modally;  this  function  is  also 
acceptable  for  TO  1TP€1TOV,  and I  would consequently translate  the 
phrase as  follows:  'bold without going against the interest [of the 
279 city]'. That G.  does not imply the personal interest of each one of 
the  soldiers  should  be  taken  for  granted  if we  consider  the 
restrictions  imposed  upon  him by  the  generic  characteristics  of 
Epitaphios (aueao€l.a  is  a very negative characteristic); at any rate, 
such  a  vigorous  polarity  as  the  one  between  personal  and  civic 
interests  cannot be appropriate in public  epideictic  or deliberative 
oratory. Was not it Perikles who reminded the Athenians that KaJ.clis-
P.€1I  yap  ~€POP.€1I0t;  dv7jp  1"0  Kae'  eav1"oll  cna~e€l.pop.€lI7J<;  r'iJt; 
7Ta1"pioot;  OVO€lI  ~UUOll  G'VlIa7TOMV1"al.,  KaK071.JXWV  O€  ElI  €V71.JXovOiJ 
7ToM4J  p.ii.J\).ov  OLaUqJ(€1"aL? (Thuc. 2.60.3). 
e:uopyY]'T'Ol.:  Aristotle defines it as  follows:  1"0  yap  €vopyrrrov  KaL  1"0 
7TpaOll  ElI  P.€u6-rrrrL  EO'7"LV  opyfjt;  KaL  dvaJ.'Y77uLat;  r'iJt;  7TpOt;  omv 
eMM 1,  1186a23). It is a relatively rare word, but it occurs (in other 
forms)  in Thuc.  1.  122:  €V  c[J  0  P.€1I  €uopyr,1"W<;  aU1"41  7Tpouop.Lkr]uat; 
j3€j3aL01"€pOt;,  0 0' opytu8€)s  7T€pL  au1"'ov  OUK  EAauuw  7T1"aL€l.  and in 
Eur. Ea.  641  and Hipp.  1039. 
'T'41  q,pov(p.q>  TIjs  yvwp.'T]s ••• <TIjs  'T'OAP.'T]S>:  after a.~pov Sauppe printed 
<r'iJt;  PWfJ-7J<;> , whereas Vollgraff prefers  <r'iJt;  oofryt;>,  as  he traces 
affinities  with  relevant  passages  in  He!.,  and  he  concludes  that 
"Gorgias exalte ici la puissance bienfaisante de la rhetorique". But 
he  probably overlooks  the importance of the  opposition between 
deeds and thinking in Epitaphiol, as well as the effect resulting from 
such an opposition here. G., by referring to the dead as  ave6.0€l.<; and 
EuopyrrrOL,  increases the pathos of  his speech, and now he wishes to 
revert  to  their  prudence,  before passing  on  once  more  to  a  fully 
emotional  and  somewhat  aggressive  tone.  The  meaning  of the 
phrase is  that those praised were brave enough to  act boldly, but at 
the  same  time  they  were  prudent  enough  to  check  violence  for 
violence's sake. The recurrent distinction between nJAfJ-7J  and  YVWfJ-7J 
in  Epitaphiol  has  already  been  discussed;  we  may  now  cite  a 
sentence  from  Demosthenes'  Epitaphios  which  parallels  G.'s 
formula: eoon  yap  eO'7"l.V  a,7TaU7J<;  dp€r'iJt;  dpxT7  P.ElI  aVV€ULt;,  7TEpa<;  OE 
280 (17). 
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1"OUS"  U~PLa-n:i.S":  this  is  the  first  in  a  string  of four 
anadiploseis,  all  of which  are  designed  to  express  cases  where 
reciprocity in behaviour becomes a praiseworthy element.  Indeed, 
the  phrase  'hybristic  towards  the  hybristic',  especially  in  an 
Epitaphios,  which  purports  to  elevate  the  dead  to  the  heights  of 
immortality, is prima facie appalling. It is  not so  much that it may 
irritate  the  (somewhat  superficial)  modern  reader  because  of its 
bringing out a  'tooth-for-a-tooth and an  eye-for-an-eye'  pattern of 
thought and reaction, for this is not uncommon in the Greek code of 
moral  values  (for  instance,  paying  your  enemy(or  your  friend's 
enemy)  with  the  same  coin  was  for  G.  a  perfectly  acceptable 
reaction as  fr.21  shows).  Given that in no  Epitaphios do  the  dead 
come second,  this  is  not the place for  G.  to  develop  the passive-
sufferer /  active-violator polarity,  which he admirably  expands  in 
He!.  7  (notice  the  U{3PLai37J  /  u{3pr.aa~  repetition  there).  G.  would 
preferably avoid saying that those praised suffered hybris, and it is 
reasonable  to  speculate  that  the  hybris  of the  dead  was  directed 
against  third  parties  (i.e.  enemies)  or against  those  in  need  who 
appealed to  the Athenians (but see Fisher 1992, p.96 with his valid 
criticism of Vollgraff 1952, p.26 n.80). The meaning of the phrase 
may be very close to  Lysias'  formulation:  TOV~ JLev  a(5t.KOVJL€VOV~ 
EAEOVVTE~,  TOV~ (5'  u{3pr.'OVTOS  JLt.aOVVTE~ (2.14). To these people the 
Athenian  dead are  u{3pt.ara.L,  in a  sense which cannot be  very  far 
from the KoAa.ara.1.  of  the a(5LKWS'  EVTVXOVVTWV. 
OELVOLS":  it is  hard to  decide if this is  a neuter, but judging from  the 
context it must be masculine. 
~a.p-rUpLa  Oe  TOU'TWv  •••  oe  cr.va..e,,~a7a:  this  sentence  (and  the  one 
following  it)  have  received  an  extensive  discussion  by  Vollgraff 
(1952,  p.58-71),  who  once  more  saw  fit  to  propose  textual 
alterations,  so  as  to  bring  the  sense  closer  to  what  he  thought 
appropriate  for  a  Sophist,  both  in  form  and  in  content.  He  thus 
281 claims  that  LlLOS- p.ev  ciyoAp.a:,a..  TOVTWV  oe  civa8fJp.aTa  is  an 
"antithese fausse, indigne d'un ecrivain de talent"; a.ya).p.G.  certainly 
means  'something evoking pleasure', but even if the text requires 
emendation,  I  do  not see how the eaUTWV  oe  ciytiJl.p.aTa  (Ipsorum 
deC'dS p.60 n.1; the parallel he alludes to, Aiskh. Eum.920, seems to 
me irrelevant) is any clearer than LlLOS  ciytiJl.p.aTa, meaning statues of 
Zeus  (he  himself admits  that  "Ie trophee  eleve  sur Ie  champ  de 
bataille ...  est  consacre a Zeus'),  and  eauTwv  O€  civa8fJp.aTa  (DK. 
instead  of iOVTWV  of the  Mss),  meaning  'their  own  dedications' 
(none of the parallels he offers refers to  ciycL).p.ara).  Moreover, d(.os 
dva8fJp.aTa is void of  sense, since it means 'dedications of  Zeus'; the 
phrase requires a dative. At any rate, the trophies of victory are a 
recurring theme in Lysias'  Epitaphios,  as  they appear four times 
(20,25, 53 and 63), of  which the last one is strikingly similar to G.'s 
phrase  (Tpo7TaLov  p.ev  TWV  7TO).EP.[WV  EGT7Jaav,  P.cLpTVpaS  oe  rijs-
aVTWV  dPErijS  EyyVS  QVTas  TOUOE  TOU  p.vfJp.aTos  TOUS  AaKEOaLp.oV[wv 
TcLcpOVS  7TapexovTaL). 
OUK  a.1TELpOL  •••  eLfl11V'TlS:  Vollgraff prints  OUTE  EP.CPUTOV  EpLOOS ••• OUTE 
EV07T)./.OV  a.PEOS,  a correction which is characterised by Loraux as "ill 
founded to  say the least" (1986, p.432 n.45).  EWPVTOS" Ap7Js  (Ares 
meaning  'war' is  a common metonymy in Greek)  Vollgraff found 
too bellicose, and thus out of  place in a public speech. But EP.<pVTOS' 
denotes something 'inborn', and as such unavoidable, as  opposed to 
the specific quality of the EPWTES  that the dead turned to, that is  a 
form oflove which is conventionally accepted. By thus defining war 
and love G.  makes sure that the praised will not run the danger of 
being  charged  with  excessive  activity  or that  they  possessed  an 
overdeveloped aspect in their character. They are prone to war to the 
extent  that physis  privileged  them  with  such  a  predilection,  and 
similarly their love-activity does not overcome the established limits 
dictated by nomos.  G.  simply employs a common characteristic of 
the Epitaphioi, namely the distinction between peace and war, so  as 
to claim that the praised warriors were competent in both situations. 
282 One-sidedness  is  imputed  by Thucydides  to  the  Lacaedemonians 
(see 2.39), whereas the Athenians are dVE~fLEvas DLaL7"WfL€vOL,  and at 
the  same  time  ready  for  adventurous  expeditions.  But  Athenian 
¢n)"oKaJ..f.a,  G.  implies,  does  not  amount  to  feminization,  and  it 
would  have  been  strange  if he  had  not  referred  to  the  military 
aptitude.  vop.Lf.LWv  EpoYrwv:  it is  hard to  see what G.  has in mind by 
referring to  'legitimate love'; it certainly alludes to  the  activity of 
the dead in peace, as  it is opposed to  EfLcPV7"OV  vApEO~, and Vollgraff 
(1952, p.65) renders it 'aspirations 16gitimes', which is wide enough 
to  include  more  than  sexual  relationships.  Vollgraff  also  cites 
Wilamowitz's explanation "Wlinsche und Aspirationen, die, so hoch 
sie gehen,  doch nicht 1Tapavop.ou01.."  (this  extended meaning of the 
normal use of epas  is  very common in Pindar;  a good example is 
traced in P.  10.  60  Kat.  yap  €7"EpOL~  E7"EPWV  ep~ tJ7TEKVLO'€  <pp€va~. 
See also Carey 1981, p.87). A very similar expression is traced in a 
different  context  (Aiskhines  1.136  Epw-ra  3f.KaLov),  which  is 
discussed  by Dover 1978,  p.42,  45f.  q,t.AoKclAou  E.Lp-rlV'Tls:  cpo  the 
well-known  phrase in Perikles'  Epitaphias  in Thucydides  (2.40) 
<pL)"oKa)"oufLEv  7"€  yap  fL€7" '  EV7"€)"€La~  Kat.  <pL)"OO'0cP0UfLEV  cLVEV 
J1-a)"aK£a~. 
<TE.ll-voL:  Vollgraff is  correct in translating 'respectueux' (1952, p.69 
with more translations cited; this active sense of  the adj. is relatively 
lUlcommon,  but  cpo  Isok.  Evag.  44:  O'EfLVO~  WV  ou  7"aL~  7"OU 
1Tpoac/nrov  (]'VvaywyaL~,  dMa.  7"aLS  7"OU  {3£ov  Ka7"aaKEvaLs).  However, 
the opportunism that he  locates  in G.  when he  maintains that "ils 
[G.' s  students]  envisagent  peut-etre  que  cela  pourra  leur  etre 
profitable dans  une autre vie,  si  toutefois  les  dieux  existent" does 
nothing but betray his ill-founded views on the Sophistic movement. 
o  01.0  I. •••  6epa1TE.£t;:  the  responsibility  of children  to  look  after  their 
parents is  a formulaic  element in the Epitaphiai (cp.  TIme.  2.46.1, 
Lysias Epit.75, PI. A1enex. 248e4-249c3). 
E.U<T~E.LS  ••• -rij  ma-rE.L:  cpo notes on fr.2l. 
283 1"01:yUpoiiV ••• tWVTWV:  'when they died the longing for them did not die 
with them, but it still lives  a  deathless life in bodies that are not 
deathless'; it is  hard to  say whether G.  had in mind chro8avotriwv 
when he decided to  create a paronomasia (and a parechesis) with 
1TOeO~ or the other way round.  Vollgraff (who  cites  an interesting 
parallel  from  Ploutarkhos Oth.  17)  concludes that  1TOeO~ expresses 
here "l'.enthusiasme,  l'  elan irresistible qui peut animer un hornme 
emotif' (1952, p.86) and that it does not have a specific object (88). 
It is  true that the construction is  complicated, but I  think that the 
correct meaning is brought out if we take 1To8o~ (usually meaning 
longing for someone who is not there) with ou  'wv-rwv (a genitive of 
the object which comes too late by thus creating a hyperbaton): 'the 
longing  ...  for  those who  are not still  alive'. This  would bring the 
formula closer to something repeatedly traced in the Epitaphioi (cp. 
Lysias 2. 23, 24 and more markedly in 81,  €1T€~87J evrrrwv  O'w/-La:rwv 
ETUXOV,  d8a.vaTov  /-Lv-ry/-LTJv  o~d.  -r7Jv  dp€-r7Jv  -r7Jv  aVTwv  KaT€'\~1ToV). 
OUK  EV  deava:rol.S  O'oJ~aa1.  ~1j: probably a consolatory reminding that 
the tantalising 1To80~ will not last long, since the relatives (and the 
other members of  the community) of  the dead are mortal, and thkus 
their own death will soon bring an end to it. Perikles in Thucydides 
2.44 (00'01.  S' ao  1TapTJ{3-ryKaT€,  TOV  T€  1TA€OVa  K€POO~  OV  1]VTUX€LT€ 
{3£ov  W€LOO€  Kat.  TOVO€  {3paxrJv  €O'€ooa~)  is  more  explicit,  to  an 
extent that, when I was being taught his Epitaphios as a school-boy, 
I found it almost macabre and rude;  but it can simply be a verbal 
expression  of the  emotions  of those  (parents  or  partners)  who, 
during  funeral  ceremonies,  sometimes  utter  in  despair  their 
intention to  be buried with their loved person.  The modem Greek 
phrase that people address to the dead is also telling: KaA1]  aVTa./-LW<rrJ 
('may we meet soon'). 
284 3  On not Being 
1.  Gorgias'  IIEp~  TOU  p..ry  vOVTOS 
The interpretation of  Gorgias' On not Being or On Nature (ONB) is 
an extremely difficult task.  This  is  clearly brought out when  one 
attempts  to  approach it through modem scholarly work.  Robinson 
claims (1973, p.60): "I am quite willing to  entertain the hypothesis 
that  Gorgias  took  the  work on nature  seriously.  What  I  am  not 
willing to  do  is  to  take it seriously myself'; Kerferd is  explicit as 
well: "Its general thesis might conceivably amuse those to whom all 
attempts at philosophy are inherently absurd, but such persons could 
hardly be expected to work through the difficult arguments which 
make  up  the  contents of the  work"  (1955,  p.3).  Gomperz  (1912, 
followed by others) thought that it is a piece of rhetoric, and others 
assumed that the theory about logos developed by Gorgias  in this 
treatise, namely that logos does not represent reality,  liberates him 
from  the  chains  of truth:  "Gorgias,  penseur  de  la  rhetorique, 
debarasse ainsi Ie langage de sa fonction d'information pour mieux 
degager sa fonction d' influence" (Brunschwig 1971, p.83; this view 
is  very  close  to  the conclusions  that Rosenmayer  1955,  p.225-60 
draws in his discussion of  the role of  a-rrcLT7]  in Gorgias). For Guthrie 
(1971,  p.193-4)  it  is  a  parody of Eleatic  philosophy;  this  scholar 
reminds us that "it is  a mistake to  think that parody is incompatible 
with serious intention. Gorgias's purpose was negative, but none the 
less serious"] . 
1 Assessments of ONE are summarized in Untersteiner 1954, p.  163 n.2, Newiger 
1973, p.  1-8, Mazzara 1982, p. 13-18. 
285 Far from  intending  to  question  the  authority  of scholars  who 
have  previously  undertaken  the  task  to  shed  light  on  ONE,  I 
consider that  this  plethora of divergent  views  probably  confums 
Gorgias' argument that due to  subjectivism, it is impossible to  say 
what is  really true. Every text is  open to  interpretations, but in the 
case of ONE no  agreement has been reached even on its  'narure': 
farce,  parody, rhetoric, quasi-philosophical, pure philosophy. I take 
it that some of the disagreement is attributable to the fact that we do 
not possess Gorgias' original text. But even so,  nothing guarantees 
that,  if we possessed it,  a consensus  would have been attainable. 
That this  is  the case can be asserted by the unsolved problems of 
interpretation of the poem of Parmenides, of which an important 
part  is  preserved.  It should  be  added,  of course,  that very little 
(probably nothing more than mere titles) of the argumentation and 
the problematic developed by the Sophists themselves is preserved, 
and it is thus impossible to  examine ONE in its context!; as Kerferd 
has pointed out ONE is "probably the nearest we have or will ever 
have to a complete technical presentation of  an articulated sophistic 
argument from the fifth. century B.C." (1982, p.93). The absence of 
any substantial comparative grounds admittedly obscures our view 
of this text. It should also  be stressed that prejudiced assumptions 
about  the  sophistic  movement  and  its  leading  figures  have  not 
helped  much.  The  view  that  Gorgias  was  primarily  interested  in 
practical means of persuasion, in other words that he was a  'pure' 
rhetorician presupposes a clear-cut distinction between philosophy 
and  rhetoric,  inaugurated  by  Plato  and  uncritically  adopted  by 
1 We know that Protagoras wrote a text under the tide ilept.  7'"ov'Ov-rQS",  the 
contents of  which are unknown to us. It seems likely that this work included anti-
Elearic arguments, and it is thus possible that aspects of  the reasoning developed 
there were slmilar to G.'s own text. Mansfeid (1990) lays much emphasis on 
PrOtagoras' now lost treatise, and he thinks that it influenced G.'s own polemic, 
as it is represented in ONE. 
286 modem scholars!. It is more than certain that Sophistic education 
involved wider philosophical and  'scientific'  activity,  and  this  is 
well attested in Aristophanes' Clouds (Dover 1968, p.x..x.-DV-xx.'Xv); 
Helen  13  can also  serve as  evidence that G.  was at least sceptical 
about the 'theories' held by natural philosophers (p.€TeWpOl\oy0l.)  and 
about the role that the speech plays in their explanations of various 
phenomena. 
Having outlined the main lines of  interpretation of ONB, we may 
now pass to the main questions: What does this text intend? In what 
manner  does  it  fulfil  its  intention?  And  lastly,  does  the  strategy 
followed in it secure its acceptability by its recipients? 
Paradoxically,  I  wish to  start from  the  last question, because I 
consider that its  answer may shed some rays of light on the other 
two as well. From the compendium of  modem approaches presented 
above,  it emerges  that some modem students  of this  text are not 
ready to accept it as a serious piece of  philosophy. Nevertheless, its 
meaning to us is one thing, and the way in whih it was perceived by 
later philosophers  in antiquity  quite  another.  For instance,  those 
scholars interested in applying formal logic so as to demonstrate the 
flaws of argumentation in ONE are perfectly legitimate, as  long as 
they realise that this is not a safe criterion for the assessment of its 
value and its position in the history of ideas. Should this have been 
the case, we would have to concede that some syllogisms that occur 
in Plato's texts  are worthless.  Any serious  attempt to  assess  the 
perception  of ONE  should,  I  think,  be  based  on  a  synchronic 
approach. The term 'synchronic' should not though be taken strictly, 
because there is only slight contemporary evidence. However, if  our 
scope is  to  investigate the intentions and the perception of ONB we 
I Kennedy (1994, p.lO) holds that "there was. however. no sharp division benveen 
philosophy and rhetoric in the fifth cenrury and all sophists explored the themes of 
truth  and  opinion,  nature  and  convention.  and  language  and  re:ility".  The 
artificiality of this  distinction bas  been shown very recently by Schiappa 1999, 
p.7ff. 
287 should necessarily tum to readings chronologically closer to it, those 
of  Plato and Isokrates
l
. 
We  may  start  with  Isokrates;  in  his  Antidosis  268  (=fr.l)  he 
classifies the views of 'old intellectuals'  (1TaI\.Cl~wv  (jo<p~arwv) about 
the number of Qv'ra.  Some (unidentified) say that they are infinite, 
Empedocles  four  (only  two  of  them,  veZx:oS'  and  ¢~:tLCl,  are 
mentioned), Ion no more than three, l'\lkmeon two, Parmenides and 
Melissus  one,  and Gorgias none  at  all.  It is  interesting  to  observe 
that  the  string  begins  with  an  infinite  number  and  is  gradually 
reduced  to  nothingness  represented  by  Gorgias.  This  passage  is 
significant  because  Gorgias  is  listed  along  with  a  number  of 
philosophers whose theories he himself criticises. In the second part 
supporting his  first  thesis  (namely,  'nothing is') he examines  the 
possibility that 'being' is either one or many, and he concludes that 
it is neither one nor many, so that 'being' is not. 
Isolcrates  classifies Gorgias  among a nmnber of philosophers in 
his Helen as  well. In the opening lines he claims that some people 
grew old by denying the possibility of  falsehood and by maintaining 
that  it  is  impossible to  utter two  (contradictory)  :t6yOl.  about  the 
same things. Isolcrates then goes on to  say that these people do  not 
realise that their activity is  not radical,  since earlier generations of 
intellectuals  have  produced more  thorough  treatises  on  the  same 
subjects. Gorgias (among Protagoras, Zeno and Melissus) is  one of 
them. This list is printed in part as  82B IDK, but the opening lines 
are omitted, and generally they have not attracted the attention they 
deserve. 
I  Dodds (1959, p.7-8) claims that "Plato certainly knows nothing of the 
"philosophical nihilism"  with which Gorgias has been credited on the strength of 
his notorious "proof' that (a) nothing exists ...  ", and this is used as a proof that 
"equally dubious, in my view, is the now fashionable contention that Gorgias was 
an original philosophical thinker", But as we shall see, it is very likely that Plato 
was aware of  Gorgias'  "philosophical nihilism", whatever this means, and that he 
probably saw it as a threat to his own theory of forms. 
288 The view that it is  impossible to  say anything false  forms  the 
central argument in the second division of ONE seeking to  establish 
that 'if anything is it is unknowable', although l\E(G does not make 
it clear if Gorgias committed himself to  this idea. Sextus certainly 
seems to  understand that Gorgias claimed that false  statements are 
impossible,  as  long  as  one conceives of a thing with one's mind. 
Argumentation from  antinomy is the  chief pattern of reasoning in 
the second part supporting the first major thesis ('nothing is') as it is 
clearly brought out by Anonymous'  preamble,  where we  are told 
that Gorgias collected contradictory properties attributed by earlier 
philosophers  to  onta (979a13ff).  There is  no  doubt that  Gorgias' 
case is not unique. Protagoras' sUbjectivism undoubtedly entails the 
impossibility  of falsehood,  and  antinomical  argumentation  had 
already been exploited by Zeno
l
.  But still, how are we to  interpret 
Isokrates' reception of  ONB? 
It is  true  that in all the relevant contexts Isokrates' tone is  the 
tone  of contempt.  Iso krates  ,  far from  intending to  be descriptive, 
prescribes what young men should avoid. This disclaimer is  useful, 
if we  bear  in  mind  that  Gorgias'  own  classification  of earlier 
philosophical activity is not neutraL Both of them object to abstract 
philosophical speculation. Guthrie (1971, p.195 n.1) has noticed this 
identity of feelings and maintained: "I confess to  a slight feeling of 
uneasiness,  because,  if Isocrates  knew  Gorgias' s  treatise  as  an 
ironical  exposure  of Eleatic  reasoning,  he  would  surely  have 
claimed him as  an ally rather than attacked him along with the rest. 
He  was,  however,  above  all  things  an  advocate,  ready  to  press 
anything  into  the  service of his  immediate case.  His  criticism  of 
Gorgias would be that by bothering at all about the philosophers and 
refuting them with their weapons he put himself in the same class". 
Gutrhrie' criticism reveals, I think, the kind of conclusions reached 
1 For the affmities of ONB with Protagorean and Zenonean processes see 
Mansfeld 1990, p. 243-271. For the impossibility of falsehood see Palmer 1999, 
p.124-134. 
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assumes that Gorgias ridiculed himself by refuting early philosophy, 
then  why  did Isokrates  himself bother about  Gorgias  by writing 
Helen? Guthrie simply endeavours here to make Isolaates' evidence 
fit  his  own reading  of ONE  as  a  parody.  An easier assumption 
should be made: Isokrates saw in Gorgias' ONE a continuum in the 
history of what we may now call  'philosophical speculation', and 
this is  further evidence against those who  tend to  support the view 
that  ONE is  a work motivated by mere practical needs.  Isolaates 
objects to  the value of this speculation, but he is honest enough to 
say so. In his own mind ONE belongs to what we arbitrarily label as 
pre-Socratic philosophy. 
We may now move to  Plato; Jaap Mansfeld has recently shown 
that some of  the deductions in the second part of  Plato's Parmenides 
are  extremely similar to  arguments put forward  in ONB. It is  not 
necessary to discuss them here (see comments), but we may simply 
quote Mansfeld's (1990, p.1l9) conclusion!: "If one does not want 
to assume that the 'special argument' is  a historical fake,  the only 
valid inference is that at Parm.162a Plato used Gorgias". What is 
perhaps  more  telling,  is  another  passage  from  Parmenides135a., 
which corresponds to  the three major theses developed in ONE. In 
Parmenides  135a.,  Parmenides  warns  Socrates  that someone  who 
has  heard  his  reasoning  about  Qv-ra.,  might  probably  object  and 
reason that a)  they do  not exist, b) if they exist they are  unknown 
(ayvWO"!"'CL),  and  c)  that  only  a  prodigy,  after  having  investigated 
them, wi.ll  be  able  to  make them known to  others.  Gorgias is  not 
mentioned here, but Hayes (1990, p.335) is right in concluding that: 
'"Plato  was indeed aware of the ONE as  were most of his educated 
contemporaries.  Moreover,  he knew  that its  arguments  had  posed 
formidable challenges to  Eleatic philosophy, and that his own quest 
1 See also Palmer 1999, p.108-117. 
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its ontological assumptions were similar to those of  the Eleatics,.l. 
This evidence suggests, I t:hink, that ONE was a well-known text; 
it must have been influential, and this view is  corroborated by the 
fact  that  its  tripartite  division  with  the  well  structured  argument 
made it memorable. There is no  evidence that it was perceived as  a 
piece of  hilarious philosophising activity. 
Given that ancient criticism seems to  take ONE rather seriously, 
how  are  we  to  interpret  it?  What  does  this  text  invite  us  to 
understand?  Wardy  (1996,  p.24)  poses  some  important questions: 
"Was Gorgias a part time or erstwhile honest, and honestly deluded, 
Parmenidean  philosopher?  Or was  he  the  sophisticated  'sophist' 
constructing  an  intellectual  pitfall?  If so,  with what  motivation? 
Without answers,  in a quite serious sense we simply do  not know 
what  On  What  Is  Not  is  saying.  My  suggestion  is  that  this 
vertiginous  uncertainty is  itself the primary message (better,  non-
message?)  of the  text  ...  Gorgias  is  deliberately  transmitting  a 
message which consists largely of noise; in so  doing he gets us to 
think about what any act of  communication must be like, and about 
what  philosophers  claim  their  messages  are  like  ".  Wardy's 
approach is promising because it does not seek to unveil a 'hidden 
meaning'. Most of the scholars have tried to  identify the target of 
Gorgias'  criticism by tracking down apparent similarities.  So  that 
Loenen (1959) reached the conclusion that Gorgias' target is solely 
Melissus. 
Gorgias  does  not put forward  any theories;  ONB is  a text  that 
examines the limits of  philosophical speculation and of  its methods
2
. 
1  Similarly Palmer (1999, 1'.117)  holds that "The Pannenides' s First Deduction 
suggests that Plato saw reflections of Gorgias'  anti-Parmenidean stance in more 
parts of his treatise than the personal demonstration . It is  very interesting to  see 
Plato giving Parmenides the chance to respond to Gorgias' attack". 
2  This does  not entail that I  adopt Blass's (1887, p49)  point that it shows  the 
uselessness of philosophical speculation. This  view implies  again that Gorgias' 
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Gorgias' philosophical views on the basis of this text.  and what is 
more, it is  methodologically unsafe to  use it as  evidence,  so  as  to 
confirm 'theories' or ideas that emerge in his Encomium of  Helen or 
The Defence ofPalamedes. 
ONE  however is  not  as  cryptic  as  it  appears  at  first  sight;  the 
methods  of argument  that  G.  uses  in  this  text  are  certainly  not 
peculiar to it.  He constantly argues by using antinomies, as  he does 
in Palamedes. He certainly polarises  'being' and 'not-being' in the 
'original proof; similarly,  he  manifestly  employs  argument  from 
antinomy in the section where he seeks to prove that 'being' is not, 
by showing that each member of the pairs one / many, generated / 
ungenerated,  in  motion  /  [at  rest]  when  attributed  to  OV'rG.  is 
impossible; the same polarisation is employed, according to my line 
of inquiry in the  second division of ONE,  where he  distinguishes 
between  sense perception and thought as  vehicles through which 
one approaches truth (the same polarisation appears also in the third 
division of ONB,  but it does  not constitute  there  the  foundation 
stone of Go's  reasoning). In this respect thus, we should not allow 
G. or his summarisers to perplex us. 
This being the  case with the method by which G.  argues,  one 
should  address  the  problem  of the  theses  that  G.  targets  so 
subversively.  Being,  concepts  and  language  form  a triad that  has 
unceasingly  been  investigated  by  philosophers  throughout  the 
centuries.  That  G.  seeks  to  address  all  these  three  elements 
collectively, and that in many cases he  does  this with reference to 
aspects  of the  reasoning utilised in the  other two,  is  undoubtedly 
amazing.  His  discussion of language,  for  instance, neglected  until 
very recently,  involves surprisingly  'modem'  approaches  to  it.  As 
far as r  know, G. is the very first intellectual in the Western world to 
express the view that language and things are two distinct entities, a 
adopted the superiority of rhetoric to philosophy, but it has  been suggested that 
this distinction is the product oflater 'epistemological' dichotomies. 
292 view that brings us very close to  the theory of the 'linguistic sign' 
put forward by F.  de Saussure at the beginning of the 20
th  century. 
And  it is  at  least inappropriate  to  get:  rid of these  approaches  by 
pointing  out  that  they  are  simply  employed  in the  course  of an 
argumentation  that  seeks  to  establish  the  impossibiliry  of 
communication or that they emanated in a social context in which 
the needs for 'practical' manipulation of  speech were increased. Yet, 
however interesting the independent views  developed in the  ONE 
may be, the triad comprising the major theses that G.  seeks to  deny 
is clearly Parmenidean. 
Parmenides, in fr.6  says: xpi]  TO  '\€YE~V TE  VOELV  T' dov  €J.LJ.LEVa~; 
this  formulation,  in the  reverse  order,  is  identical with the  three 
theses ofG.'s ONE as they are encapsulated at the beginning of  both 
Anonymous's and Sextus's versions. It is hard to believe that G. had 
anything else in mind when he decided to compose his text, but this 
does not mean that the ONE is simply anti-Parmenidean, because, as 
we have already seen and it will perhaps be made clearer when we 
will be concerned with the separate arguments, G. attempts an attack 
on philosophical speCUlation in generaL This Parmenidean formula 
probably served as  the pretext for the composition of G. 's heretical 
text, which in all likelihood was meant to  be perceived by men of 
high intellectual standards. 
ONE  cannot  and  should  not  be  evaluated  on  the  basis  of 
simplistic dichotomies; rhetorical or philosophical, this matters very 
little.  What  matters  is  that  G.  attempts  to  question philosophical 
speculation, for which he openly expresses his reservations in Helen 
13.  In paraphrasing  the  three  major theses  of ONE we  may  say: 
philosophical  entities  do  not  exist;  the  conception of them  either 
through the  senses  or through our mind is  iinpossible;  even if the 
conception  of  them  were  possible  no  one  would  be  able  to 
communicate them. One more point should be made; I take it that by 
the term aVTo.  in the first division of ONE, G. refers to philosophical 
speculation,  but  in the  two  following  ones  the  word  is  used  to 
denote the objects of external realiry as welL If this is the case, is it 
293 possible that in the second and the third theses G. has philosophical 
speculation in mind? I take it that the answer to this question should 
be  positive.  G.  very  frequently  argues  by  using  analogies  (see 
Introduction),  and  it  is  safe,  I  believe,  to  assume  that  when  he 
refutes the possibility of acquiring knowledge or communicating it, 
this  refutation can be applied to  philosophical speculation as  well. 
TIlls  is  at  least  how  Plato  conceived  ONE,  as  is  shown  in 
Parm.l35a. 
II.  The versions: Anonymous'MXG 5-6, 979a12-
980b21 and Sextus' Adv. Math.  7, 65-87 
Unfortunately,  Gorgias'  original text under the title  On  not Being 
(ONB)  does not exist; all the information we possess on its content 
is due to  the accounts of the Anonymous author of the treatise De 
Melissa Xenophane Gorgia (MXG),  and that of Sextus Empiricus' 
Against  Mathematicians  (VIL  65-87).  The  identification  of the 
author of  MXG goes far beyond the scope of this study, and it will 
suffice to mention that MXG has relatively recently been studied by 
Barbara Cassin in a massive volume under the title Si Parmenide: 
Le traite anonyme De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia (1980),  and that 
Jaap Mansfeld has also attempted to investigate the text "in its own 
right" (1990, p.200). 
Another question, which seems more relevant to the scope of 
this  study, is  related to  the reliability of these two  accounts.  Older 
generations of  scholars have thought that priority should be given to 
Sextus' account (an idea strongly supported by Loenen 1959, 'The 
task before  us  is  to  reconstruct  the  meaning of Gorgias  from  the 
wording of Sextus" p.180;  see also  p.178  n.  7).  The superiority of 
MXG  has  been  defended  by  a  number  of scholars  (for  further 
literature see Untersteiner 1961, p.38), and Migliori went as far as to 
hold that Sextus  is  dependent  on lv[XG  (1973,  p.54,  a  possibility 
hinted at by Kerferd 1955, p.4:  "It has never I think been seriously 
294 suggested  that  Sextus  took  his  information  from  the  author  of 
lvfXG,). 
It is  now true that ivfXG presents serious textual problems, which 
in some  cases  are  insoluble.  However,  this  does  not entail  that it 
should  be  rejected  as  a  source  of information  (as  Loenen,  1959, 
thought).  NfXG is  by far more economical in its  demonstration of 
Gorgias'arguments and this might be taken as  a first sign that it is 
unembellished (or at  least that it is  less  embellished than  Sextus' 
version)  .  It is  also  true  that  when  Anonymous  offers  his  own 
assessment  of Gorgias'  theses,  he clearly  states  that  he  does  so 
(e.g.979a35, where Anonymous clearly indicates that he provides as 
with his own criticism of Gorgias' 'orginal proof'). Moreover, there 
are some cases in which the two versions are so similar, that there is 
no point in trying to establish the superiority of  the one to the other. 
Kerferd has clearly shown that the arguments supporting the first 
thesis "are in fact identical" (1955, p.9) in both summaries. From a 
methodological point of  view this implies that a sober consideration 
of ONE should take into  account both versions.  The same,  I  am 
inclined  to  believe,  holds  for  cases  where  the  two  versions  are 
remarkably divergent. 
Thus,  the  line  of inquiry  followed  here  presupposes  that  -
especially in the absence of Gorgias' original text - we do  not have 
the  privilege  of ignoring  either  of  the  versions.  Any  serious 
investigation of what G.'s ONE looked like should be based on a 
close  reading  of both  summaries  in  comparison.  Due  to  the 
economical  description  of ivfXG,  our  comparative  approach  will 
normally proceed by presenting first the separate arguments as  they 
appear  in  this  text.  That  this  is  methodologically  preferable  is 
corroborated by the fact that j\;fXG (especially in the  first division) 
makes  use  of a terminology which is  more appropriate  for  a Fifth 
century  intellectual,  like  Gorgias  (see  Calogero  1932,  p.  158  n.4, 
Kerferd 1955, p.14; contra Loenen 1959, p.178-79 n.  7), and by the 
fact  that  Anonymous  provides  us  with  a  number  of arguments 
unparalleled in Sextus. Because of the lack of direct evidence, the 
295 degree to which both versions represent Gorgias' original arguments 
is  for  most  of the  time  a  matter of conjecture,  and  I  consider it 
legitimate not to  bring in any objections to  the arguments  as  they 
stand in the  accounts available (objections to  particular arguments 
proposed by  some scholars  are  discussed within the  frame  of my 
comments on these arguments). 
Both  Sextus  and  Anonymous  seem  to  agree  on  the  tripartite 
character of  ONE; nothing is, if  it is it is unknowable, and if it is and 
it  is  lmowable  it  is  impossible  to  communicate  it  [or:  our 
lmowledge] to others (the passages recapitulating these major theses 
have been compared by Gaines 1997, p.1-12). The main difference 
is  that  Anonymous  preserves  the  argument  in  indirect  speech, 
whereas Sextus uses direct speech. 
Anonymous then continues with the announcement of the second 
set of  arguments supporting the first major thesis. He informs us that 
Gorgias  based his  argumentation on a  collection of contradictory 
properties  attributed  by earlier philosophers  to  QV1'"a.,  and  that  in 
some cases he argued against them by using their own arguments 
(the  names  of Zeno  and  Melissus  are  brought  in).  However, 
Anonymous clearly states that this set of arguments came after the 
'original proof', the demonstration of which follows  immediately. 
This preamble is  unparalleled in Sextus, who  instead presents the 
structure of the arguments for the first major thesis: if anything is it 
is either a) being, or b) not being or c) both being and not being. He 
then  commences  the  detailed  demonstration  of  the  arguments 
starting from (b). 
This  discrepancy  concerning  the  argumentation  supporting  the 
first  thesis  is  proved to  be  puzzling,  for prima facie  Anonymous 
seems to provide us with !\Vo sets of arguments (the 'original proof 
coming first,  and  afterwards  the  argument based on contradictory 
properties),  whereas  Sextus  prefers  to  offer a clear-cut distinction 
between three separate arguments. The location of this discrepancy 
between the sources led Gigon (1936,  p.192-93)  to  hold the view 
that they differ to an extent that disallows us from saying which one 
296 IS  consistent  with  Gorgias'  original  arguments.  Kerferd  (1955) 
convincingly argued that the two sources are identical, and in fact, 
close reading of  this first part of  ONE points to that direction. 
Tne  similarities  emerge  when  one  undertakes  the  task  of 
examining the separate arguments: in the 'original proof' (in j\£YG) 
the  first  argument seeks to  establish the possibility that 'not-being' 
is,  by using the verb  'to be' equivocally. Sextus' text is  more clear: 
'not-being' is  and is not; in the respect that it is  conceived as  'not-
being' it is not. But since we may say that 'not-being' is  'not being', 
then it is. But this is  absurd, because it is impossible for something 
to  be  and not to  be at the  same time. It is  obvious then,  that the 
important point of this  first  argument is  exactly the possibility of 
holding that 'not-being' is, and this is confinned by the fact that the 
second argument both in MXG and Sextus has as  its starting point 
the hypothesis 'if  not being is' (the only difference is that MXG uses 
the term  tJ-iJ  elvat.,  and Sextus tJ-iJ  ov). Both sources then state that 
these  two  elements  are  contradictory,  so  that if we concede that 
'not-being'  is,  then  it  follows  that  'being'  is  not.  Which  is  the 
inference oftbis argument? Sextus says: 'in no way being is not, so 
that not-being is not' (or to make it more clear, it is not 'not-being' 
that it is not!). 
So far so good. But why then, if  'in no way being is not', does he 
immediately  proceed  (68)  with  the  demonstration supporting  the 
thesis  that 'being is  not'? The answer has been given by Kerferd: 
"the argument which Gorgias  is  using proceeds by a reductio  ad 
absurdum" (1955,  p.16).  It  is  the elliptical wording  in lvfXG  that 
actually obscures the point (e[  yap  TO  tJ-iJ  elvat.  eo-n.  TO  eIvat.  tJ-7] 
eLVUL  1Tpoa-r,KeL).  Sextus,  with  the  phrase  OUX~  De  ye  TO  av  OUK 
eO'TLV,  sheds  a ray of light on what must simply be  understood  in 
lvf.XG. 
The  last  argument  of the  'original  proof  puts  fonvard  the 
possibility that both  'being'  and 'not-being'  are.  But  in this  case, 
'not-being' is  not, as  well as  'being' since it is  the same with 'not-
297 being'. This  argument in Sextus comes  after the  arguments  from 
antinomy  (75-76),  and it was  exactly its place there that puzzled 
Gigon. Why does Sextus present it at this place? First of  all it should 
be  noted  that  Sextus'  own  account  presents  an  internal 
inconsistency: in his outline he follows the order a)  if 'being' is, b) 
if 'not-being'  is,  c)  if both  'being'  and  'not-being'  are.  In  the 
detailed discussion of  the arguments, (b) comes first, and (a) second, 
an  arrangement  which  is  in  accordance  with  Anonymous,  who 
clearly  states  that  the  arguments  for  (b)  came  after  the  'original 
proof. This discrepancy between the outline of the arguments and 
their actual discussion may be explained onthe assumption that this 
was  the  arrangement in the  summary he had before him (palmer 
1999, p.255). That (c) comes after (a) and (b), whereas in iv[XG it is 
included in the 'original proof is  explained by the fact that Sextus 
simply reformulated the arrangement.  All the  chances  are  that he 
considered it more appropriate to present the arguments concerning 
'not-being' and 'being' first, and then to pass to their synthesis. The 
effort on behalf of  Sextus to  present a smoother and more 'logical' 
arrangement  may be taken  as  a  sign  that M.XG  is  closer to  the 
original, Gorgianic arrangement. 
In  M.XG,  the  arguments  from  antinomy  follow  Anonymous' 
criticism  of  the  'original  proof.  Both  versions  turn  to  the 
investigation of the implications of the assumption 'if anything is'; 
although the separate arguments are not identical, it is  not possible 
to  maintain  that  the  two  versions  differ to  such  a  degree  which 
prevents us  from recognising Gorgias' arguments. The first obvious 
difference is that /v[XG includes an argument unparalleled in Sextus, 
namely  the  one  about  motion,  although the  latter,  because of the 
irrecoverable  textual  difficulties  in  i'vfXG,  is  our  only  source  of 
information on the antinomical pair one / many. 
Both versions  begin with the  pair generated /  ungenerated;  the 
terms used in A1XG are yeviJTov  I dyev7JTov,  whereas Sextus instead 
of dyev7JTov  uses  the  word  d£C5I.ov.  It is  also  worth  stressing  that 
298 Sextus thought that an argument combining both properties (d£o(.ov 
cIj;.a  Ka.L  YE"lf7JTOV)  had its place at this point. The demonstration in 
MXG  takes  as  its  starting  point  that  if it  is  ungenerated  it  is 
unlimited, a thesis based on an (undefined) axiom of  Melissus. This 
axiom, never stated explicitly in this version - which however has 
already dealt with Melissus in its first chapter, is voiced in Sextus: if 
it is  eternal, it does not have a beginning (dPX17v),  which entails that 
it  is  unlimited.  The  implications  of this  difference  have  been 
explained by Mansfeld (1990,  p.1l4): "this proves  that MXG 5-6 
cannot have been Sextus' source, because apX17v  is  not fOllild  there 
and  because  it  is  unlikely  that  Sextus  would  have  'translated' 
Anonymous' reference about Melissus into an argument which only 
dealt with apX17". 
From the assumption that being is  unlimited both versions infer 
that it is nowhere. Once again, Sextus' accollilt is more detailed; for 
in MXG it is merely assumed that it cannot be either in itself or in 
anything else, because in that case there would be two  things,  the 
container and the contained. Sextus on the contrary,  examines the 
inferences  of these  two  possibilities:  a)  if it  is  anywhere,  it  is 
different  from  that  in  which  it  is,  so  that  the  contained  is  not 
unlimited.  In  that  case,  the  container  will  be  bigger  than  the 
contained,  which  is  absurd  because  nothing  is  bigger  than  the 
unlimited.  Conclusion:  the  unlimited cannot be  anywhere.  b)  it is 
not self-contained; if it were  self-contained the  contained and the 
container  would  have  been  the  same  thing,  so  that  being  will 
become two  things,  a  location and  a  body_  But this  is  absurd.  It 
seems  that  in  Anonymous'  version  the  argument  'one  would 
become two' covers both possibilities:  'being' is  in itself or 'being' 
is  in something else. This corresponds only to  the second argument 
in Sextus, namely the one examining the possibility that 'being' is in 
itself. This discrepancy illustrates once again that Sextus did not use 
lvIXG (Mansfeld 1990, p.116). 
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alL  In MXG this  is the third step of the arguments  supporting the 
thesis  that  'what  is'  is  ungenerated,  and  it  is  based  on  what 
Anonymous  calls  'the  argument  of Zeno  concerning  space'  (see 
comments ad loc). In Sextus this conclusion is the final element of  a 
string recapitulating the steps of the argumentation concerning the 
'ungenerated':  'if being  is  eternal,  it  is  unlimited,  and  if it  is 
unlimited, it is nowhere, and if  it is nowhere it is not at all'. 
Both versions proceed with the discussion of the alternative 
hypothesis:  if the  assumption  that  'being'  is  generated  is  to  be 
confirmed, then 'being' has  generated either from  'being' or from 
'not-being'.  Anonymous  introduces  his  arguments  more 
straightforwardly,  whereas  Sextus  begins  with  a  hypothesis:  'if 
being has generated, it must be either from being or from not-being'. 
The arguments against these two possibilities are not the same in the 
two  accounts.  Anonymous  contends  that 'if 'being'  changes  into 
something else, then it is not 'being' anymore', and this seems to be 
elevated to a rule, for he is too ready to assert that the same applies 
for 'not-being' as well, before he actually passes to the refutation of 
this second possibility. Sextus on the other hand, prefers to  say that 
'if being  is,  it  has  not  been  generated  - it  already  existed'. 
Anonymous  then  goes  on to  give  the  reasons  why  it  cannot  be 
generated from 'not-being'. This is due to that a) 'if  not-being is not, 
nothing is  generated from nothing,  and b)  'if not-being is,  for the 
reasons  that  it  cannot  be  generated  from  being,  from  the  same 
reasons it cannot be generated from not-being' (that is  in that case 
'not-being'  would  have  to  change).  Sextus'  argument  against 
generation from  'not-being' is  conspicuously out of key with what 
might  be  considered  as  Presocratic  terminology.  'Nothing  can 
generate from  'not-being', for that from which anything generates 
should  itself  partake  of existence'.  The  discrepancy  has  been 
explained  by  Kerferd  (1955,  p.ll):  "Both  these  arguments  are 
attributed by Aristotle to  early philosophers in general terms (Phys. 
191a 23-31).  This  suggests  a  possible  answer  to  the  discrepancy 
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arguments to establish each point, and as the theme was a well worn 
one, only one argument is reported in each case". 
Sextus now in a passage which is unparalleled in MXG, goes on 
to  investigate the possibility of attributing both properties to  au  at 
the  same  time.  He  says  that  'being'  cannot  be  both  eternal  and 
generated,  because  these  two  elements  are  mutually  exclusive. 
Calogero  (1932, p.182) thought that this argument is  spurious (for 
further literature see Untersteiner 1954, p.169 n.43; see also Loenen 
(1959), p.189,  Migliori 1973, p.58).  The view that it is  merely an 
encapsulation of the structure of the antinomical argument, which 
corresponds  to  979b34,  where  Anonymous  summarises  this  first 
argument,  is  attractive,  especially in the absence of an  analogous 
argument  in  JvfXG.  Moreover,  Sextus  is  prone  to  dialectical 
synthesis, as the demonstration of  the third argument of  the 'original 
proof'  shows,  and  it  is  hard  to  explain  why he omitted  such  a 
dialectical  synthesis  in  the  context  of the  following  argument 
concerning the pair 'one' and 'many'. However, it is worth noting 
that this "synthetic" argument is announced from the very beginning 
(17  ciLowu  up.a  KaL  yev.,,-rov  68),  and  this  programmatic 
announcement probably entails  that what we have here is  not an 
enlarged version of a phrase simply summarising the argument in 
Sextus' source. The easiest assumption is that a mere recapitulation 
in Gorgias'  original text was  elevated in some versions  which, of 
course, we do not possess now, to a separate argument, and Sextus, 
who  had  before  him  one  of them,  proceeded  analogously.  A 
comparison with Palamedes 26 can perhaps serve as demonstration 
of what this  summarising fonnulation looked  like.  In that context 
Palamedes  concludes,  that if he is  wise he  had not committed the 
crime, and ifhe had committed the crime he is not wise: 
Palamedes 26  Sextus 72 
Ka.t.  el.  ci1.01.0V  €O"T"L  1"0  QU,  au  y€yov€V, 
\  "  'v...!  ~~ 
~  YEYOV€V,  aUK  eO"T"LV  w,ol.OV. 
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about one I  many, and in motion I  at rest, is  impossible. The first 
argument  is  practically preserved only in Sextus,  due  to  the bad 
condition of the  text in l\1XG,  and the  second is  totally absent in 
Sextus. 
We  may  turn  to  the  second  major  division  ('if it  is  it  is 
unknowable'); again the condition of the text in k!XG is bad, and to 
some extent its interpretation should necessarily be dependent on the 
readings  one  is  ready  to  adopt,  and  for  the  same  reason  the 
comparison with Sextus' account should necessarily be tentative. 
MXG is again shorter, but probably more accurate, than Sextus; 
at the beginning of  MXG (980alO) there is a lacuna, which I think 
has been satisfactorily reconstructed by Palmer (1999, p. 257-58). In 
Sextus there are two main headings: a) 'if  objects of thought are not 
[or: are not the case)', and b) 'if objects of thought are [or:  are the 
case]'. Palmer must be on the right track when in his reconstruction 
of the lacuna in MXG he brings them in. His reconstruction runs as 
follows:  a)  if it is, says Gorgias, it is unknowable. b) if objects of 
thought are not [or: are not the case], what is the case is not thought 
of. c) If this is the case, being [or: what is the case] is unknowable. 
d) if  objects of thought are [or: are the case], what is the case is not 
thought of. 
There are two main points that afford comparison; the first  one 
concerns  the  (im)possibility  of falsehood.  Anonymous  (980a12) 
claims  that  'all things  that are  objects of thought should be, and 
what is  not the case, if in fact  it  is  not,  should not be an object of 
thought'; he then suggests that if  this is true then no  one would utter 
a false  statement even if one held that there are chariots racing on 
the sea.  Sextus on the other hand, argues that 'if objects of thought 
are the case, then all objects of thought are true'; he  then brings in 
the example of  chariots so as to show that the preceding syllogism is 
absurd, and he concludes that 'objects of thought are not true' (79). 
The  arrangement  of  argument  in  the  two  versions  differs 
302 significantly; where Anonymous with the suggestion that 'no one 
would utter a false statement even if  one held that there are chariots 
racing on the sea' allows us to think that this might well be a valid 
statement, Sextus clearly uses it as  a proof that the suggestion 'all 
objects of  thought are true' is absurd. 
The possibility of thinking of things  that are not true is  covered 
by  Sextus  in  a  context  investigating  the  consequences  of the 
statement 'if objects of thought are  the  case, what is  not the case 
will not be an object of  thought' (80). This argument is supported by 
the fact that these two  elements (what is  and what is  not the case) 
are antithetical. But again this results to an absurdity, because some 
things which are not true  (he  adduces  the example of Skylla and 
Khimaira, unparalleled in MXG) are thought and conceived of by 
human mind. From that,  Sextus infers  that what is  the case is  not 
thought of - presumably because things  that are not the  case  are 
thought of, so that their opposites, namely things that are the case, 
are not thought of The  argument has been refonnulated by Sextus; 
one  should  notice  the  we;  1Ta.pa.crrf]O"O{.L€V  at  78,  which  is  then 
followed by the conclusion OUK  apa.  'TO  OV  <PpOV€7..ra.~  (picked up  at 
80, that is in the conclusion of  the demonstration simply announced 
at 78). 
The  second  argument  in  MXG980al4-19  is  related  to  the 
acquisition of  knowledge through senses. The view I tend to  take is 
that  this  second  argument  (corresponding  to  Sextus  81-82)  deals 
with this alternative means of  attaining knowledge (see Levi, quoted 
by Untersteiner 1954,  p.IS5), an  argument which gains  ground, if 
we consider that the distinction between the senses and the mental 
or noetic processes is  a recurrent theme in  earlier philosophy,  and 
consequently it is  likely that Gorgias, a thinker prone to  arguments 
from  antitheses, would not have failed to  argue on the basis of this 
intellectual  conflict,  so  as  to  prove  that  both  senses  and  noetic 
processes are unreliable. 
I believe that Sextus' representation of this argument is  far from 
what  Gorgias  might  have  said.  That  he  has  misunderstood  the 
303 argument can be brought out by comparison with what we have in 
Anonymous' account. At .MX"Ga14 we are told that things seen and 
things heard are true, because each one of them is conceived of by 
our mind.  Intellectual  activity  is  now  considered  as  a  means  of 
testing the truth of  things perceived through senses. It is held that, in 
the way that what we see (vision represents here sense-perception) 
is not [true], in the same way what we see is not more true than what 
we conceive through our mind (noetic processes). This is reinforced 
by the observation that (and here the synthesis of the two opposed 
elements is brought about) many people might see other things and 
some others conceive of  different things, and it is impossible to say 
which  of them  are  true  and which  are  not.  Both  the  first  step 
(knowledge  through  noetic  activity),  and  the  second  (knowledge 
through senses) are shown to be invalid on the basis of  SUbjectivity. 
Sextus construes the argument differently; he seeks to  establish 
the ontological independence of each one of the senses, as  well as 
the independence of mental perception in relation  to  senses  as  a 
whole.  This independence is said to  be due  to  that each object of 
sense is perceived through a different organ, appropriate to  it. As a 
matter of fact, objects perceived through the mind, such as  chariots 
racing on the sea, should exist, even if  one does not see them. What 
must have been an argument from antithesis, now takes the form of 
a reductio ad absurdum. 
The third division of ONB puts forward the idea that if anything 
is  knowable, it cannot be communicated to  others.  In this  context, 
the  differences  between  the  two  accounts  are  considerable,  in 
Kerferd's words (1982, p.215), "in the third section, at least for the 
greater part, we have two quite distinct sets of arguments ...  the two 
sets must be treated as  complimentary if we are to  recover Gorgias' 
original argument". 
In 1\£{G980a20-b2 it is maintained that it is imnossible to convev  .  . 
through  words  things  perceived  through  our  senses,  because 
different objects are perceived through different senses. Sextus 83-
85 makes exactly the same point (his account is more detailed), and 
304 it  is  safe  to  assume  that  a similar argument must have been put 
forward by Gorgias  himself,  of which a shorter version has been 
preserved to  us.  Both versions  thus  make it clear that in the first 
instance  Gorgias  proceeded by establishing  a  gap  between  .\oyoS" 
and  senses.  Both  versions  conclude  that  .\oyoS"  is  different  from 
things (iviXG980b2  Ka.~  AEYE!- <5  AEywV,  aM' ou  xpwf-l-a  ouoe  -rrpa.Yf-l-a.; 
Sextus 85 f1-1]  WV  oe  AOyOS"  OUK  av  ~)'7J.\w8€£7]  E-rEPCP)' 
l\1.G'G980b3-9  offers  an  argument  unparalleled  ill Sextus  (see 
Kerferd 1982, p.219); this argument turns to the relation of  senses to 
thought (that Gorgias  argues both from  senses  and thought in this 
third division of ONE is  a further argument in favour of our view 
that in the second division he proceeded in an analogous manner as 
well). The first point is that a thing that does not exist in one's own 
mind  cannot  be  conveyed  to  him  by  another.  If the  first  is  to 
conceive of it,  then he should perceive it through his senses.  The 
second point,  complementing the first,  is  that a  colour (that is  an 
object of a sense) cannot be conceived of through mind, but seen. 
This  second  point,  is  an  objection  to  what  can  be  labelled  as 
conceptual  theory of meaning  (see  comments ad loc.).  From this 
standpoint,  it can be claimed that  Gorgias  refutes the idea that if 
someone  utters  the  word  'red',  then  the  hearer  will  necessarily 
conceive of  this colour. 
The  following  steps  in the  two  verslons  are  entirely  different. 
MXG980b3ff.  examines the problems of communication (discussed 
in my  commentary).  Sextus  83-851.1  on the  other hand "feels the 
need to  deal with two possible objections" (Kerferd 1982, p.218) to 
the main argument 83-85 1.1. The first one (85), which is  attributed 
to  Gorgias  (~7J(j£v), maintains that it is the objects of the world that 
invoke logos and not vice versa.  The second one puts forward  the 
view  that  logos  has  an  ontological  substance,  as  objects  of 
perceptions  do.  But logos differs  from them, in the way that each 
one of them differs from the others (see comments ad lac.). 
305 NOTES 
lvlXG: Anonymous' Introduction (979a12-24) 
9i9a12-13 
These are the three divisions of  the O:t\iB; the ei.  oe ... el  oe  Kai. .•. d.NI.ei 
construction makes  it  clear that  the  argumentation  is  based  on a 
concessio, and we thus have a chain of three consecutive arguments. 
(1) G.  first shows that nothing is;  (2) he then concedes that it is and 
shows that it cannot be known, and finally, (3) after conceding both 
that it is and is knowable, he says that it cannot be communicated to 
others. Apart from (1), which at any rate is  the starting point of the 
argumentation, the second and the third steps (2,3) presuppose the 
denial of accuracy of their preceding arguments (1, if  not 1, then 2, 
but if not 1 and 2 then 3). This argumentative process in its general 
features is adopted in The Defence of  Palamedes, although there are 
some differences in the details (see Introduction). 
The  full  arguments  supporting  the  first  thesis  are  glven  ill 
979a23-980alO:  first  we  have  the  r81.OS'  d:mJ8€L~LS'  of Gorgias 
(979a24-33),  followed  by  its  criticism  by  the  author  of MXG 
(979a34-b19),  and  then the  second argument of the  first  division 
(979a20-980a9). The second thesis,  concerning the unlrnowability, 
is  dealt with in 980alO-980a19 and the third thesis concerning the 
impossibility to  transmit our knowledge to  others  is  developed in 
980a20-980b19.  A  general  statement  of the  author  of iYfXG  is 
closing his own version of  the arguments of Gorgias. 
A strikingly similar parallel for the three stages of argumentation 
in the ONB can be traced (see Hays  1990, p.335-337, Palmer 1999, 
p.  108-110)  in Plat.  Parmenides135a3-b2,  which runs  as  follows: 
"As a result, whoever hears about them [sc.  the  e~o7J  and the  1.8eaL 
of Tei  oV'ra]  is  doubtful and objects (1)  that thev do  not exist [sc.  iUs-
OVTe  E<1'TL  lau-ra] , and that, even if thev do  [sc.  eL  Te  on  p.a.Aurra 
eL7J] ,  (2)  they  must by strict  necessity  be  unknowable  to  human 
306 nature [sc.  uyvCtJO'Tcr.];  and in saying this he seems to  have a point; 
an~ as we sai~ he is extraordinarily hard to win over. Only a very 
gifted man can come to know that for each thing there is some kin~ 
a being itselfby itself; but only a prodigy more remarkable still will 
discover that and (3) be able to teach [sc. oL3cfgcu] someone else who 
has sifted all these difficulties thoroughly and critically for himself' 
(trans. M.  L.  Gill - P.  Ryan, Plato, Parmenides (1996), p.138;  the 
underlining  is  mine).  What  is  at  issue  here  are  the  possible 
objections that Socrates may have to face in bis attempt to define the 
fonns and the ideas of the QV'ra..  These objections would be that (1) 
that it does not exist (<.Us  OUTE  Ean  Tcr.iJ-ro.  = OUK  Elvcr.£.  1J'rya'LV  ouoev 
MXG, on J-L€V  ouv  OUO€V  €(rnv Sext.66), (2) that even if they do  (EL 
TE  on J-Lc£ha-ro.  EL7]  =  El  0' Ea-rC.V MXG,  El  Ko.L  €a-rC.V  Sext.66), they 
must necessarily be unknowable  (UYVWOTcr.  rij  avepam!.vT}  rpV(J"EC.  = 
uyv<.tJO-rov  MXG,  aKo.Ta.A1J1TTOV  avepc!nrcp  Sext.66;  cpo  also  the 
impossibility of having noetic access  to  Tel  QV'ra.  in Parm.133b4 ) 
and that "even if a very gifted man can come to mow  ...  "  (avopcJ<, 
YVWOTOV  MXG,  El  Ko.L  Kcr.Tcr.A1J1TTOV  Sext.66),  (3)  "only  a 
prodigy  ...  will  be  able  to  teach  someone  else"  (en  O€ 
ecr.UP.o.a-rOTEpOU ..• Ko.L  UAAOV  ouv7]aOJ-LEVOU  Ol.Oa.';O.l.  = aM' ou  07JAWTOV 
UMOI.S"  MXG,  aMel  TO£  ye  avegoLa-rov  Ko.L  avepp..ryvEuTOV  Tqi  7TeAo.S"). 
Stage (1) is conceded in both Plato and the two versions of Gorgias' 
treatise, so  as to give way to the second stage (2); though this is not 
conceded  with  a  clear  hypothesis  in  Plato,  it  is  nevertheless 
presupposed that only a very competent man will be able  to  reach 
knowledge  (a  point  which  is  not  found  in  Gorgias)  and  what  is 
more, (3) only a really extraordinary man will be able to  teach it to 
someone else. 
The use of the vertebral arguments of Gorgias in the text of Plato 
show that the latter was at least aware of  the ONE (Hays 1990). Tnat 
they are presented as the possible knocking over of Socrates' theory 
about the QV'ra.  is perhaps more interesting, especially under the light 
307 of  what is said at 128c6-dl; in that context Zenon tells Socrates that 
he  wrote  his  treatise  (which  is  read  before  the  dialogue  starts, 
though  it  is  not quoted by Plato) with the intention of defending 
Parmenides  against  those  who  made  fun  of  his  arguments 
concerning the  One. Is Gorgias one of them? And if so,  did Plato 
read the ONE as a mainly anti-Parmenidean text? 
Nestle 1922, p.551-62 has argued that Gorgias antedates Zenon 
and on the grounds of this chronological manoeuvre he reached the 
conclusion  that  Zenonn's  treatise  was  pointing  at  Gorgias'  text. 
Nthough the transference of the date cannot be accepted, it should 
be noted that the connection of Gorgias with Zenon's arguments -
in  Plato's book - acquires  an interesting implication.  As Palmer 
(1999,  p.l09;  for  a  general  discussion  of what  he  calls  the 
"sophistical appropriation of Parmenides" in 110-117) has pointed 
out, "the Gorgianic scepticism  ...  should be compared both with the 
antagonism of Parmenides'  detractors in the earlier portion of the 
dialogue  and  with  Gorgias'  own personal  demonstration  against 
Parmenidean Being in 'On What-Is-Not"'. It is possible  that Plato 
saw  Gorgias'  arguments  in the ONB  as  a  threat  against him (see 
Hays  1990,  p.335)  and  this  is  why  he  gave  Parmenides  the 
opportunity  to  answer  Gorgias  (  or  even  Gorgias  as  the 
programmatic opponent of the anti-Parmenidean or the  anti-Eleatic 
conclusions).  In  Hays'  (1990,  p.336)  own words  "he  knew  [sc. 
Plato J that his own quest for forms was particularly vulnerable to 
the  same  arguments  because  its  ontological  assumptions  were 
similar to those of  the Eleatics"  (the italics are mine). 
OUK  €.l.va.L  <fnlO1..V  OUOEV:  the first thesis of  Gorgias is given in indirect 
speech, hence the infinitive EIvo,£  (instead of the OUOEV  EIITl.V,  Sextus 
66).  It should be noted, that Isokrates He!.3, Ant.268  depends the 
word  Ov'ra.  from  OVO€V  (He!.3  OUOEV  'l""WV  OV'l""WV  E<rrl.V,  Ant.268 
7TaV'l""eAWS- ovoev);  OVOEV  should be taken in a general way and it "can 
include Being, Not-Being and particular existences in its  negation" 
308 as  Levi (1941,  p.13,  cited by  Untersteiner 1954, p.166 nolO)  has 
pointed  out  (also  Migliori  1973,  p.26  n.4).  Gorgias  does  not 
undertake the task of attacking solely the Being of  Parmenides - he 
has a wider scope. The 'nothing' of this first phrase implies a total 
denial  of the  theoretical  constructions  of the philosophers  and  it 
must be related to  the subject of the rowS"  cL1TOOEL;LS":  OUK  EarLV  OU-rE 
eivuL.  OU'TE  J.LTJ  eLva!..  Both  'being'  and  'not-being',  together  with 
what  may  be  attributed  to  them  as  their  characteristics  by 
philosophers, are  described by this perileptic ouoev  of the opening 
lines of  MX:G.  That the word includes both being and not-being is 
also brought out by the contexts of 979a30 ouoev  uv  EL7]  (the result 
of the second argument of the  LOI-OS"  d:rrooEL;LS")  and 979a32 OUK  UV 
eL7]  ouoev  (the result of the third argument of the LOWS"  a1TooEL;LS"), 
where oucev  expresses  the impossibility of the existence of either 
being or not-being, if  those were identical (-rau-rov; see Palmer 1999, 
p.70).  It  may  be  added  that  oucev,  meaning the impossibility of 
attributing  a  specific  characteristic  to  ov-ra  without contradictions 
resulting is brought out in 979a20. 
979al4-18 
This short passage (unparalleled in Sextus) is  an example of what 
may be called early, or sophistical doxography (see Mansfeld 1990, 
p.22-28, 59-64) and it is not paralleled in Sextus' version. It would 
probably be  more  accurate to  say that we have a  classification of 
doctrines  of earlier philosophers,  an  outline of their fundamental 
credo,  which - it should be  noted - in the  case of Gorgias  is  not 
intended  as  a neutral  accumulation of their ideas.  It is  clear that 
those  doctrines  quoted  here,  will  be the very target  and the  very 
weapon of Gorgias'  attack. The refutation of the premises of earlier 
philosophers  is  based  on  their  contradictory  character  (,\Eyov-re; 
.  ')  ..  UVUV-rLU  . 
In addition we know that Protagoras had written a book under the 
title (?)  JJEp~ ..  oU v Ov-roS",  where he argued against the monists (1TP0S" 
309 'TOUS  ev  'TO  OV  Ei.CTa:YOV'Tas,  cpo  Porphyry (B2 DK)). It must then be 
safe to conclude that in this treatise Protagoras had also collected the 
ideas  of the  monists  with  the  purpose  of attacking  them  (see 
Mansfeld  1990,  p.62,  who  holds  that  Gorgias  was  inspired  by 
Protagoras  and  - with  less  certainty  - that  he  combined  the 
arguments of Protagoras against the monists with those of Zenonn 
against the pluralists). 
It seems that Hippias had also  composed a collection of earlier 
ideas,  which  according  to  Athenaios  had  the  title  Luva.ywrrl 
(86B4DK);  in  86  B6  DK we read·  'TOV'TWV  LCTWS  ELp7J1"a.L  'TeL  jJ-Ev 
,  Opq;El.,  'TeL  De  MOtJCTa.i.lfI  Ka.'TeL  ~pa.xU rulfl cL\,\a.xov,  'TeL  DE  'HCTLODlfI, 
'TeL  DE  'OjJ-fJPlfl,  'TeL  DE  'TOLS  ruOLS  'TWV  7TOL7J1"WV, 
CTUyypa.q;a.7s  'TeL  jJ-ev  ".EM.7]CTt.  'TeL  De  ~a.p~6.pow  eyw  De 
,  I  EK  7Ta.V'TWV 
7TOAtJEt.D77  'TOV  AOYov  7TOt.fJCTOjJ-a.t.  (for  Hippias as a common source of 
Plato  and  Aristotle  see  Snell  (1944),  reprinted  in  Classen  1976, 
p.478-490, Classen 1965, p.  175-181, Pfeiffer 1968, p.  52,  Patzer 
(1986), Mansfeld 1990, p.  84-96, with more references on p.71  n.9; 
contra Stokes 1971, p.282 n.106; see also Guthrie 1971, p.282-283 
and Kerferd 1981, p.48-49). 
The summary of the arguments given in the form of antithetical 
pairs are not presented here in the same order as  that in the second 
part of the first division (that they were presented in the second part, 
that is after the LOWS  d7TOOEt.~t.S, is made clear from three passages: a) 
979a24  jJ-E'TeL  rTJv  7Tpc!n-ryV  LOWV  a.V'TOV  d7T()OEt.~t.V,  b)  979a33  OU'TOS 
jJ-EV  ovv  <5  7Tpw-rOS  AOYos  EKELVOU  - if Diels reading is adopted - and 
c) 979b20 jJ-E'TeL  De  'TOV'TOV  'TOV  '\cyov  q;7]CTLV).  The counter-arguments 
about the  (1)  one and many dichotomy (ev  /7ToAAeL),  which comes 
first  in the summary,  are  discussed after the arguments concerning 
the  pair  (2)  generated-ungenerated  (ciyEV1"a.  /  /,ElIOjJ-EV'Ta.);  both 
arguments  are  followed  by  an  argument  concerning  [3]  motion, 
which  is  not  included  in  the  summary  (unparalleled  in  Sextus). 
Schematically,  in the  summary we  have  (1)-7(2),  whereas  in  the 
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addition of  the argument about motion (2)-7(1)-7(3). 
On  the basis of obvious similarities  with a passage  from  Xen. 
Mem.I.1.14,  we  could  safely  draw  the  conclusion  that  Gorgias' 
classification as it is given in the version of  l"\1.J(G had an impact on 
Xenophon (see ~1ansfeld 1990, p.59-61, 99-101, with references to 
others p. 80 n.193, and p. 81 n.197), when - for the needs of  his text 
- he summarises the ideas of some of the Presocratic philosophers. 
TIlls  summary  follows  the  statement  that  Socrates  neglected  the 
philosophers, because of the fact that they had different views. The 
summary  of their premises,  as  it  is  given  by  Xenophon  is  the 
following: 
TWV  'IE  7TEP~ rijs TWV  7TaVTWV  <pUO'EWS  J1-EP~J1-VWVTWV TO!:S'  J1-€V  OOKE!:V 
(a)  EV  J1-0VOV  TO  OV  ElvUL,  TO!:S'  0' a.7TELPU  TO  7TAfj8oS', 
(b)  KU~ TO!:$"  J1-€V  dEL  7TCJ.VTU  KLVE~a8U~,  TO~S' 0' OUO€V  a.v  7TOTE 
(c)  KU~ TO!:$"  J1-€V  7TaVTU  Y£YVEa8u£  'IE  KuL  d7ToMva8u~. 
TOL$"  oe  OUT  av yEvea8u£  7TOTE  OUO€V  OUTE  d7ToAea8uL. 
Some remarks:  (1)  the order in which the premises  are  listed in 
Mem. 1.1.14,  is  not the identical with that of the  summary MXG. 
The order of  the arguments in both summaries is the following:  1:a, 
0:b, 2:c. (2)  It is safe to  conclude that Gorgias' original summary 
also  contained  the pair motion/rest.  (2a)  The  pair motion  /  rest, 
which  comes  second  in  Xenophon  (and  is  missing  from  the 
summary of wiXG)  shows that it may also  be safe to  deduce that 
Gorgias,  in  his  argumentation,  had  also  included  an  argument 
concerning rest.  (3)  Both Gorgias and Xenophon do  not name the 
philosophers to whom they attribute these premises. 
Under  this  light  the  passages  from  Isokr.Ant.268  (=86B IDK 
where only the last portion of  the passage is printed), PI. Soph.242c-
243a  and  .A.rist.Ph.184b15-25  and  Met.1028b2  seem  to  have  a 
common denominator: they are all related to the first element of the 
311 Gorgianic  summary (the one/many dichotomy)  in the respect that 
they  all  classify  the  several  views  of  the  early  philosophers 
concerning  the  number of the  o[nta.  In  Isokrates'  classification 
Gorgias  himself is  included  (he  is  the  last  one  in the  list:  some 
(who?) say that the o[nta are infinite, Empedocles four - the two of 
them  mentioned,  i.e.  veLKOS"  and  cP~;\[.a.  - Ion no  more  than three, 
Alcmeon  only  two,  Pannenides  and  Melissos  only  one)  for-
according to the orator - he held that the number of o  [nta is oujdevn 
(Gorgias  is  also  mentioned  in  Isokr.He1.3;  see  Mansfeld  1990, 
p.l  00-1 01;  for  others  who  have  discerned  those  similarities, 
Mansfeld 1990, p.71 n.9) 
a1.,.v8ets  -nl.  hepol.s  eLfl'TlIJ-Eva.:  The participle O1.Jv8e/s  (which is  also 
used by Porphyry  to  describe  the  collection  of earlier views  by 
Hippias) shows that the summary that we have in MXG existed in 
Gorgias'  original text. The 'others' of the text are not the Eleatics 
exclusively. Gorgias is interested in a total attack upon the abstract 
philosophical speculation as a process. That he does not have only 
the Eleatics in mind is  shown by the fact that pluralism is  also  at 
stake as opposed to monism. It  is the philosophical argumentation as 
a process - which compensates philosophers with contradictions -
that Gorgias wants to bring to the surface. 
'lTEflI.  'iWV  OV'itllV:  the  abstract  and  fundamental  being(s)  of the 
philosophers; it is  the first occurrence of the term 1"0  QV  in the text. 
In Helen  13, we are told that physical philosophers, by substituting 
the  one  view  for  another  make  unbelievable  and  hidden  things 
visible to  the eyes of their minds. This passage (cited by Mansfeld 
1990, p.99;  see Introduction)  is,  if nothing else,  an  indication that 
Gorgias had remarked - and what is more, he was able to  integrate 
these remarks in his  argumentation- that philosophers have  a great 
flexibility  in  their  argumentation  and  that  he  was  aware  that  in 
philosophical conflicts, there are always disagreements and a great 
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those disagreements are now his target. 
The  first  occurrence  of  Tci.  OVTa.  m  a  context  where  the 
predominant  theme  is  the  ascertainment  that  philosophers  have 
expressed totally controversial ideas about it is a sign that Gorgias' 
polemic  has  as  its  object  all the  theoretical  conceptions of being 
(Levi 1941, p.32-34, Lloyd 1966, p.119 n.2). That OVTa.  signifies the 
philosophical constructions is  also shown by Isokr. Ant.268, where 
Gorgias  is  mentioned along with other philosophers  (the way that 
Faggi  1926  puts  it  is  remarkable  "e  questa  l'  Essere  solitario, 
schematico,  astratto,  geometrico,  inerte  e  senza vita,  che  Gorgia 
nega", p.227; see laso Rensi 1938, p.  99  n.1;  Guthrie 1971, p.199; 
more recently Mansfeld 1990, p.102-103  and Palmer 1999, p.  67). 
The plural should not be considered as  an exclusive allusion to the 
pluralists.  The  OVTa.  is  the  intersection  where  the  different 
philosophical  speculations  about  the  being  arrive  from  opposite 
directions. 
This  passage  shows  clearly  that  Gorgias  does  not  intend  to 
discuss the phenomenal world, the phenomena (as  Calogero, 1932 
first thought, followed by Kerferd 1955 and Newiger 1973). 
'Td.vo;v-n.a.:  in a way it foreshadows the method that Gorgias will use 
in the second portion supporting the first thesis; this method can be 
labelled  argument from  antinomy.  Cassin  (1980,  p.436)  rightly 
concludes that the antithetical views of the  philosophers "forment 
ainsi, face  a. Gorgias, un bloc contradictoire qui aneantit son propre 
dire". This strategy is used again in The Defence of  Palamedes (25-
26), where Palamedes addresses his opponent, Odysseus and he says 
that his accusations are contradictory. In that context we have a man 
(Palamedes)  who  is  accused  of  two  opposite  things  (OVO  Tel. 
Eva.vnw-ra.Ta.):  wisdom  and  madness.  In this  context  we  have  a 
ftmdamental  philosophical notion (being)  predicated with opposite 
(Tava.vTLa.)  characteristics:  one/many,  generated  /  ungenerated, 
motion I rest. In addition, in both texts, it is postulated that only one 
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one  given  thing  without  contradictions  resulting;  but  the 
examination  of  each  alternative  (avMoyL~E'T'a1.  KaT'  a.p.q;oTepwu 
979a18, cpo 01.'  dp.q;Crrepa  av  Etrr.;  if;euo-f;s The Defence of  Palamedes 
26) leads to the conclusion that none of those characteristics can be 
attributed  to  it.  In  the  same manner the  two  major arguments  of 
Palamedes already mentioned have the same character.  Facing the 
question
44Has Palamedes perfonned the actions accused of T, two 
alternatives are given and both of  them are proved to be groundless. 
The same holds  for the exhaustive argumentation showing that he 
was  not  able  to  perfonn the  acts  accused  of (did  I  commit  the 
treason  alone  or  with  accomplices,  was  it  night  or  under  the 
daylight); two  alternatives are given and then it is  shown that both 
were impossible (for this pattern of  argumentation see Introduction). 
Schematically: suppose that something exists x (er  n  EO'n);  if it 
exists  it must either be y  (€v)  or -y (rrol\l\d.),  q  (yevop.evou)  or -q 
(dyev7]7"ov) ... But neither y, nor -y, neither q nor -q  ...  exist,  so -x 
(980a9 elval.  oJu ovoev). 
,  ,  J..~  ,  '+  h  '  .  t'  t  '  "  G  Ka:.  a.~'r''T'EpWV:  KaTa.  gen.  ere  agams  ,no  concernmg;  . 
argues  against both members  of all  those pairs  of characteristics 
attributed to GU'T'a. 
919a 19-24 
choiv: After the summary of the premises of philosophers, we have 
now an outline of  Gorgias' own refutation. 
EL  n  €a-n  ••• YEVOf.LEVa.: Bonitz; er  n  EO'n  <~ €V  :r,  'TrOMeL  eLVal.  Kal.  ~ 
dyev7]7"a  :r,  yevop.eva.  EL  ouv  p.-ry  Eo-n>  P.frrE ...  is  Diels'  reading 
(followed by Levi  1941, p.IO),  but it  cannot be accepted,  because 
Gorgias,  in the  second portion of his  first  thesis  (979b20ff.),  does 
not discuss the possibility of  p.-ry  EO'TL  (see Untersteiner 1954, p.166 
n.24,  Cassin  pA37-8,  443-4);  on  the  contrary,  by  tracing  the 
antinomies  of  the  arguments  of  philosophers  about  being  he 
concludes that there is OVOEV  (cp.979b20, 979b35). 
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pair  (979b21)  we  read  dy€1I7{T'ov  /  yevop.evov  in  singular  (see 
Mansfeld 1990, p.l13 and my comments ad loc.). 
6ci.-repa.:  It is  clear that if  something exists, then a choice should be 
made;  for these pairs include MO antithetical notions which cannot 
be attributed to  one single thing.  Consequently, the following step 
will be the proof of  the impossibility of  either entity of  each pair. 
O'Tt.  <5'> OUK  €O""M.V  •••  j'Ev0\l-eva.:  <0 '> Untersteiner 1961, p.58 (citing 
HeLl3 on  0'  Tj  7Te~eW); all  the  characteristics  attributed to  being 
(with the exception of  motion) are repeated here paratactically, since 
the idea is that none of  them can even separately describe it. 
m  \JoEv  Ws  MEALmroS ••• OE.LKWew:  'a la maniere de';  the  author of 
MXG means that Gorgias in the argumentation following the rowS" 
d.7T60e~g~S"  picks  up  and  combines  arguments  and  argumentative 
processes used by those philosophers. Hence the ro~oS"  d.7Tooe~g~S" is a 
contradistinction to this method. m  \JoE-v ••• m  oe: they should not be 
taken strictly as an anaphoric reference. They should be taken with 
the  more general meaning  'some  ...  and  other',  because  otherwise 
what is said here would be inconsistent with the contents of the full 
discussion  of each  one  of these  premises  (Calogero,  cited  by 
Untersteiner 1961, p.59-60). 
\Joem  -rT)v  1I"pw1"'Tlv •••  a.'1T'OSeL~I.V:  'after  his  first  original  proof 
(equivalent  with  the  AoyoS"  of 979a33);  the  'original  proof  of 
Gorgias  comes  first,  though the summary of the  arguments of the 
second part in favour of  the first thesis has already been given by the 
author  of MXG.  Several  translations  have  been proposed  for  the 
rOLOS"  d.7TooeLg~S"  ('special'  demonstration:  Kerferd  1955,  'originale 
dimonstrazione':  Untersteiner  1961  and  Mazzara  1982, 
'spezialbeweis':  Newiger 1973,  'demonstration bien a lui:  Cassin 
1980,  'special  proof,  'particular  proof:  Mansfeld  1985,  1988, 
'eigenen  Beweis':  Buchheim  1989,  'personal  demonstration': 
Palmer 1999). Wesoly (1983-1984, p.23), has rather recently argued 
(Palmer,  1999,  p.69,  also  adopts  her  view)  that  the  'argomento 
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(,originale') refutation ofPannenides, whereas the other arguments 
are  based on  the  contradictory  character of the  arguments  of his 
successors. Her disclaimer is clearly feasible and it is reinforced by 
the argumentative process of Gorgias, who - to  an  extent and in a 
specific way - is using Pannenides as an intertextual presupposition 
for his own proof that nothing is (see following notes). 
O~ OUK  E.a-nv •••  tL~  ei,va.t,,:  both  'to  be' and  'not to be'  are the target 
of  Gorgias  original  demonstration.  Kerferd  (1955,  p.19  -who 
endeavours  to  reconcile the version of .M.XG  with that of Sextus) 
took this phrase as  a quotation of Gorgias own words by the author 
of  .M.XG.  In other words he (mistakenly) thought that Gorgias was 
repeating at this place his 'whole thesis', so  as to make feasible his 
interpretation of the  LOLOS'  d:lT68eL~LS'  as  an  exclusive refutation of 
'not to be' (-;0  J1-7J  elvuL). But that the text is  clear and in his own 
words  sound (p.6)  is shown by the repetition of the whole phrase 
later (979b 1). What is more the author of  .M.XG emphatically states 
(€V  ~ AeyeL) that in his 'original proof' Gorgias maintained that both 
'to be' and 'not to  be' are not (contra Kerferd see Mansfeld 1990, 
p.215-6 n.58). Despite this point, the interpretation of  Kerferd is not 
without  interest.  For  the  starting  point  throughout  the  'original 
proof' is not 'to be' or 'being', but its opposite 'not to  be' or 'not-
being'. But evidently saying that Gorgias  is  refuting solely 'not to 
be'  or 'not being' is  one thing and saying that he is  starting from 
'not to  be' or 'not-being' with the intention of objecting to  both 'to 
be' (and 'being') and 'not to be' (and not-being) is quite another. 
The First Thesis (979a25-980a9) 
The 'original proof' (979a25-33) 
The 'original proof' is perhaps the most demanding part of  the ONE, 
as  it is  given in MXG.  This  is  not due to  textual difficulties  (with 
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content  is  practically based on conjecture),  but to  the  extremely 
economical manner in which the author of  iv[XG decided to preserve 
it.  If one wishes  to  appreciate the  argumentation of this  part one 
should not be oblivious of the fact that what we have here is a short 
summary of an  original  Gorgianic  argumentation.  This  entails  of 
course that we do not possess the form in which Gorgias expressed 
his complicated ideas. The very intricate content of this part - with 
the  antithetical  notions  of 'being'  and  'not-being',  the  necessary 
repetitions, and the logical transitions from the one argument to  the 
other - is  enough to  make even the most naive reader of Gorgias 
realize that the original text, especially here, would have been full of 
stylistic  devices  ('"we  do  not have  this  proof in its  original  and 
majestic Gorgian form" Mansfeld 1990, p.218). 
The 'original proof is developed in three stages or rather we have 
three  arguments  closely  related.  The  whole  argument  runs  as 
follows: 
(1)  a.  eZ  P.€v  yd.p  TO  P.7T  eLva!.  €(J"n  P.7T  elvar., 
For, ifnot being is not being, 
b. otlO€V  av '7rr0U  TO  P.7T  QU  TOU  aUTOS- eL7J. 
not being would be no less than being, 
c. TO  T€  yd.p  P.7T  au  €(J"n  P.7T  au  Ka~ TO  au  au, 
because not being is not being, and being [sc. is] being 
d.  [Wo-re  auoev  p.u)..)..ov  dvar.  :ry  aUK  elvar.  Td.  1Tpa.yp.aTa] 
[so that things no more are than they are not.] 
(2)  a  eZ  8' op.WS'  TO  p.1]  eLva!.  EO"'T'L. 
But ifnot being is, 
being - its opposite - , he says, is not 
c eZ  yd.p  TO  p.1]  elvar.  EO"'T'L, 
Because if not being is 
d TO  elvar.  P.7T  eLvar.  1Tp0a-r]Kel. 
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Then it follows that being is not. 
(1)+(2) 
So that in this way, he says, nothing would be, 
(-73)  €i  p.-r,  Ta.VTOV  €~va.1.  TE  Ka.~  p.-r,  E'Vo.l.. 
unless being and not being are the same. 
a 
But if  they are the same, 
even in this way nothing would be; 
ovn. 
because not being is not, and the same holds for being, because it 
is the the same with not-being. 
Some remarks:  it  is  clear from  the  words  signifying transition 
(the  underlined  words)  that  both  the  first  two  arguments  are 
structured in the same way. There is an hypothesis (Ia, 2a) followed 
by a logical follow on (lb, 2b); then there is  an argument (Ic, 2c) 
and  finally  a  conclusion.  The  discussion of the  first  and  second 
arguments (1,2)  is  followed by a general disclaimer or conclusion, 
which I take it to be deduced from both of them,  and not merely 
from the second one. The third argument is announced by a phrase 
combining both elements (being and not being), which is picked up, 
so as  to  fonn the assumption of it (3a). It is then asserted that even 
in this  case nothing would be (3b),  because,  as  it  is  argued,  not-
being is not and being, being the same with not being is not as well. 
An objection to  the translation of the passage as  it is  cited above 
would probably be that it renders almost everywhere €Zvo.,.  p.-r,  €Zva., 
with  the  tenns  'being'  and  'not-being',  which  would  nonnally 
correspond to the alternative tenns TO  OV,  TO  p.-r,  OV  also traced in the 
text.  But I take it that the syntax of an iniinitive with an article (a 
very  important  property  of  the  Greek  language  in  terms  of 
description of  abstract notions) does justify this choice, which - and 
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with the negative 'not-being', as two contrasted terms. 
Putting these details aside, we can now pass to the interpretation 
of the  'original  proof  as  a  whole.  Gorgias  seems  to  make 
experiments with the  double semantic value of the verb  eIva.t.  ('to 
be');  ONE is  the  first  extant work where the  route  designated by 
Parmenides,  the  great father  of ontology,  is  seriously  questioned. 
Gorgias' strategy has, it appears, as its starting point the observation 
that  the  verb  'to be' has  a double  function:  it can be used  either 
existentially or as  a copula. In the latter case it can also be used so 
as  to  assert the identity of two  terms,  as happens in the case 'X is 
X', or 'Y is Y', where 'Y is -X'. In modem terms he presupposes 
the implication of existence in a rather functional linguistic element 
(the  'copula'  of the  traditional  grammars).  According  to  Gorgias 
thus, 'X is X' implies that 'X exists'. 
One  may  object  here  that  this  interpretation,  by  usmg  the 
distinction  between  'existence'  and  'copula'  does  not  take  into 
account the  modem surveys  on  the  Greek verb  to  be,  and  more 
particularly the  influential conclusions  of Charles Kabn.  In many 
articles  this  scholar has  shown  that  the  'copulative'  /  'existential' 
dichotomy - as  far as the Greek verb 'to be' is concerned' - is  an 
artificial  one,  and  that  it  originally  does  not  exist  in  the  Greek 
language. He mainly argued against the concept of 'existence', as a 
separate category of the  Greek language,  and he thus  proposed -
among others - the  'veridical' use of the verb  'to be' (though he 
concedes  that  "when  we  are  talking  about  truth  and  reality,  the 
existential and copulative uses 0 f be are never far away" Kabn 1979, 
p.  330). The point cannot be fully discussed here; what may be said 
is  that without denying the predominance of the veridical usage of 
'to be', we may feel free to  use the term 'existence'. We are not here 
beginning our interpretation with  the  presupposition of a  separate 
'existential'  meaning of the verb  'to be'. We are  simply realizing 
that Gorgias does presuppose that such a distinction exists (and it is 
recognizable by the recipients ofms argumentation), just in order to 
319 make use of  it. Under this light, we can compare the words of  Kahn 
(ibid, p.329) with the use of  the verb 'to be' made by G.: 
"Of  course, we can easily see how the existential and copula uses of  be 
will also turn up, if  we think of  the reality in question as expressed by a 
subject-predicate sentence -for instance by the sentence 'The sun is 
shining'. For if  this sentence is true, then its subiect (the sun) must exist. 
And the sentence uses the conula verb is to medicate something of this 
subject, namely that it is shining, or that its light reaches us." 
(the  underlining  is  mine).  G.  presupposes  that the  sentence  'not-
being  is  not being'  is  true and he thus  "shows" that  'not-being', 
namely  the  subject  of the  sentence,  exists.  Whether this  kind  of 
argumentation is logical and productive (plato would certainly have 
his objections) is a debatable point. 
It has been almost unanimously accepted that the 'original proof' 
is  - in one  way  or another - related  to  P armeni  des ,  concept  of 
being. Nestle 1922, pp.551-62, Calogero  1932 and Broecker 1958, 
425-438) all thought that Parmenides is the exclusive target of G. 's 
criticism; Cassin (1980) saw it as a "catastrophic repetition" of the 
Pannenidean argument and Kerferd - in the phrase announcing the 
scope  of the  'original proof'  (919a24)  - saw an  obvious  parallel 
with  fr.2.3  and  6.23  of Parmenides ("it is  likely that Gorgias  had 
these phrases of Parmenides in mind"; more recently Palmer 1999, 
p.71, argues that G.  chose Parmenides, because, by attacking him, 
his  argument would acquire a more general  application to  all  the 
philosophers putting forvvard different fundamental entities). 
Whether G.  had in mind Parmenides cannot be certified directly; 
we  can  only  rely  upon  suggestions.  We  have  already  said  that 
probably  the  rOt-oS'  cL1TCJO€l.ql.S'  in  a  contradistinction to  the  second 
portion of the argumentation supporting the first thesis (where other 
philosophers were at least used, as the summary of  li-fXG witnesses) 
owes its name to the fact that in this part G.  offers an original attack 
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either in the A1XG, or in Sextus. 
That Parmenides is  probably the target of G.  gains credence by 
the striking similarity between the arguments used in the 'original 
proof and those  used in Plato's Pannenides  162a.  Guthrie  (Hist. 
Gr.PhiI.  voLV, p.55 n.4) saw a 'close parallel' and Cornford (1939, 
p.226)  thought  that  'Gorgias  might  be  directly  answering  the 
argument  of G.'s  (see  also  Brumbaugh1961,  pp.21-22  and n.4;  a 
detailed discussion in Mansfeld 1990, pp.264-5). The passage from 
Plat. Pann.162a is the following: 
the one is a not-being ...  So if  it is not to be, it must have being a 
not-being as a bond  (o€(]'f-L6~) in regard to its not-being, 
just as, in like manner, what is must have not-being what is not, 
in order that it, in its turn, may completely be. 
(transL M. L. Gill - P. Ryan) 
Mansfeld (1990,  p.265)  concluded that "at Pann.162a Plato  used 
Gorgias ...  [sc. who] anticipated one of  Plato's major contributions to 
philosophical discussion".l So, if  it is the case that we have here an 
adaptation  of the  Gorgianic  argumentation  concerning  not-being, 
then the suggestion that G. is attacking Parmenides is strengthened; 
in other words it is  likely that Plato in this context has Parmenides 
using  the  very  arguments  employed by G.,  so  as  to  show  that  it 
cannot  be  claimed  that  not-being  is  not  at  all  (notice  that 
Brumbaugh,  ibid.,  pp.21-22  n.4  uses  the  term  'double  irony' 
concerning the relation of  Plato to G.). 
The  conclusion  that  the  specific  target  of G.  in the  'original 
proof is  Parmenides may be tantalising;  for  it is  well known that 
despite the progress in the interpretation of Parmenides' ontology, a 
point of common consensus  has  not yet been reached.  His  poem, 
I  He  rightly, of course, points out that G.  did not go  so  far  as  to show that not-
being is  relatively not - as  Plato did - but he  was content to  adopt the  ide~ that it 
does  not exist at alL  though we  should not accept that  while  G.  merely  played 
with a consciously ambiguous use of the words. and saw not being as  "a sort of 
toy", by contrast Plato was much more profound in trying to  deflne why "words 
have different meanings" simply because G.  is  an earlier philosopher, or what is 
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interpretations.  One  would  now  think  that  the  interpretative 
difficulties become more intricate if one realises that our task is not 
merely to unlock Parmenides' text, but also to scrutinize the relation 
between this  text  and a  secondhand account of the  criticism of a 
later sophist.  I wish to  take a more optimistic view by suggesting 
that  apart  from  the variety of modem readings  of Parmenides we 
possess the reading of a person who  was  (chronologically at least) 
closer to  him, that is  the reading of G.  himself. In saying this, I do 
not,  of  course,  mean  that  G.'s  approach  is  the  key  to  our 
understanding of Parmenides,  for  G.,  or what we have  from  G.'s 
original text,  is  an attack on Parmenides.  What I  mean is  that the 
obscurity  of  Parmenides'  passages  which  are  related  to  the 
interpretation of ONE should not prevent us  from reading it as  its 
intertext  (as  Kerferd  thought,  1955,  p.7),  because  G.'s  criticism 
unavoidably  integrates  and  incorporates  a  discernible  manner  of 
perception of  his target. 
It  has  already  been  said  that  G.'s  programmatic  phrase 
announcing the agenda of his  criticism in the 'original proof (OUK 
E(nW  OUTE  Elva!.,  OUTE  J-LTJ  ELva!.  279a24)  can  be  related  to 
Parmenides' two routes of  inquiry fr.2.3,5: 
3.1]  J-L€V  01TWS"  ea-nv  TE  Kat.  ~  aUK  ean f1-TJ  ELva!., 
5.  1]  8' ~  OUK  Eanv 'T'E  Kat.  ~  XPEWV  Ean  f1-TJ  ELva!.. 
G.'s experiment in its process clings to  the second route and objects 
to  both  the  alternatives  'it is  either for  being  (1]  f1-€v) ...  or for  not-
being  (;,  8').  This  serves  perhaps  as  a  further  argument  that  the 
'original proof can be read as  anti-Parmenidean: had G.  intended to 
deny  merely  the  controversial  entities  of  the  philosophers,  a 
declaration  that  'it is  not  for  being'  in  the  programmatic  phrase 
would have sufficed (see Palmer 1999, p.70). But since he wants to 
more, because Gorgias is  Gorgias and Plato  is  Plato;  it might be more rewarding 
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both the routes ofParmenides. 
If this  analysis  is  so  far  correct  we may  now  see  how G.  is 
organising his argument against Pannenides. G.  is making a choice: 
he is taking p.TJ  €LVUl. (the second route) as his starting point. In other 
words, facing two  alternatives, the positive 'being' and its negation 
'not-being', he chooses the second. 
I consider that the argumentation of the  'original proof can be 
elucidated if we use two tenns of modern linguistic theory,  that is 
the  tenns  'marked'  and  'unmarked'. It is  of course  impossible to 
discuss fully those tenns here, but for the purposes of  our discussion 
some  examples  will  suffice.  A  characteristic  of an  unmarked 
category is  that it can be traced in contexts  where the  unmarked 
category would not be nonnally expected. For the words 'long' and 
'short',  both  denoting  'length'  we  can  say  that  'long'  is  the 
unmarked  category,  for  in  our possible  question  concerning  the 
length of a given object we nonnally ask "How long is  it", rather 
than  "How  short  is  it?"  The  same  generally  holds  in  matters 
concerning gender: we may say "What a nice dog!" (and nonnally 
not "What a nice bitch"), without knowing whether the dog we are 
referring to  is male or female (a discussion of gender in relation to 
marked/unmarked  categories  can  be  found  in  Lyons  1977, 
pp.30Sff.). So generally (the subject is of course more complicated) 
the  category  male  is  the  unmarked,  whereas  the  female  is  the 
marked one. In those tenns negation - which interests us here - is 
the  marked  category,  as  contrasted  to  non-negative  statements. 
men we want to  take information concerning the content of a box, 
we normally ask "What is  in the box?", instead of asking  "mat is 
not  in  the  boxT',  though  the  latter  is  of course  grammatically 
acceptable. 
It is clear then that G. proceeds by using as his starting point the 
marked  'not-being'.  This  allows  him  in  the  first  argument  to 
to take into account that their intentions are different. 
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than being". If he had. chosen the unmarked category 'being', then 
the predication (<4ifbeing is being'') would have been useless (in fact 
he  predicates  'being' of 'being' in 979a27:  Ka.t.  .,0  av  ov;  but no 
argument can be deduced from this phrase, which at any rate offers 
an  analogy  to  the  "0  .,E  ya.p  f1-7J  ov  Evn  f1-7J  av.  One  may  also 
observe  that  the latter sentence is  stressed by the  use  of the  verb 
EO'"Tr..,  while  the  former  is  given  elliptically).  For  the  affirmation 
'being  is'  does  not  serve as  the  necessary presupposition  for  the 
desired consequence on, that is 'if  not-being is', then 'being' being 
its opposite is not. G.  then, by using the marked 'not-being' both as 
subject and predicate,  infers that 'it is' and he thus  passes  to  the 
second  argument  (2),  by  taking  for  granted  the  conclusion  of 
argument  (1).  In the  third  argument  (3),  he presupposes  that  the 
alternatives  are identical. Having done away with the difficulty of 
the  non-existence  of  'being'  he  can  easily  and  without  any 
compunction assert that 'not being is not' (979a34) - this has not of 
course been prove~ but it is axiomatically asserted - and also  that 
'being' is  not - this has been proved on the basis of the  assertion 
that 'not-being' is. 
Has  G.  succeeded in his attack? Is  his argumentation coherent? 
Very recently, on the basis of logical analysis of the arguments of 
G., Palmer (1999, p.73, whose analysis - in my view - is otherwise 
the most economical and the most accurate one) has concluded that 
"Gorgias' personal demonstration ends  up  confirming Parrnenides' 
injunction  against  the  second path  ...  thus  confirming  the  value  of 
Parrnenides' original injunction to  stay on the first path". This may 
be  true.  It  is  also  clear  that  G.'s  'original  proof  is  panly 
inconsistent,  and  we  have  already  pointed  out  that  in  the  first 
argwnent he establishes the existence of 'not-being' and in the third 
one he takes it for granted that 'not-being' is not (aUK  (gun).  Without 
having any intention to  vindicate the sophist, I should like to  insist 
on the point that if the 'original proof has  any value, we will not 
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arguments.  Even  if  G.  did  not  succeed  in  knocking  over 
P  anneni  des ,  point,  however  flagrantly  inconsistent  his 
argumentation may be, the value of his proof lies elsewhere. It can 
be traced, I am  inclined to  believe, in the contribution of G.  to  the 
history of  ideas. What is important is that he did not hesitate to  take 
the  Eleatic  bull  by  the  horns,  and  he  thus  gave  scope  for  an 
elaborated discussion of  not-being by Plato. Mansfeld (1990, p.119) 
concludes:  "What Plato  did  with  it  is  what  really  matters  to  the 
history  of philosophy  ...  this  ancestor  really  was  begotten  by  his 
offspring". But what might have happened if this ancestor had not 
existed? 
979a25-29 
eL  fLEV  yap ..•  p.-TJ  eLva.L:  Kerferd (1955, pp.8-9),  eL  fJ-EV  yap  ro  fJ-7J 
ELva/.  <  eO'·n v>  ,  .ry  eO'-n  fJ-7J  elva/., reading  .ry  for:ry,  R;  the reason is 
that  the  final  sentence of this  argument  Wa-r-E ... ra.  'lTpaYfJ-ara  (see 
notes ad loc.) creates a non sequitur. He thus translates "For if it is 
possible that it should not be, inasmuch as  it is (possible for it) not 
to be  ...  ". Though his remark that the last sentence is a non sequitur 
is correct, I prefer to  bracket it because I am inclined to  agree with 
Mansfeld (1990, p.219) who entertains the hypothesis that Wa-r-e ..• ra 
'lTpa.Y/Lara  is  an  interpolation.  In this  first  sentence  G.  predicates 
'not-being' of itself, so as by using the verb  'is' as a copula to  infer 
that 'not being' or 'what is not' is. 
OUOEV  av  l1'T'Tov ••• eL1'J:  'not-being  would  be  no  less  than  being' 
means  that  'not-being' is;  G.  has  shifted from  the  identity of 'not 
being' with 'not being' ('Y is Y') to  the attribution of  ELva/.  to  'not-
being'. Hence the criticism of the author of  J1XG that there must be 
a distinction between a a.'lTttWs" and a  O/LOI.~ ELva/..  This distinction is 
made  by Aristotle,  who  claims that  the  'dialectical paralogism'  of 
the obfuscation of  the ELva/.  a.'lTttWs" with the ELvaL  -n is peculiar to the 
eristie (Rh.1402a3-6  E-n  Wa-rrep  EV  rOLS"  EPUrT"LKOLS"  'lTapa  ro  a.'lTttwS" 
Kat.  /L7J  a.'lTAWs",  aMa r£,  Y£YVETa./.  cpa/.vo/LevoS"  avMOYLO'/LOS".  oLov  EV 
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Ov;  see Wesoly 1983-4, p.28. Kahn (1966, 263-264) maintains that 
€ival.  a1TAWs  in  Aristotle  does  not  generally  mean  'exist';  it  is 
"ultimately synonymous with the old Homeric (and post-Homeric) 
use  of EaTi  for  'is alive"',  though he  concedes  that  at  Aristotle's 
So  ph. E1.l67  al-4  "an existential nuance is possible"; see Mansfeld 
1990, p.l18 n.66). In this  light the avoidance of the use of EaTi  by 
Lykophron, as it is attested by Aristotle (=83  B 2 DK) so as to  avoid 
confusion (A€A€VKWTaL,  instead of  A€VK6~  EaTl.V)  is  very interesting 
(see Kerferd 1955, p.25). 
Wa-r~ OUOEV ••• 1Tpci"yp.a:rn:  Mansfeld's (1990, pp.l08, 219) suggestion 
that  the  final phrase is  an  interpolation of the  author of MXG -
equivalent to  auoev  TWV  OVTWV  €iVaL  - seems correct. This sentence 
is  unparalleled  in  Sextus  and it  creates  a non sequitur.  From the 
preceding sentence G.  adduced that 'not-being', like 'being', is. By 
inferring  now  that  'things  are  no  more  than  they  are  not'  is  a 
contradiction which, I think, is not committed by G.  (De Lacy in his 
survey on  au  jJ.aMov,  1958,  pp.  59-71  casts  doubt on whether G. 
used  this  phrase).  Palmer  (1999,  p.72)  thinks  that  from  this 
conclusion we must infer "that they are not, which is tantamount to 
the  conclusion  in the  two  subsequent  arguments  that nothing  is". 
But this  conclusion does not result from  the dubious  usage of the 
verb  'to be' so  far.  The case may have been then that G.  is  taking 
from  the  first argument the necessary conclusion of the possibility 
of the 'existence' of 'not-being' (without at this stage confirming its 
'non-existence', as he does for 'being' at 979a31), which at any rate 
is  the most difficult task.  Having set out this  ground, it  is  easy for 
him  in the  third argument to  postulate that  'not being'  is  not  (the 
arbitrariness  of this  syllogism  is  depicted  by  the  phrase  OUK  OV 
Vo€i:.-al.  in  Sextus).  Mansfeld's  correction  thus  admittedly  has  the 
advantage  of creating  a  logical  passage  to  the  second  argument 
(979a30ff).  But  his  suggestion  to  transpose  the  sentence  after 
979a24, that is after the programmatic announcement of  the scope of 
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such a transposition would be made if  we wanted to  preserve it "at 
all  cost').  1Tpa:yp.a:ro,:  has  been  interpreted  in  various  ways; 
Calogero (1932, p.197), takes it to mean the "molteplicita empirica 
del reale"; he  is  followed by Kerferd (1955, p.5,  1981, p.96), who 
thinks that in the first part of the ONE G.  is also concerned with the 
phenomenal world ("  .. .is also  concerned with the status of objects 
of perception"  and  he  claims  that  Tci.  1TpaYJ.La.m  "makes  it  clear 
that. . .it  is  not  the  existence  of Being  or Not-Being  which  IS  m 
question, but something wider"; the same view is  taken by Newiger 
1973, pp.21-22). Both Kerferd's and Newiger's arguments are based 
on the passages from Isok. Ant.268 and He!.3,  for which we have 
already adopted a different interpretation (see notes on 979al4-18). 
Levi (1941, p.15  cited by Untersteiner 1954, p.167 n.27)  goes too 
far in saying that Tci.  1TpaYJ.La.Ta.  refers to  "the particular things that 
arise either from a single first principle or also  from the peras and 
apeiron  of the  Pythagoreans,  or from  the  many  first  causes  of 
pluralism, things which by this very derivation involve change and 
Becoming, and therefore aspects of Not-being" and Untersteiner's 
(1961, p.60) connection of the word with xp7}P.a.Ta.  of Protagoras is 
not likely.  Migliori  (1973,  p.30),  attributing  to  it  a  more  general 
meaning  by suggesting  that "si puo,  quindi,  considerare  la frase 
nella  sua  generic  ita,  ritenendola  una  conferma  dell'  acquisita 
identita  tra  essere  e  non  essere",  is  more  accurate.  However,  I 
consider that the view taken by Mansfeld,  that  Tci.  1Tpayp.a.Ta.  is  a 
general term - which in this first major thesis of ONE represents Tci. 
Dvm (1990, p.l02 and Palmer 1999, p.72 and n.  32) - is  the most 
convincing.  It  is  not  necessary  to  repeat  our  argumentation 
concerning Tci.  OVTa.  (see notes on 979al4-18, and Introduction). We 
can simply add here that the word 1Tpa.YJ.La.Ta.  is used by the author of 
j\;fXG  at  least  once  to  denote  the  fundamental  entities  of 
philosophers. This passage can be found in the account concerning 
Melissos  in  MXG  975a2:  Ka.1.  p.it  1ToMci.  elva./.  Tci.  1Tpa.YJ.La.Ta., 
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by Mansfeld  1990, p.207;  the italics  are  mine).  TIlls  does  not of 
course  imply  that  all  the  occurrences  of -rrpaYfLa-ra  in  the  MXG 
replace ,ei  ov-ra. 
e!.  8'  op.~  ••• a.VTt.Kel.p.Evov:  the  argument  is  characteristically 
Gorgianic; facing the question of 'existence' of  both 'not-being' and 
'being', and having (for the time being) answered positively to  the 
first,  he adduces that 'being' is not. Why is  it not? Because it is  the 
opposite of 'not-being', the  touchstone of 'existence'  and because 
(as  G.  knows  very  well:  cp.The Defence of Palamedes  25)  two 
opposite qualities cannot be attributed to  one single thing. G.  in the 
first argument singled out 'not-being' and in the second he excludes 
'being'.  Everything  is  ready  to  deny  both  of them  in  the  third 
argument.  op.~: Mansfeld (1990, p.219 n.73) suggests  OfL<O[>~, 
because  of the  distinguo  made  by  Anonymous  in  the  criticism 
(979a36,  b5),  and  because  the  transmission  from  the  prevlOus 
argument is  in this manner smoother. I do  not find it necessary to 
contaminate the demonstration of  G. with a tenn  which was later to 
become technical, especially when the tradition of  the text does not 
demand it. The transition with the <3  ' ofLWS- on the other hand is rather 
satisfYing, as  it does not obscure the fact that the assumption of the 
second  argument  is  based  on  the  argument  of the  first  one. 
o:'VTt.KEI.P.EVOV:  "the  Stoic  tenn  for  a  member  of  an  exclusive 
conjunction  .. .it  fits  the  context  ad sententiam"  (Mansfeld  1990, 
p.219). 
'TTP0<n1KEL:  'it  follows'  from  what  has  been  shown  In  the  first 
argument. 
OUOEV  av  €L1'J:  the conclusion of  the second argument. 
eL  p.1,  Tau-rov  ••• p.1,  ELvaL:  Reinhardt (1916, p.36-39) thought that this 
third argument makes  a triple analogy with the three  arguments of 
Parmenides (B  6,  8-9). This  is  not accepted by Palmer (1999,  p./2 
n.36; see also Untersteiner 1954, p.167 n.30). 
328 OUK  aV  EL'T]  OUOEV:  the conclusion of  the third argument. Notice that 
this is an alternative form of  the conclusion of  the second argument  . 
.,.0  'TE  yc:1p  p:Tj  ov ...  -rq;  p:Tj  OV'Tl.:  the  argument proceeds  again  by 
starting from  'not-being'; the present statement that  'not-being'  is 
not,  and  which  in  fact  contradicts  what has  been said in  the  first 
argument,  is  in  formal  conformity with Parmenides' second route. 
But instead of predicating 'not-being' of itself G.  absolutely claims 
that 'not-being' is not and then - by following the opposite method 
of the one used in the second argument - he says that 'being' is not 
either,  because  it  is  the  same  as  'not-being'.  Schematically: 
Argument 2:  {+}  'not being':;::'being-7{-}  'being'  (where  {+}  for 
'is',  {-}  'is  not');  Argument  3:{-}  'not-being'~  'being'-7{-} 
'being', ('not-being'). 
1Tpoho~: instead of aUTOS"  of the Mss;  the  suggestion of Diels  has 
been  followed  by  Kerferd  (1955),  Untersteiner (1961),  Newiger 
(1973,  p.  33  n.64),  Buchheim  (1989).  aUTOS"  6  Foss,  ,  ,~ 
o  aVTOV 
Mullach.  Cassin's  reading,  who  accepts  the  Mss'  6  aUTOS",  is 
consistent  with  her view  that  the  anonymous  author  of MXG  is 
actually  giving  the  exact  words  of G.  ("l'identite  du  sens  n'est 
garantie que par l'identite litterale" p.447); this is  wishful thinking, 
not a realistic approach. 
Anonymous' criticism (979a34-b19) 
The following paragraphs are devoted by the author oflv1XG to his 
criticism of  the  'original demonstration' of  Gorgias.  The arguments 
of  this criticism will not be discussed in  detail here; this is the task 
of  those who  are concerned with  the assessment of  MXG as such 
and for the identification of  its author. In  any case,  the text of:VlXG 
as  a  contribution  to  the  history  of ideas  has  thoroughly  been 
e.xamined  by  A1ansfeld  (1990,  pp.200-237)  and Cassin  (1980),  to 
whom the reader is referred (Kerferd 1955 has also commented on 
the criticism). Notes on te'Ctual problems are unavoidable due to the 
obscurity of  the text (in some cases at least). 
329 cl<MO~>  d1TOOe~KvUOVaW  Diels  (followed  by  Untersteiner  1962, 
p.60),  KU'  d.<VTu>TTooe£Kvvu~  Kassel,  KUi.  U<UTCls- a.>:rooe£Kvvu~V 
Kerferd. The reading of R must clearly be accepted. G.'s 'original 
proof has  already been distinguished by the author of lvfXG from 
the  second part  (979a14 Ta.  ETEPO~<;  eLp7]J1-EvU).  Moreover TOUTO  at 
979a37  is  referring  to  the  corrupted  77  Eunv  ...  p.7J  av,  which is  an 
economical modification of  something clearly attributable to  G.  (see 
Cook-Wilson  1892,  pp.441-2,  and  Kerferd  1955,  p.9).  Kerferd's 
addition of UVTO<;  is  unnecessary,  since the  reference of the verb 
a.1TOOeLKVVULV  to  the  'original  proof  is  clear.  OLaAEI'ETUL: 
'examines',  is  also  sound  (oLe.AEyxeTUL  Wandland,  adopted  by 
Untersteiner, a concomitant of  the cl<MO~> a.1Tooe~KvuovULV). 
eL  TO  I.I.-TJ  QV  ea-n.v: Anonymous' starting point is the same as that of 
G.;  he  has  remarked that  G.  singled out  'not being'  and  that  he 
argued that it is. So at this point he merely repeats the hypothesis of 
the first argument of  the 'original proof (cp. 979a25). 
i1  a.1TAWS  ebrE'i.v  <av>  eLT(  <i1  >  KUL  ea-n.v  01.l.0LOV  I.I.-TJ  QV: 
Untersteiner's reading is preferable, as it is economical and closer to 
the reading of  the Mss. (77  €anv  a.1T.AWs- el1TeLv  eL7]  KUI.  €unv  eL7]  KUi. 
€anv  op.owv  p.7J  av R,  7}  c1.1T.Aws- eL1TeLV  eL7]  KUI.  €unv  op.owv  p.7J  av 
L); €UT~V c1.1TAWs- el1TeLv  KUI.  €UTLV  op.oiws- p.7J  QV  Foss, 77  €UT~V c1.1TAclJ<; 
eL1TeLV  77  KUi.  €UTLV  op.oiws- p.7J  av  Diels, 7]  €UTLV  c1.1TAWs- eL1TeLV  7}  -V 
KUi.  €UTLV  7"0  p.7J  QV  p.7J  QV  Apelt (see Cassin 1980); Mansfeld reads 
it  d1TAWs- eL1TeLV  <av>  eL7]  <iJ>  KUI.  €UTLV  op.oiws- p.7J  av.  The whole 
period is  a perileptic repetition of G. 's own distinction:  if we say 
that  'not-being'  is,  then  this  'is'  can  either  denote  'existence' 
(ci1TAWs-)  or a 'similarity', such as  'Y is Y' (op.owv). 
TOUTO  OE. ...  a.vci.J'KT(:  7"OUTO  refers  to  the  preceding  sentences; 
Anonymous  is  stating  that  G.'s  double  function  of 'is'  as  either 
existential or 'similar' (as 'being is being' in the 'original proof) is 
330 not feasible (for <paLVeTaI.  and a.vaYK7]  see Mansfeld 1990, p.220 n. 
80,81). 
<.OO-rrepEI.  O"O~V  OV'TOI.V:  'as  if there  were  two  things';  Kerferd 
suggested that  OVTOI.V  shows that it is  not 'being' and  'not-being' 
that are  considered, but 'things in general'  (1955, p.ll), for  'not-
being' "would not be included under OVTOI.V". However, Anonymous 
is  here assuming that we have a pair of two  opposite things  in  a 
general manner.  It is  not necessary then to  think that he is  strictly 
referring  either  to  'things'  (according  to  Kerferd  meaning  the 
'phenomenal  world')  or  to  'beings'  (namely,  the  fundamental 
philosophical  entities).  The  meaning  is  made  clear  from  the 
following sentences. 
TO\)  Il-EV ••• Il-EV  Il--TJ  Ov:  L,  OOKOUVTOS"  R (Apelt, Newiger (1973) pA2, 
Cassin (1980), p. 455, 461-3, Mansfeld (1990), p.220); Anonymous 
establishes a distinction which is distorted by the OOKOUVTOS"  (though 
the latter is a lectio difficilior). He says: 'as if  there were two things, 
the one being, the other not-being', then the only thing we can say is 
that the first is true (TO  I-'-€V  €(rn, 'veridical' meaning of  the verb 'to 
be', note the opposed OUK  a.A:rIlES")  and the second is  not true (it is 
false),  that  is  'not-being'  is  not in  an  absolute way  (cp.  that  the 
statement TO  1-'-7]  QV  €(rnv is eaVl-'-aawv  and merely conceded at  the 
context of 979b7). So, the first argument of the criticism is that the 
existential use  of the verb  to  be does  not equally pertain to  both 
'being'  and  'not-being'.  'Not-being'  then is  not,  unless  one  feels 
free to use the verb 'to be' equivocally. 
01.0.  n  ...  Il--TJ  elval.;  Anonymous is  picking up  the announcement of 
the 'original proof and is making it a question. 
TO  OE  UIl-<!>W  11  TO  ETepOV  OUK  €O"T1.V;  TO  oe L,  TO  R;  T£  oe  UI-'-<PW  <7]> 
OUeETepOV  OUK  eanv Diels,  TL  oe  al-'-<pw  ouoe  eaT€pOV  OUK  eanv 
Kassel,  TO  0'  al-'-<pw  aue'  €TepaV  aUK  eanv  Cook-Wilson,  TO  oe 
al-'-<pw,  aue'  ETepov,  aUK  eanv;  Calogero  1932,  p.174  n.  2  (and 
Untersteiner  1962  p.63),  TO  oe  UI-'-<pw  7]  TO  €TepOV  aUK  eanv; 
Kerferd  (1955  p.12  n.1,  cpo  PI.  Hipp.Min.376a3),  TO  oe  al-'-<pw 
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OUK  €crnv  Cassin  (1980,  pp.455,  463-4)  nioE  ap.<pw 
OV8€'TEPOV  OUK  €a'TLV,  Mansfeld (1990, p.221 n.82). I follow Kerferd 
('TO  E'TEpOV  could  also  be  8a'TEpOV  as  we have  8a'TEpa  at  979a21) 
because the second member of  the disjunction - corresponding to p.iJ 
ElvaL  - is  answered by the argument of Anonymous (introduced by 
yap)  which  is  identical  with  the  first  argument  of the  'original 
proof. 
ouoev  'Ya.p  <~'T"'iov>  ••• 'TOU  ELva!.:  Foss's  Trr'TOV  IS  necessary; 
Anonymous  by  repeating  the  basis  of the  first  argument  of the 
'original proof is reaching the  opposite conclusion. Having posed 
the rhetorical question' ...  why is it not either the one or the other' 
[sc.  Elva!.  /p.iJ  Elva!.]  he is saying that according to  G.  (cfnJuLv)  'what 
is  not  (or  'not-being')  is  no  less  than  what  is  ('being')'. 
Consequently, the second alternative (E'TEPOV)  is - as of course and 
by definition 'what is' is (979a39). 
El  oe  KaL..'Tl{)  [!-L-I]]  OV'T1.:  p.iJ  does not belong in the text because it 
makes the statement senseless. 
E'T1.:  where 'not-being' is only if predicated  of itself,  'being' is by 
definition.  So  as  to  infer that  'Y is'  (Y being  'not being'  and X 
being 'being') we have to say 'Y is Y', whereas for X we can either 
say 'X is X' or 'X is' in an absolute manner. 
El  oe  ••• ciA1'\8es:  the  opposite  of the  preceding  argument;  "if we 
concede  that  not  being  is"  in  an  absolute  manner,  that  is  if we 
attribute to it an exclusive property of 'being'. 
(<.Os  0-1]  8au!-LcLO'1.ov ••• ):  explicitly  shows  that  the  hypothesis  Ei 
8E ...  d.)..7]fJe~ is hardly accepted even as a concession. 
1TO'iEpOV  <Ou>:  Kerferd's addition is  accepted, because it ascertains 
that the only logical answer is a:rraV'Ta  ElvaL. 
'iouvavnov:  the  opposite  of what  G.  inferred  (ovoev  for  which 
Anonymous has 1TcLV'Ta;  see Mansfeld 1990, p.222). 
OUK  civa.')'K1'\ ••• I-L-I]  ELva!.:  Anonymous picks up  the hypothesis of the 
second argument of the 'original proof and claims that 'if  not-being 
is, it does not follow that being is not' which is the exact opposite of 
332 the  conclusion  of that  argument  (TO  elval..  hai.  OUK  ian.  TO 
avnKEip.EVOV  979a30) . 
<n>: Foss; it specifies that there would be 'something', namely 'not 
being'. 
KaTa.  TOV  EK€LVOU  AOYOV:  Anonymous is using afresh an argument of 
G.  which he  has  already rejected  (see  Mansfeld  1990,  p.222  and 
n.84). 
€L  oe  TaUTOV  ea'nv: a straightforward attack upon the third and final 
argument of  the 'original proof. 
cLVTl.<TTpetjsaVTl.:  self-referentially Anonymous makes his tactic in this 
argument explicit. G.  said (tlls  yap  KaKEivo~ AeYEL) that 'if  not-being 
is the same (muTov) as being, both being and not-being are not' (a 
slightly modified version of that at 979a33-35,  in the respect that 
here it is not explicitly said that 'being' is not, because it is the same 
as  'not-being' which is  not)  and he  concluded:  warE  ou8ev  earl.v 
('nothing is'; cpo  979a33  OUK  av  EL'T]  ou8€v); Anonymous from the 
same argument feels  free to infer the opposite position ("all things 
are"). Anonymous reaches the opposite conclusion because he takes 
the conclusion of the first  argument of the  'original proof ("not-
being is") and he asserts that 'being' is. 
The antinomies (979b20-980a8) 
The second portion of  the argumentation supporting the first general 
thesis  of G.  is  developed  with  the  process  of arguments  from 
antinomy; in order to show that ou8ev  EarLV  (a recurring phrase in 
this second part) G.  expresses the hypothesis 'if it is' (and by this 
something we still mean the  fundamental theoretical constructions 
of  the  philosophers,  oaol.  7TEPI.  TlVV  QVTWV  A.€YOVTE~  TavaVTia 
979a15) and he then attributes to this 'something' properties such as 
generated / ungenerated, one / many, in motion / at rest. In its tum, 
now, the examination of each one of those properties proves to  be 
fruitless  so  that  in  all  the  cases  the  hypothesis  el  8€  Earl.V  is 
rejected. Schematically 'Ex' (x is) presupposes either Fx or -Fx, Yx 
333 or -Yx, where F /  -F, Y /  -Y ... represent the antithetical pairs of 
properties attributed to  Ov-ra..  The examination of each one leads to 
the conclusion that the hypothesis 'x is' is not feasible, so as to have 
-Ex. 
Two interrelated questions arise here: who is the target of G.  and 
why is this argumentation from antinomies necessary at all? G.  has 
already  proved his  first  thesis  (auK  €illa.L  auo€lI)  in  the  'original 
demonstration', but now it seems that this  was not enough. Should 
we then draw the conclusion that this second portion is  redundant? 
We  have already  argued that the  ONB is  a  general  attack on the 
theoretical  constructions  of the  philosophers.  It should  be  added 
now - and this is perhaps more important - that the ONB (especially 
its  first part) can hardly be interpreted us  a direct attack upon the 
premises of the philosopher as  such. In other words, the reading of 
the  ONB  which  aims  at  the  identification  of the  philosophers 
criticised by G. - which undoubtedly is a part of  our task - is, in my 
view, heading for failure (see Introduction). 
G.  is not putting forward a new theory of  his own, in preparation 
for whose announcement he has first to do away with the theories of 
others.  On the contrary he is  an intellectual who  knows that every 
single idea acquires substance by the means of linguistic utterance 
and  that from  the moment that something is  argued  in  words  the 
relentless activity of interpretation is about to be launched. What is 
questioned thus is not primarily the feasibility of  the one or the other 
theory, but the possibility of establishing a firm  theoretical system 
which aspires to  partake of the absolute truth. Under this prism the 
part  of the  ONB  under  discussion  is  not  - strictly  speaking  -
intended to knock over any theory of any philosopher. By using the 
argumentative tools of  philosophers, G. is seeking to show that once 
one is using arguments to  support one's thesis, one should be aware 
that  there  are  other  arguments  (sometimes  one'  s  own)  that  can 
potentially be used against oneself. Hence the pastiche of a variety 
of contradictory  (and  incompatible)  attributes,  whose  common 
denominator  is  that  they  have  been  used  inflexibly  by  various 
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of these  (indispensable)  properties  contradicts  another  and  so 
infinitely. 
Putting those programmatic remarks aside we may now pass 
to  the presentation of the arguments as  a whole (see also notes on 
979al4-18). 
L  The first  notional pair is  that of ungenerated /  generated. The 
argumentation against those alternatives (A, B) is the following: 
(A)  ,  ,  ,  " 
KG.l.  El..  JJ.EV  aYEVTfTOV, 
if it is ungenerated 
he takes it to be unlimited in accordance with the premises of 
Melissos. 
b)  Tb  0'  G.7TELPOV  OUK  Civ  elva£.  7TOV.  OUT€  yap  €V  aUT(/),  OUT  Ci  v  EV 
,  "  '!'  KaL  TO  €V  <po 
But the  unlimited  is  nowhere.  For it  is  neither  in  itself nor  in 
anything else; in this case it would have been two or more, the one 
that in which it is and the other that which is in it. 
c)  p:TJoaf-LOu  OE  OV  ouoEv  elvaL  KaTa  TOV  TOU  ZfJvwvos  1\6yov  7TepL  ri]s 
xwpas. 
But if  it is nowhere it is nothing according to the argument of  Zenon 
about space. 
The arguments about generated follow  a transitional phrase which 
announces them: 
Transition: d.yev7JTov  f-LEv  ovv  OLa  TaUT'  OUK  €IvaL, 
For those reasons it is not ungenerated, 
(B)  OU  f-L-TJV  ouoe  y€v6{1:€vov.  y€veaeat.  youv  OUOEV  Civ  OUT  g 
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allTOS'  OUT' EK  yjr  allTOS'. 
as it is not generated either; for nothing can be generated 
either from being or from not-being. 
because if  being underwent such a radical change, it would 
not be being anymore 
"  ","  ~"  ",.,  V  \  wo-rrep  y  €~  Kat.  TO  /.L!{  Oll  y€VO~TO, OUK  av  €Tl.  €~7J Y::!l 
as, if  not-being came into being, it would not be not-being 
anymore. 
Transition: OUQE  JL7]v ovo' EK  </.Li,>  aVToS'  all  y€lI€a8a~' 
But of course nothing can be generated from not-
being 
for if  not-being is not, 
nothing can be generated from nothing; 
b')  el .1' €(J"TLlI  (aJ) TO  JLTJ  Oll, 
but again if not-being is, 
ot.'  a:TT€p  ovo' EK  TOU  OllTOS', 
for the reasons that hold for being 
for those very reasons it cannot be generated from not-
being. 
Some  remarks:  the  argument  against  non-YElI€a~S' proceeds  in 
three steps; the first one (after the hypothetical 'if  it is ungenerated') 
is  assuming  (rather  arbitrarily  by  appealing  to  the  authority  of 
Melissos) that if it  is  ungenerated it  is  unlimited;  from that (b)  G. 
deduces that it is nowhere, that is  it cannot be spatially (?) located. 
And he concludes, on the ground of the argument of Zenon that if it 
is nowhere it is nothing or it is not at all. 
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arguments (a-b, a' -b'). The second step of  the first pair (b) presents a 
problem: if  the meaning is 'if  not-being changed into being', then it 
is a repetition of  b'  - where we have the discussion of the coming-
to-be  from  not-being  - with  the  additional  problem  that  in  the 
context of b' we are told that nothing can be generated from  not-
being,  for the same reasons (that is  because it would change into 
something different) as  for being. The problem has been located by 
Cook-Wilson  1892,  p.445-6)  and  Kerferd  (1955),  who  posits  a 
reasonabe explanation. He says that the  "comparison between the 
.two  halves  [sc.  a,  bJ  is  simply  formal".  So  from  (b),  we  may 
generally infer that if a thing changes into something else then it 
ceases  to  be the  same  as  that  which  was  before.  Generally  the 
second members of each pair (b, b') remind us of  ajoketo be found 
in Plato's Euthydemus 283d: Kleinias' friends, we are told, wish to 
make him wise, and to make him not be an dJ-Lue7js-;  that is they wish 
to make him what he is not, and to make him not be what he is now. 
But what kind of friends  are  those who  want to  kill  their friend 
(E~ol\wMvUL  )? 
II.  After a general conclusion pertaining to  the first argument as  a 
whole, the author of  MXG gives the second pair, namely one / many. 
The text is preserved in an extremely bad condition, full of lacunae 
and  our  knowledge  about  it  is  practically  dependent  upon  the 
version  of Sextus.  The  first  phrases  are  announcing  the  notional 
pair, and in the usual way, it is reported that 'if it is' it is either one 
or many, because if  it is neither of  them then there is nothing. 
1 
1  Apelt has  ventured a constitutio of the text,  which runs  as  follows:  Kai  EV  jl-ev 
OUK  elvaL,  on  dawfLa'Tov  o.v  eL7J  'TO  cOs  d),:rf1bk  €v,  Ka80  ouoev  €XOV  jl-€ye8os.  a 
dvaLpei:a8aL  'T41  'TOU  Z7jvwvos  .:\6yqJ.  EVos  oe  jl-7]  DV'TOS  OUO'  Civ  OAWS  elvaL  ouoev. 
jl-7]  ydp  DV'TOS'  EVos  jl-7Joe  1To'\'\d  elvaL  oei:v.  eL  oe  jl-frre  €v,  </npf.v,  jl-frre  1To,\,\d 
€anv,  ouoev  €anv. 
337 It is  impossible  to  make  any  comments  on  this  part  of the 
argumentation,  to  which  we  shall  tum  in  the  discussion  of the 
version of  Sextus (we may point out here that Sextus devotes a very 
short part of  his version to this pair). 
ill.  Finally, the argument against motion (or / and) change - which 
does not appear in the general 'doxographical' preamble at 979al4-
18 (see notes ad. loc.) - is given briefly. It has plausibly been argued 
that  it  followed  an argument  against  rest  (see  Untersteiner  1954, 
p.149  and  p.  170  n.  56  with  further references;  more  recently 
Sicking  1964, pp.225-47 and in Classen  1976,  384-407,  Newiger 
1973, pp.87ff., Mansfeld 1990, p.263  and Palmer 1999, p.115 and 
n.35; contra Gigon (1936), p.200. Loenen 1959, pp.191-2 thinks that 
the argument about motion is a "personal addition on the part of  the 
Anonymous").  But even  the  argument  against  motion  (or  /  and 
change) that Anonymous decided to  include in his text is  obscure. 
All we can say is that it seems that G.  makes a distinction between 
motion as  qualitative change and locomotion.  The two  arguments 
that we have are the following: 
ouo' cl.V  KLV7]8fjVU£  CP7]ULV  ouoev' 
Nothing, he says, would move; 
a) hypothesis  el y?J.p  KLv7]8e[7], 
because if it moved [sc.changed] 
argument  [,,] OtiK  cl.V  J:r' eL7]  WaUVTWS"  €Xav, 
it would not have been in the same state any more, 
conclusion  d..U?J.  TO  p.Ev  <ov> OUK  QV  €L7],  TO  8'  aUK  QV  yeyovos- eL7J. 
but, instead, on the one hand being would be not-being, and 
not-being would acquire existence. 
b) hypothesis  ETr..  0' el KLVeLTaL  KU~ €V  <  QV> [.L€TucpepeTaL, 
Futhermore, if  it moves and being one it changes place, 
argument 
338 being, not being continuous any more, is divided and it is not 
at the same place. 
conclusion  Wa-r' €l  -rrav7IJ  KLV€LTaL.  -rrav7IJ  (n'{jP7JTaL. 
so that if  it moves everywhere it is divided everywhere. 
The argument is rather difficult to follow. First of  all as it stands 
it does not show - as the other arguments do - that  'if  something is' 
it cannot be in motion, so as to conclude that it is not at alL  On the 
contrary it is prima facie a refutation of motion as  such.  For this 
reason Foss suggested that at the beginning (and at the end) of the 
argumentation there must be a lacuna. But suggesting a lacuna is an 
easy way to pass over the problem. The problem is, I am inclined to 
believe, linked to  the fact that the author of MXG records only the 
argument against motion and not that against rest.  Discerning the 
reasons why he did not include the latter in his version is based on 
speculation (for possible answers see Palmer 1999, p.1l5 n.35), but 
it is  certain that in each case G.  argued from both alternatives (see 
Sicking 1964, p.  230). The argument from antinomy is peculiar to 
G.  and the systematic abolition of each argument occurs both in the 
first pair (A) as it is given by Anonymous and in Sextus' version (on 
whom  we rely  exclusively  for  the  argument  about  one /  many). 
Moreover,  the  argument  against  ayev7JTov  implies  an  argument 
against rest,  for both were attributed to  the  'being' by the  Eleatic 
monism. And it is also worth our attention that the pair at rest / in 
motion is found (among others) in Plato's Parmenides (the affinities 
of  this part of ONE with this dialogue are discussed below). 
It  is  thus  possible  (though  not  certain)  that  a  general 
announcement containing the hypothesis El  0' ean n ... followed by 
the  two  alternatives  (at  rest,  in  motion)  was  placed  before  the 
discussion  of the  first  alternative  (see  Newiger  1973,  p.  80).  The 
phrase ovo ' av  KwrfHjvaL  frlaLv  ovoev is thus introducing the second 
(that is  the preserved) alternative about motion, which is  similar to 
the  transitional phrase with which Anonymous is  passes  from  the 
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yevofJ-evov)  - with  the  conspicuous  difference  that  here  we  are 
lacking  an  implicit  reference  to  the  (not  preserved)  preceding 
argument. 
A  striking similarity should also  be noticed; we have seen that 
the argument against yeveaL~ had as its starting point the hypothesis 
that if  something were generated from either being or not being then 
both of them would have changed into something else - they would 
have  been transformed  into  something  different  from  that  which 
they  were  before  this  change  took  place  979b27  -9.  The  first 
argument  against  motion  (III  a,  which· deals  with  motion  in  a 
qualitative sense, namely change)  obviously proceeds in a  similar 
manner (cp.  I a-b;  at b, stating generally that if not being came to 
being  then  it  would not  be not-being  anymore,  occurs  the  verb 
yeVOtTO,  and in the context of 980a3 we have the form yeyov(k  eL7J. 
See Migliori 1973, pp.44-5). 
This similarity has an interesting implication for it is not unique. 
The second argument against change is  based on the idea of the 
divisibility of being, which - as  is attested by Sextus 73  - has also 
been used  in the  argument  against  One.  Another similarity with 
Parmenides  139a2-b3  is  also  telling;  at  that  point,  Parmenides 
argues  that the  One  (for which we have  'being'  in G.)  is  at  rest 
(aK£v7JTOv), on the basis that it is not "either in itself or in something 
else"  (139a6-7)  From this  it is  inferred that what is  never in the 
same thing is neither in motion nor at rest, so  that TO  fEV  a.pa ...  OUTe 
EaT7JKEV  OUTe  KLVE"2-raL.  But this  argument  (though more subtle in 
Plato) has already been used as  a step of the reasoning against the 
possibility that being is ayev7JTov. 
If my suggestions are so  far correct, it may be tempting to think 
(thOUgh  for the lack of the original argumentation of G.  we cannot 
prove) that the notional pair [at rest  Jlin motion is  not traced in the 
summary  of  Anonymous  (979al4-18),  because  the  arguments 
against each individual member of it were identical with or very 
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course be objected that seeking to  restore the text on the basis of 
what  is  said  in  Plato  is  methodologically  unsound,  but  these 
similarities  certainly  merit  our  attention  (they  have  undoubtedly 
drawn the attention of several scholars); that they do  not reproduce 
the original argumentation is more than clear. 
We  may  now  pass  to  a  short  examination  of the  similarities 
between  this  part  of  MXG  and  Plato's  Pannenides.  These 
similarities  have  been  shown  and  explained  by  Mansfeld  (1990, 
pp.112-18) and Palmer (1990, pp.111-7). The latter claims that ''the 
Pannenides's First Deduction suggests that Plato saw reflections of 
G.'s anti-Parmenidean stance in more parts of his  treatise than the 
personal demonstration" (p.117). Apart from the verbal similarities 
or the discernible relation between separate arguments, both G., and 
Plato,  in his  first  deduction,  are  proceeding with arguments  from 
antinomy.  Plato's  argumentation  is  more  exhaustive  and  a 
considerable amount of the pairs used in Pannenides do  not appear 
in  G..  However,  it  is  interesting  that  the  structure  of  the 
argumentation is methodologically identical. 
We may better turn to  Pannenides and try to  investigate these 
similarities,  by  examining  the  arguments  in  the  order  that  they 
appear in MXG: 
1.  The argument against dy€v7JTov  begins with the assumption that if 
being is  ungenerated, then according to  the axiom of Melissos it is 
unlimited, and we also remember that Anonymous has already told 
us (979a23) that in the second portion of  the first thesis G.  proceeds 
in the manner of Melissos and Zenon. The same thing is asserted at 
the beginning of the first  deduction of Pannenides at  137d7.  This 
axiom is  also  traced at  MXG 974a10  (30  B  5,9DK)  d£owv  oE  QV 
o  y~yvoJ.L€VOV  €T'€A.€VT'7]O'€  1TOT'€  (cp. Mansfeld 1990, p.114). G.  then 
infers that if  it unlimited it is nowhere, because it is not in itself or in 
anything else,  for  it would thus  be two  or more (the  argument in 
Sextus  is  rather  different  and  it  corresponds  better to  Plato,  see 
341 Mansfeld 1990, p.116). In Parmenides now we are told (for the full 
argument see Palmer 1999,  p.1l4) that the  One being cannot be 
either (a) in itself or (b) in anything else. Both points are argued in 
Plato (whereas in MXG it is arbitrarily stated that it would either be 
in itself or in something else). From (b)  Plato infers that the One, 
being contained in itself, would no  longer be one but two,  which 
corresponds  to  the  argument  of G.,  as  is  given  by  Anonymous. 
Argument (a), which is absent in MXG is given (not in every detail 
similar to Plato's) by Sextus (69). The third step, namely that ifit is 
nowhere,  it is  not at all,  based - according  to  Anonymous - on 
Zenon is not attested in this context of Parmenides (see Mansfeld 
1990,  116-17), and what is  more we do  not possess his argument 
that if it is not somewhere it is nothing. We may then assume that 
our only source  about this  argument is  Anonymous  (although he 
does  not record the  argumentation by which Zenon reached this 
conclusion).  But a  famous  passage  from  Timaeus  52B  (cited  by 
Kahn  1966,  p.263,  with  more  examples  and  a  convmcmg 
discussion), puts forward the idea that if  721  OV  is to be at all, it must 
be  located in some place, and it seems that this idea was a locus 
communis  of Greek  thought.  It  is  worth  our  attention  that  in 
Parmenides  138b5-6,  when Parmenides  says  that  the  One is  not 
placed anywhere - neither in itself nor in anything else - Aristotle 
(his  interlocutor)  simply  retorts  aUK  €eYnv.  It  is  safer  then  to 
conclude  with  Mansfeld  (1990,  p.1l7)  that  where  G.  merely 
elaborated a common assumption, "all Anonymous did was to swap 
this  elaboration for  a  learned  but utterly  uneloquent  reference  to 
Zenon". 
II.  The  argument  about  one  /  many  has  been  preserved  in  a  poor 
condition and we cannot draw out much from it with any certainty. 
III.  The argument against motion does not present the same degree of 
similarity.  Plato's  account  (138b-139a)  is  more  elaborate,  as  he 
clearly distinguishes between two distinct types of  KLV7JeYLS:  change 
and motion; motion is further divided into 'turning round in a circle' 
342 or 'changing place'. The only argument in MXG which has affinities 
with  Plato  is  that  of change  (dMOLW(TLS-;  cpo  11zt.181b-c).  At 
Parmenides  138c1-3  we  read:  dMoWVp,EvOV  De  ro  EV  eavrov 
dDvvarov  7TOV  EV  en  EIva~, for which in iv[XG we are told that if it 
were changed it would not longer be in the same condition, and the 
same holds for not-being (see Palmer 1999, p.115-6). 
We may now move on to  the identification of the philosophers 
attacked by G  ..  The target of G.  is  a  general one,  including both 
monists  and  pluralists  (see  Untersteiner  1954,  p.147  and  p.169 
n.36).  In particular,  it  is  clear that the Eleatics are still his  target, 
because both the properties of  non-generated and One are pointed at 
(along with that of rest,  which does  not occur either in MXG or 
Sextus). It should also  be noticed that the first  alternative of each 
pair is a refuted Eleatic attribute of  Being (this is a further reason to 
suppose  that  the  argument  against  rest  preceded  the  argument 
against  motion;  on motion and Parmenides  see Kirk-Stokes  1960 
answered by Bicknell  1967).  Empedocles  as  a pluralist may have 
been  included  in  the  criticism  of many,  but  the  problems  with 
interpreting his ideas concerning YEVECTLS- and death do not allow us 
to  reach safe  conclusions  (see Kirk-Raven-Schofield  1983, p.292; 
Empedoc1es accepted that his rhizomata are coming into being). His 
ideas  about  motion  must  have  also  been  targeted  by  G.  (see 
Mansfeld 1990, p.61). Mansfeld (1990, pp.61-2) adduces "physicist 
monists  who  did  not  deny  Y€VE(J'LS- and  motion"  and  Heraclitus's 
theory about motion. 
979b20-34 
!.LETa. ••• 4nloiv:  after the 'original proof'; this  is  the beginning of the 
second  portion  of the  argumentation  supporting  the  first  general 
thesis of  G  .. 
EL  OE  ~O"Tl.v: it introduces the first antithetical pair; the same phrase 
is  used at  the beginning of the second argument about one / many 
and it must have been originally used in his own text. It has already 
343 been used at  the introduction of Anonymous  (979a19).  Calogero 
(1932 p.177 n.l) saw a relation of  7TC1.VTa  at the end of the criticism 
with the  EL  ea·nv (in the light of his belief that the point at stake 
throughout ONB is the phenomenal world). Anonymous has clearly 
finished  his  criticism  and  he passes  to  the  argumentation already 
promised at  the beginning of his  version (see Migliori  1973, p.36 
n.38). 
a:YEvrrT"OV  11  YEVO\.l-EVOV:  'generated  or  ungenerated';  in  the 
introduction, Anonymous presented this pair in the plural, and the 
following step will be the hypothesis that if it is  unlimited it will 
then be two  or more. Mansfeld (1990, p,1l3) argued that either an 
argument  against  "ageneticist  pluralists  such  as  Empedocles  and 
Anaxagoras has been suppressed"  ...  or that "an argument against the 
ageneticist monists .. .implied one against the ageneticist pluralists" 
and he concluded that we cannot be certain of either of these two 
possibilities. 
a:rrELpOV •••  Aa\.l-~a.VEL:  cpo  DKJOB2,3,4  and MXG 974a9-10  (on  the 
source  used by Anonymous  see  Mansfeld  1990,  p.114,  Newiger 
1973,  p.58-9);  Nestle  (1922,  p.555) has  imputed to  G.  that he is 
obfuscating spatial and temporal unlimited (as Aristotle does with 
Melissos,  cpo  Soph.  E1.l67b13ff  (=30A10DK)  OLOV  0  MEAf.aa-ov 
AOY0S",  on  a7TELpov  TO  a.7TUV,  Aa{3wv  TO  fLEV  a.7Tav  dyev7JTov  (€K  yap 
fL7J  OVTOS"  ouoEv  av  Y€Vea8uL),  TO  OE  Y€VOfL€VOV  eg  dpx77S"  Y€Vea8uL  €l 
fL7J  ovv  yeyovEv,  dpx:iJv  OUK  ggELV  TO  7Tav,  WG'T'  G.7T€LPOV  OUK  dvaYK7J 
DE  TOVTO  G'VfL{3af.v€LV"  ou  yap  el  TO  Y€VOfL€VOV  a.7Tav  dpx:iJv  EX€L,  KaL 
EL  n  dpx:iJv  EX€L  yeyov€v;  see Kirk-Raven-Schofield  1983, p.394, 
Guthrie 1969, vol. ii, p.109; various interpretations summarised by 
Reale  1970,  pp.73-86).  Untersteiner has  argued that  'eternity and 
infinity' are inextricably interwoven (1954, p.l69 n.38, with further 
references and Migliori 1973, p.38). 
OUO  11  'TT'AELW:  d7T€Lpw  Bonitz;  but  the  reading  of the  Mss  is 
preferable.  Anonymous  has  already  used  this  formula  (MXG 
974all-12) and his is now repeating it (see Cassin 1980, pp.488-9, 
Mansfeld  1990, p.124 n.54).  The  'two' then refers  to  the  case  in 
344 which 'being' would have been in itself (Sextus 70  ovo  YEVf]a€'ra~ 
TO  QV, see Kerferd 1955, pp.20-1). 
\-L1loa\-LOU ••• €LVaL:  see the general introduction on this part of MXG 
above. 
KaTa  TOV •••  xwpas:  29A24DK;  but this  is  not  a proof that  what  is 
nowhere is not at all. It is an argument showing that the place of  DV 
is not, because it is in an other place, which again must be in another 
place and so  on ad infinitum (cp.  ouoev  yap  KWAvEL  EV  aAAcp  /-Lev 
Mansfeld 1990, p.116-1 7). 
OLa  TaUTa: for the reasons given in the previous paragraph. 
oiJoE  y€v6\-L€vov:  the  other  leg  which  will  prove  to  be  equally 
untenable. 
oilT'  E~  OVTos ••• Wtl  OVTOS:  the  argumentation  is  twofold;  the  two 
alternatives  are  presented  in  the  order  in  which  they  will  be 
discussed. 
\-L€Ta1T~<TOL: if  it undergoes a change (cp. Melissos 30B8, ch.6: 7]v  oe 
/  \,'  ,  "\  ,  ~,  ,  ,  \  I  1'1  l' 
/-LETa7TEOT/,  TO  /-LEV  EOV  a7TWI\ETO,  TO  OE  OUK  EOV  yEyOVEV.  OUTWS  OUV, 
,  \\'"  ~  '1'  i'  ''')  EL  7TOl\l\a  E~7],  To~aUTa XP7]  E(,va~,  0  OV  7TEp  TO  OV •••• 
TO  Ov:  L, R;  aUTO  Apelt (follwed by Untersteiner); but the meaning 
is clear without the emendation. 
W<rrrEp  y'  €L..e'l.1l  \-L-Tt  Ov:  it  is  an  analogical  formula;  the  full 
discussion of the  change of 'not-being'  is  found  in the  following 
paragraph (see Kerferd 1955, p.22 and Introductory notes above). 
€t  \-LEV  yap  \-L-Tt  E<TTL:  the first alternative; G. is flirting again with the 
ambiguities of  the 'original proof. 
a~: it makes the necessary contrast to  the preceding possibility; the 
'existence' of 'not-being' has been 'shown' in the first argument of 
the'  original proof. 
~lL'  a.1TEp ...  TOU  OVTOS:  namely  because  it  would  change  into 
something else (cp. OUK  av ET' Er7],  979b29). 
€t  O~V  \-LEv ••• Kat  €LVaL:  explicitly  shows  the  method  of 
argumentation  from  antinomies;  if something  is,  it  IS  necessary 
345 (dvaYK7])  for  it to  be either generated or ungenerated.  Since both 
alternatives  are  impossible  (<dovvaTa>,  following  the  reading of 
Newiger), it is impossible for it to be at all. 
979b35-980al 
€TI.  €.L.1T€f> ••• 4krnv: <n, 7]> Foss (followed by Skouteropoulos), but it 
is not necessary; the comma should be placed after ean and a semi 
colon at the end of  the sentence. 
€.t  oe .•• ouoev  av  €.L.'TJ:  again  the  argumentation  from  antinomy  is 
made clear. 
Z"vwvos: cp.29 B2 DK. 
980a2-8 
tOOau-rws  Ei)(ov:  it  would  not  be  the  same,  it  would  alter.  The 
argument echoes that against yEV€aIS. _ 
The Second Thesis (980alO-19) 
The  second  major  thesis  of the  ONB  is  related  to  problems  of 
cognition  and  reception  of 'reality';  G.  has  now  completed  the 
arguments supporting the first major thesis, which is now conceded, 
so  as  to  pass  to  the  second  one.  Even  if something  is,  it  is 
unknowable. 
The  account  gIVen  by  the  author  of MXG  is  conspicuously 
compressed, and the textual difficulties make our understanding of  it 
extremely  difficult.  The transitions  from  the  one  argument to  the 
other are obscure, if they exist at all,  and any reconstruction of the 
contents  of the  argumentation of G.  is  in many cases  necessarily 
dependent  upon  the  several  interpretational  approaches  of  its 
modem  students.  It is  also  unavoidable  to  conclude  that  G.'s 
original  argumentation  must  have  been  more  detailed,  since 
Anonymous' account of it is  disproportionally shorter than that of 
the other two major theses. 
346 Let  us  attempt to  present the  arguments  as  they  are  given in 
MXG:  the starting point (?) (a lacuna precedes this point, see notes 
ad.  loc.) is that (1) the objects of thought must be (Mansfeld 1990, 
p.103,  has plausibly argued that in this second thesis "the verb 'to 
be' is used both in the veridical and in the referential sense"), and 
that not-being, since it is not, cannot be the object of thought. This 
must have been the follow-up to something stated in the portion of 
the  text which has  not survived.  From this  it is  inferred that the 
possibility of false statements must be excluded (and this is directly 
attributed to  G.:  <p7]uLv),  so  that one may justifiably hold that there 
are  chariots  competing  in  the  middle  of the  ocean  (the  example 
occurs in Sextus also, and it must have originally been used by G.). 
Why is that? Because all those things would have been - that is they 
would have been the case, they would have been true (7Tcl.Vra  yap av 
mvra  eL7]).  (2)  Now,  things  seen  and  things  heard  (that  is  the 
objects of  vision and the objects of  hearing) are (true), because each 
one of  them is conceived. But exactly as things we see  (are not, i.e. 
are not true), in an analogous way things that we see are no more 
true than things thought. Because as  in the first case many people 
may see the same things, in the second many people may think of 
the same things, but it is unclear which of them are true (7ToLa  De 
raA7]8fj,  aD7]Aov).  (3) So that even if  things are, they are unknown to 
us. 
The  structure  of the  argumentation  has  been  interpreted  in 
various ways.  Untersteiner thought that it is  a tripartite argument, 
moving from philosophical doctrines (the first part of 1) to poetical 
creations, and finally to  sense-perceptions. The last stage is  further 
divided by him (he  actually  follows  Levi,  see Untersteiner  1954, 
p.155) into thought including sense-perception and the opposite of 
it,  that  is  sense-perception  distinguished  from  thought.  I  am  not 
inclined  to  agree  with  such  a  formal  division,  which  seeks  to 
establish relations between this  second major argument of G.  and 
particular human activities;  in the case of the 'poetical creations', 
347 for instance, the identification of  the image of chariots racing on the 
sea with Prometheus  129-30  (see Untersteiner  1954,  p.171  n.71) 
does not offer a firm ground supporting the idea that G. really had it 
in his mind. 
A  more  auspicious  interpretation  is  given  by  Mansfeld,  who 
divides  the  argument into two  steps;  in the first  one  (in which he 
includes the sentences KaL  yap  'To.  0pw/1-Eva ••• avTlvv) he saw echoes 
of the Protagorean doctrine homo mensura, whereas in the second 
he  took  it  to  be  heavily  reformulated  in  a  Pyrrhonist  way  (he 
describes it as  a "Pyrrhonist ring",  1990, p.264, though the ring is 
created by his  adding of a word in the text;  see notes on text ad 
loc.). The interpretation of  Mansfeld (the same, basically, holds for 
Migliori  1973,  p.63  n.llO)  has  the  advantage  that  it  does  not 
presuppose  a  drastic  emendation  of the  text,  as  does  the  one 
proposed by Newiger (1973, p.141) who  thinks that the  argument 
about  the  subjectivity  of different  opinions  should  (apart  from 
980a26-17) also be placed in 979a15, that is in the context of the 
passage  discussing  the  relations  between  thought  and  sense-
perception. 
Some  points  should  be made  about  the  first  argument  (1);  it 
follows  a  lacuna  and  it  mainly  says  that  a  possibility  of false 
statements does not exist. If I think of chariots racing in the middle 
of  the sea, then the truth of  my thought cannot be obj ected to on the 
basis of an absolute truth which dictates that chariots cannot race in 
the sea. We have already argued that similarities with poetical texts 
do  not  support much the view that G.  is  referring  to  the truth of 
poetical activity (as Untersteiner thought;  see  supra).  Is  it then an 
example,  which in  virtue  of its  oddness  is  adduced  to  support  a 
refutation of the thesis that what is thought of must be the case? In 
other  words  should  we  infer  (a)  that  things  perceived  do  not 
necessarily partake of truth, or on the contrary (b) that since a thing 
is perceived, it is true for the person who perceives it - and probably 
not true for a person who does not perceive it? Sextus, to name an 
ancient reader of G., prefers (a) (see 79; the same view is taken by 
348 Newiger 1973, p.  137  and Sicking  1964, p.338);  Mansfeld on the 
contrary prefers (b), in the light of Protagorean echoes,  as  he was 
the first sophist to put forward the idea of non-contradiction (1990, 
pp.104-6; see also Pepe 1985, p.503). Palmer has shed fresh light on 
the issue by comparing a passage from Euthydemus 286c, where the 
principle of non-contradiction is perhaps attributed to  the  Eleatics 
(palmer 1999, p.128 n.17).  G.'s a7TUVTa  OEL  TeL  CPPOVOVJ1-EVU  EivUL 
reminds  us  of Pannenides'  TO  yap  aUTO  VO€LV  €G"TLv  -rE  Ka~  eivaL 
and it might have been the case that a modification of this dictum 
fitting  the  purposes  of the  second  major  thesis  of  ONB  had 
originally been employed. However, we must be cautious because 
we do not possess G.' s own argumentation, and as Palmer suggests 
"even if it [sc.  our evidence for the original arguments of Gorgias 
and Prodicus] were better, it might still be unclear whether anything 
like  an  'interpretation'  of  Pannenides  lies  behind  their 
appropriations"  . 
Taking  sides  ill such  an  intricate  subject  is  unWIse;  G.  had 
probably argued in a more dialectical way than the version of  MXG 
allows us to discern (see Palmer 1999, p.258). It may, however, be 
possible to reach a tentative conclusion on the basis of a Gorgian 
dictum preserved in Proklos (=fr.26): TO  J1-EV  EivUL  dCPUVE:;  J1-7]  'TUXOV 
TOU  oOKELV,  TO  OE  oOKELV  daOEVE:;  J1-7]  'TUXOV  TOU  ElvuL.  This  is  a 
Protean formulation, for in virtue of its prophetic wording it can be 
interpreted  in  various  ways;  but  for  our  present  needs  it  is 
illuminating because, if it is originally Gorgianic, it shows that in 
G.'s  mind  reality  (or  truth)  and  thought  have  a  mutually 
complementary relation,  so  that seeking to  assert that G.  is  either 
refuting  or supporting the possibility of falsehood is  pointless.  In 
Palmer's  words  (1999,  p.258)  "One  should  note  that  although 
Gorgias is prepared to employ an argument against the possibility of 
falsehood, the fact that it might have been embedded in this type of 
dialectical  structure  makes  it  unclear  whether  he  felt  himself 
committed to the thesis". The question may then be left open. 
349 We may now pass to the second argument; its compressed form 
has  given  rise  to  a  number  of interpretations  and  consequently 
drastic emendations, which I find unnecessary. I consider that this 
second argument (2) can be read along the lines of the attack on the 
Presocratic philosophy and that it could have been put forward by 
G.  himself (and  I  follow  thus Buchheim,  whose  emendations  are 
confined to merely linguistic points that do not effect the meaning of 
the  text).  Lloyd  (1971,  pp.  121-2)  in  what  he  names  "typical 
controversies  in  the  pre-Platonic  period"  includes  'reason'  and 
'sensation' as two means by which knowledge is attained (though he 
concedes that they "do not involve pairs of opposite terms";  for  a 
brief  and learned discussion on the relation of  the senses to common 
sense in Presocratic philosophy see Kirk (1961). 
This controversy - too complicated to be presented here in every 
detail,  especially  with  regard  to  its  relation  to  the  several 
philosophical systems as  such - has a very interesting implication, 
relevant to the argument employed by G  .. My line of interpretation 
is that in this second major division of ONB G.  attempts to make the 
most  of  this  epistemological  divergence  between  reason  and 
sensation. This possibility is strengthened if  we realise that the most 
fervent supporter of "thought" - with tantalising influences on the 
development  of philosophy  - was  Parmenides,  who  accepted 
'reason' (AoyoS)  as  the only vehicle through which man can reach 
knowledge,  and who  repugnantly refuted the  senses  (cp.B  7.4,SB 
vw~av  aaKO~OV  o~~a  Ka~  ~Eaaav dKOV~V /  Ka~  yAwaaav,  KpLva~ 
OE  AOYCP  ~OAV07]P~V  EAEYXOV ... ).  The  same  holds  for  Melissos 
(30B8.SDK;  see  Kirk-Raven-Schofield  1983,  pp.398-400)  who 
maintained  that  we  perceive  things  OUK  opews,  and  partly  for 
'obscure' Heraclitus who seems to  say that senses are not of much 
use  for  men with 'vulgar soul'  (fiap{3apovs  if;vxas;  the  word soul 
represents here a rational function of man; see Kahn 1979, pp.l06-
7). 
350 Philosophers  after Parmenides  did  not readily  accept this  anti-
sensational  dogmatism;  Empedocles  accepted  the  senses  on  the 
condition  that  men will  learn  through  his  teaching  to  use  them 
efficiently  (31B2,3DK;  see  Kirk-Raven-Schofield  1983,  pp.284-5, 
Guthrie  1969,  vol.  ii,  pp.138-9).  We  may  add  the  Atomists  and 
especially Demokritos (B  11  DK) who held that knowledge through 
oLavow  is  genuine  (yv7]aL7]),  whereas  the  one  through  senses  is 
'obscure'  (aKorL7]),  and  he  thus  seems  not  to  exclude  sense-
perception.  More  examples  could  be  added  here,  but  what  has 
already been said,  with the  addition of Protagorean  relativism,  is 
enough  to  show  that  this  is  what  G.  inherited  from  earlier 
philosophers. 
I  take  it  thus  that  G.  in  this  second  argument  supporting  his 
second  major  thesis  proceeds  once  more  with  an  argumentation 
from  antinomies.  The one pole of his  antithetical pair (knowledge 
through rationalistic approaches) is guaranteed by the special target 
of his  'original proof: Parmenides and the Eleatics; the other pole 
(knowledge  through  senses)  is  a  neutralisation  of  theories 
'legalising'  sense-perception  under  conditions.  Their  common 
denominator is that both fail to  furnish knowledge, or that - in the 
phrasing of MXG - things perceived by the senses (represented by 
vision,  a 0pWf.LEV)  are  no  more  true  (ovoev  f.Lat,t,ov)  than  things 
thought (a  Owvoovf.LE8a).  Why is  that? Because as  in the first case 
many people may see these (or the same) things, in the second many 
people may think these things (or the same things). Things seen by 
some people may conflict with things thought by other people, so 
that  no  firm  knowledge  can  be  established,  on  the  basis  of a 
relativism  which  applies  both  to  perceptions  and  intellectual 
activity.  Epistemological  certainties  about  lines  and  methods  of 
inquiry of  truth have been overturned (as ontological certainties had 
been disparaged in the first major thesis). 
980a9-19 
351 MYEL  <,.a.~,.a.S>  •••  EtVa.L:  I follow Buchheim; Untersteiner (following 
Gercke  and  followed  by Migliori  1973,  pp.64-S)  prints  MYE~[V] 
Cl.7raTUV  and he does not accept the existence of a lacuna, because he 
thinks  that  the  absence  of a  phrase  of transition  indicating  the 
passage to  the  second major thesis  stresses  "the  close  dialectical 
relationship  between  the  theme  of the  first  part  and  that  of the 
second" (19S4,p.171 n.66); the argument is  weak, because such a 
phrase marks the passage from the second major thesis to the third, 
which  are  related  more  closely  (980a20).  Hence  he  proposes 
a7TaTuv, which he includes in the conclusion of  the first major thesis 
(the ontological one) on the basis that it is chiefly of gnoseological 
interest (1961, p.69).  The point is  far too pressed; throughout this 
part of  MXG Anonymous makes the announcement of a new theme 
clear (cp.  979a23, 979a33, 979a20, 980a20, 980b17; note that this 
second argument in Sextus'  version is  formally  introduced in the 
form  of a concession 77).  yap thus  does  not denote the transition 
from the first major thesis to the second, but rather a follow-up from 
something missing. Cook-Wilson, in order to make the text clearer, 
suggested that the phrase <el.  TO  OV  cPPOVEI,Ta~> should be added 
either before a7TaVTa  or after  Elva~, and the second suggestion has 
been reluctantly  followed  by Newiger  (1973,  p.12S).  The  whole 
point has ingeniously been discussed by Palmer (1999, p.2S7-8). He 
proposes an "exempli gratia reconstruction" of  what must have been 
in the lacuna, which fits the text ad sententiam. a)  El  DE  Kat- ear~v 
cP7Ja~v  ayvW<J"TOV  elva~ b) El  yap  Tel.  cPPOVOVf.LEVa  OUK  earLV  QVTa,  TO 
OV  OU  cPPOVEI,Ta~ c)  Ei  D'  OVTWS,  TO  OV  ayvW<J"TOV  Ear[v  d) en  DE  El. 
Tel.  cPPOVOVf.LEva  ear~v  QVTa,  TO  OV  OU  cPPOVEI,TaL.  The first addition 
makes the transition clear (analogous transitions had been proposed 
by Foss  <elva~  ayvW<J"Ta  7TaVTa>;  see also  Apelt in Cook-Wilson). 
(b) he takes from Sextus (77,78), (c) is inferred from (b) and (d) is 
opposed  to  (b),  followed  by  the  a7TaVTa  DEI,V  yap ... This 
interpretation has I  think the  advantage  of corresponding  to  G.'s 
common practice  of putting  forward  antinomical  arguments  (see 
352 Introductory notes also). (d) directly contrasts to (b) in a formulation 
reminiscent of  the arguments of  the first major thesis. 
TCLiJ-rCL:  'thoughts of this kind'; TaVT7J  Apelt, but it is not necessary, 
for it refers generally to the example of  chariots. 
,'\ '\,,,  0;:,  'e  '\ \ ' /!!  \ \'  ,  '"  ~  ,  CLIV\  WO""TTEp •••  Ol.CLVOOU!-LE  CL:  a/\/\  "'UT~  'TTO/\/\O~  Ta  aVTa  opuxn,  Ta 
OpWJ.LEva  eanv,> OVTW  y' ovoev  J.LaAAov ... , Newiger 1973, p.141. But 
such an emendation is redundant (for the meaning of the phrase see 
Introductory notes). The criterion of intersubjective truth, that is of 
relative personal truth, is not necessary here, since  the point at stake 
is  that earlier philosophers'  suggested methods  of inquiry,  reason 
(Parmenides and the Eleatics) or (rational and creative) use of the 
senses - as a quasi-antithetical pair - do not guarantee access to any 
kind of absolute knowledge. One may feel  the need to  object that 
both  senses  and thought are presented by G.  as  means by which 
men acquire knowledge in Pal.  (23  for the senses, 35  for thought); 
but  this  is  a  text  of  a  different  nature,  and  I  propose  that 
comparisons between the ONB with any other text of G.  should be 
made  if  and  only  if they  concern  argumentative  patterns,  or 
strategies of  reasoning. This is why I do  not agree in every respect 
with Mansfeld's  analysis  of this  second  argument,  for  which he 
largely relies upon Palamedes. The same scholar (1990, p.224 and 
n.90) maintains that the formulation is a Pyrrhonist ring, and he thus 
prints:  aAA'  Wa'TTEP  ovoev  J.LaAAOv  [TO.  CPPOVOVJ.LEvaJ  <7]>  a OpWJ.LEV 
eanv,  OVTW  <y' ovoev> J.LaAAOv  a  OpWJ.LEV  7]  <Cl.>  OLavoouJ.LE8a.  But it 
is  the  word  CPPOVOuJ.LEVa  that  makes  the  ring;  without  it  there  is 
simply an analogy of the truth of vision (representing the senses) to 
the truth of  vision as compared to the truth of  thought. 
TO  otiv  !-LaAAOV  ~  •••  CL  TOLa.8'  ern:  the  meaning  is  clear  with 
Mansfeld's (1990,  p.224 and  n.91)  <Ta  TO~6.>O'  7]  <T>o.  TO~6.0', 
who changes TO  to  TL  (with Apelt). I propose a modification of this 
reading,  which  I  think  makes  the  passage  to  the  next  sentence 
smoother - the question introduced with TL  is hardly answered by it 
353 - and which brings out the antithesis more clearly: T<d.> ovv JLUAAOV 
<  '>~ , " < >'  I~"  I  TOLa  a  7]  T  a  TOLaa  E(rn; 
The Third Thesis (980a20-bl6) 
The  third  major  thesis  of G.  develops  with  the  problematic  of 
language. It is conceded now that knowledge is possible (though it 
has just been shown that it is impossible), and the new argument is 
introduced encapsulated in a question:  "how can one make things 
clear (or communicate them) to another?" The answer is that this is 
impossible, for reasons developed in this third part and summarised 
at the very end of  Anonymous' account on G.  (980b18-19), namely 
because a)  things are not AOYOL,  and b) because no  one understands 
the same thing as  other persons. This perileptic reproduction of the 
arguments brings out the dual form of  the (extremely interesting and 
in some cases  very similar to  modem)  argumentation concerning 
language  in  this  third  thesis:  language  is  discussed  a)  in  its 
properties of signification, which implies an investigation of how it 
is  (not)  possible  to  refer  to  objects  of the  world,  and  b)  in  its 
function  in  inter-human  communication,  which  implies  an 
investigation  of how  it  is  (not)  possible  for  one  (the  sender)  to 
transmit new information to  someone else  (the receiver),  and this 
information to acquire in the mind of  the latter an identical meaning 
with the one that existed in the mind of the former.  I consider that 
this  descriptive model (provided by MXG)  is  economical and that 
the constituent arguments are embraced by it. 
The argumentation may now be presented, and a discussion of it 
will follow later. The arguments run as follows: 
Ai. If things are knowable, how would one, he [sc. G.]  asks,  make 
them clear to  another? How would one, he [sc. G.]  asks make clear 
what one has  seen by the means of logos?  Or how would this be 
354 made clear to the hearer, who has not seen it? For, exactly as vision 
does not recognize utterances, in the same manner hearing does not 
hear co lours, but utterances; and the speaker does speak, but he does 
not speak a colour or a thing. 
ii. And that which one does not understand [personally], how is one 
going  to  understand it from  someone  else  through words  or any 
other sign that is different from the object, unless by vision if it is a 
colour, or by hearing it if it is a sound? For, truly, the speaker does 
not speak a sound, nor a colour, but logos;  so that it is not possible 
to  think of a colour, but to  see it, nor [to  think of]  a sound, but to 
hear it. 
B i.  But even if it is possible to  have knowledge of a thing and to 
speak  this  knowledge,  how  will  the  hearer  understand  the  same 
thing?  For it  is  not  possible  for  the  same  thing  to  be  in  many 
different people; in this case a thing which is one would be two. 
ii. But even if, he says, it were in many and still the same, there is 
nothing preventing it from  appearing different to  them, since they 
themselves are not the same even when they are in the same state; 
for if  they were in the same state, they would be one, not two. 
iii.  And it  seems  that the  same  person does  not perceive  similar 
things at the same time, but some [things] by his hearing and other 
[things] by his vision, in a different manner now and in the past. So 
that hardly could one perceive the same thing as another. 
I have divided the argument into two sets (A, B), corresponding to 
those given in the summary at 980b18-19 (see above). (A) is the one 
concerning  problems  of signification  and  reference,  and  (B)  is 
pertinent  to  material  that  I  included  under  the  heading  of inter-
human communication. This does not of course mean that problems 
of communication are  excluded from  (A),  for the third thesis as  a 
whole basically discusses communication. My point is that  (A) is a 
discussion of communication from  the perspective of problems of 
signification, to the extent that here logos is examined as  a medium 
355 expected to enable men to refer to the world, whereas (B) moves to 
a discussion which is marked by the elevation of the participants to 
a detenninant factor, by examining the role of  personal differences 
in the transmission of a message and the possibilities for it to  be 
decoded by the receiver in a way that will secure its identity with the 
message  as  it  was  originally  encoded  by the  sender.  The  same 
division is made, basically, by Mourelatos (1982, p.223), who labels 
our (A) as  'KUT1l'YOPLK~  e~a'Tj' and (B) as  'e~O"'T]  LOeUTllS  TUUT6T'TjTUS'. 
The two groups of arguments should now be examined separately. 
The  first  part  (i)  merely  says  that  the  object  of vision  (which  a 
subject has perceived, and is about to communicate to someone else) 
cannot  be  rendered  in  words,  because  vision  does  not  perceive 
cp86yyous and in the same manner hearing does not perceive colours, 
but  cp86yyous.  It  is  important  to  discern  that  this  first  argument 
focuses primarily on the sender, the person who encodes a message 
linguistically. This is  shown by the phrase  'and the speaker does 
speak  (KUt.  My€~ a Mywv),  but he  does  not speak a  colour or a 
thing'. So, at this point the issue at stake is the impossibility of the 
receiver's  understanding  of what  he/she  is  told  because  of the 
inherent problems of logos  as  a medium;  because,  although vocal 
utterances are  sounds  (and G.  does  not rule  out the possibility of 
perception  of sounds  through  hearing:  ry  dK07} ... d'\'\d.  cp86yyous 
980b2), they differ from  other types of sounds in the respect that 
they purport to carry meaning, which entails that their role is to refer 
to objects (and properties such as xpwfLU) of  our world. But language 
is  not the things that it denotes, the objects of the real world.  The 
names  of things  do  not  bring  out the  reality  of the  objects  they 
signify, names and objects are onto logically different. A word is not 
its referent. 
The second argument (ii) extends the problematic of the first one 
(though Mansfeld 1990, p.123  n.40  thinks that it repeats what has 
already  been  said;  contra  Newiger  1973,  pp.153-4,  followed  by 
Kerferd  1982,  p.219).  The  point  made  now  is  that  one  cannot 
356 perceive in one's mind what one is told by someone else, unless one 
has  personal  experience of it.  If it  is  a  colour one  must see the 
colour, if it is  a sound one must hear the sound. This means that if 
one should at  any cost try  to  communicate something to  anyone 
else, one should not do it by using a representational system such as 
language.  One should rather present colours and reproduce sounds 
(so  that we might think that G.  did not have any difficulties with 
onomatopoeic  words).  From  this  point  it  is  inferred  that  it  is 
impossible to think of a colour or of a sound; the only alternative is 
to  see  or hear them  respectively.  Now,  it  is  interesting  that  the 
perceptions of  hearing (notice that the word for the object of  hearing 
is no  longer cf;eoyyos,  but ifiocf;os,  that is a mere, non-verbal sound, 
which can include a noise; for further literature see Mansfeld 1990, 
p.123  n.  40,  who  does  not  accept the  distinction;  recently Wardy 
1996 p.19) and seeing are substituted here for both language (AOYCP 
7}  <rTJ/Le£cp  TLVI.  ETepcp)  and  thought  (DLUVOELaBUL).  Why  is  that? 
Because language and thought are interwoven, in the respect that 
when communicating an experience (or information) through words, 
the  receiver's mind  should necessarily  receive  it in  a  form  of a 
representation which clearly is not equivalent to the experience or 
the object itself What lies behind this combination is,  I think, the 
refutation  of a  conceptual  theory  of meaning.  Mourelatos  1982, 
p.228, saw traces of this theory in 980bl5-6; he is  using the term 
"ideational  theory  of meaning",  but  I  follow  Lyons'  linguistic 
terminology (Lyons  1977,  pp.109-144).  Probably, what G.  has in 
mind is the idea that when one is referring to a colour, say blue, then 
it  may be assumed that  the  listener  'visualises'  in his  mind this 
colour (the idea expressed by the word DWVOELaBUL).  But G.  answers 
that this is not feasible, because colours and sounds cannot be the 
objects of  concept, but the objects of  vision and hearing respectively 
(Kerferd saw in DwvOELaBUL  the  introduction of a  "gulf. ..  between 
sense experiences and words" 1982, p.220). 
357 The next set of arguments presents a model of communication; 
that G.  is moving from an examination of  .:toyos  as  a medium to  a 
system which implies speech is shown in the very beginning of  this 
part (980b8), where it is conceded that one may be able to  utter a 
verbal message (My€~v). For argument's sake what has been refuted 
is tentatively accepted as  a possibility. The type of communication 
which G. has in mind is one in which a sender encodes a message in 
logof and a receiver decodes it so  as  to perceive exactly the same 
(notice  the  repetition  of Tal.}'-o,  TO  aUTO)  message  (so  correctly 
Wardy 1996, pp.19-20; Mourelatos (1982 p.223) names G.'s thesis 
as one of  "Loe.anl  TaUTO'T1"\Ta",  see supra). One may see more clearly 
what G. conceives of  as human communication (I do not necessarily 
imply that he commits himself to this conception) if one compares 
the words of  one of  the most important connoisseurs of  semantics of 
our days:  "Under a  fairly  standard idealization of the process of 
communication,  what  the  sender  communicates  ...  and  the 
information derived from the signal by the receiver. ..  are assumed to 
be  identical.  But  there  are,  in  practice,  frequent  instances  of 
misunderstanding; and we must allow for this theoretically" (Lyons 
1977,  p.33).  G.'s idealized  demands  of communication form  the 
keystone of  his refutation of  it. 
The  first  argument  (i)  poses  the  problem that the hearer of a 
statement will not be able to have in mind exactly what the speaker 
has uttered. For in that case what he is saying will not be one thing 
any more, but two, which implies that what the hearer will perceive 
will necessarily be something different. The thought pattern of the 
one becoming two  has  been used  at  979b24, in a  different (anti-
Eleatic)  context,  and  it  is  likely  that  it  is  here  picked  up  (see 
Newiger 1973, p.156 and Kerferd 1982, p.220). The reverse of this 
argument is used in the following one. 
A point should be made here; in order to denote the message sent 
by the  sender (or speaker) to  the receiver I have already used the 
rather  vague  term  'statement'.  What  kind  of meaning  does  this 
358 'statement' carry? Does it refer to (a) an external object, let as say to 
a 'tree', or should we assume that it denotes (b) the 'concept' of a 
tree, existing in the mind of the speaker, who in that case hopes to 
impart it to the hearer's mind, so that the latter will have the same 
'concept'  in  his  mind.  This  is  a  crucial  point,  and  it  has  been 
answered by Mourelatos (1982, pp.224-5), who says that if we had 
(a) then 'the one' would not have been 'two' (as it is in the text) but 
three.  This  disclaimer  entails  that  G.  is  here  conceding  a 
'conceptual' theory of meaning as well (since a theory of this type 
has - in my view - been refuted at Aii). 
In  the  second  argument  (ii),  it  is  suggested  that  even if two 
people, as a result of  their communication, had the same concept in 
their minds (that is if by any chance the two were one; Mourelatos 
1982, pp.225-6 is  talking about  "a.pL8!-LllTLK-T]  Ta.UTOTllTa."),  nothing 
stops us from assuming that this would not appear similar to them. 
This is  explained by the fact that two different persons are not in 
every  respect  similar.  Emotive  parameters  and  the  different 
backgrounds  of  the  participants  evidently  creep  into  the 
argumentation, as these parameters have the property of  maximizing 
the  sUbjectivism  of perception in virtue  of a  tactic  based on the 
matter of  the degree of  similarity. 
The third (iii) argument reinforces the feasibility of  the preceding 
one;  in  an  informal  way  it  may  be  reformulated:  "if one  man 
perceives at the same time different things through different senses, 
and in a different way now and in the past, imagine what happens 
with  two  different  persons!"  In  this  argument  two  phases  are 
discernible (see Mourelatos 1982, p.226): a synchronic (EV  r4)  a.vr4) 
)(povq;) and a diachronic one (vvv  r€  Ka.~  7TaA.a.L  OLa.</>opw~). 
In  the  first  phase  we  are  told  that  a  man  at  the  same  time 
perceIves  different  things  through  different  senses;  this  is  an 
obvious observation, for a man who sees and hears a car passing by 
perceives the image of the car through his vision and the sound of 
the machine of the car through his hearing, so that the same person 
359 is in a way necessarily divided, as  far as  the object of perception is 
concerned.  Given  that  all  this  argument  is  employed  so  as  to 
strengthen the difference between two persons, it can be interpreted 
very simply if we admit honestly that what is said at this point is  a 
question that we put numerous times to ourselves, in the following 
manner: "How am  I  to  believe  that  the  way 1 see  an  object  is 
exactly the same as the way the person standing beside me sees it?" 
Moreover,  it  may  be  a  question  of contradictions  reSUlting  from 
perceptions through different senses; my hearing makes me believe 
that a car is coming, though I cannot see it, because I am standing 
on a blind hill.  Or it may be that a car according to my hearing is 
closer to me than my vision makes me believe. 
The  diachronic  phase  poses  the  problem  of  interpretation 
resulting from the development of  an individual. Because I perceive 
something now in a particular way, this does not mean that I always 
perceived it in the same way.  And what is more I  am not always 
able  to  remember how I perceived a particular thing  in the  past, 
because my memory (according to  G.'s He/.  11)  is  a notoriously 
weak adviser of my soul. If one person is so divided, divided in the 
present and in the past, then two different (aAAqJ  980b 16) people are 
two people further divided,  and the more the people are, the more 
the subdivisions will be. The overall result of this argumentation is 
clear: a subjectivism which excludes the identity of  perceptions with 
objects of  perception. 
The  third  and  final  major  thesis  of G. 's  ONB  is  extremely 
interesting for two main reasons:  a)  it is one of the deplorably few 
sources of information on the Sophistical investigation of language. 
In his  article on the ideas of the Sophists about language Classen 
(1959) concluded that G.'  s (and the other philosophers ') interest in 
language was above all practical. Under the same prism, the interest 
in the theses put forward in this last part of ONB has been reduced 
simply to  their pertinence to  rhetorical practices. But it seems that 
G.  had  developed  a  more  theoretically  oriented  speculation. 
However weak or even unattractive one may find his argumentation, 
360 his remarks about the relation between words and objects, between 
words  and  concepts  of objects  are  striking  (one  may  compare 
Cratylus here). It is interesting that the archaic idea that names bring 
out the reality of  the object they signify has been removed. One may 
compare here Heraclitus' frA8, where the name of the bow is taken 
to bring out the reality "of the unity between death and life" (Kahn 
1979, p.270 with more examples). The same feature can be found in 
Aiskhylos' Agamemnon 680ff., where the name of  Helen brings out 
the reality of her notorious character (cp.  Supp1.584ff.  for  L1l.Kll  as 
L1L-OS  K6-Pll). 
The same holds for G.'s remarks about human communication. 
The analysis of AOyoS"  in ONB (along with the information that we 
possess about Protagoras and Prodicus) evinces that those involved 
in the Sophistic movement took a profound interest in language; and 
it  is  inappropriate to  deny this  interest  on the basis  that  G.  was 
obsessed with formulating dazzling arguments to meet the practical 
demands  of  persuasion.  And  the  fact  that  these  linguistic 
observations  are  integrated  in  an  argumentation  that  supports 
"paradoxical" theses does not imply that they did not contribute to 
the development of  the linguistic investigation. 
b) Some of the remarks that occur in the third part of ONB are 
amazingly  pertinent  to  modem  theories  of  language  (see 
Mourelatos,  1982);  several  ideas  used by G.  have been issues  of 
dispute both for ancient and modem philosophers, and it is  for this 
reason that forthcoming histories of linguistic theory should, I think, 
reconsider  the  rationality  of placing  the  origins  of  linguistic 
investigation  with  Plato  and  Aristotle.  ONB  clearly  shows  that 
language had been a pivotal philosophical subject before Plato; we 
shall  hardly  have  a  comprehensive  history  of  linguistic 
investigation,  unless  we  realize  that  Presocratic  philosophy  and 
especially the Sophistic movement deserve more attention than they 
usually receive. 
361 980a20-b20 
€t  8E  KUL..Ci.AA<t>;  it announces the passage to the third and final part 
of ONB; knowledge is conceded and it is argued that it cannot be 
made clear through words to another. 
Wo-n-Ep  'Yo.p ••• aAAo.  <\>86yyous:  It has been suggested that the idea put 
here should be interpreted in accordance with Empedocles' theory 
of a-rroppoui  (Gigon 1972, p.  110).  Mourelatos has challenged this 
view on the basis that G.'s ideas are extremely paradoxical, so that 
if they  are  to  be understood,  they  must be  expressed  in  a  plain 
manner, without reference to  complicated ideas (Mourelatos  1982, 
p.224). It is possible that G. employs the common idea among some 
of the Presocratic philosophers (Empedocles is one of them) of the 
perception of  the like from the like, without necessarily committing 
himdelf to the theory of  a-rroppoaL 
UU'i6:  for the Mss aiTEc., which does not seem to make any sense; it 
refers to the preceding sentence. 
<TT)\.I.€L<t>:  "It is  interesting to  notice that language  is  probably now 
being  widened to  include  its  written  form  as  well  as  its  spoken 
form" (Kerferd 1982, p.219). Perhaps this is true, but it is even more 
interesting  if G.  refutes  every  possible  available  representational 
system of communication, where a sign stands for a meaning (see 
also Mansfeld 1990, p.123 n.34). 
<tJs6<\>ov  aKoo>o-uS:  with Diels; Cook-Wilson o/6<po~; it is difficult to 
decide because of the obscure neuter (xpwf-La);  but the acc. provides 
the object of  the participles. 
ou  <tJs6<\>ov>  AE.'Y€L  <0  M>-ywv  ou8E  xpw\.I.u:  oD  MYEL  0 Mywv  y' 0 
ElSE  xpwf-La  Newiger, Kerferd; the text is lacunose; the addition by 
Wilson (followed by Buchheim) is  the  counterpart of xpwf-La  with 
which it appears in the final sentence of this argument. The reading 
proposed by Newiger  1973,  p.153,  oD  MYEL  0  Mywv  y' 0  ElSE 
xpwf-Lu  fails  to  include the  object of hearing  as  well,  though it is 
closer to the obscure reading ofR. 
362 ouo  'Yap  av  eL'll  'TO  ev:  An argument which reminds us of the one 
employed  against  the  possibility  of 70  OV  being  ungenerated 
(979b24).  According to  Kerferd (1982),  it is  an Eleatic  argument 
applied to  a non-Eleatic field. It may be safer to  say that a thought 
pattern is here picked up,  for the reverse of it can be traced in the 
fo llowing argument. 
Et  'Yap  €V  'T0  a.tl'f'(~ ••• EtEV:  A  combination of the  emendations by 
Cook-Wilson (El  ya.p  €V  np  ati70) and Apelt (Els  av  dAA), made by 
Newiger, followed by Buchheim. 
vUV  'TE  Ka.1.  1Ta.Aa.L  oLa.cj>6pws:  cpo  PI.  Tht.  154a6-8  7L  OE;  aAAqJ 
dVepW1TqJ  dp' OP.OLDV  Ka.1.  aOL  cjJa.LVE7a.L  onovv; EXELS  70V70  laxupws, 
7]  1TOAV  p.aAAov  on  ouoE  aol.  aunp  7aU70V  OLa.  70  P.7]O€1T07E  oP.o£ws 
aU70V  aEavnp  EXELV. 
363 Sextus Adv.Math.65-87 
Introduction and the first division (65-76) 
Sextus begins his  account of ONB  by presenting the  three major 
theses (65); however, the 'doxographical' summary including main 
ideas  of early  philosophers  is  not  traced  here.  On  the  contrary, 
Sextus passes straight away to the demonstration of the first thesis, 
namely  that  'nothing  is'  (ovoev  eunv  66).  The  arguments 
supporting this first thesis are further summarised and divided into 
the following:  either a)  being is, or b) not-being, or c)  both being 
and not being. But neither being is, nor not-being, nor both being 
and not-being. It is clear that Sextus offers a tripartite division of  the 
argumentation supporting the first  thesis. But when we turn to the 
detailed  discussion of the  arguments  Sextus  does  not  follow  the 
same order; instead of  starting with the discussion of 'being', as it is 
announced in his brief summary, he starts with 'not-being', that is 
with (b), so that the order which we actually get in the body of the 
first part in Sextus is (b), (a) and (c). 
Another obvious point is that (c),  that is  'both being and not-
being', forms a separate argument; but in Anonymous' account, this 
argument is  embedded within the  'original proof, which seeks to 
establish that it is not either for 'being' or for 'not being'. In Sextus 
this argument is dealt with separately in 75-76, after the discussion 
of (a), which as  Anonymous confirms followed the 'original proof 
of G  ..  The discussion of 'being'  in Sextus is  based solely on the 
antithetical pairs generated I ungenerated,  one I many,  so  that the 
pair in motion I at rest tracked down in MXG is missing. Moreover, 
Sextus'  version  does  not  indicate  the  intertexts  on  which  G.  has 
based his  criticism;  the names  of Zenon and Melissos  are  absent 
here. It should also be mentioned that the arguments supporting (b) 
in 67  are  suppressed in Sextus, and although there  are no  serious 
textual problems here,  Anonymous'  textually problematic account 
in the 'original proof brings out the equivocal usage of 'being' on 
364 the part ofG. more effectively (for a comparison of  the two versions 
see Inroduction). 
We may now pass to  a closer examination of the arguments of 
the first thesis. The argument against 'not-being' is twofold: in the 
first instance it is shown that 'not-being' is not to  the degree that it 
is conceived of as  'not-being', and that it is to the degree that it is 
'not-being'. But it is absurd for something both to be and not to  be. 
Conclusion:  'not-being' is not.  This is  a reformulation of the first 
argument of  the 'original proof in MXG. The being of 'not-being' is 
taken again from the predicative use of  the verb 'to be', as is shown 
by the phrase 7]  O€  €un  j-LTJ  OV.  The second proof runs as  follows: if 
'not-being'  is,  'being'  is  not,  for  these  two  are  opposite  to  each 
other, and ifit is the case that 'not-being' is, the case for 'being' will 
be that it is not. But saying that 'being' is not is absurd, so that 'not-
being'  is  not.  The  point  of this  second  argument  is  that  if we 
concede existence to  'not-being', then we should accept the absurd 
consequence that 'being' is not, because of  the fact that 'being' and 
'not-being'  are  mutually  exclusive.  The  demonstration  is  again 
analogous with the one in MXG. 
In both arguments therefore the argumentation has as its starting 
point  'not-being'  (see  Kerferd  1955,  p.18),  that  is  the  marked 
element of  the antithetical pair consisting of  the positive 'being' and 
the negative 'not-being' (see the introductory notes on the 'original 
proof). On the whole, the purpose of these two  arguments is  the 
denial of 'not-being'. 
After this very short discussion of 'not-being', Sextus passes to 
the  demonstration  of the  arguments  refuting  the  possibility  of 
'being' .  That  the  argumentation  proceeds  with  contradictory 
properties attributed to  OVTa  is clear, and generally the structure of 
the  arguments  is  similar  to  that  in  MXG  979b20-980a8.  Sextus 
summarises the argumentation of  the first pair: "if 'being' is, it must 
be  either  eternal  (69-70),  or generated  (71)  or  both  eternal  and 
generated (72)"; but each one of  these possibilities is invalid, so that 
'being' is not. Let us follow the thread of  the arguments. 
365 If 'being'  is  eternal  (a£oLOv),  it  does  not have  a  start  (apX77v) 
which entails that it is infinite. But if it is infinite it is nowhere; for 
if  it is anywhere it must be different from that which contains it, and 
in that case being would not be infinite, for it would be located in a 
container which is  bigger than the contained. But there is  nothing 
bigger than the infinite so that the infinite is nowhere. On the other 
hand it cannot be contained in itself, because that in which it is and 
that which is in it would be the same, so that 'being' would be two 
things: the location (767TOS)  and body (awJLa).  This is absurd, so that 
'being' is not self-contained. These two. sets of arguments support 
the  view  that  'being'  is  not  eternal  (notice  that  Mansfeld  1990, 
p.llS, claims that these two  arguments, as they are represented in 
Sextus  "correspond to  both of Plato's arguments"  at Parmenides 
138a-b; see above The antinomies). 
The second member of the pair is now examined (71): "'being' 
cannot be generated". Two alternatives  are put forward: if 'being' 
has come into being, it is either from  'being' or from  'not-being'. 
Both possibilities are unfeasible: if  it came into being from 'being', 
it has not come into being at all, but it existed before. That it has 
come into being from 'not-being' is impossible too, because nothing 
generates  from  'not-being',  as  the  latter  does  not  partake  of 
existence at all. In both cases 'being' is not generated. 
The  possibility  that  'being'  is  both  eternal  and  generated  is 
refuted on the basis that these notions are mutually exclusive, so that 
"if 'being' is eternal, it has not come into being, and if it has come 
into  being,  it  is  not  eternal"  (it  is  an  argument  from  antinomies 
whose  structure  may  be  compared  to  the  one  in  Pal.  26;  see 
Introduction). 
The second pair is now introduced (Kat.  (l,\AWS'  73): if  it is it must 
be either one or many. The first  alternative is  divided further into 
four  possibilities:  if it  is  one  it  is  a)  either  a  quantity,  or b)  a 
continuum or c) a size or d) a body. But if  it is one of  those it is not 
one, for if  it is (a), it will be divisible, if  it is (b) it will be divisible, 
366 if  it is (c) it will not be indivisible, and if  it is (d), it will have length 
and breadth and depth.  Since it is  absurd to  claim that  'being' is 
none of  those alternatives, being is not one. 
The  second part of this  argument  concerning the possibility  a 
plurality of beings is based on the assumption that many is created 
by putting together  (aVveEa~s) single entities,  so  that if one of the 
constituent  entities  is  destroyed  the  possibility  of a  plurality  is 
destroyed as well. 
Up  to  this  point  Sextus  has  discussed  the  refutations  of the 
possibility  of either  'being'  or  'not-being';  what  follows  is  the 
refutation of  both 'being' and 'not-being' (dJL4>07"Epa  75). Again we 
have two arguments, the first of  which corresponds to  the third one 
in the  'original proof in MXG (see Kerferd  1955,  p.19,  Migliori 
1973, p.59). It runs: If 'not-being' and 'being' are, in so far as their 
existence is  concerned,  'not-being' will  be identical with  'being'. 
For this reason neither of them is:  for it has been agreed that 'not-
being' is not and it has been shown that 'being' is the same as  'not-
being'. 
A  second  argument  (76)  is  put  forward,  which  in  Kerferd's 
(1955, p.19) words "rounds off' the first one; if 'being' is the same 
as  'not-being', it follows that it is impossible for both of  them to be. 
If both  are,  they  are  not  identical,  and  if they  are  identical,  the 
possibility that  both  are  is  not feasible.  This  is  another argument 
from antinomy. 
The reasoning in support of the first major thesis is summed up 
with a repetition of the three sets of arguments:  if neither 'being', 
nor 'not-being' nor both of them are,  then nothing is  (OVSEV  eanv), 
for  no other alternative beyond those three can be conceived of. 
367 The second division (77-82) 
The second thesis concedes the first; 'if  anything is unknowable and 
unconceivable  by  human  mind'.  Sextus'  representation  of the 
second  major thesis  is  twofold.  In  77-80  Sextus  formalises  G.'s 
arguments in relation to the consequences of  two hypotheses: a) 77-
78  objects of thought are not (or are not the case), b) 79-80 objects 
of  thought are (or are the case). In 81-82 sense-perception is brought 
in,  though this second part is  conspicuously the product of drastic 
reformulation and embellishment on behalf of Sextus (in Loenen's 
words,  the  most  fervent  supporter  of Sextus'  version  "he  [sc. 
Sextus]  must  have  been  completely  at  a  loss  as  to  G.'s  real 
meaning", p.194). 
The first hypothesis runs as follows: if  objects of  thought are not 
the case, then what is  the  case is  not an object of thought (this is 
directly attributed to  G.,  cp7]alv  0 Topy[as, and repeated in 78). This 
seems  reasonable  to  Sextus  (Kal  Karel.  A6yov),  who  is  ready  to 
embolden it with an example:  exactly as, if objects of thought are 
white,  it  follows  that  white  things  are  objects  of  thought, 
analogously, if it happens that objects of thought [are things that] 
are not the case, it is necessary that what is the case is not thought 
of.  This  passage  is  difficult  to  translate;  more  particularly,  the 
phrase  'it follows  that  white  things  are  objects  of thought'  (Kav 
UVf-L{3€{3f]K€L  rotS  A€VKOLS  cppovEia8aL)  has been taken to  mean that 
'thought  is  a  property  of white  things'.  Kennedy  (1972),  for 
instance,  translates  "'being considered'  would  also  have  been  a 
possible attribute of what is white",  and Barnes "being thought of 
belongs to  what is  white" (Untersteiner 1954, p.l55 is even more 
explicit in using the word 'predicate'). But if my reading is correct, 
what is at stake here is not the possibility of  predicating of 'thought' 
to 'whiteness'. What is at stake is the following analogy (I reverse it 
for clarity): 
368 IF objects of  thought are not the case: IF objects ofthought are 
white 
What is not the case is not thought of: White(s) are thought of 
If  this, or something similar, is what Sextus means, Skouteropoulos' 
rendering (1991, p.190) is more attractive: ''rw:rL  O'ITWS  d.KPL~WS,  UV 
IQ  '"  ~  '1  "\  I  e  1  ''''  I  ~  CTUV€!-'ULV€  UU'I"U  'ITOU  VOOU[.L€  VU  €LVUL  I\€UKU,  U  1'J'I"UV  LOLO'l"1'J'I"U  'l"WV 
Now, according to Sextus the argument 'if  objects of  thought are 
not  the  case,  what is  the  case  is  not  thought of is  a  valid  and 
cohesive  syllogism,  on  the  basis  that  objects  of thought  are  not 
[necessarily and always]  the case,  so  that what is  the  case is  not 
thought of. With the phrase 'it is clear that objects of  thought are not 
the  case'  he  announces  and  immediately  passes  to  the  second 
hypothesis. 
If  obj ects of  thought are the case, whatever is thought of  is [true] 
- in whatsoever manner one conceives it.  But this does not make 
sense. For, if  one conceives of  a man flying or chariots racing on the 
sea, this does not entail that it is the case that a man is flying or that 
chariots are racing on the sea.  The hypothesis as  it stands  affords 
two  readings:  a)  whatever is thought of (since it is  thought of)  is 
true, hence the impossibility of  falsehood, or b) whatever is thought 
of is not true (since it is not validated by reality). Sextus (like some 
modem scholars, e.g. Kerferd 1981, p.97: "Gorgias is not accepting 
the view ...  that it is not possible to  say what is  false";  see also my 
comments on MXG) obviously adopts the second reading: both the 
phrase  O'IT€P  €a'T~V  d7TEfL<pULVOV  and  the  examples  which  are  here 
corroborating it point to this direction (especially if compared to the 
neutral and unbiased phrasing in MXG 980all). From this string it 
is thus inferred that objects of  thought are not the case. 
Sextus establishes now a fresh argument (7Tpor;  'TOV'TOl.s), which is 
an  argument  from  antinomy.  The  argument  proceeds  with  the 
assumption that if obj ects of thought are [true] (in passing I should 
369 mention that in Sextus'  account of the second part of ONB  OV  is 
chiefly 'veridical'), what is not [true] cannot be thought of. But what 
is  and  what is  not  [true]  contradict  each other,  so  that if what is 
[true]  is  thought of,  what is  not [true]  will not be thought of.  The 
argument  from  antinomy  brings  about,  according  to  Sextus,  an 
absurdity:  a score of things which are  not [true]  are conceived of 
(for  instance  the  mythical  monsters  Skylla and  Khimaira;  if this 
example  is  originally  Gorgianic  or  not  has  divided  scholars: 
Calogero  1932,  p.207,  Gigon 1936, p.204 believe it is  not;  contra 
Untersteiner 1954,  p.172 n.77).  Accordingly, what is  [true]  is  not 
conceived. 
The following  argument (81)  is - as  I have already held - far 
from  what  G.  must have maintained.  Unfortunately,  any accurate 
reading  of the  relation  of sense-perceptions  to  the  acquisition  of 
knowledge  should  rely  on  the  too  lacunose  MXG.  Since  the 
unreliability of Sextus' account of  this issue should be demonstrated 
in comparison with Anonymous' one, in this context I shall confine 
myself  to presenting it as it stands. Sextus proceeds with an analogy: 
exactly as  things seen are called visible because we perceive them 
through vision and things  heard bear this name because they are 
perceived through hearing, so that we do not rule out visible things 
because we do  not hear them and things heard because we do  not 
see them (each one of them should be distinguished on the basis of 
the same sense, and not of any other), in the same manner, even if 
objects  of thought  are  not  perceived  through  vision  and  heard 
through  hearing,  they  are,  for  they  are  perceived  through  the 
appropriate criterion. So, if  one thinks of chariots racing on the sea, 
even if one  does  not  see  them,  one  should  accept  that  there  are 
chariots  racing  on the  sea.  This  is  absurd.  Consequently,  what is 
[true]  is  not thought of nor perceived. That Sextus has missed the 
point is  clear from  the  fact  that his  conclusion applies  to  OV  (see 
Loenen p.195). What had to  be shown was that if anything is it is 
unknowable (on O€  Kav  ~ n  76). 
370 The Third Division (83-86) 
The  third  major  thesis  concerning  the  incommunicability  of an 
allegedly possessed knowledge is  now introduced.  As  Kerferd has 
observed (1982, p.217) it is divided into two sets of arguments: the 
first  (83-85  1.1)  is  a  criticism of the  one-to-one  relation between 
thingsand their signifier, namely A-0Y0s-.  The second set consists of 
two  arguments,  which  in  Kerferd's  words:  "are  ...  answers  to 
possible objections to the main argument" (1982, p.217). 
The starting point of  the first argument picks up what has already 
been said in connection with the second major thesis (81): objects of 
the external world are perceived through a sense which pertains to 
their nature.  Visible  things  are  perceived through  vision,  audible 
things are perceived through hearing. A wider spectrum of senses is 
now  opened  (Kat.  KO~VWS- aLa87]Ta),  which  goes  beyond  the 
paradigmatic use of hearing and, mainly, vision. If this is the case, 
how is it possible to communicate objects perceived through senses 
to  others?  The answer is  given at the first  line of 85,  and it is  a 
negative  one:  It is  not possible.  Why  is  that?  Because  A-oyos-,  the 
medium through which we signify, is different from objects of the 
external world. And as it is impossible to hear something visible (or 
to  see  something  heard),  in the  same  way  we  cannot  transform 
objects  into  words,  for  they  are  not  words.  In other  words,  the 
problem that emerges here is one of ontological order. Objects and 
A-0Y0s- are two distinct things, so that A-0Y0s- cannot represent. 
We may now consider the implications of this argument, which 
IS  encapsulated  in  the  formula  OUK  apa  'Tel  OV'Ta  J-L7]VVOf.LEV  'TO£S 
')TEA-as- dA-A-el  A-oyov,  os- €-repos- €an  'TWV  tJ'1TOKE~f.L€VWV. If logos  is 
different from objects, as it is, then would it be more efficient to use 
objects  themselves?  "I observed  a  cow  passing by,  whereupon  I 
pointed to  her,  and  expressed a desire to  let me go  and milk her. 
This had its effect; for he led me back into the house ...  She gave me 
a large bowl full, of which I drank very heartily, and found myself 
371 well refreshed" (J.  Swift,  Gullivers' Travels,  Penguin, p.277). The 
hero is  in the land of the Houyhnhnms and he does not speak their 
language. He observes a cow (in other words, a V7TOKE[/-LEVOV) and he 
expresses  a  desire  (with body-language  presumably)  to  milk her. 
The native understands his desire and he arranges for him to receive 
a large bowl of  mille The hero who was desperate for a refreshment 
has  now  fulfilled  his  desire.  Why  then  does  the  hero,  in  the 
following chapter, endeavour to  learn their language, so  as to relate 
his adventures to his master? If his adventures consist in a string of 
itemized  perceptions  which  have  never been experienced  by  the 
master,  will  the  latter  be  able  to  follow  the  story?  With  some 
difficulty he does (in English!). 
Was  G.  unaware  of the  fact  that  elevated  communication,  or 
simply  written  language,  unavoidably  involves  a  degree  of 
representation?  It is  unlikely.  First,  because  the  argument,  as  it 
stands, seeks to  establish the incommunicability of knowledge, and 
so it is embedded in a negative, critical discourse; in short, there is 
not a positive theory of ,16yoS'  to  be tracked down in this context. 
Secondly, from a historical point of  view what matters is mainly the 
valuable observation that there is no  such a thing as  a one-to-one 
relation  between  objects  and  words  (see  Introductory  notes  on 
MXG). 
There are two consequent arguments. The first one explores the 
relation of words with objects, and it defends the idea that external 
objects produce speech, and not vice versa. It is maintained that the 
external  objects  - those  perceived  by  humans  - lend  '\6yoS'  its 
substance, and Sextus exemplifies that by saying that it is  the  fact 
that we taste a soup that brings about a '\6yoS'  corresponding to  its 
quality, and the fact that we see a colour that produces an utterance 
concerning this  particular colour.  Conclusion:  it  is  not '\6yoS'  that 
indicates external objects, but external objects that give meaning to 
'\6yoS'. 
372 In modem  terms  this  is  a  pseudo-dilemma  (any  discussion 
concerning  the  origins  of language  falls  outwith  the  scope  of 
modem linguistic theory); the question  "is it objects that validate 
the meaning of words or words that give meaning to  obj ects" is  a 
chicken-and-egg one. It is perhaps more interesting to  see what lies 
behind this argument (if it is originally Gorgianic; see Untersteiner 
1954,  p.174  n.98  with  further  literature).  Kerferd  (1982,  p.218) 
holds:  "Exactly  what  theory  this  implies  about  the  origin  of 
language  for  Gorgias  we  are  not  told".  Nevertheless,  it  may  be 
possible to  construe its  meaning if we consider its  affinities  (see 
Untersteiner  1954,  p.174  n.  98,  though  I  disagree  with  his 
conclusions) with the discussion of the fourth possible reason that 
made Helen  follow Paris to Troy in the Encomium. In that context 
(15),  we have a  stimuli-response pattern.  Objects of the  external 
world - for  the external appearance of which men should not be 
held responsible - invoke  emotions  within the soul,  and lead  to 
action.  We may assume,  though it cannot be proved,  that in this 
context G. has the same pattern in mind. External objects stimulate 
men who produce a logos  dependent on the nature of the stimulus. 
At any rate the priority goes to the stimuli, not to .\oyos. 
The following argument (86) runs: admittedly '\'oyos - like visible 
and audible things - has its own substance, which entails that it can 
signify  objects  of the  external  world.  That this  disclaimer is  put 
forward as "a possible objection" (in Kerferd's words, 1982 p.218) 
is shown by the fact that it is followed by an argument objecting to 
it.  This argument concedes  (El  yap  KU£)  that even if '\'oyos  has its 
own substance (cp. Hei.  8, where '\'oyos is  defined as  an omnipotent 
ruler with a minute and invisible body), it differs from other objects 
perceived  through  different  senses.  So,  even  if we  allow  for  an 
ontological  independence  of logos,  the  fact  that  it  is  perceived 
through a different channel infers that it fails  to  denote a score of 
objects  (in the way that audible things cannot be grasped through 
vision and so on - Wa-rrEP  oUDe  €KELVa  rTJv  d'\''\'1j'\'wv  3t..aD7],\,o'i  q;vULV). 
373 The  argument  as  it  stands  can  be  reformulated  as  follows: 
articulated  (oral)  .:\oyoS"  makes  use  of sounds  (cp.  #Joyyor.  MXG 
980b2).  But speech is  perceived through one  opyavov  and visible 
things  through another.  Consequently, most existing things cannot 
be conveyed through speech. 
This  argument  has  an  interesting  implication.  In He!.  .:\oyoS"  is 
presented to  enter human beings in a mechanistic way;  in Sextus' 
account .:\oyOf. are perceived through an unidentified opyavov. Are we 
to  suppose that this  opyavov is simply the  sense of hearing, which 
allows men to perceive articulated speech? Is it possible that mental 
and cognitive processes of  perceiving speech are hinted at as well? 
To  what extent is this a Gorgianic argument? If  the answer to  the 
last question is to  be positive, the lack of any grounds to  give any 
positive answers to the other two questions does not much improve 
our knowledge of G. 's ideas on speech-perception, if  they existed at 
all.  It may merely be said  that prima jacie the  argument  can be 
supported from a clear-cut distinction between hearing and the rest 
of the senses. But it is tempting to  suppose that an exegesis of the 
differences in perception between sounds and articulated utterances 
was included as well. Nevertheless, for lack of conclusive evidence 
this issue should be left undecided. 
374 FRAGMENTS 
4 
The  passage  provides  us  with  an  approach  to  colour  which  is 
ascribed by Plato to  G.  Still, it is hard to  see how much of what is 
said here can safely be considered as  a quotation from  G.,  but we 
will not be far from truth if we claim that Meno is haunted by G. 's 
shadow. At the very beginning of  the dialogue, Meno is presented as 
G.'s student, and when he later goes on to define 'virtue' (ciPE'T7])  he 
gives a definition which is explicitly said to be the fruit of  both G.'s 
and Meno's knowledge about it (see  fr.19). In that context, instead 
of defining  'virtue'  in  an  absolute  manner,  Meno  presents  a 
relativistic definition of it: different attributes are ciPErr]  for different 
kinds of  people. It is vital, now, to realize that the present passage is 
the  concomitant  of Sokrates'  dissatisfaction  with  this  definition, 
because  the  consecutive  definitions  of shape  and  colour  are  an 
attempt to  exemplify what a (or rather any) valid definition should 
look like. 
The  present  exemplification  through  colour  has  already  been 
announced  in what precedes  it;  at  74b  Meno  accepts  that  he  is 
unable to locate one virtue which can be applied to everything (p.£av 
ciPEriJV  Aa{3ELv  Karel.  1Tavrwv) and at this Sokrates undertakes to ease 
the progress of the discussion by developing the definition of shape 
which has already been used as an example in passing (73e).  At 75e 
Sokrates gives the first definition of colour:  'shape is that and only 
that among beings which is always followed by colour'. This Meno 
finds  naive,  because it  is  a definition which defines  the  unknown 
through the  unknown (evidently, colour has not yet been defined). 
Sokrates  then  gives  a  second  definition  (76e):  'shape  is  the  end 
(1T€pa~) of a solid thing (G"TEPEOV)'.  No comment is made by Meno; 
he now urges  Sokrates to  do  away with some unfinished business 
375 and he thus asks him for a definition of  colour: this brings us to the 
beginning of  our fragment. 
Some  explanation  should  be  gIven  now  about  the  portion  of 
Meno  cited here.  So  far,  editors of G.  omit aM'  E7TE~oav  JLOL  a-V 
rour'  EL1T7JS ..•  1TC1.VV  JL€V  oJv  xcipwm;  I take the view that such an 
omission is unjustified for two main reasons. The first one is that it 
is  closely  related  to  the  pivotal  characterisation  of Meno  as 
uf3p~a-r-TJs-;  Bluck  comments:  "Meno  is  not  really  arrogant,  and 
Sokrates  does  not mean this  seriously"  (1961  note ad loc.).  This 
may be so; the following lines, however,invite us to determine why 
Sokrates  calls  Meno  an  uf3PI-a-r-TJs-.  This  characterisation  is  partly 
justified by Sokrates by stressing that Meno demands from  an old 
man a definition of  a.PEn]; Meno promises to give his definition, but 
not before Sokrates gives his own one about colour. Sokrates is now 
introducing an explicitly erotic vocabulary; every effort is made to 
present Meno as  a blaclanailer, who founds  his tyrannical activity 
on his beauty. This decisively completes the presentation of Meno 
as  uf3p!.a-r-TJs-.  His  attitude  is  hybristic  exactly  because  he  takes 
advantage of  his beauty which, in a way, victimises Sokrates who is 
now compelled to indulge (see Dover 1989, pp.34ff., esp. p. 36). 
The  second  reason  brings  us  closer  to  G.  himself;  Sokrates, 
according to the words that Plato puts in his mouth, seems to allude 
to  the  despotic  nature of speech as  it is  presented by G.  in He!., 
something which is perhaps cqrroborated by the love-wording of  the 
speech (,101'05'  and love are intenvoven in He!.). I would defend this 
thesis  on the  basis  of the  following  arguments:  a)  rvpavvEuovrES' 
could be taken as an allusion to the definition of speech as ovvciaTTJS' 
in  He!.  8  (the  possibility  that  €V  '101.S'  ,1Oyo!.S',  apart  from  'in the 
discussions', can also take on the meaning 'through your speeches', 
cannot be excluded, and such a possibility further stresses a general 
reference to  speech) and to  the compelling power of love, to  which 
attention  is  drawn  here  in  an  explicit  manner.  Moreover,  the 
emphasis  on  speech  is  manifestly  strengthened  when  Sokrates 
376 alleges  that  Meno'  s  beauty  would  have  been  obvious  even  if 
someone had his  face covered. Meno is  literally becoming speech. 
b) The expression on  E1/-Lt  flrrwv  TWV  Ka.AWV  may be a (sarcastic) 
reiteration of the  discussion of the first  reason in He!.  6 (see  also 
19), where the word 1JO"O"wv  and its opposite are dazzlingly repeated. 
c) It cannot be mere coincidence that what follows is  a reply  Ka.'T(1 
Topyia.v;  the  proposed  reading  of the  lines  preceding  it  - as  an 
implied allusion to G.'s own theses - serves thus as  a prelude to the 
definition of  colour. 
OUK  k8EAEI.S:  a somewhat 'hypocritical' anxiety of Sokrates to  hear 
the Gorgian definition of 'virtue'(cp. PI.  Ion  541e OUO€  a.'T'Ta.  €O"'TL 
~  ,  '?'  ~  ,  1"'6/)  '-)  Ta.UTa.  7TEpL  wv  OELlIOS'  EL  E  €/\ELS'  EL7TELV •••• 
Ka:..tt.  r oP'YLa:v: a  fa  maniere de;  Sokrates assumes that Meno, being 
familiar with G.'s tropes, will be in a position to  comprehend more 
easily (and accept) the definition of  colour. 
AE.'YE'T'E:  G.  and his  followers,  the representative of whom in  this 
dialogue is Meno. 
d.'rroppoa.s ••• Ka:'T'a.  'EIL1rEOOKAEa::  'effluences  of beings ...  following 
Empedocles'; Empedocles' theory about the function of the senses 
cannot fully be discussed here. As the next two questions uttered by 
Sokrates  show,  sense-perception  was  the  result  of the  combined 
function of both the sense-organ and the object of perception.  He 
accepted  that  some  7TOPOL  existed  through  which  the  d7TOpp0a.£ 
('  effluences ') passed, and that for this reason a symmetry between 
them was necessary (cp. 31A86-89, B3, 84,89 DK; see Diels 1884, 
Wright 1981, pp.229-30). 
«a"UVES  0  'T'l.  AE.'YW}}:  Pindar  10Sa  Snell-Mahler (= 94  Bowra,  121 
Turyn) addressed to Hiero; cpo PI. Phdr. 236d, Ar. Birds 945. 
EO"'T'LV  'Ya.p  xpoa: •••  a.taB1,'T'os:  at last Sokrates' gives the definition of 
colour; whether or not this is  Empedocles' own definition as  it was 
quoted by G.  we cannot tell, especially due to  the absence of direct 
evidence from G.'s own preserved texts. It is possible that although 
377 he accurately conveys its content, at the same time he gives to it the 
form  that  would  make  it  seem  KaTeL  Topyf.av.  OX'TlIJ-0:rwv:  in  the 
margin of T  XfYTliLa.TWV,  accepted by Diels-Kranz and Unterseiner; 
Richards prefers  aWf-La.TWV (cp. Alexander Aphrodosias comments on 
Aristotle's de sensu 24,9 Wendland). I accept most editors' reading 
because  "possibly  Plato  wrote  d7TOpp0-r,  XPTJf-La.TWV,  or  possibly 
Empedodes  talked about  d7Toppoa£  of things,  but  Plato  chose  to 
speak of effluences  ofaxTIf-LaTa  because  axfjiLa  has  been  defined 
whereas XPfjiLa and aWiLa have not" (Bluck 1961, note ad loc.). Note 
the interesting coexistence of  all the proposed readings at He!.  18. 
-rpa.')'I.K-T):  much has been said about the meaning of  this attribute and 
it seems to  me that no  definitive answer has or can be given (see 
Untersteiner 1961, p.75 with further literature; Bluck (1961a), 289-
95  summarises more views; see also Buchheim 1989, p.188-89). It 
seems to me that Bluck (1961a) is right in concluding that "-rpa.')'I.K" 
in our present  context  alludes ...  to  its  [sc.  the  definition's]  high-
flown language and to what Sokrates chooses to treat as its grandeur 
or profundity. These are the qualities that make it Gorgian, and at 
the same time cause Meno to admire it" (p.295). 
S 
For  an  interpretation  of the  fragment  see  Diels  1884,  pp.361ff, 
where he puts forward the view that it comes from an unpreserved 
writing of G.  on natural  philosophy  (see  also  Untersteiner  1961, 
p.76). 
Sa 
All  the  three  passages  offer  examples  of what  is  considered  an 
unjustifiably grandiloquent style, which is  explicitly pointed at  by 
Hennogenes' r/roXP€UOVTaL  (for r/roxpov  see fr.15). The description of 
beasts as  'living tombs' is an image which regularly recurs both in 
ancient and modern literature.  An interesting example is  traced in 
Hdt.  1.  216:  E7T€eLV  De:  yepwv  yElI1]TaL.  Ka.pTa,  o[  7TpOO'7]KEOVT€5  0' 
378 I  '8  I  e  I  I  < ,f, I  ~  ,  "  'e  1TUVr€S"  O'VV€I\  Ovr€S"  UOU<TL  fl-l.v .•• €'t'7]<TuvreS"  oe ru Kpeu  Ka.reUswvra.l.. 
I 
VOU<T<fJ 
T€A€v-n]O'-u.vra.  OU  Ka.Ta.<TLreovra.L  llid y7j  KPU1T1"OU<TL  (cp.  also 3.  38, 
99; the custom of the Massagetai is  also  described in Dissoi Logoi 
2.14).  Latin  literature  provides  us  with  some  depictions  of this 
undoubtedly macabre image; in Lucretius' De Rerum Natura 5.  993 
we read viva videns vivo sepelieri viscera busto (more instances in 
Meurig Davies 1949, p.73). It is also interesting that this image is a 
reversal of  the image presented in the final words of  the Epitaphios, 
.  ~\ \.  '8 I  "'e  I  I  r-' r  I  F  l.e.  (1.1\1\  a.  uva.roS"  OUK  €V  a.  uva.rOLS"  <TWfl-Q;<TL  .,,1)  OU  ."wvrwv.  or a 
similar image  (birds  eating bodies)  in Greek literature  Cpo  Aiskh. 
Septem  1020-1, Soph. Antigone 1081  and Electra  1487f., and Eur. 
Ion 933. 
The  characterisation  of Xerxes  as  the  'Zeus of the  Persians', 
which is  attested by Longinus, is related by Russell (1964 note ad 
loc.) to Herodotos 7.56 where an Hellespontean man says: Jj  Zeu,  TL 
07]  avopL  elOOfl-€voS"  IIep<T7J  Kat.  oVvof.La  avrl.  LiLOS"  Sepg7]v  eEfl-evoS" 
aVa<TTUTOV  rr,v'EMaoa.  8eAeLS"  1TOL7]<TUL. But it can also be seen in the 
light  of Isokrates'  Panegyricus  151,  where  we  are  told  that 
monarchy led the Persians to  cowardice, and that they thus  called 
their ruler oU£fl-wv,  although he was a mortal man (cp.  also Aiskh. 
Persae 80:  l<To8eoS"  cpliY;,  of  Xerxes, and OU£f.Lova. 642, ee0f.L7]<TTWP  654, 
We;  edS" 711, l<To8eoS" 856, of  Darius). 
(fr.6=Epitaphios) 
7 
The date of the speech remains uncertain (for some suggestions see 
Untersteiner 1961, p.85). According to Aristotle (who in this part of 
his Rhetoric presents an exemplified classification of the proems of 
epideictic speeches), G.  in the prologue praised those who founded 
the  1TuvwUpeLS"  (Lysias  33.1  praises  Herakles  for  establishing  the 
Olympic  games), whereas Isokrates  (Panegyricus  1)  blames  them 
379 because  they do  not honour wisdom (a view which goes back to 
Xenophanes).  An indication of its  content is  given  in  8a (for an 
expanded version of the fragment see Buchheim 1989 with notes). 
For the ideal of Panhellenism in the fifth century see Flower 2000, 
esp.92-93. 
8 
The first to  identify these two sentences with G.'s 'Oil.ufJ-1nK(k  was 
Bemays  (1853),  and  this  identification  made  the  word  aL.VLYfJ-a 
('riddle')  appear inappropriate;  Bernays himself proposed  aL.aLfJ-a, 
Diels  1TAiYfJ-a.  Ferguson (1921),  now,  thought that  aLvLYfJ-u  gave 
good meaning, because he thought that G.  intended to  compare his 
ability to  expand publicly on any sublect with Oedipus  who  was 
bold enough to  face  the Sphinx, and he also  maintained that KaAEL 
fJ-EV ...  ouvafJ-EVOv  did not necessarily belong to  G.'s oration.  In my 
view the only part of  the fragment that could safely be attributed to 
G.  is this: ro  dywvLap.a  ~p.Wv  .•. oLrrwv  oe  dpErwv  oELraL,  roA.p.7JS  Kat. 
ao<p£a~.  Clemens  brings  in  G.  at  a  point  where  he  criticises 
philosophical investigation (especially that  of the Epicureans  and 
the  Stoics),  and TJJ.LWV,  which probably existed in the quotation of 
G. ' s speech that Clemens had before him,  is  meant to  distinguish 
this kind of (hedonistic  as  Clemens himself calls it)  philosophical 
investigation from the one dictated by Christian faith, which reveals 
itself  with  alviYl-LaaL  Kat.  aufJ-f30AOL~  dAA:T]yop£aL~  rE  aD  Kat. 
fJ-EracPopaL~ (Stra.5. 4,21). 
Similarly,  I  think that  Clemens's allusion  to  the  herald at  the 
Olympic  games  does  not  prove  that  the  second  sentence  is  a 
quotation  from  G.'  s  oration.  This  sentence  has  several  Gorgian 
overtones,  the  most  remarkabe  one  being  the  {3ouAOfJ-EVOV  / 
ouvap.Evov  antithesis.  But  the  subject  of the  verb  Ka/l.EL,  speech 
(AOYOS)  is not the Gorgian speech; Clemens's Stromateis is devoted 
to  the Christian AOyOS.  Buchheim (1989, p.l94) cites a parallel that 
clearly  shows  how  superficial  similarities  may  lead  to 
380 misinterpretation: Wa-rr€p  Ka.~  Ell  rOlS'  Oi\V/k7TLa.KOLS  dy&n  Ka.AEL  /kElI 
o K7Jpvg  rov  f30VA,6/k€1I0V,  CI7"E<jJa.1I0L  DE  rov  VLK-r7ua.vra.·  rovrCfJ  r41 
rp07TCfJ  Ka.~  E7TL  rijs aYVELa.s. 
It is possible that G. used dyWVLU/ka.  to refer to his own speech, by 
bringing it closer to  the situational context in which he delivered it. 
-rOA,/k7!  and  uo<jJLa.  are both required for success in both his and the 
athletes'  activities  (note  that  YVW/k7!  and  PW/k7!  are  presented 
antithetically in  the Epitaphios).  By bringing himself close  to  the 
athletes, G.  is probably the first to use the antagonistic enviroment 
of  the games as a metaphor for rhetoric. 
8a 
The passage is  cited only because it refers to  the contents of G.' s 
speech,  for  Isokrates  suggests  that  G.  never  got  married  (see 
Test. 18).  The  important information is  that  G.'s demand  was  for 
O/kOVOLa.  between the  Greek  cities,  not  solely  within them,  and  it 
should of course be associated with what is put forward in 5b; the 
Olympic  games  was  an  appropriate  occasion  for  someone  to 
propound  the  Panhellenic  ideal,  because  it  was  a  Panhellenic 
festival,  which  also  entailed  the  suspension  of  any  existing 
hostilities. 
9 
Nothing is mown about G.'s Pythian speech; Philostratos gives  us 
the vague information that it was delivered at the altar of the temple 
of  Apollo (d7TO  rou {3W/kou  7JXTJU€lI, Test.I). 
10 
Again  the  content  of the  speech  IS  unknown;  nevertheless,  we 
should distinguish this speech from the Pythian and the Olympic in 
view of its locality. It is unclear if EYKW/kWlI  Eis'  HAeLovs  is  the title 
of the work, or a specific reference to  the preamble of G.'s speech 
381 (see  Buchheim  1989,  pp.195-6).  It is  likely,  however,  that  his 
speech  was  a  praise  of the  city  of Elis.  The  possibility  that  G. 
delivered this  speech before or after a visit to  Olympia is  feasible 
(see  Untersteiner  1961,  p.  87).  The  phrase  1TOI\LS  €Uoa£J.Lwv  is  a 
recurring formula, for which see Ar. Birds 36. 
(frs.11,lla= Encomium of  Helen, The Defence of  Pal  me  des) 
12 
The symmetrical antithesis is typically Gorgian, so that there can be 
little doubt that Aristotle quotes G.'s own words; judging from the 
existing  evidence  he  must  have  been  the  first  to  observe  the 
importance  of laughter  in  public  speaking.  The  wording  of the 
fragment does not make it clear whether yel\wn, as a weapon against 
the threatening seriousness of  the opponent, means a)  'by laughing', 
or b) 'by arousing laughter in the audience'. Halliwell (1991), p.293 
accepts (b), and he contends that "the formulation strongly points to 
the  use of rhetorically induced laughter not so  much for  a  direct 
expression of animosity, as in order to win one's audience's amused 
approval and thus to manipUlate the mood of a public gathering in 
one's own favour". But (a) is no less plausible, especially in view of 
the Platonic passage (cp.  infra), and perhaps more importantly,  in 
view  of the  fact  that  laughter  is  so  frequently  an  expression  of 
enmity,  a  gesture  which  in  some  cases,  as  Greek  literature 
abundantly  brings  out,  can  cause  irrecoverable  damage  to  the 
honour and the social status of  a person. 
In  Grg.  473e,  a  passage  whose  relevance  to  the  Gorgian 
contention  about  the  function  of laughter  has  been  accepted  by 
Dodds (1959, note ad lac.), Sokrates delays his conclusion that 'the 
more  miserable  person  is  the  one  who  escapes  the  danger  and 
becomes a tyrant' to  ask:  'What's up now, Polus? Do you laugh? Is 
this  another kind of scrutiny [Jl\€yxov],  that is  laughing when one 
says  something,  instead  of scrutinizing  one's  own  words?'  The 
382 theatricality of the passage is  overt;  Plato  invites us to  imagine a 
smile on Polus' mouth which is enough to  cut off Sokrates, who at 
this  point  in  the  dialogue  says  nothing  hilarious.  The  emphasis 
placed on Polus'  laughter,  expressed with two  staccato  questions, 
elevates  what  could  otherwise  be  an  unimportant  smile  to  a 
philosophical method of examination. There can be little doubt then 
that  Plato,  by drawing  his  readers'  attention  to  Polus'  laughter, 
intends  them  to  construe  it as  a practice of his  circle,  and more 
particularly that of G.  himself,  whose view  about the  function of 
'laughter' must have been known to Plato. 
This  passage  acquires  added  significance  in  the  light of what 
follows; Polus' reply to  Sokrates is  another question:  "Do not you 
think that the  falsity of your view has already been proved, when 
you  maintain  views  that  no  one  else  maintains?  You  may  ask 
anyone of  those who are now present". Polus seems to wish to ripen 
the  grapes  of his  'laughter';  we may imagine that while  he was 
laughing his  head was  turned to  the members  of the rest of the 
company and we may infer that it was with the intention of  winning 
over his audience that Polus resorted to  yeA.ws-.  It is needless to say 
that  Sokrates  turns  Polus  down  on  the  basis  of his  political 
inexperience,  which,  as  he  says,  the  year  before,  when  he  was 
elected a j30VA.€.vrys, provoked laughter in numerous people. 
The Platonic passage thus 'stages' the Gorgian theoretical advice, 
and it brings out the duality of its  character:  the  laughter of G. 's 
'student' aspires to arouse his audience's laughter and in this way to 
predispose it against Sokrates who, of course, does not fail not to be 
victimized. This brings us to (b): we have seen that in Grg.  473e it is 
laughter  itself  that  preponderates  with  further  implications 
pertaining  to  the  importance  of  the  audience's  laughter.  But 
unfortunately  (b)  cannot  be  defended  in  connection  to  direct  or 
indirect evidence about G  .. Nevertheless, it is hard to see any reason 
why this dimension of the Gorgian dictum should be excluded; for 
the  importance of arousing laughter in audiences  clearly  emerges 
from  later  oratorical  practice  (actually  the  plethora  of evidence 
383 makes  any  attempt  towards  a  full  presentation  of the  theme 
impossible  in this  context),  which  in  a  way  draws  back to  G.'s 
contention. 
Despite the different approaches, it has amply been shown that 
G.  paid  tribute  to  pleasure  ('i€p!j;LS")  as  a  means  of  attaining 
persuasiveness  (explicitly  in  He!.  5,  13),  so  that  his  prescription 
about the usage of laughter cannot be seen independently of this 
parameter. The role of  pleasure and laughter in persuasion is attested 
in Aristophanes'  Wasps 567; in that context Phi10kleon explains to 
his  son the privileges of being a juror by referring to  defendants' 
striving for  acquittaL Among other means of persuasion, they also 
"narrate myths to  us  [jurors],  others  comic  stories  from  Aisopos; 
others make jokes, so as to make me laugh and thus to appease me. 
And if  we do  not change our minds ...  ". This comic exploitation of 
the function of  laughter points to its power to win over audiences in 
courtrooms,  and thus  to  its  contribution to  the  acquittal  of those 
involved.  In  fourth-century  rhetoric  things  are  rather  different; 
without intending to  systematize evidence (this  has been done by 
Halliwell)  it  seems  feasible  to  maintain  that  pleasure  through 
laughter is  there inextricably interwoven with  'slander'  (AoLoopLa), 
an  element which is  undeveloped in  G.'s preserved texts.  This is 
eloquently  expressed  in  Demosthenes  18.3  (0  <pvaEL  -rriiaLV 
dv8pumOLS"  Vm:1.pXEL,  'iWV  J-L€V  AOLOOPLWV  KaL  'iWV  Ka'i7])'0pLwV  dKOVELV 
-ryO€WS"),  and later at 138 (cp. also Philip.3.54, 19.23; Aiskhines 1.35). 
Laughter  in  oratory  is  thus  chiefly  integrated  within  the 
characterisation of the opponent in which even false evidence about 
his  life  can be employed (a good example  is  the  presentation of 
Aiskhines'  parentage by Demosthenes;  for  false  evidence  and the 
identity  of litigants  see  Halliwell  1991,  p.288;  see  also  Harding 
1994, who investigates the impact of Old Comedy upon rhetoric). 
So far I have been stressing the role of laughter; we may now see 
the role of stubborn seriousness as  opposed to  'playful' laughter. In 
Demosthenes' Against Conon, Ariston, the plaintiff, in anticipating 
his opponent's arguments claims that among other things he will say 
384 that his  (and his company's) misbehaviour was  due to  a  'playful' 
mood (ElS"  YEAWTa  Kal.  aKW/L/LaT'  e/Lf3aAEZv  7TELpaaaa8aL  13); he then 
says that Conon will claim falsely that he (Ariston) and his brothers 
are heavy drinkers, uf3pLaTai.,  ayvw/LOvES"  and 7TLKpOf..  Much has been 
said about hybris in the context of this speech; it will suffice here to 
say  that  Ariston  himself  claims  that  he  did  not  prosecute  his 
opponents  for  hybris, because,  as  he explains,  he was told by his 
relatives  not  to  do  so.  But  how  are  we  to  interpret  the  words 
ayvw/LovaS"  and  7TLKpOVS"  in contradistinction to  the  'playfulness'  of 
his opponents? 
Both  attributes  gIve  the  impression  of a  stubborn,  inflexible 
person,  a  character with  no  sense  of humour;  Ariston,  in  short, 
alleges  that  Conon  will  present  him  as  a  person  with  no 
understanding,  and it seems that he cannot  feel  confident  enough 
that even the judges will abstain from laughter at the representation 
of the  facts  by  Conon  (20).  It is  for  this  reason  that  he  there 
dramatises his  sufferings and invites the judges to  visualise them. 
This short presentation clearly brings out the dangers  involved in 
seriousness; Ariston may justifiably claim that no one would laugh, 
if it happened to be an eye-witness of the incident, but at the same 
time  he  is  anxious  not  to  present  himself as  prejudiced  against 
playful  activity.  Demosthenes  in  defending  him  is  aware  of the 
possibility that the judges will perhaps be more influenced by the 
'staging' of  slapstick comedy with the prosecutor playing the role of 
the  foolishly touchy protagonist than by the actual sufferings of a 
complainer  who  is  overdoing  it  (for  brief  comments  on  this 
fragment see Untersteiner, 1961, p.134, and Buchheim 1989, p.196). 
13 
Dionysios'  information  about  G.'s  writing  on  KaLpos  IS  clearly 
marked by a sceptical, if not polemical, tone which is  founded on 
385 the axiom that KULp6~ is an elusive subject of  investigation due to its 
inherent association with D6~u. I take it that this tone can potentially 
be useful in relation to  the nature of G.'s own writing because it 
points to a general, 'theoretical' analysis of  this important parameter 
of  eloquence. 
KULp6~ is a fundamental notion in the circle of the Sophists which 
could simply be  defined as  the  consideration of the right time at 
which one should act; both the words 'time' and 'act' should be read 
in  the  wider  possible  way:  time  should  necessarily  include  a 
'spatial'  meaning,  that is  the pragmatic  constraints  imposed on a 
speaker by the context in which he delivers his speech, the audience 
and the horizon of its expectations, which unavoidably entails their 
political,  religious  or other dispositions  etc.  In short,  KULp6~, as  a 
technical term,  results  from  the observation that communicating a 
view effectively does not merely depend on the clarity of  a message, 
but on the speakers' timing as welL 
According to  Diogenes  Laertios  (IX.  52=Al,52DK), Protagoras 
(not G.  as Dionysios says) was the first to  display KULPOfJ  DUVUIl-LV. 
The doxographical  divergence  about who was  the first  to  discuss 
KULp6~ cannot be discussed here; in Diogenes it is presented as one 
among other Protagorean novelties. Skouteropoulos is  too ready to 
accept the doxographers in claiming that '''Ev4J  0  ITPW'TuyoPU$  ~'TUV 
o  1TPW'TO$  0  01TOLO$  E1TLo-TJIkUVE.  TIJ  O"'T1IkUCTLU  1TOU  EXE.L  ~ u'LaB'llO"'T1  TIi$ 
KU'TMA'llA'll$  1TE.pLCT'TUO"'T1$ ••• 1TpW'TO$  0  lOPYLU$,  01TW$  O"'T1IkE.L('~lVE.L  EOW  0 
~LOVUCTLO$ 0  •  AALKUPVUCTCTE.U$,  E'ITLXE.LP'llCTE.  vCr.  1TPOCTOLOpLCTE.L  KUt.  'TOU$ 
TEXVLKOU$  KUVOVE.$  YLCr.  TIJv  Eq,UPIkOY-rl  uuTIi$  TIi$  a.pXll$  CTTIJ 
P'llTOPLK-rl"  1991, p.261; see also Gomperz 1912, p.165ff.) A number 
of other Sophistic works also mention KULp6~; in Dissoi Logoi quite 
a good deal is said about it. At 2.20 we read: 1TIJ.VTa.  KULpqi  iJ-€V  KaAcl 
EVTL,  EV  dKULpLq.  0' ULaxpcl (see also 5,9) which shows that KULp6~ is 
not here viewed on the level of its oratorical implications (although 
this  does  not justify Schiappa's (1999,  p.74)  conclusion that "the 
absence of any rhetorical treatment of  them in the Dialexeis implies 
386 that the disciplinary matrix connecting these concepts to persuasive 
speecbmaking either had not emerged or was not yet fixed in Greek 
language  or thought").  Allddamas,  probably  one of G.'s  students 
and a fervent supporter of oral speech, also contended TqJ  KUl.plfJ  TWV 
7TpUYP.UTWV  KuL  TU'iS  €7Tl.evp.iul.s  TWV  aveparrrwv  €VO"T0xWS" 
aKoAovefjaul.  KuL  TOV  7TpOaTJKOVTU  Aoyov  €l7T€'iV  (On  the Sophists, 3; 
see also Isokrates 2.33). 
KULPOS  is  traced in G. 's preserved texts expressed with the word 
TO  D€OV  (for this term as  a synonym of KULPOS  see Vollgraff 1952, 
p.20-27); in the Epitaphios those honoured are praised for doing and 
saying the right thing at the right time; similarly in the opening of 
He!.  the rhetor defines his task as an expression of  that which oUght 
to be said (TO  D€OV),  a statement which has widely been explained as 
an allusion to  KULPOS (see notes ad lac.). The phrase €<PL€£S  TlfJ  KULplfJ 
in Test. 1a is rightly taken by Guthrie (1971, p.272 n.4 with further 
literature) to refer "to his gift of improvisation" as  in that context it 
is the practice of  public display that it is discussed. 
It is possible now to  return to  the nature of G.'s writing about 
KULPOS;  I  have  already  suggested  that  it  is  likely  that  it  was  a 
'theoretical' work where general rules were put forward; Dionysios' 
objection  is  that  KULPOS  is  something  that  cannot  be  studied 
systematically, and accordingly no universal rules can be set about 
it,  because  it  depends  decisively  upon  personal,  SUbjective 
considerations  (this  is  said  in what  follows  the  passage  cited by 
Diels-Kranz;  Kerferd  1981,  p.81  almost  invited  future  editors  to 
include this part, hence Buchheim  1989,  p.82  and Skouteropoulos 
1991, p.260); in short KULPOS  cannot be judged independently of a 
given occasion. That this is accepted by him as  an axiom, is  shown 
by  his  all-encompassing  contempt  towardst  philosophers  and 
rhetoricians expressed at the beginning of the passage cited. All this 
suggests  a  'theoretical'  discussion  of KULPOS  to  the  extent  that 
Dionysios finds  it unpractical.  What such a dissertation on KULPOS 
may have included is mere speculation; probably suggestions about 
387 its importance (this, according to Diogenes Laertios, was the content 
of Protagoras'  work  on  Ka.,p6~)  or  about  the  modification  of 
arguments  dictated  by  the  expectations  of the  audience.  These 
prescriptions could have been supported by the analysis of  examples 
of  real speeches. 
(For  Ka.l..p6~  see,  SUss  1910,  pp.iii  and  17ff,  Gomperz  1912, 
pp.165ff,  Untersteiner  1961,  p.  134-136,  Kennedy  1963,  p.66-68, 
Wilson 1981,418-420, Consigny 1992, Noel,  1998, Schiappa 1999, 
p.73-74) 
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Aristotle  scorn.:fully  presents  G. 's method  of teaching  through  an 
analogy; he compares the learning of model speeches by heart as  a 
teaching-method  of rhetoric  to  a  hypothetical  teaching  of shoe-
making, which solely consists in the presentation of many different 
kinds  of shoes.  According  to  Aristotle  this  is  a  process  which 
involves  learning  from  the  products  of art  (d7TO  rijs  T€XVTJ~) and 
which unavoidably fails  to  lead to  the  acquisition of the art itself. 
This passage has frequently been discussed by modem scholarship, 
which, it should be added, in recent years tends to find in it support 
for the contention that rhetorical meta-language is absent throughout 
the  fifth  century.  The  feasibility  of this  statement  is  also  partly 
connected to  the  explanation of what  Aristotle  means  by  A6yov~; 
other scholars take it to  refer to  whole speeches, others to  parts of 
speeches  or  recurnng  themes  labelled  loci  communes 
(  commonp  laces). 
Wilcox  (1942,  p.153)  takes  the  VIew  that  ''we  should  accept 
Aristotle's testimony in the Sophistici Elenchi that the  theory was 
extensively developed and unlike the communes loci of G.". Kerferd 
(1981,  p.31)  also  maintains  that  Aristotle  has  in  mind  the  loci 
communes of  the kind Cicero describes in Brutus 46-47 (= Test.25), 
and  he  concludes  that:  "It  can  hardly  be  in  doubt  that  it  is 
commonplaces of  this kind which the pupils of G.  were required to 
388 learn  by  heart  ...  rather  than  whole  speeches  as  is  sometimes 
asserted" (the same view is taken by Natali 1986, p.106). Kennedy 
(1994,  p.35,  and  1959),  in  discussing  the  rhetorical  handbooks, 
discerns  two  traditions:  "the  theoretical ...  including  Tisias  and 
Theodorus,  and  the  tradition  of the  exemplar  or  collection  of 
commonplaces ...  including  G."  (1959,  p.172).  Cole  (1991,  p.92), 
who offers a detailed discussion of  TEXT!'q,  holds that "sample speech 
parts, like sample shoe parts, can be constructed in such a way as to 
minimise  idiosyncrasy  and  so  point  more  clearly  than  would  a 
random selection of such objects to  the general principles on which 
their construction is  based" and he  encapsulates his view of fifth-
century  rhetoric  as  follows:  "The  analytical  metalanguage 
characteristic of fourth-century treatises may have had purely oral 
antecedents  of  which  all  reports  have  disappeared.  Yet  the 
completeness of the disappearance ...  suggests otherwise." Similarly 
Schiappa (1999, p.45)  concludes that 'The 'Arts' attributed to  G., 
Thrasymachus,  and  Antiphon  are  probably  the  result  of  the 
publication of exemplary speeches ...  there were no theoretical 'Arts 
of  Rhetoric' written in the fifth century B.C.E.". 
There  is  thus  a  consensus  about  the  'practical'  and markedly 
exemplary character ofG.'s teaching, the divergence of  views being 
chiefly located in the examination of  G.'  s tools. Moreover, it is clear 
that,  as  far  as  G.  is  concerned,  scholarly  work  tends  to  take 
Aristotle's testimony for granted, and thus to found its conclusions 
upon it. However, both the statements that G. had not developed any 
theoretical  meta-language  and  that  his  teaching  proceeded  solely 
with the memorization of  model-speeches cannot be true. 
Firstly, it should be pointed out that Aristotle is not acting as  an 
impartial historiographer of rhetoric; his contempt for the display of 
model-speeches, or parts of them, can only be considered soberly if 
one is  ready to  see it in comparison to his own elevated analysis of 
rhetoric.  As he says G.' s practice falls  short because it employs TO. 
0:1T0  ri'js  TEXVTJS  and by the same token because it fails to present the 
389 TEXV7J  itself  Retrojecting  this  term  almost  one  century  before 
Aristotle's  time  and  thus  reaching  conclusions  concerning  the 
teaching of  rhetoric is unsafe. TEXV7J in Aristotle's time has already a 
long history in which Plato's philosophy plays the most important 
role,  particularly with the distinction between TEXV7J  and  e:rncrrr]J-L7J. 
In Aristotle's philosophy TEXV7J  takes on a specific meaning, for he 
places it between  EJ-L1TEl..p£a  and E1TLcrrr]J-L7J,  and more particularly he 
relates it to the third of  the three kinds of  E1TLcrrr]J-L7J,  that is  1TOL7]TLKTJ 
(cp.  Meta.  981b25-982al,  l025b21, 26,  l046b3; Eth.Nic.1139b14-
1141b8).  The  emphasis  is  thus  placed on the process,  not on the 
finished work for  that belongs to  the realm of TVxaLov  and  TEXV7J 
tends  (as  E1TLa-rr,J-L7J  does)  to  the  Ka86Aov,  the  difference  between 
them being that TeXV7J  is  1TEPI.  yev7JCFLv  (namely the passage from  a 
shapeless  material  to  a  form).  It is  with  such  a  philosophical 
background that Aristotle criticises G.' s teaching;  apart from  that, 
we  should  point  out  that  if Tel.  a1TO  Tfjs  TeXV7JS  are  either  loci 
communes or parts of speeches,  as  most scholars agree,  composed 
for memorization, their obvious raison d' etre was to provide people 
with generally applicable arguments  (or possibly cliches  for  other 
parts of a speech), and they were thus concerned with what one says 
rather than with the way in which one says it, there is even one more 
reason why we should not be surprised by Aristotle's criticism. For 
it  cannot  be  accidental  that  the  subject-matter  of speeches  is 
excluded by Aristotle in his study of rhetoric, on the basis that it is 
related to other disciplines (ethics, politics etc). 
It is thus not the absence of 'theory' in the way we construe the 
term that Aristotle locates in G. 's teaching method, nor does he say 
that  the  latter  proceeded  solely  by  display.  But  is  it  feasible  to 
contend  that  rhetorical  metalanguage  was  unavailable  in  G. 's 
teaching? First of all, no one can seriously put forward the view that 
any  teaching  is  possible  without  conveying  the  principles  that 
underline the discipline taught, at least in the way that the instructor 
has them in his / her mind. Common experience shows that queries 
390 cannot always be answered by the means of paradigms, and some 
generalization is always involved. It is  equally true that teaching is 
by nature a kind of communication where oral speech is  primarily 
employed (electronic technology has  certainly facilitated  distance-
learning  in  our  days),  and  insofar  as  antiquity  is  concerned, 
difficulties  related  to  the  publication  and  distribution  of books 
would make teachers of successful public speaking prefer to  write 
down  what they  considered appropriate  to  meet  the  practical  and 
immediate needs of their audience. Moreover, relentless mobility is 
a  common  characteristic  of the  representatives  of the  Sophistic 
movement,  and certainly of G.  himself.  This  is  tantamount to  the 
fact that such a thing as a school like Plato's Academy or Aristotle's 
Lykeion is  something unattested in G.'s days;  for this reason it is 
legitimate  to  speculate  once  more  that  written  composition  of 
paradigms was of more general applicability, and thus preferable to 
'theoretical'  discussion  of the  function  of rhetoric,  especially  in 
view  of the  fact  that  this  teaching  was  addressed  to  people 
unacquainted with a developing genre. All this suggests, I think, that 
the  non-theoretical  orientation  of  the  fifth-century  'rhetorical' 
writings does not necessarily entail the absence of a metarhetorical 
language. 
Absence of theoretical perspective in the study of rhetoric in the 
fifth century has convincingly been refuted by Gagarin (1994), who 
rightly places his interest chiefly in the writings of this period, and 
not in fourth-century assessments of them. For our purposes it will 
suffice  to  present briefly some aspects  of metalanguage in  G.  To 
start  with  indirect  evidence,  we  know  that  he  had  composed  a 
treatise on  Ka.Lp6~, which is  criticised by Dionysios as  unsuccessful 
(see fr.13).  Regardless of the quality of this work, its existence is  a 
first  indication that G.  had actually discussed an aspect of rhetoric 
which  undoubtedly  has  a  diachronic  value.  Segments  of meta-
rheroricallanguage can be traced in  G.'s extant texts.  He!.  8-14 
includes  a  discussion  of '\6yoS",  which undoubtedly  establishes  a 
metarhetoricallanguage, to the extent that it deals with matters such 
391 as  persuasion,  acceptability  of  arguments,  emotional  appeal, 
pleasure  and  its  relation  to  effectiveness  etc.  The  same  mutatis 
mutandis holds for the third part of ONE, which paves the way for 
serious  philosophical  approach  to  language  and  which  has 
frequently  been underrated by scholars who  connect  it  with  G.'s 
practical  ends.  Independently  of  the  context  in  which  these 
discussions appear,  they certainly suggest an increasing interest in 
discussing speech both in its  endogenous characteristics and in  its 
role in social discourse (one may also mention G.'s advice about the 
importance of laughter in one's argumentation). There is  no  doubt 
that this evidence is highly random and that it does not amount to a 
systematic,  theoretical  approach  to  rhetoric;  but  this  is  rather 
different from saying that metarhetoric is unattested in G.' s writings. 
It would be more accurate to contend that G.'s teaching is a hybrid, 
where  practice  and theory have  a  complementary  function.  To  a 
certain degree, metalanguage can be traced even in what could be 
seen  as  a  sample  of purely  paradigmatic  rhetoric  of  general 
applicability,  that  is  Pal.  The  typology  of motives  leading  to 
criminal action at 19, to mention one example, is a remark of great 
significance  (for more such remarks,  see  my commentary  on the 
text). 
In conclusion, Aristotle's view about teaching a.7TO  ri]s  T€XV7]S  is 
a  criticism  which  is  based on  a  syncresis  with  what  he  himself 
defines as  T€XV7];  thus Buchheim is certainly right in printing  OUTOS 
yap  {3€{30f]87]K€ ..• 1Tap€OWK€V,  because  this  portion  of  the  text 
illustrates Aristotle's own criterion, to  which, in his view, G.'s end 
is opposed. Similarly modern suggestions that metarhetoric is absent 
in G.'s teaching (and time) fail to  give a clear meaning to  the term 
metarhetoric,  as  they almost invite us  to  construe it in the terms of 
fourth-century philosophising. On the contrary, examination of G.'s 
own texts suggests an unprecedented (in existing evidence) amount 
of language  which  is  designed  to  explain  language,  and  which 
392 allows  us  to  infer  that  much  more  theoretical  language  was 
employed in everyday contact with students of  eloquence. 
15 
Aristotle  exanunes  what  ifroxpov  style  anses  from;  there  are  four 
main  causes:  a)  compound  words,  b)  obscure  and  difficult 
expressions  (-1"0  xpf]afJUI.  yIl.WrrUI.~, c)  the use of epithets which are 
either  J1-UKpoIS  or  dKU£pOI.~  or  7TVK1IOIS,  and  d)  inappropriate 
metaphors. This technical term frequently recurs in Greek criticism 
and it is variously defined (for an examination of it see VanHook 
1917, pp.68-76). In this fragment we have examples of compound 
words, which are unattested elsewhere in G.'s preserved writings; he 
is certainly fond of compound words (see Introduction), but nothing 
similar to  1T'TWXOJ1-0V(jOKOII.UKU~  can be tracked  down  in his  extant 
work. 
1T"iW)(0f.L0uO'oK6t..aKas:  'wanting-in-wisdom flatterers'; the MSS have 
1TTWXOJ1-0V(jo~  KOII.Ug,  but Vahlen' s  suggestion has justifiably been 
accepted by most scholars. 
k1Tl.0PK-TJO'UV1US  KaT'  euopK-TJO'UV'iOS:  I  prefer Ross's reading  to  the 
MSS'  EmopKTj(jU1ITU~  KUL  KUT€VOPKTj(jU1ITa~,  because  it  brings 
together in an antithetical structure what is  otherwise an example 
which consists in two separate words. 
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These  are  examples  of rjJvxpov  arising  from  metaphors;  for  a  full 
discussion of the  textual difficulties  see  Solmsen  1987,  pp.SOO-2, 
who  rightly suggests that we should "separate the second sentence 
aV ...  Ee€pL(jU~  from  the  preceding  one,  for  these  two 
quotations ...  have no connection with one another" (p.SOO);  see also 
Buchheim 1989, pp. 197-8. 
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393 Skouteropoulos (1991, p.265) rightly relates this passage to Plato's 
Phaidros  267a,  where  we  learn  that  G.  along  with  Tisias  had 
invented  a  technique  by  which  they  could  both  prolong  their 
speeches.  In the  same  connection,  it  is  useful  to  remember that 
according to  Aristotle (Soph.  El.  174b 32), when Lykophron found 
it hard to  praise the lyre as  he was asked, he praised a star bearing 
the same name with this instrument. 
Nestle (1940, pp.313-14) takes it for granted that G.  composed a 
speech  for  Achilles,  but it  is  equally  possible  that  Aristotle  uses 
Achilles'  name  exempli  gratia,  in  order  to  illustrate  how  G. 
developed his praises by  referring to partly relevant material. That 
Aristotle  did  not  perhaps  have  a  specific  speech  in  mind  is  a 
hypothesis corroborated by the reasoning employed in Hel.,  and by 
the  wording  in with which he introduces his  explanation (el  yap 
'AXLl\l\€a  I\€ywv ... ). If  we wish to find an extant speech that develops 
exactly  in the  manner that  Aristotle  describes  in  this  part of his 
Rhetoric, we should turn to Isokrates' Helen, where eventually the 
hero praised is Theseus, not Helen. 
18,19 
The  passage  from  Plato's  Meno  IS  usually  taken  as  an 
exemplification of the type of definitions that Aristotle ascribes to 
G.  in naming him as  the representative of those who  'enumerate' 
(egapLef.LoiJvTES)  virtues  (in  including  Aristotle's  reference  to 
Sokrates  I  follow  Buchheim,  because  Aristotle  does  not  merely 
record  G.' s  method  of definition,  but he  opposes  it  to  Sokrates' 
own).  It  is  thus  generally  taken  for  granted  that  Aristotle's 
information  is  correct  and  that  it  is  in  accordance  with  the  first 
definition of virtue in Meno  71e (e.g.  Guthrie  1971, p.254 claims 
that "But he  [sc.  Meno]  is  introduced as  an  admirer of G.,  and we 
know from Aristotle that G. did not approve of attempting a general 
definition  of  arete''';  B1uck  1961,  note  ad  loc.,  claims  that 
"Aristotle .. .is  probably  thinking  of  the  present  passage,  and 
394 attributing  the  views  expressed by Meno  to  his  master G.").  An 
interesting implication of the comparative reading of  these passages 
is that some scholars take the view that 'enumerating' was the only 
practice employed by G. in giving definitions; this view is explained 
variously:  Guthrie (1971, p.254) associates it with the Protagorean 
relativism  and  Untersteiner  (1961,  p.140)  with  Ka~p6~.  However, 
G. 's  repugnance  to  absolute  definitions  IS  refutable  and 
consequently Aristotle's accuracy should be scrutinised. 
Levi  (1966,  p.201-2)  remarks  that  Aristotle's  evidence  IS 
disputable by observing that ''vari passi del Menone riconoscono  0 
implicano che Gorgia aveva definito la virtU. in generale (71c; 73c-d; 
76a-b)". None of  the passages referred to by Levi proves that G. had 
put forward a general definition of 'virtue' (the more telling instance 
is  73c-d, where,  once more, the definition given is  said to  belong 
both  to  G.  and  Meno),  but  this  scholar's  contribution  consists 
chiefly in his questioning the validity of  Aristotle's information. 
Unlike  Levi,  several scholars  (Guthrie  1971,  p.254,  Buchheim 
1989,  p.198,  Skouteropoulos  1991,  p.266)  see  in  G.'s  preserved 
texts (He!.  1, Epitaphios; for the function of  this type of  definition in 
Hel.  1 see comments ad lac.)  a verification of what Aristotle says 
here,  which undoubtedly entails that they take  his  statement as  a 
general reference to G.'s unique way of defining things. However, 
whereas  the  passage  from  Aristotle  affords  this  reading,  it  is 
necessary to make it clear that Plato's student is  either selective or 
that he  systematises  evidence  from  G.' s texts.  Even if "practical" 
and "rhetorical" aspects of definition are brought in (this is  implied 
by Guthrie  1971, p.254, when he alleges  that "G.  would no  doubt 
have  claimed  that  Sokrates  was  trying  to  extend  a  method 
appropriate  to  natural  science  beyond  its  proper  sphere")  a 
monolithic insistence on relativistic definitions (x  is  y for  a,  p is  q 
for b ...  ) is not always helpful. The argument from antinomy at Pal. 
25  furnishes  us  with a good example for  the  necessity of absolute 
definitions:  Palamedes  is  there  describing  madness  through  an 
enumeration of the  acts  that  it leads  to;  this  method he  employs 
395 there is 'absolute' enough to apply to any individual situation (other 
absolute  definitions:  He!':  of speech  8,  of poetry  9;  of human 
motives  PaL  19).  Consequently,  neither  Aristotle  nor  modem 
scholars who  take his account for granted are right in maintaining 
that  'enumerating'  attributes  was  G.'s  only  method  of defining 
things. 
We may now examine the definition of 'virtue' as  it is  given by 
Plato; once again the parentage of  the definition is a hybrid: at 71d it 
is  clearly  said  that  the  definition  that  follows  is  an  exclusive 
privilege  of the  knowledge  of G.  and  Meno.  Two  levels  are 
discernible in it: on the first one Meno displays what is  dpeT"!J  for a 
man and for a woman and on the second one it is merely expressed 
that different things are virtues for different groups of  people. These 
groups of people can further be divided into two categories on the 
basis of two  criteria: age and sex. But when we turn to  73c, where 
Meno  offers  the second Gorgian definition of virtue,  we find  out 
that he gives an 'absolute' definition (er7Tep  EV  ye  n  '7]Te!s  KUTa. 
7TavTwv)  which  is  reminiscent  of theses  held  by  G.'  s  pupils  in 
Gorgias:  T£  a-Uo  y' 7]  apxeLv  olav  T'  elvuL  nov  dVepW7TWV;  It has 
already  been  said  that  Levi,  in  showing  that  Aristotle's  view  is 
inaccurate, suggests that this is an example of an absolute definition 
attributable  to  G.  Bluck  1961  (note  ad lac.)  is  more  cautious  in 
explaining  that,  "here  again,  Gorgias  himself  may  have  said 
something of this sort, though it is an ideal that was not confined to 
a few",  and he goes on to  compare it to  similar views expressed in 
Gorgias and in the Republic. We may now see why neither the first 
nor the second definition can safely be ascribed to G. 
As  Bluck  observes,  the  distinction  between  age  and  sex  as  a 
determinant  factor of what  'virtue'  is  for  groups  of people  is  not 
necessarily an invention of any of the Sophists; on the contrary, it 
involves  characteristics which are  recognizable  in  what should be 
considered as  mainstream morality.  In short,  it is  hard to  see why 
efficiency in civic life and compliance with its rules for males and 
396 devotion to  males by women should be  attributed  specifically to 
G.'s definition of virtue.  In the same connection, the teaching of 
efficiency in public affairs  is  not peculiar to  G.;  in a  number of 
passages it appears as a common Sophistic ideal (see Kerferd 1981, 
p.38).  Plato  does  not thus  seem  to  be  concerned  with  the  actual 
content  of "Gorgias'" definition,  but with its  'relativistic'  nature. 
The particularly Gorgian style of the last phrases of the definition 
should not make us feel unconfident; Plato is always ready to dress 
what is presented as Sophistic in the appropriate gown. 
One is even more alert when one examines the second "Gorgian" 
definition  of virtue;  once  again,  the  ability  to  aPXELv  is  a  basic 
Sophistic ideal (see Bluck note ad loco  with references to Gorgias), 
and it is unnecessary to accept that G. was either the first or the only 
person to  have held such a view. In the same way that by the first 
definition Plato intends to  stress its relativism,  so  the second one 
paves the way for Sokrates to bring in the theme of  oLKaLOaVv7] and 
then to  ask him if this is  a virtue or the virtue, so as  to  catch him 
again in the web of  a multitude of  other virtues. 
It is  unsafe  then  to  suggest  that  in  Meno  Plato  quotes  G.'  s 
definitions of virtue.  These should preferably be considered in the 
context of the dialogue; their function within Meno and the way in 
which they contribute to the progress of the discussion there cannot 
be discussed in the context of this thesis. The general conclusion is, 
once  more,  that  our  approach  to  the  Sophists  through  Plato's 
writings should be extremely careful. 
Kal.  1Tpa.TrOV'iO.: if we read 'in so  doing' we are close to  G.'s views 
about friends  (see  fro  21), because this would suggest that helping 
friends  and harming enemies is more important than being a good 
citizen. Still, this is not enough to say that the definition is Gorgian, 
since helping friends and harming enemies is too common in Greek 
ethics to be purely Gorgian. 
€UAa~€LaeaL: cpo Pal. 34, with note ad loco 
397 Ka.e'  eccJ.<M""I1V •••  EO'"T'I.V:  Meno  provides  the  parameters  which 
determine  apEn];  the  polyptoton  with  the  repetition  of the  word 
EKU070S is Gorgian. What is presented as  Gorgian in content is also 
expressed in the appropriate style. 
Wo-a.UTWS  SE ...  KCLKI.a.:  KUK£U  is presumably offered as the antonym of 
apEn];  the construction is  reminiscent of the  opening lines of HeI. 
As in that text G.  first defines what is  Koap.os  and then explains that 
the  opposite is  aKoap.£u,  in the same way here Meno  first  defines 
what is  virtue and he then explains that the  (absence of the)  same 
characteristics (waa.vTWS)  are KUK£U. 
20 
For similar views see Antiphon B53, 54 and Anon. Iambl. 7,  1-3; a 
detailed interpretation is developed by Musti 1984, pp.129-153. 
21 
G.'s view of  CPLA£a.  depicted in this passage from Ploutarkhos is  in 
accordance with Pal.  18;  in that context it is  both helping friends 
and harming enemies that motivate a wrong-doing. Further evidence 
is offered by a passage from Xenophon's Cyrop.1.6.31  (OWJPL{E  oe 
/  n  \  ,  \  .J../\  /,  (\  ,  ' .. A'  ,  TOVTWV  U  TE  7TpOS  TOVS  'f'LI\OVS  7TOL7lTEOV  KUL  U  7TpOS  E)(vpOVS .•• KUL 
TOUS  CPLAOVS  O£KULOV  Er7]  Egu7TuTav  E7T£  yE  ayue4J  KuL  KA€7TTELV  Ta. 
nlJlI  CP£AWII  E7TL  yE  ayue4J), if  one accepts that the oLSciaKuAos referred 
to  there is  G.  (see Nestle 1939, pp.36ff.; For acting justly/unjustly 
and  its  bearing on  CPLA£U,  see  Blundell  1989,  p.50-1;  cpo  also  the 
interesting example of an excuse for transgressing an oath in Dissoi 
Logoi 3.6-7). Public offices and failing to  favour friends is a matter 
posed by Thrasyrnakhos in Pl.Rep. 343e). 
22 
We  do  not  know the  context  in which  G.  claimed that  a woman 
should rather be known for her good reputation than for her beauty. 
Scholars have accepted that there must be a certain relevance of  this 
398 view with the one put by Thucydides in Perikles' mouth: rij~  TE  yap 
inTaPXouO'7]S  <pUUEW';  {J.TJ  XEr.pOU~  YEvEa8U~  u{J.Lv  {J.eycL)VT]  i]  oo~u.  KUI. 
~~ E7T'  EA.cLX~UTOV  UPErij~  7TEP~  1}  rj;oyov  EV  TOLS  a.pUEU~  KA.EO~  ~  (2. 
45,  2).  Kerferd  (1981,  p.160)  claims  that  Pericles'  advice  "was 
inserted by way of reply to  G.  (DK82B22) who had said  ...  ". This 
assumption (Untersteiner 1961, p.142) is  weakened if we consider 
that Pericles is there referring to widows (see Lacey 1964, pp.47-49; 
Schaps  1977,  pp.323-330  is  also  interesting),  not  to  women  in 
general, as Ploutarkhos'  s wording shows. 
23 
This  fragment  (along with fr.24,  and He!.  9)  convincingly shows 
that G.  took a serious interest in poetry,  and tragedy in particular. 
Nevertheless, the exact meaning ofG.'s contention remains obscure, 
and none of the interpretations proposed so  far seems to  me to  be 
conclusive.  The main problems  that  bar our way  to  an  efficient 
appreciation ofG.'s contention are the following: a) we do not know 
how  much of what  Ploutarkhos  says  belongs  to  G.,  b)  we  are 
unaware of the context in which G.  expressed this view, and c) the 
dictum is elliptical to such an extent that it is hard to see the exact 
meaning  that  the  words  U7TUTIjUUS  /  U7Turrfje£s,  O~KULOTEPOS. 
ao<pWTEpoS take on. 
In my view, it is safe to ascribe to G.  only that portion of  the text 
which  is  purely  antithetical,  because  what  precedes  W~  Topyius 
<P7Jaiv  is certainly meant to introduce a new subject in Ploutarkhos' 
own  text.  The  sentence  starting  with  0  {J.€V  yap  u7TuT~aus 
O~KUL6TEpOS  ...  is,  I  believe,  Ploutarkhos'  attempt  to  explain  G.'s 
view,  and it may possible that he himself did not possess  a more 
extensive portion of the context in which G.'s contention appeared 
than the one he preserves (for further literature see Dosi  1968, pp. 
36ff.). 
Much has been said about the role of U7TcLT7J  in G.;  Verdenius 
(1981) elevated deception to a Gorgian doctrine, and concluded that 
399 "Gorgias' idea of  tragic deception was his own idea and that it was 
based  on  a  transference  from  rhetorical  to  poetical  speech"; 
Rosenmeyer (1955, p.232) contends that "a  pate bacame prominent 
in the vocabulary of G.  because he placed a positive accent upon 
what prior to  him had been regarded  as  a negative situation:  the 
frequent  discrepancy  between  words  and  things",  and  Kerferd 
(1981,  p.79)  maintains  that "deceit is  only possible in relation to 
what  is  actually  true".  Dosi  (1968,  p.83)  contends  that  "la 
definizione risulta infatti assolutamente conforme a tutto il sistema 
filosofico gorgiano".  All these views are discernibly influenced by 
theses held in ONE, and especially by the distinction that G.  draws 
between words and things. In fact, apate is not "prominent" in G.'s 
vocabulary, as it is commonly assumed: it appears in Hel.  8, 10, and 
Pal. 33. 
My line of inquiry is that G.' s contention about tragic deception 
should  be  addressed  autonomously,  without  drawing  general 
conclusions about the role of  deception in his thought. What G. says 
in this fragment is very close to his examination of  poetry in Hel.  9. 
Almost  anticipating  Platonic poetics,  he there  explicitly  contends 
that  E1T'  dX\orpLwv  TE  1TpaYfLaTWV  Kat.  O'wfLarwv  EV'TUXLaIS  Kat. 
OV(J1TapaYLaLS  LOLOV  TL  1Ta8TJfLa  Odt.  TWV  AOYWV  €1Ta8EV  i]  tjJvx!J  (one 
may  compare  the  Athenians'  response  to  Phrynikhos'  MLA7}TOV 
"AAWO'LS";  cpo  Hdt.  6.21:  Kat.  07J  Kat  1TOL7}O'aVTL  CPPVVLXCfJ  opafLa 
MLAfrrOV  aAWO'LV  Kat  OLO~aVTL €s  oa.Kpva  TE  €1TEO'E  TO  8E'T]7"pOV  Kat 
€~  TJfLLWO'av  fLLV  wS"  dvafLV7}O'aVTa  OlK7}La  KaKeJ.  XLAL 7JO'L  OpaXfLfjO'L).  In 
this  context G.  refers  to  poetry generally,  not to  tragedy,  but we 
have  reasons  to  believe  that  in  general,  he  tended  to  see  in  the 
products  of arts  the  potential  to  make  their  recipients  identify 
themselves with them. This hypothesis is further strengthened on the 
basis  of the  analogy  that  G.  draws  between  the  effects  of the 
products of sculpture and painting and the way in which love and 
desire are inflamed within the human soul. In Hel.  18, G.  makes it 
plain  that  humans  can  fall  in  love  with  soulless  products  of art 
400 (1Tpayp.a:rwv  Kat.  awp.chwv).  It is possible then that when G. contends 
that  the  deceived  is  wiser than  the  undeceived,  he refers  to  the 
wisdom  of those  spectators  who  go  to  the  theatre  ready  to  be 
deceived, those, in other words, who are ready to concede that what 
happens  on the stage  concerns  them personally.  The dissimilarity 
between this  fragment  and  the function of poetry and arts  as  it is 
presented in Hel.  is that in the latter the recipients of  art are doomed 
to experience emotions, whereas in the former being wise is a matter 
of  some of  the spectators' wisdom, as  aorpWrEpo~ shows. 
If this  is  the  case  with  the spectators,  what does  G.  mean by 
saying that the poet who deceives is  OLKa.LOTEPO~ than the poet who 
does  not?  Rosenmeyer  (1955,  p.227,  and  n.7,8)  interprets  it  by 
saying "he plays the literary game more correctly than the one who 
does  not",  and  Verdenius  (1981,  pp.1l7-18)  maintains  that  "in 
ordinary circumstances  a deceiver is  considered to  be unjust, but 
that deception is so essential to tragedy that the poet who puts it into 
practice is to  be called just".  Both these views are worth attention 
because they correctly assume that there is a distinction to be drawn 
between immoral apate,  and  morally neutral tragic  apate.  In this 
connection, Ploutarkhos'  explanation that the poet who deceives is 
more 'just' because Tov8'  tJ1Tocrxop.€VO~ 1TE1TO[7jKEV gains ground if  it 
is  seen in the light of the overtones of apate in G.'  s two preserved 
speeches; in Pal., a distinctly forensic speech, deception is presented 
as  an inappropriate tool of persuasion, because the judges need to 
hear  the  truth  concerning  the  acts  (see  33).  The  logical 
argumentation is  at work to  free the defendant from the groundless 
accusations.  In Hel.  though,  G.  is  certainly  more  open  to  apate 
because he intends his work to be a 1Ta[yvwv, and thus much closer 
to the purposes of  poetical work. G. not only proceeds to produce an 
apate  of the  kind  that  good  playwrights  do,  but  he  is  confident 
enough to  say that he does  so:  he brings  his  speech to  an  end  by 
saying that  €Vep.ELva  TqJ  vop.tp  0V  €8ep.7jv  €V  dpxfj  TOV  il.oyov;  this 
401 brings him very close to the 8'KU'Mepos tragic poet, whose role is to 
deceive people who know that they are being deceived. 
This fragment is  valuable because independently of the manner 
in which one decides to  interpret it,  it certainly brings out that G. 
saw tragedy  (and poetry in general,  as  He!.  9  makes  us  believe) 
disconnected from  its  moral implications.  In a good deal of texts, 
poets appear as the procurers of lies who deserve punishment (more 
distinctly in Heralclitus' fragments);  .Aristophanes,  a contemporary 
of G., appears in his Frogs very concerned with the morality of the 
messages  that  the  tragedy  conveys  (cp.  for  instance  Frogs  909, 
where  Euripides  imputes  to  Aiskhylos· that  ha  was  dl\u~wv  KUL 
<PEJlU~ oro,s Te  TaUS  8eunJS /  efrpr6.Tu). 
24 
It is  unknown who  was  the first to  describe Aiskhylos' Septem  as 
'full of  Ares'; Ploutarkhos clearly attributes it to G., and this may be 
related  to  his  source  (according  to  Pfeiffer  1968,  p.  281  "These 
polemics  against  G.  stressing  the  point  that  all  the  plays  of 
Aeschylus  are  'full  of Dionysus'  are  derived  from  a  Peripatetic 
source, probably Chamaeleo llepL  Alax6AOU"). Nothing can be said 
with certainty about the parentage of the saying; Frogs was staged 
in the year 405, and this makes it possible that it is  G.  who  quotes 
.Aristophanes.  However,  in  the  absence  of other  evidence  (for 
references  to  further  possible  relations  between  .Aristophanes' 
criticism  and  Sophistic  theses  see  Pfeiffer  1968,  p.  47  n.1)  we 
depend much on Ploutarkhos' information; at any rate, G. 's attested 
interest  in  poetry  makes  it  possible  that  he  expressed  this  view. 
Immisch (1927, p.29) was a strong supporter of the view that it was 
G.  who  took it from Aristophanes, whereas most scholars take the 
opposite  view  (pohlenz  1920,  p.452,  Untersteiner  1961,  p.l44, 
Pfeiffer, 1968, pp. 46 and 281, Buchheim 1989, note ad lac., Dover 
1993, note ad lac.). 
402 v ApEws:  'full of war', a common metonymy; cpo  EjLCPVTOV" ApEos- in 
the Epitaphios. 
25 
Hellanikos , Damastes, Pherekudes =  frs.  4F 5b, 5F llF, 3F 167 in 
the FGrHist. respectively. See also Untersteiner 1961, p.145. 
26 
We  do  not  know  in  what  context  G.  expressed  the  saying  that 
Proklos attributes to him, but its content is not unparalleled in G.'s 
preserved work. In He!.  4 we find the formula 0  jLev  SLa  TO  ET.vaL 
eSogev referring to Helen's divine father (Zeus), and in Pal.  S6ga  as 
opposed to what is true plays an important role (most prominently in 
24;  cpo  also TOLS- 7Tpc!rrOLS- OUO"L  TWv'E>..AT]VWV  Kat.  SOKOVO"L  33). This 
Protean motto  seems  to  introduce the relation between ElvaL  and 
cpaLv€(Jf)aL,  which  undoubtedly  prevailed in the  Sophistic  circles; 
Protagoras  IS  the  intellectual  whose  contribution  to  this 
philosophical  issue  was  particularly  felt,  as  Plato's  Theaetetus 
l66dff shows.  In that  context,  also  known  as  the  'defence  of 
Protagoras',  the  Sophist  explicitly  says  that  jLETPOV  yap  EKaO"'TOV 
-ryjLWV  ElllaL  TWV  TE  OVTWV  Kat.  jLT],  jLVPLOV  JLEVTOL  ()LacpEpELV  €TEPOV 
ETEPOV  aVT4J  TOVTqJ,  on  T4J  jLev  aAAa  €O"'TL  TE  Kat.  cpaLVe'TUL,  T4J  Se 
MAa. 
It seems that G.' s saying puts forward a complementary relation 
between elvaL  and SOKELV  (so I think that Mazzara 1999, pp.16-19, 
is  right  in  observing  an  objective  and  a  subjective  level  in  this 
fragment)  as  elvaL  is obscure or invisible if it cannot be conceived, 
and SOKELII  is  weak, if it does not correspond to reality (notice that 
G.  uses the  second leg of this  antithetical construction in He!.  13, 
when  he  says  that  the  astronomers  SOgav  dVT~  S6frys- rryv  jLev 
dCPEA6jLEVOL  rryv  S'  EVEpyaO"cljLEvoL  Ta  a7TLO"'Ta  Kat.  aS7]A.a  cpaLIIEa8aL 
TOLS- ri]s- sog7]S- OjLjLaO"Lv  E7ToL7]O"av).  It is difficult, if not impossible, 
to fathom whether G. himself accepted dependence of  either of  these 
403 qualities on the other, because the only other context which includes 
similar observations,  MXG 980a9-13,  bringing in the  example of 
chariots  racing  on the  surface of the  sea.  does  not make it clear 
whether or not  G.  commits  himself to  the view that whatever is 
thought is true. If  what he means there is that not all thoughts are 
true, then Proklos does justice to  him by ascribing to  him the view 
that OOKELV  is weak if  it does not correspond to reality. But if  on the 
other hand, what he means is that, due to subjectivism, such a thing 
as a falsestatement does not exist, then Proklos misrepresents G. 
27 
G.  uses a Homeric antithesis (II.  4.450:  EVea  0' af.L'  olf.Lwyr]  TE  Kat. 
EVXWlb}  7T€AEV  dvopwv)  as  a basis to  create a stylistically pompous 
expression, by adding to  it another one AI.Tai:s  /  d7TEI./l.af..  He thus 
forms  a chiasm,  and the antithesis becomes symmetrical, with the 
use of two  words denoting almost the same thing:  AI.TaLS,  Evxak 
AI.Tai  also appears in Pal.  31  (see comments ad loc.).  It is perhaps 
worth  noting  that  G.' s  modification  of the  Homeric  antithesis 
achieves  more  intense  pathos  by  the  passage  from  d7TEL/l.a£  to 
olf.Lwyaf.,  as  the former implies  the still existing power to  threaten, 
whereas the latter expresses the results of  a defeat. 
ADDENDUM 
Kerferd (1981, p.45) rightly claims that "there is no reason to  doubt 
the attribution to him [sc.Gorgias] of  the Onomastikon mentioned by 
Pollux".  What  the  content  of this  book was  we  cannot  tell  with 
certainty,  but we  know  that Demokritos  worte  a book under this 
title. Pollux says that, unlike other similar books, G.'  s onomastikon 
404 was  arranged in a  fashion  that made its  reading pleasant,  and he 
cocnludes his  short description of it with a homoeoteleuton which 
makes us wonder whether he borrowed it from G. or not. Perhaps all 
he  wanted  to  do  was  to  to  colour  his  account  with  a  touch  of 
Gorgian expression. 
What  is  perhaps  more  important  is  that  Pollux's  information 
makes our knowledge about G.' s interest in language more palpable. 
It is  possible that in his  Onomastikon  G.  collected and  explained 
words  and phrases  which  could  be  used by his  students,  or that 
among these 'lemmata' one could find words which were coined by 
G. himself 
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